The writer Andy Cichon seems qualified to present a qualified opinion
Andy Cichon | U.S. Naval Institute (usni.org)
Andy Cichon | U.S. Naval Institute (usni.org)
Why have we forgot 50/50 crewing with the USN? There have been plenty of articles and much conjecture over jointly crewed SSNs until Australia.6x Collins boats 58 personnel = 348
4x upgraded Los Angeles boats 129 personnel = 516
If the ADF can’t recruit the extra man power needed in 5/10 years of 168 personnel then the crewing should come from the US which I presume would offer help while we are getting trained up on them.
The issue with any of the mentioned corvette or light frigate designs is simple:
Range, endurance and capacity (and in turn through-life adaptability).
Any second tier combatant arguably needs to be able to conduct long duration, independent presence over great distances without the need for accompanying support. That's just the reality of our region's vast geography.
In peace time that's all about naval presence, diplomacy and maritime security. In war time, that's about having the legs to escort and protect merchant shipping whilst our major large surface combatants are tied up.
- The MMPV has a range of only 3,000 nmi (at an unquoted speed, no endurance figure) - I really don't know why people keep bringing it up!
- The Braunschweig-class K130 has a range of only 4,000 nmi at 15 knots, and an independent endurance of only 7 days.
- The ALFA 3000 has a range of 5,000 nmi at 15 knots (endurance not given). That figure would be much lower at a standard 18 knots.
- The MEKO-100 has a range of 4,500 nmi at only 14 knots (No endurance figure).
Any second tier combatant should at least match the range of Anzac: 6,000 nmi at 18 knots, and have an endurance well in excess of 30 days.
Ships getting bigger is a general trend and extra capacity and through-life flexibility shouldn't be seen as a bad thing. Imagine if Anzac was a bit smaller as the extra space/weight capacity wasn't needed in her originally planned role as a patrol frigate?
He might, however one has to question why his opinion appeared where it did, instead of somewhere else that did not also publish opinions with assertions that are at best, questionable.The writer Andy Cichon seems qualified to present a qualified opinion
Andy Cichon | U.S. Naval Institute (usni.org)
ANDSo the Los Angeles class and Collins class are from the same era and both at this stage maybe going through a LOTE.
So if it’s good enough to operate ageing Collins to stop a capability gap then why not operate a nuclear submarine instead.
They cost the same and I prefer to have Australian nuclear submarines Portarlington deterring China right now then Collins.
The RAN could easily buy or build a submarine tender like the US deploys at Gaum to service the Subs.
Construction at bases to prepare for nuclear submarines should start now and don’t see why the infrastructure can’t be built in 5years.
It gets our navy ready for nuclear subs training and maintaining them it’s a win win!!
And apparently we have returned to the land of make believe.6x Collins boats 58 personnel = 348
4x upgraded Los Angeles boats 129 personnel = 516
If the ADF can’t recruit the extra man power needed in 5/10 years of 168 personnel then the crewing should come from the US which I presume would offer help while we are getting trained up on them.
Important comment from AlexsaI wonder about the focus on more Hobart class DDG's. These are at the end of their growth margin now. The RAN will have to work hard to fit the planned upgrades into them. This certainly is not a hull that can take 100+ VLS in its current form. Stretching the platfrom would be significant job and you may as well plug the Hunter (which will be building its first block this year) as has been suggested. Just getting on and building the Hunters as now designed at a faster rate make be a more effective way of getting extra cells at sea (noting they replace a vessel with 8 cells with 36 ... or 42 if that comes off).
I worry about a number of issues on all the ideas floating about:
1. Any corvette (80 to 100m) may divert funds from projects such as the Hunter without providing a usable asset that can be intergrated into current operations. This may also derail the continous build programme.
2. Any overseas offer (Navnatia) will produce a vessel that with struggle to take the capability (noting their offer is the F105 hull) and has no growth margin. It also means an additional logistics train as much of the equipment on the Hobard DDG is out of production (to be fair this will be the same for diferent batches of the Hunter, however, this logistic train is established prior to the next batch starting) This is likely to derail the continous build programme.
3. So called cheap and simple platforms will be fitted with weapons and combat systems not currently in Australian use to save costs. This detracts for the ability to support the vessel and complicates training. In the 80's DE folk often stayed on DE's same with the DDG's and the FFG's. This reflected the different machinery, systems and weapons on each class. This may also derail the continous build programme. We need this programme start and remain in place to avoid just the situation we are now in.
4. Splitting the build of Hunters with a build of 100+ cell DDG's may derail ecconomies of scale meaning the drumbeat of deliveries will be longer. Iterative growth of the Hunter over batches appears a better option (provide we start on a new build vessel after the 9 hulls are delivered).
So if defence are going to build a second tier combattant to bulk out the numbers it should not detract from the current projects and it should use current weapons and combat systems. This does not mean AEGIS and CEC but CEAFAR and SAAB 9LV are very capable and can add somethign to task group in that ships fitted with these systems can add something to the defence of a convoy or group (rather than only just being able to defend themselves)
The current reporting and leaking of this process makes the Australia DoD look pretty poor in how it manages capability. It really does look like 'shiny kit syndrome' ..... a 'mega cruiser' it is desired because it looks cool ....... how it fits into the operational needs of the RAN against percived threats does not appear to have been discussed. The whole thing is not helped by individuals, the press and think tanks with an agenda.
Wow you are something…He might, however one has to question why his opinion appeared where it did, instead of somewhere else that did not also publish opinions with assertions that are at best, questionable.
Also if one reads through the article, his opinion piece manages to gloss over major potential issues as well as making a few assumptions that are IMO very questionable.
As a side note, his USNI bio specifically mentions him as a "surface warfare officer" and air warfare project manager at the RAN's Maritime Warfare Centre. As in, not a current or ex-submariner.
AND
And apparently we have returned to the land of make believe.
Firstly, the Los Angeles-class (688) SSN first started construction in 1972 with the lead Collins-class SSG starting construction in 1990. It is only towards the end of the Los Angeles-class build that it begins to overlap with the Collins-class build. Secondly, aside from the USN having a somewhat different crewing and damage control philosophy, any of the current USN SSN's have higher crewing requirements per sub than the current RAN subs and by a significant margin. Even accounting for the likely number of USN crew dedicated to damage control, a USN Los Angeles-class SSN would likely have double the crew requirement in RAN service vs. the RAN's current SSG's.
The third, fourth and fifth issues are IMO the important ones, and those which most people seem to keep ignoring. The third issue being that, by virtue of being an SSN, additional skills are required by the crew. Not only would crew be required to operate/manage the reactor, but the entire crew would need to be trained to respond to potential issues aboard an SSN. The fourth issue is related to the third, in that not only are additional skills required, but experience with said skills as well. Even if the RAN had an officer or senior rating NCO who successfully went through a USN training programme qualifying them to operate/manage a SSN reactor, how likely or even realistic would it be to expect a newly trained but inexperienced in the role crew to carry out such crucial tasks, particularly in the event of wartime scenarios or crises? I would expect any RAN SSN programme to have a part dedicated to getting an initial intake of personnel for SSN service trained and qualified for their duties, as well as establishing an ongoing training pipeline for future personnel. However, it would likely take a number of years for the initial intake to first get the needed training, and then build upon that training with experience. Expecting the US to provide the numbers of personnel required to manage all that an SSN would require whilst the RAN gets its own pool of SSN crew up to scratch is borderline ridiculous IMO. I do not know how the RN operates their SSN's, or how the RAN plans to operate it's SSN's once are in service, but aboard USN SSN's every crewmember has specific roles in nuclear emergencies. If the RAN were to operate in a similar fashion, then even currently qualified RAN sub personnel would need to undergo training specifically related to operating aboard a vessel with a nuclear reactor. The effect of such a requirement would be that the USN would need to provide the entire crew for any purchased or leased ex-USN SSN's until the RAN had enough trained and qualified personnel to start providing some of the crew and again that training process would likely take several years for many of the major posts. I do suppose that the RAN might decide to not have all sub crew serving aboard an SSN trained for potential nuclear emergencies, but the potential consequences in the event of some sort of catastrophic incident or failure could be grave.
The fifth issue is that in addition to all that would be required for RAN personnel who would serve aboard an SSN, the personnel and facilities in Australia that would be tasked with supporting and maintaining the SSN's would likewise require specific training, experience, and capabilities to deal with potential issues specific to subs powered by nuclear reactors. The needed facilities could likely be either built or adapted in a few years, but again it would require time for the skillsets to be acquired.
Now, with the newest Los Angeles-class SSN being ~27 years at present, do people really see much value in the RAN leasing and operating SSN's that old when it could easily be five or ten years before the RAN starts having the personnel, facilities and support infrastructure in place to operate them? Also, if the USN currently is having issues maintaining their SSN's in a timely manner, then it would be unlikely that the US would be in a position to maintain SSN's for the RAN until Australia had the infrastructure and personnel to do so itself.
Lets wait for the decision on what we are getting. Training on that platform (and the reactor it will be fitted with) will be the critical issue. Training on a platform that is not representative of the SSN that may be acquired may waste resources. Don't forget, being engaged in the building of these boats is beneficial training as well.There are certainly difficulties to overcome in the training and lack of experienced crews in operations of nuclear submarines and certainly may require years to address ,the use of a vessel like the Los Angeles class for training may help develop such skills I understand R.A.N personnel are to train with R.N on their Astute class and likewise on U.S.N submarines , my posts on the Los Angeles class submarines were to address such shortfalls of submarines at present available to develop skills on
Australian submariners to train onboard British nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS deal - ABC News
Australia Should Work Closely With U.S. to Master Nuclear Submarine Building, Congressmen Say - USNI News
Exactly. The RAN should not take on old SSNs like the Los Angeles until its SSN maintenance’s establishment is fully up to strength. That means infrastructure, recruiting and training. That will take years. Maintaining an SSN with working nuclear reactor is not a training mission.The Los Angeles class may be an option for training of Australian crews and to meet political claims of nuclear submarines ,the U.S does not claim to have the maintenance of these vessels in a timely and budgetary fashion
The Capacity of the Navy’s Shipyards to Maintain Its Submarines | Congressional Budget Office (cbo.gov)
You would need double that to fill positions ashore and on the boats at sea and give crew rest and respite from being underweay6x Collins boats 58 personnel = 348
4x upgraded Los Angeles boats 129 personnel = 516
If the ADF can’t recruit the extra man power needed in 5/10 years of 168 personnel then the crewing should come from the US which I presume would offer help while we are getting trained up on them.
I never said that you were making things up. I have stated that people are ignoring a number of realities.Wow you are something…
I’ve stated fact that the last of the Los Angeles class boats 1994-1996 due to be refueled and upgraded are comparable to age and tech as the Collins.. Fact!
ive stated the crew size for 6 Collinscompared to 4 Los Angeles class boats and the margin needed to meet the crewing size.. Fact.
move mentioned US crewing and training our sailors onboard nuclear subs that has been reported at length… fact.
5 years to gain the training and facilities to support a small number of nuclear submarine should be possible.. the other option is to have UK and US boats relocate in which we will need to upgrade facilites anyways..
so not sure why you think I’m making shit up…
Agree, the best way forward is training in the US and UK. Eventually some these trainees will serve aboard USN/RN SSNs. None of them will likely serve on RAN SSNs, they will form the nucleus of nuclear technology Australian training efforts for the future fleet. Hopefully future RAN subs will have similar nuclear technology (S9G reactors or a derivative of). All the other sub stuff training is critical as well but the nuke stuff is the priority now.I never said that you were making things up. I have stated that people are ignoring a number of realities.
Some of the systems onboard upgraded i688 Los Angeles-class SSN's are likely comparable to some of the systems fitted aboard Collins-class SSG's, but some of the systems as well as overall vessel architecture would have been set at the time the class was designed and would not be significantly changed during a reactor refueling. There is also the matter of different sonar systems themselves being fitted to USN and RAN subs, not deal-breaker but yet another thing for Australia to have to adapt to. That or figure out a way to fit sonars and sensors the RAN is familiar with to ex-USN SSN's...
As for the size of the RAN pool of submariners per sub, so what? How many RAN submariners are qualified to serve aboard an SSN in any capacity? Again it would depend on just how the RAN decides to do things, but given the potential risk to a sub and crew, I would expect that all RAN submariners would need to undergo training before being qualified to serve aboard an SSN. In short, none of the current crews of RAN subs could be serve in an SSN at present. Across the entirety of the RAN sub fleet, there might be a handful of personnel who have received the appropriate training and experience to operate in an SSN environment at present, but I seriously doubt that there would be enough personnel to fill the crew of even a single Los Angeles-class SSN. Conflating the size of the RAN's sub personnel (which is likely larger than listed due to training, staff and ashore postings) with the number of RAN personnel who are already qualified to serve aboard SSN's is a major problem. Current RAN sub personnel are good candidates for additional training to transition them so they are qualified to serve aboard SSN's in essentially the same roles as aboard a SSG. However, without training to learn new skills needed for serving aboard an SSN and then opportunities to hone those skills with experience, one cannot realistically expect a conventional submariner to transfer to a nuclear boat and know what to do in the event of a nuclear accident, incident, or damage. Further, IMO there would be little value in having RAN personnel trained to operate and maintain the S6G reactors fitted aboard Los Angeles-class SSN's as these are older, 6th generation reactors whilst the S9G fitted aboard the Virginia-class SSN's is a 9th gen reactor design. I believe the newer reactor generation has some additional capabilities like natural circulation, but with changes to how portions of the reactor functions, that would also change how the reactor has to be managed as well as what likely and potential problems might be.
For those interested, the USN nuclear schools for enlisted Machinist's Mate, Electronics Technician, and Electrician's Mate are all about a year long, followed by about six months further hands on training at facilities ashore. As I understand it, new USN enlisted recruits would complete their basic training, one of the above training posts, and USN sub school, all before getting assigned to the crew of a sub which would include and be led by experienced USN officers and enlisted NCO's. Further to this, the USN's mandatory minimum enlistment period for those who go through the nuclear schools is six years, with other USN enlistment positions having minimum enlistments of only four or five years. This USN document also outlines the career path of a Machinist's Mate (Nuclear). Areas of interest in that document are the far left column which shows the range of years in service for specific levels along the career path with the far right column showing the typical career development. An enlisted MMN with 3-6 years of service & experience would likely be qualified as a steam/reactor plant operator, but with would likely require 10-13 years of service & experience before one would be qualified to be an assistant or lead Petty Officer overseeing junior MMN's who are operating a reactor.
In the case of the RAN, which currently has no nuclear schools or pool of experienced nuke personnel, the RAN will likely be highly dependent on the USN and RN for both training personnel and having trained RAN personnel build experience. Such dependence will likely last until the RAN is able to establish both domestic nuclear training schools as well as a cadre of experience nuke operators that can operate whatever SSN the RAN ends up getting as well as oversee the training and experience of future RAN SSN personnel. It will likely take a number of years before the RAN is at this point. Early acquisition of SSN's for/by the RAN is not going to help matters, since the RAN will be unable to actually crew, operate and maintain them because of a lack of personnel with the needed skills and experience.
I suspect the best way forward at present is to arrange training and posting slots for RAN personnel aboard USN and RN nuke boats and in their nuclear schools, so that the RAN starts to build up a cadre of personnel with the appropriate skills and experience. Doing so might, at some point, permit a jointly-crewed USN/RAN or RN/RAN SSN, but I would still not expect such an effort to be viable for a number of years yet.
No nothing easy in what you have described.So the Los Angeles class and Collins class are from the same era and both at this stage maybe going through a LOTE.
So if it’s good enough to operate ageing Collins to stop a capability gap then why not operate a nuclear submarine instead.
They cost the same and I prefer to have Australian nuclear submarines Portarlington deterring China right now then Collins.
The RAN could easily buy or build a submarine tender like the US deploys at Gaum to service the Subs.
Construction at bases to prepare for nuclear submarines should start now and don’t see why the infrastructure can’t be built in 5years.
It gets our navy ready for nuclear subs training and maintaining them it’s a win win!!
The absolute best solution would be to accelerate production of the Hunter class and I actually think this is more likely than buying extra Hobarts. The reason I believe this is more likely is because unless the new Hobarts are built entirely overseas it will mean that Australian shipbuilders will be diverted away from their current projects. Put simply that means that the Hunter program will be delayed in order to build three less suitable ships slightly quicker.I wonder about the focus on more Hobart class DDG's. These are at the end of their growth margin now. The RAN will have to work hard to fit the planned upgrades into them. This certainly is not a hull that can take 100+ VLS in its current form. Stretching the platfrom would be significant job and you may as well plug the Hunter (which will be building its first block this year) as has been suggested. Just getting on and building the Hunters as now designed at a faster rate make be a more effective way of getting extra cells at sea (noting they replace a vessel with 8 cells with 36 ... or 42 if that comes off).
I worry about a number of issues on all the ideas floating about:
1. Any corvette (80 to 100m) may divert funds from projects such as the Hunter without providing a usable asset that can be intergrated into current operations. This may also derail the continous build programme.
2. Any overseas offer (Navnatia) will produce a vessel that with struggle to take the capability (noting their offer is the F105 hull) and has no growth margin. It also means an additional logistics train as much of the equipment on the Hobard DDG is out of production (to be fair this will be the same for diferent batches of the Hunter, however, this logistic train is established prior to the next batch starting) This is likely to derail the continous build programme.
3. So called cheap and simple platforms will be fitted with weapons and combat systems not currently in Australian use to save costs. This detracts for the ability to support the vessel and complicates training. In the 80's DE folk often stayed on DE's same with the DDG's and the FFG's. This reflected the different machinery, systems and weapons on each class. This may also derail the continous build programme. We need this programme start and remain in place to avoid just the situation we are now in.
4. Splitting the build of Hunters with a build of 100+ cell DDG's may derail ecconomies of scale meaning the drumbeat of deliveries will be longer. Iterative growth of the Hunter over batches appears a better option (provide we start on a new build vessel after the 9 hulls are delivered).
So if defence are going to build a second tier combattant to bulk out the numbers it should not detract from the current projects and it should use current weapons and combat systems. This does not mean AEGIS and CEC but CEAFAR and SAAB 9LV are very capable and can add somethign to task group in that ships fitted with these systems can add something to the defence of a convoy or group (rather than only just being able to defend themselves)
The current reporting and leaking of this process makes the Australia DoD look pretty poor in how it manages capability. It really does look like 'shiny kit syndrome' ..... a 'mega cruiser' it is desired because it looks cool ....... how it fits into the operational needs of the RAN against percived threats does not appear to have been discussed. The whole thing is not helped by individuals, the press and think tanks with an agenda.