The writer Andy Cichon seems qualified to present a qualified opinion
Andy Cichon | U.S. Naval Institute (usni.org)
Andy Cichon | U.S. Naval Institute (usni.org)
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0
- Thread starter OPSSG
- Start date
So the Los Angeles class and Collins class are from the same era and both at this stage maybe going through a LOTE.
So if it’s good enough to operate ageing Collins to stop a capability gap then why not operate a nuclear submarine instead.
They cost the same and I prefer to have Australian nuclear submarines Portarlington deterring China right now then Collins.
The RAN could easily buy or build a submarine tender like the US deploys at Gaum to service the Subs.
Construction at bases to prepare for nuclear submarines should start now and don’t see why the infrastructure can’t be built in 5years.
It gets our navy ready for nuclear subs training and maintaining them it’s a win win!!
So if it’s good enough to operate ageing Collins to stop a capability gap then why not operate a nuclear submarine instead.
They cost the same and I prefer to have Australian nuclear submarines Portarlington deterring China right now then Collins.
The RAN could easily buy or build a submarine tender like the US deploys at Gaum to service the Subs.
Construction at bases to prepare for nuclear submarines should start now and don’t see why the infrastructure can’t be built in 5years.
It gets our navy ready for nuclear subs training and maintaining them it’s a win win!!
6x Collins boats 58 personnel = 348
4x upgraded Los Angeles boats 129 personnel = 516
If the ADF can’t recruit the extra man power needed in 5/10 years of 168 personnel then the crewing should come from the US which I presume would offer help while we are getting trained up on them.
4x upgraded Los Angeles boats 129 personnel = 516
If the ADF can’t recruit the extra man power needed in 5/10 years of 168 personnel then the crewing should come from the US which I presume would offer help while we are getting trained up on them.
Aardvark144
Active Member
Why have we forgot 50/50 crewing with the USN? There have been plenty of articles and much conjecture over jointly crewed SSNs until Australia.
Those 4 options, Insanity imo, just so that the RAN can get more hulls in the water 2-3 years earlier.
I don’t see why Arafura 7-12 can’t be delayed and civmec simultaneously build 2-3 hobarts while Spain builds 2-3 By 2032. (The safest option)
The tier 1 option (the one with most risk and cost) would be if civmec started building the type 26 ddg with 100+ cells whilst bae in Osborne continue building the asw variant
the inbetween option would be the lighter armed, long range, less $$, possibly future proof arrowhead140.
.
Proposed
3,000-5,000nmi above various corvette/light frigates, 16-24 cell VLS, complement 60-90.
6,500-7,000nmi Type 26 (electric drive). potentially 100-150 cell VLS, complement 160-200.
9,000nmi Type 31, 24 cell VLS, complement 80-120.
Current/Planned
5,000-5,500nmi Hobart. 48 cell VLS, complement around 180-200.
6,000-6,500nmi Anzac, 8 cell VLS, complement 160-180.
7,000nmi Hunter (electric drive), 32 cell VLS, complement 160-200.
The Los Angeles class may be an option for training of Australian crews and to meet political claims of nuclear submarines ,the U.S does not claim to have the maintenance of these vessels in a timely and budgetary fashion
The Capacity of the Navy’s Shipyards to Maintain Its Submarines | Congressional Budget Office (cbo.gov)
The Capacity of the Navy’s Shipyards to Maintain Its Submarines | Congressional Budget Office (cbo.gov)
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
We could see results off the DSR as early as this week, we are less than a month away from the SSN announcement, how about we be patient for a couple of more weeks before we start planning the commissioning ceremony for HMAS Cheyyene.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
He might, however one has to question why his opinion appeared where it did, instead of somewhere else that did not also publish opinions with assertions that are at best, questionable.
Also if one reads through the article, his opinion piece manages to gloss over major potential issues as well as making a few assumptions that are IMO very questionable.
As a side note, his USNI bio specifically mentions him as a "surface warfare officer" and air warfare project manager at the RAN's Maritime Warfare Centre. As in, not a current or ex-submariner.
AND
And apparently we have returned to the land of make believe.
Firstly, the Los Angeles-class (688) SSN first started construction in 1972 with the lead Collins-class SSG starting construction in 1990. It is only towards the end of the Los Angeles-class build that it begins to overlap with the Collins-class build. Secondly, aside from the USN having a somewhat different crewing and damage control philosophy, any of the current USN SSN's have higher crewing requirements per sub than the current RAN subs and by a significant margin. Even accounting for the likely number of USN crew dedicated to damage control, a USN Los Angeles-class SSN would likely have double the crew requirement in RAN service vs. the RAN's current SSG's.
The third, fourth and fifth issues are IMO the important ones, and those which most people seem to keep ignoring. The third issue being that, by virtue of being an SSN, additional skills are required by the crew. Not only would crew be required to operate/manage the reactor, but the entire crew would need to be trained to respond to potential issues aboard an SSN. The fourth issue is related to the third, in that not only are additional skills required, but experience with said skills as well. Even if the RAN had an officer or senior rating NCO who successfully went through a USN training programme qualifying them to operate/manage a SSN reactor, how likely or even realistic would it be to expect a newly trained but inexperienced in the role crew to carry out such crucial tasks, particularly in the event of wartime scenarios or crises? I would expect any RAN SSN programme to have a part dedicated to getting an initial intake of personnel for SSN service trained and qualified for their duties, as well as establishing an ongoing training pipeline for future personnel. However, it would likely take a number of years for the initial intake to first get the needed training, and then build upon that training with experience. Expecting the US to provide the numbers of personnel required to manage all that an SSN would require whilst the RAN gets its own pool of SSN crew up to scratch is borderline ridiculous IMO. I do not know how the RN operates their SSN's, or how the RAN plans to operate it's SSN's once are in service, but aboard USN SSN's every crewmember has specific roles in nuclear emergencies. If the RAN were to operate in a similar fashion, then even currently qualified RAN sub personnel would need to undergo training specifically related to operating aboard a vessel with a nuclear reactor. The effect of such a requirement would be that the USN would need to provide the entire crew for any purchased or leased ex-USN SSN's until the RAN had enough trained and qualified personnel to start providing some of the crew and again that training process would likely take several years for many of the major posts. I do suppose that the RAN might decide to not have all sub crew serving aboard an SSN trained for potential nuclear emergencies, but the potential consequences in the event of some sort of catastrophic incident or failure could be grave.
The fifth issue is that in addition to all that would be required for RAN personnel who would serve aboard an SSN, the personnel and facilities in Australia that would be tasked with supporting and maintaining the SSN's would likewise require specific training, experience, and capabilities to deal with potential issues specific to subs powered by nuclear reactors. The needed facilities could likely be either built or adapted in a few years, but again it would require time for the skillsets to be acquired.
Now, with the newest Los Angeles-class SSN being ~27 years at present, do people really see much value in the RAN leasing and operating SSN's that old when it could easily be five or ten years before the RAN starts having the personnel, facilities and support infrastructure in place to operate them? Also, if the USN currently is having issues maintaining their SSN's in a timely manner, then it would be unlikely that the US would be in a position to maintain SSN's for the RAN until Australia had the infrastructure and personnel to do so itself.
Important comment from Alexsa
"CEAFAR and SAAB 9LV are very capable and can add something to task group in that ships fitted with these systems can add something to the defence of a convoy or group (rather than only just being able to defend themselves)"
If or what is selected must be an asset not a liability.
Agree the above will be important
Cheers S
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Given a last chance to change
Wow you are something…
I’ve stated fact that the last of the Los Angeles class boats 1994-1996 due to be refueled and upgraded are comparable to age and tech as the Collins.. Fact!
ive stated the crew size for 6 Collinscompared to 4 Los Angeles class boats and the margin needed to meet the crewing size.. Fact.
move mentioned US crewing and training our sailors onboard nuclear subs that has been reported at length… fact.
5 years to gain the training and facilities to support a small number of nuclear submarine should be possible.. the other option is to have UK and US boats relocate in which we will need to upgrade facilites anyways..
so not sure why you think I’m making shit up…
@Tbone
Please moderate your tone. You are allowed to disagree but you need address the issues raised if you wish to justify your views. Noting the comments made, please advise what evidence you have that gaining the skills to operate an SSN across a new complement that has not operated SSN before should be possbile inside 5 years. Do you have any knowledge of the training systems within Australia or the US to make the assumption.
@Todjaeger gave you some background on the issue of inducting a new capability. By all means respond to it with facts not just your option. If you think your opinion is informed and has merit in itself then you need to justify this by providing some information on your knowledge of qualifications to have your opinion respected.
alexsa
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Oh an one more thing.. if it’s possible to have a fleet of older nuclear submarines by 2028 to stay on station for months in the choke points to our north undetected and having a small fleet of these by the end of this decade you bet the Australian public would be all for this.
considering we are supposedly going to war by 2027 then I really don’t see why you think having an older submarine for a short time while we wait till 2040 and beyond to acquire new nuclear submarines isn’t an optimal pathway of deterrence and gives Australia a strike weapon we need during war time.
considering we are supposedly going to war by 2027 then I really don’t see why you think having an older submarine for a short time while we wait till 2040 and beyond to acquire new nuclear submarines isn’t an optimal pathway of deterrence and gives Australia a strike weapon we need during war time.
There are certainly difficulties to overcome in the training and lack of experienced crews in operations of nuclear submarines and certainly may require years to address ,the use of a vessel like the Los Angeles class for training may help develop such skills I understand R.A.N personnel are to train with R.N on their Astute class and likewise on U.S.N submarines , my posts on the Los Angeles class submarines were to address such shortfalls of submarines at present available to develop skills on
Australian submariners to train onboard British nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS deal - ABC News
Australia Should Work Closely With U.S. to Master Nuclear Submarine Building, Congressmen Say - USNI News
Australian submariners to train onboard British nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS deal - ABC News
Australia Should Work Closely With U.S. to Master Nuclear Submarine Building, Congressmen Say - USNI News
Lets wait for the decision on what we are getting. Training on that platform (and the reactor it will be fitted with) will be the critical issue. Training on a platform that is not representative of the SSN that may be acquired may waste resources. Don't forget, being engaged in the building of these boats is beneficial training as well.
Scott Elaurant
Well-Known Member
Exactly. The RAN should not take on old SSNs like the Los Angeles until its SSN maintenance’s establishment is fully up to strength. That means infrastructure, recruiting and training. That will take years. Maintaining an SSN with working nuclear reactor is not a training mission.
You would need double that to fill positions ashore and on the boats at sea and give crew rest and respite from being underweay
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
I never said that you were making things up. I have stated that people are ignoring a number of realities.
Some of the systems onboard upgraded i688 Los Angeles-class SSN's are likely comparable to some of the systems fitted aboard Collins-class SSG's, but some of the systems as well as overall vessel architecture would have been set at the time the class was designed and would not be significantly changed during a reactor refueling. There is also the matter of different sonar systems themselves being fitted to USN and RAN subs, not deal-breaker but yet another thing for Australia to have to adapt to. That or figure out a way to fit sonars and sensors the RAN is familiar with to ex-USN SSN's...
As for the size of the RAN pool of submariners per sub, so what? How many RAN submariners are qualified to serve aboard an SSN in any capacity? Again it would depend on just how the RAN decides to do things, but given the potential risk to a sub and crew, I would expect that all RAN submariners would need to undergo training before being qualified to serve aboard an SSN. In short, none of the current crews of RAN subs could be serve in an SSN at present. Across the entirety of the RAN sub fleet, there might be a handful of personnel who have received the appropriate training and experience to operate in an SSN environment at present, but I seriously doubt that there would be enough personnel to fill the crew of even a single Los Angeles-class SSN. Conflating the size of the RAN's sub personnel (which is likely larger than listed due to training, staff and ashore postings) with the number of RAN personnel who are already qualified to serve aboard SSN's is a major problem. Current RAN sub personnel are good candidates for additional training to transition them so they are qualified to serve aboard SSN's in essentially the same roles as aboard a SSG. However, without training to learn new skills needed for serving aboard an SSN and then opportunities to hone those skills with experience, one cannot realistically expect a conventional submariner to transfer to a nuclear boat and know what to do in the event of a nuclear accident, incident, or damage. Further, IMO there would be little value in having RAN personnel trained to operate and maintain the S6G reactors fitted aboard Los Angeles-class SSN's as these are older, 6th generation reactors whilst the S9G fitted aboard the Virginia-class SSN's is a 9th gen reactor design. I believe the newer reactor generation has some additional capabilities like natural circulation, but with changes to how portions of the reactor functions, that would also change how the reactor has to be managed as well as what likely and potential problems might be.
For those interested, the USN nuclear schools for enlisted Machinist's Mate, Electronics Technician, and Electrician's Mate are all about a year long, followed by about six months further hands on training at facilities ashore. As I understand it, new USN enlisted recruits would complete their basic training, one of the above training posts, and USN sub school, all before getting assigned to the crew of a sub which would include and be led by experienced USN officers and enlisted NCO's. Further to this, the USN's mandatory minimum enlistment period for those who go through the nuclear schools is six years, with other USN enlistment positions having minimum enlistments of only four or five years. This USN document also outlines the career path of a Machinist's Mate (Nuclear). Areas of interest in that document are the far left column which shows the range of years in service for specific levels along the career path with the far right column showing the typical career development. An enlisted MMN with 3-6 years of service & experience would likely be qualified as a steam/reactor plant operator, but with would likely require 10-13 years of service & experience before one would be qualified to be an assistant or lead Petty Officer overseeing junior MMN's who are operating a reactor.
In the case of the RAN, which currently has no nuclear schools or pool of experienced nuke personnel, the RAN will likely be highly dependent on the USN and RN for both training personnel and having trained RAN personnel build experience. Such dependence will likely last until the RAN is able to establish both domestic nuclear training schools as well as a cadre of experience nuke operators that can operate whatever SSN the RAN ends up getting as well as oversee the training and experience of future RAN SSN personnel. It will likely take a number of years before the RAN is at this point. Early acquisition of SSN's for/by the RAN is not going to help matters, since the RAN will be unable to actually crew, operate and maintain them because of a lack of personnel with the needed skills and experience.
I suspect the best way forward at present is to arrange training and posting slots for RAN personnel aboard USN and RN nuke boats and in their nuclear schools, so that the RAN starts to build up a cadre of personnel with the appropriate skills and experience. Doing so might, at some point, permit a jointly-crewed USN/RAN or RN/RAN SSN, but I would still not expect such an effort to be viable for a number of years yet.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Agree, the best way forward is training in the US and UK. Eventually some these trainees will serve aboard USN/RN SSNs. None of them will likely serve on RAN SSNs, they will form the nucleus of nuclear technology Australian training efforts for the future fleet. Hopefully future RAN subs will have similar nuclear technology (S9G reactors or a derivative of). All the other sub stuff training is critical as well but the nuke stuff is the priority now.
No nothing easy in what you have described.
The Collins and LAs are nothing alike. The most glaring difference being Australia, built, is the parent service of and have operated the Collins for over 25years, including major upgrades. There is zero, zilch, nil experience in Australia operating, let alone, sustaining or upgrading LAs.
There is an overhead in maintenance and support that the US is currently struggling to meet, thinking Australia could just pick it up tomorrow is delusional.
There is a reason I regularly rant about training, education, qualifications, certifications, elitism, exceptionalism etc. It's because people assume this stuff is easy and we have plenty of resources to just do it, to just make it happen.
We don't. To fix it we need planning, investment and time. Not dumb arse ideas based on we will go to the used SSN yard and buy a few, then knock up a capability over a week end.
There has been some confusion over this discussion re the nuclear submarines one discussion was the availability because of the lack of production spots available in either America or the U.K with their nuclear submarine programs this led to present nuclear submarines coming or at end of service life being either refueled or refurbished as a possible beginning
It would certainly be correct that the training of the crews are highly specialised and can take years almost as long to build the submarine itself this article provides some idea of the demands of the training
Making the shift to nuclear-powered submarines: training and recruiting | The Strategist (aspistrategist.org.au)
The U.S.N has its own hierarchy system of training
Nukes, Nubs And Coners: The Unique Social Hierarchy Aboard A Nuclear Submarine (thedrive.com)
I think we are all waiting for what the decision will be on this ambitious program with fingers crossed
It would certainly be correct that the training of the crews are highly specialised and can take years almost as long to build the submarine itself this article provides some idea of the demands of the training
Making the shift to nuclear-powered submarines: training and recruiting | The Strategist (aspistrategist.org.au)
The U.S.N has its own hierarchy system of training
Nukes, Nubs And Coners: The Unique Social Hierarchy Aboard A Nuclear Submarine (thedrive.com)
I think we are all waiting for what the decision will be on this ambitious program with fingers crossed
The absolute best solution would be to accelerate production of the Hunter class and I actually think this is more likely than buying extra Hobarts. The reason I believe this is more likely is because unless the new Hobarts are built entirely overseas it will mean that Australian shipbuilders will be diverted away from their current projects. Put simply that means that the Hunter program will be delayed in order to build three less suitable ships slightly quicker.
I am also not convinced that any additional Hobarts would neccessarilly signal an increase in the size of the fleet. In the short term it would simply mean that the Anzacs would start to be replaced a few years earlier. In the longer term the actual fleet size will be determined by the rate at which ships will be built and the ability of the navy to man them.
I think the more realistic approach could be to aim for at least 2, maybe 3 Hunters in service by 2032 and perhaps look at increasing their missile loadouts. Perhaps add more VLS to our existing Hobarts as well.
I also think the Corvettes will simply be stretched versions of the Arafura. Eventually Australia may aquire something more akin to a light frigate but I think something like Lurssen's MMPV is a more likely short term solution. This might be what they had in mind for the new MCVs anyway. They could start building these ships instead of the final batch of Arafuras.
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