Anthony_B_78
Active Member
That's a big assumption. There is a significant cost difference between acquiring a new capability and keeping one in service. I guess we shall see though when an army restructure is eventually revealed. I'm not so pessimistic we'll see the end of the M777.
Takao
The Bunker Group
Oh it's semi-tounge in cheek. But it's an interesting example where I'm not sure the approvers understood was what being written.
But the reality is, the M777 is obsolete. It should be placed very neatly at the 12 nm line to defend Australia to the best of its capability. Yes it's cheaper to sustain an in-service capability rather than replace it; but if we do that then why buy F-35 and not keep F/A-18C? Or Keep PC-9? Or keep Fremantle-class patrol boats? At least the AS9/AS10 will be built in Australia and so most of the money will stay here - unlike M777 sustainment.
The Army has tried this too often (see Kiowa and M113AS4). It leads to a force that isn't survivable and can't make the leap to the current tech easily. And the people who pay the price aren't on this forum or in Canberra. In no way is a M777 better than a SPH.
Anthony_B_78
Active Member
I would expect it is horses for courses. Towed artillery still has its place. Or the US Army - among others - wouldn't have acquired the M777 in the first place when they had a fairly good SPH.
I agree their argument for axing the second tranche was hollow. Should have just said, "and we'll axe this to save money".
Not likely to sling an SPG under a Chinook, and a C130 can land a himars 100km or so from its target....if we have total air superiority, and it's flying over 100% safe airspace, if not, a C130 going down with a HIMARs is a huge loss to an SA7.
buffy9
Well-Known Member
HIMARS and C-130 is good and is readily achievable in the short-term, but it still doesn't provide the same kind of job a howitzer can do. It can do a lot, but cannons operate very differently.
Chinook and M777 can be done but I'm doubtful of how effective it actually is. The guns are more vulnerable to counter-battery fire because they now lack the tow vehicle and cannot scoot, while the guns become dependent on the Chinooks for resupply of ammo unless they've been set up a road where a 40M or HX77 can get to with ammunition. While you can't airlift an SPH, its a single system that carries its own crew and ammo, with tracks for cross-country (with an assosciated increase in possible fire positions), which isn't necessarily the case with a Chinook and M777 which may require a wider LZ in order to deploy the gun.
I'm sure it has its uses, an extra four Chinooks were acquired to make it work, but I have my doubts on how effective it is in the fight.
All true.
My point is that while the HIMARs iand SPGs are a great investment, they should not replace ALL towed arty. Having flexibility is something a small army needs. I understand that it means having SAM, towed, SPG, HIMARs and more in Arty regts, but perhaps the M777s can go to ARes.
My point is that while the HIMARs iand SPGs are a great investment, they should not replace ALL towed arty. Having flexibility is something a small army needs. I understand that it means having SAM, towed, SPG, HIMARs and more in Arty regts, but perhaps the M777s can go to ARes.
The Commonwealth forces in Malaya outnumbered the Japanese forces. The Japanese had superior aircraft & a lot more of them, more experienced troops, & more tanks.
buffy9
Well-Known Member
I suspect reserves would need a very small full-time cadre for things lile daily maintenance, but if seeking to maintain the airmobile role there would need to be integration with 5AVN in Townsville - definitely an 11th Brigade thing. Not unachievable, but the regular army still needs guns. Integration with units and habituation to certain skills, such as danger close, would be more challenging to maintain. I know HIMARS was floated for reserves sometime ago, but this seems to have disappeared for some reason.
I love chocs, are used to be one and their cost to maintain is low as far as I'm aware - but there is a sacrifice in habituation and integration.
I think reserves are interesting coming out of the review. It is recommended that a review look into how to use them appropriately, though area defence for northern bases and a skeleton for surge/reinforcement are noted.
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I was making the point that comparisons are being drawn based on numbers and types of equipment. I am pretty sure the Japanese would have found the seasoned 7th division much more challenging.
This is true but the best of the allied forces and commanders were occupied else were. The forces employed in Malaya were mostly green undertrained and equipped with second line equipment, with no tanks. The senior leadership in Malaya in this case was in my opinion about the worst in the British army and even refused to build defences along the Jahar straight incase it panicked the population. They then surrendered when they still outnumbered the Japanese and the Japanese were very close to having run out of ammunition and having to withdraw. This whole shambles is in my opinion far worse than the current Russian effort.
I find it hard to blame Percival for the surrender. He didn't know how close to running out of ammo the Japanese were, but he did know how close to running out of water Singapore was.
I do blame him for the fiasco which led to it though. He knew of the weaknesses of Malaya's defences when he was appointed commander there. He'd produced a good analysis of them & proposals for remedying them before the war, when he was chief of staff to the Malaya CO at the time, General Dobbie, who superbly led the defence of Malta in 1940-42. Dobbie agreed with Percival's conclusions & sent them to the War Office, with his endorsement. The Japanese invasion in December 1941 proved that Percival's analysis was correct.
Percival was short of everything except men, & most of those were under-trained, & he faced local opposition to some of what he'd proposed, but even so, he did very poorly, faced with an attack conducted very much as he'd predicted, & with eight months to prepare for it. He refused pleas from other officers to improve Singapore's landward defences, saying it would be bad for morale.
He'd been a brave & effective junior to mid ranking officer in & immediately after WW1, & an efficient & competent chief of staff, but he seems to have been out of his depth as CinC of a theatre of war.
I do blame him for the fiasco which led to it though. He knew of the weaknesses of Malaya's defences when he was appointed commander there. He'd produced a good analysis of them & proposals for remedying them before the war, when he was chief of staff to the Malaya CO at the time, General Dobbie, who superbly led the defence of Malta in 1940-42. Dobbie agreed with Percival's conclusions & sent them to the War Office, with his endorsement. The Japanese invasion in December 1941 proved that Percival's analysis was correct.
Percival was short of everything except men, & most of those were under-trained, & he faced local opposition to some of what he'd proposed, but even so, he did very poorly, faced with an attack conducted very much as he'd predicted, & with eight months to prepare for it. He refused pleas from other officers to improve Singapore's landward defences, saying it would be bad for morale.
He'd been a brave & effective junior to mid ranking officer in & immediately after WW1, & an efficient & competent chief of staff, but he seems to have been out of his depth as CinC of a theatre of war.
Absolutely agree Wombat, Mr Mozart is obviously unaware of the actual events during the Australian campaigns of the Pacific War and later during 1ATFs operations in South Vietnam. Having done a major study into exactly this issue for my professional development, armour was absolutely the prime force multiplier for Australian operations in tropical terrain. Matildas in the island campaigns and Centurions in SVN were keystone tactical tools. Infantry and aviation casualties in TICs where much higher when direct armour support was not available in Vietnam with the statistical support for that reality overwhelming. Also sadly the mythical 'untouched jungles of asia' are now mostly just a memory. Even the Solomon Islands is getting cleared by the day, and Indonesia is already a semi urban or at least developed rural geography, leaving only the PNG mountainous regions and West Papua conforming to the 'deep jungle' stereotype. Meaning the many if not all future ADF 'littoral' operations would be over open agricultural if not built up urban and semi urban environments. BTW, most ATGMs cannot operate effectively in even medium forest making MBTs devastating in the assault in thick primary jungle or the like. Don't believe, read any account of 1ATF close combat operations post the withdrawal of the 1st Armoured Regiment Centurion MBt contingent.
Takao
The Bunker Group
And, in addition to all of that, any comparisons with European operations is incorrect because they fundamentally misunderstand the doctrinal differences.
For us, the tank has always been about infantry support. We played with an Armoured Division in WW2, but didn't continue it because for us, infantry is the decisive part of the land component and hence all our support is devoted to that. We aren't seeking grand, Battle of 73 Eastings style battles where tanks verse tanks (although we can do those). We, rather, expect that armour will always be integrated into combined arms teams, supporting the infantry as the BG or Bde achieves its mission.
Although the winner for LAND 400 Phase 3 has as yet not being announced, do we know if Army prefer / want six or eight dismounts per vehicle going forward?
Further to that are we looking at four or six vehicle's for a Platoon sized lift.
Curious S
Anthony_B_78
Active Member
We broke it up because our strategic circumstances changed. One can draw a parallel with what is happening now. The Beersheba brigade structure and much of the recent planning was arguably about what was happening in Iraq and in Afghanistan. It was about being able to deploy credible forces and sustain them on similar operations. We started to move away from that and now that will be taken further.
The 1st Armoured Division was raised with the intention that it be deployed to North Africa. When Japan entered the war it was retained in Australia, and not broken up until 1943, with several constituent units seeing action, usually fighting in squadron-size forces supporting infantry, as you said.
We were no different in this regard to the Americans, who deployed tanks to the Pacific Theatre but not armored divisions. That distinction is what some of us have been trying to get across as being pertinent to the discussion about operations in our region.
If war had not occurred with Japan, one can see that the 1st Armoured Division would have deployed to North Africa, joining the 6th, 7th and 9th divisions, and we may well have seen the Australian corps fighting in Italy and/or perhaps even in France.
It didn't help that one of his subordinates was an extremely self important, arrogant, individual, who believed himself to be the greatest and most talented general Australia had.
Having more support from subordinates would have helped a lot.
That is true, but I remember reading some years ago that both Churchill and Wavell told him not to surrender at that time. whether they had info that they were not passing on or did not understand the situation fully when telling him not to surrender I don't know.
SwingShift
Member
Or for a much older example some of the popular theories on the demise of the Roman Empires Ninth Legion back around 120 AD, where overmatch of the Picts in almost every facet of victory was assumed; Strength, fitness, experience, formation, leadership, battle hardened, wealth, weapons, and supply chains.