Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Todjaeger]

Surely the first question that should be asked is why the RAN can be trusted to spec a corvette when as recently as 5 years ago they couldn’t read the deteriorating security situation/select an appropriate class or armed vessel….

As @Volkodav mentioned, it was a gov't decision, not a RAN one. Further, decisions which dictated what would end up getting selected were made more than five years ago and much closer to if not more than a decade ago. The 2013 Defence White Paper specifically mentioned Offshore Patrol Vessels when discussing replacement of the Armidale-class patrol boats whilst mentioning that a modular ship approach like was originally suggested for the OCV in SEA 1180 could remain a possibility for the future. We are nearing the ten year mark since that was published, and the decision to go with an OPV for SEA 1180 instead of the OCV was suggested in the 2009 White Paper would have been made some time prior to publication...

Honestly, this just keeps getting back to issues I have been banging on about in this thread for a while recently. Namely the sheer amount of time it actually takes for many defence systems, naval especially, to get brought into service.

Back on 17 April 2016 PM Turnbull announced that the initial OPV's would be built in SA, and that three designers had been short-listed for the OPV, but it would be more than a year and a half (24 November 2017) before Lürssen would be announced as the prime. Nearly a year later the name Arafura would be released for the class by the CN, with the lead ship getting laid down on 10 May 2019 and entry into service expected some time this year, which is starting to draw to a close. That suggests a 10+ year timeline between when the idea of OPV's is raised and lead ship initially entering service.

A key takeaway from that sort of timeline is that if people decide that corvettes instead of OPV's are what should have been ordered, that decision should have been made no later than when the section on Naval Forces was getting written for the 2013 White Paper, which would likely have been some time towards the end of 2012. Another key takeaway is that whilst options for corvettes are now being looked as either an adjunct to or replacement for some of the Arafura-class OPV's, there is a very real possibility that OPV production run will have been completed before there is a corvette design that is ready for Australian production.

Right now it seems that questions are being asked and answers sought for whether or not corvettes would have a useful place in the RAN fleet and if yes, where/how they would be utilized. Such questions would of course have to be answered prior to a responsible gov't seeking designers for a hypothetical design, or even just going sole source with a familiar designer in an effort to expedite construction and entry into service.

 

[ADMk2]

As @Volkodav mentioned, it was a gov't decision, not a RAN one. Further, decisions which dictated what would end up getting selected were made more than five years ago and much closer to if not more than a decade ago. The 2013 Defence White Paper specifically mentioned Offshore Patrol Vessels when discussing replacement of the Armidale-class patrol boats whilst mentioning that a modular ship approach like was originally suggested for the OCV in SEA 1180 could remain a possibility for the future. We are nearing the ten year mark since that was published, and the decision to go with an OPV for SEA 1180 instead of the OCV was suggested in the 2009 White Paper would have been made some time prior to publication...

Honestly, this just keeps getting back to issues I have been banging on about in this thread for a while recently. Namely the sheer amount of time it actually takes for many defence systems, naval especially, to get brought into service.

Back on 17 April 2016 PM Turnbull announced that the initial OPV's would be built in SA, and that three designers had been short-listed for the OPV, but it would be more than a year and a half (24 November 2017) before Lürssen would be announced as the prime. Nearly a year later the name Arafura would be released for the class by the CN, with the lead ship getting laid down on 10 May 2019 and entry into service expected some time this year, which is starting to draw to a close. That suggests a 10+ year timeline between when the idea of OPV's is raised and lead ship initially entering service.

A key takeaway from that sort of timeline is that if people decide that corvettes instead of OPV's are what should have been ordered, that decision should have been made no later than when the section on Naval Forces was getting written for the 2013 White Paper, which would likely have been some time towards the end of 2012. Another key takeaway is that whilst options for corvettes are now being looked as either an adjunct to or replacement for some of the Arafura-class OPV's, there is a very real possibility that OPV production run will have been completed before there is a corvette design that is ready for Australian production.

Right now it seems that questions are being asked and answers sought for whether or not corvettes would have a useful place in the RAN fleet and if yes, where/how they would be utilized. Such questions would of course have to be answered prior to a responsible gov't seeking designers for a hypothetical design, or even just going sole source with a familiar designer in an effort to expedite construction and entry into service.

Those questions would be very useful if we weren’t staring down the barrel, literally as we keep being told by our very own Defmin.

The Corvette idea accordingly seems to have one overriding factor in it’s corner and for some, appears to be the only issue that matters.

It appears to some to be the fastest way we will get “more missiles’ to sea, the soonest…

 

[Todjaeger]

Those questions would be very useful if we weren’t staring down the barrel, literally as we keep being told by our very own Defmin.

The Corvette idea accordingly seems to have one overriding factor in it’s corner and for some, appears to be the only issue that matters.

It appears to some to be the fastest way we will get “more missiles’ to sea, the soonest…

It might be faster to try accelerating the initial entry into service of the Hunter-class frigates if more missiles at sea is the desired outcome TBH.

Gov't, the ADF and RAN would need to determine what the minimum needed capabilities are for any corvette, as well as what systems should be fitted to provide said capabilities. A designer/builder (Lürssen would possibly be fastest) would need to be selected, and long-lead items would need to be ordered. Keeping in mind that a corvette is a proper warship and therefore more complex than an OPV, even with shortcuts taken it would likely be several years before any lead ship of a RAN corvette class could be laid down. Referring back to the OPV timeline, it was roughly 6.5 years between the when OPV's were mentioned in the 2013 DWO and the lead ship was laid down. If everything can get expedited because gov't, the ADF and RAN already have an idea of what they want/need, and Lürssen already has some familiarity with Australian yards which are in turn already familiar with some of the Lürssen work, it might be able to cut some of that time down. Instead, it might be possible to get a corvette lead ship laid down in perhaps four years, which means construction would likely be starting towards the end of 2026 or early 2027. I could easily foresee construction of a lead ship for an FSG taking three years or more between being laid down and launched (Nuship Arafura took ~2.5 years) which would push any lead corvette out to being launched in late ~2029 or later and then likely another year or two for ship tests and acceptance trials. That once again puts things out to 2031 or 2032 with the real possibility of things getting delayed even further if there are problems with the design, any disputes, or issues with the availability of components, materials, or workforce.

As much as one might wish it to not be the case, time is a very real issue which any new/additional warship order is going to run into.

 

[Morgo]

It might be faster to try accelerating the initial entry into service of the Hunter-class frigates if more missiles at sea is the desired outcome TBH.

Gov't, the ADF and RAN would need to determine what the minimum needed capabilities are for any corvette, as well as what systems should be fitted to provide said capabilities. A designer/builder (Lürssen would possibly be fastest) would need to be selected, and long-lead items would need to be ordered. Keeping in mind that a corvette is a proper warship and therefore more complex than an OPV, even with shortcuts taken it would likely be several years before any lead ship of a RAN corvette class could be laid down. Referring back to the OPV timeline, it was roughly 6.5 years between the when OPV's were mentioned in the 2013 DWO and the lead ship was laid down. If everything can get expedited because gov't, the ADF and RAN already have an idea of what they want/need, and Lürssen already has some familiarity with Australian yards which are in turn already familiar with some of the Lürssen work, it might be able to cut some of that time down. Instead, it might be possible to get a corvette lead ship laid down in perhaps four years, which means construction would likely be starting towards the end of 2026 or early 2027. I could easily foresee construction of a lead ship for an FSG taking three years or more between being laid down and launched (Nuship Arafura took ~2.5 years) which would push any lead corvette out to being launched in late ~2029 or later and then likely another year or two for ship tests and acceptance trials. That once again puts things out to 2031 or 2032 with the real possibility of things getting delayed even further if there are problems with the design, any disputes, or issues with the availability of components, materials, or workforce.

As much as one might wish it to not be the case, time is a very real issue which any new/additional warship order is going to run into.

Spot on. This is exactly the point I was trying to make in an earlier post.

The best thing we can do at this point is put any spare resources we can into increasing the Hunter drumbeat, and accepting that this means a larger fleet in the long term (which I believe we need anyway).

Corvettes will be too little too late at this stage.

 

[alexsa]

I wasn't making an argument at all.

I was merely using that as a comparison based on the manning capabilities.

Another better example might be the European Patrol Corvette in planning that is designed specifically for Oceanic range and has an on paper range larger than both the Hobart and Hunter.

At 3000t ~110m and an expected compliment of 90, it might be a better example of a larger corvette more suited to our requirements.

You would still get close to 2 for 1 in terms of manning requirements vs a Hunter.

And manning will be driven by the demands of the weapons systems and nature of operations. That was my point. As systems improve ship's compnay size has reduced, however, a large corvette is not likely to have the systems aand weapons equivalent to something like the Hunter which is a significantly more complex beast.

 

[Stampede]

It might be faster to try accelerating the initial entry into service of the Hunter-class frigates if more missiles at sea is the desired outcome TBH.

Gov't, the ADF and RAN would need to determine what the minimum needed capabilities are for any corvette, as well as what systems should be fitted to provide said capabilities. A designer/builder (Lürssen would possibly be fastest) would need to be selected, and long-lead items would need to be ordered. Keeping in mind that a corvette is a proper warship and therefore more complex than an OPV, even with shortcuts taken it would likely be several years before any lead ship of a RAN corvette class could be laid down. Referring back to the OPV timeline, it was roughly 6.5 years between the when OPV's were mentioned in the 2013 DWO and the lead ship was laid down. If everything can get expedited because gov't, the ADF and RAN already have an idea of what they want/need, and Lürssen already has some familiarity with Australian yards which are in turn already familiar with some of the Lürssen work, it might be able to cut some of that time down. Instead, it might be possible to get a corvette lead ship laid down in perhaps four years, which means construction would likely be starting towards the end of 2026 or early 2027. I could easily foresee construction of a lead ship for an FSG taking three years or more between being laid down and launched (Nuship Arafura took ~2.5 years) which would push any lead corvette out to being launched in late ~2029 or later and then likely another year or two for ship tests and acceptance trials. That once again puts things out to 2031 or 2032 with the real possibility of things getting delayed even further if there are problems with the design, any disputes, or issues with the availability of components, materials, or workforce.

As much as one might wish it to not be the case, time is a very real issue which any new/additional warship order is going to run into.

If we work with an established design currently being built by NVL Group then maybe there is some opportunity in reducing the time frame of production.

NVL Group launches construction of first new Bulgarian MMPV

German shipbuilder NVL Group (formerly Lürssen Werft) held a steel cutting ceremony for the first of two Multipurpose Modular Patrol Vessels (MMPVs) on order for the...

www.janes.com

Larger main gun up front, Nulka and torpedo decoys and hopefully a proper flight deck and hanger to fully support a Romeo helicopter.

These features alone would provide a big a boost in capability compared to the original Arafura design.

As to additional missiles, well it does add to the lead times and complexity as discussed.

What can we achieve with the time available and the ship we have to work with?


Cheers S

 

[Todjaeger]

If we work with an established design currently being built by NVL Group then maybe there is some opportunity in reducing the time frame of production.

NVL Group launches construction of first new Bulgarian MMPV

German shipbuilder NVL Group (formerly Lürssen Werft) held a steel cutting ceremony for the first of two Multipurpose Modular Patrol Vessels (MMPVs) on order for the...

www.janes.com

Larger main gun up front, Nulka and torpedo decoys and hopefully a proper flight deck and hanger to fully support a Romeo helicopter.

These features alone would provide a big a boost in capability compared to the original Arafura design.

As to additional missiles, well it does add to the lead times and complexity as discussed.

What can we achieve with the time available and the ship we have to work with?


Cheers S

Shortcuts might (emphasis MIGHT) be possible in certain areas but I fear that there will be a number of hard limits where time measured in years would be required to bring a new RAN warship order to fruition.

AFAIK there is no shipyard in Australia or amongst friendly/allied nations that has a hot yard producing existing warship designs with excess/spare capacity to produce more vessels to fulfill a hypothetical Australian order for the RAN, never mind a warship fitted with and using kit that is compatible with existing RAN kit and systems which can be supported and supplied or re-supplied by Australian industry. The importance of using Australian compatible/supported kit is not about supporting industry, but the opposite, namely enabling Australian industry to support the RAN as well as maintaining commonality for support and training across the RAN. For example, if all the RAN surface warships use one type of interface (IIRC a derivative of the SaabTech 9LV supported by a division in Australia) but then the XYZ-class warship uses a different type interface, that would require not only a different supply chain to provide logistics, but also its own training stream to provide operators and technicians/maintainers, That desire for commonality and the efficiencies that can provide is one of the reasons why the RAN had adopted 9LV-based systems not only for the ANZAC-class frigates (where the RAN first started using 9LV IIRC) but also to interface with the Aegis CMS aboard the Hobart-class destroyers and Canberra-class LHD's. If memory serves, versions of 9LV will also be used aboard the Arafura-class OPV's as well as the Hunter-class frigates.

With there being no existing warship production (and therefore the already active and humming along supply chain) which the RAN can jump in on, Australia would need to figure out what is would absolutely need from a new warship order, find a design which can meet those needs as well as find a shipyard that can establish the supply chains needed to produce the final design. As I have mentioned repeatedly over a number of posts in this thread, the timelines to work all that is required out and then actually get a warship built takes years, with it often being over a decade before the lead ship is actually available for service.

If people desire for the RAN to expand with additional warships in less than a decade, Australia might need to see what is available and might be suitable second-hand warships. As hard as people might try, or as hard as they might believe, I just do not see Australia realistically being able to get new warships (apart from some early build Hunter-class frigates, maybe...) into service before 2030.

I would ask people that consider the timeline which would be required in order for the RAN to start receiving a new class of warship into service by 2030. I ask this because at times it almost seems as though people believe the RAN can just go to a warship vendor and purchase a warship, not unlike people might go to a car dealer to purchase a new automobile. The reality is quite a bit different.

 

[TScott]

Well, you don't need something the size of the Type 31. IF you were to acquire corvettes, something around the size of the Anzac Class frigates is fine. You aren't going to put CEFAR ASM radar or 32 VLS etc on them. They aren't going to be battle cruisers. All they require is a 57mm gun on the foc'sle, a 30mm autocannon on top of the hangar, 8 Mk-41 VLS, a decent radar and I/O sensors, four say NSM, a hangar & flight deck for a helo and a UAV, a couple of mission bays, a couple of good diesels as power packs and that's basically it. FFBNW 2 x Phalanx. Build the hulls strong to handle big bad seas and weather, and get the crewing down to about 60 - 80 plus say 80 - 100 sea riders. Make 'em diesel electric if you want to.

How about the up-gunned Legend Class that was proposed for the USCG? It seems to cover off most of your points, however, requires a crew of a similar size to an Anzac.

Maybe a watered down version of it, somewhere between the USCGC current Legend Class and the 4921 Proposal?

Patrol Frigate 4921 is a more radical redesign with a crew of 141,[57] adding weapons and sensors at the expense of reducing range from 12,000 to 8,000 nautical miles (22,000 to 15,000 km).[58] It adds a 12-cell Mk 56 VLS launcher for ESSM air-defense missiles, just behind the main gun, which is upgraded from 57mm to a 76 mm Super Rapid.[57] Two quad launchers for Harpoon antiship missiles and a triple launcher for torpedoes are added to the stern.[58] It retains the SeaRAM/Phalanx CIWS and 6 machine guns of other NSC variants.[57] The stern is closed in and houses a towed-array sonar;[58] a hull sonar is installed for mine countermeasures and an ESM suite.[58] The original "National Patrol Frigate" concept had an AN/SPY-1F air-defense radar[60] but by 2012 the PF 4921 was being shown with an Australian CEAFAR radar.[57]

Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and Germany have also shown interest in NSC derivatives.

[57]

With construction of the last of 10 about to commence.

 

[StingrayOZ]

If people desire for the RAN to expand with additional warships in less than a decade, Australia might need to see what is available and might be suitable second-hand warships. As hard as people might try, or as hard as they might believe, I just do not see Australia realistically being able to get new warships (apart from some early build Hunter-class frigates, maybe...) into service before 2030.

Clearly the obvious option is to buy the Spanish Armada ships and crew.
1 x JC1 with harriers (Canberra)
2 x Galacia LPD (Choules)
5 x Alvaro deBazan (hobart)
6 x Meteoro class OPV (76mm, 2 x25mm, 4 SRBOC, 20 kts)
1 x Cantabria (supply)

This address amphibious lift, destroyer capability, OPV and logistics supply. This will then allow Land400 to continue and address the issue of a destroyer gap, and a more combat OPV. We can spend another $6b and upgrade the new Avaro de Bazan to newer aegis and radar.

Because if we are buying ships, we better be buying crew as ashore support and logistical tails as well. Can't support new ships without decent local logistics, crew etc.

 

[Stampede]

StingrayOZArmada

 

[Morgo]

Clearly the obvious option is to buy the Spanish Armada ships and crew.
1 x JC1 with harriers (Canberra)
2 x Galacia LPD (Choules)
5 x Alvaro deBazan (hobart)
6 x Meteoro class OPV (76mm, 2 x25mm, 4 SRBOC, 20 kts)
1 x Cantabria (supply)

This address amphibious lift, destroyer capability, OPV and logistics supply. This will then allow Land400 to continue and address the issue of a destroyer gap, and a more combat OPV. We can spend another $6b and upgrade the new Avaro de Bazan to newer aegis and radar.

Because if we are buying ships, we better be buying crew as ashore support and logistical tails as well. Can't support new ships without decent local logistics, crew etc.

Armada Australis?

 

[south]

As @Volkodav mentioned, it was a gov't decision, not a RAN one. Further, decisions which dictated what would end up getting selected were made more than five years ago and much closer to if not more than a decade ago. The 2013 Defence White Paper specifically mentioned Offshore Patrol Vessels when discussing replacement of the Armidale-class patrol boats whilst mentioning that a modular ship approach like was originally suggested for the OCV in SEA 1180 could remain a possibility for the future. We are nearing the ten year mark since that was published, and the decision to go with an OPV for SEA 1180 instead of the OCV was suggested in the 2009 White Paper would have been made some time prior to publication...

Honestly, this just keeps getting back to issues I have been banging on about in this thread for a while recently. Namely the sheer amount of time it actually takes for many defence systems, naval especially, to get brought into service.

A key takeaway from that sort of timeline is that if people decide that corvettes instead of OPV's are what should have been ordered, that decision should have been made no later than when the section on Naval Forces was getting written for the 2013 White Paper, which would likely have been some time towards the end of 2012.

Sure - the government made the decision, but does anyone believe that the government wrote the specifications against which the decision was judged? Or made the assessment and recommendation? Or that a year before contract award that the situation could not have been re-evaluated? Now, before we even have a ship sailing the oceans, there are reportedly concerns (identified and voiced on this very site, let alone within the RAN) on the utility of this class of vessels. This should be scrutinised heavily. The strategic situation has not changed that rapidly.

A billion here, a billion there. Pretty soon we will be talking real money.

 

[ngatimozart]

Perhaps but for the costs involved when a corvette realistically will cost about the same price as a Type 31 or similar why would you bother limiting your self to a smaller vessel that wouldn't at least give you options in the future to adjust your force if needed? If we where 100% confident that we would never potentially have to upgrade them with better radar, sensors, weapons etcetc then sure something the size of an Anzac would be perfect but in our environment would it not be better off spending the exact same cost to acquire a corvette to acquire a larger vessel that would give us future options. Yes we are getting the Hunters, getting the Hobarts upgraded and such a sized fleet done well for us in the past but back then we didnt face the situation we do today which is only going to get worse so at least IMHO getting a vessel that leaves us options and at little to no extra cost is simple logic.

The other thing I forgot to add is you'll be wanting at least 6,000 nm range at say 16 knots and a top speed of say 24 knots.

IIRC a Type 31 is 5,800 tonnes. Add another 300 - 500 tonnes for it being fully loaded. A fully loaded 4,000 tonne corvette will get you into places that a Type 31 can't go. It's not about how big it is but how you use it, and what you are using it for. The extra tonnage of the Type 31 (2,000 tonnes) is extra weight that has to be pushed through the water and that costs money. You won't be gaining anything. If you require more frigate sized combatants than you increase the Hunter construction drumbeat rather than attempting to create another variant of the OMT F370. That'll be cheaper and more efficient in the long run.

MEKO® (globalsecurity.org)
Something like the latest version of the MEKO 200 design. They are proven Southern Ocean operators to with the RSA Navy.

Looks interesting. A definitely interesting drive.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Armada Australis?

Well that is like 20 years worth of ship production and a busy European yard, and a medium power navy to crew it.

They also have 6 FFG's, maybe we could take those, and conscript the 60-70 year old ex-sailors to man them?

The idea that corvettes are super easy and fast to build should be perhaps considered.

Germany's K130 Batch 2 Corvette Program 2 Years Behind Schedule - Naval News

The German Navy is set to receive their new Braunschweig class corvettes at least two years behind original schedule. Commissioning of the first new "K130 Batch 2" corvette “Köln” was originally anticipated by 2023, but this is will now occur in 2025 at the earliest, with delays affecting the...

www.navalnews.com

Also look at the issues the project is having with the Germans perhaps ordering more, to replace the inital batch, and avoiding the midlife upgrade costs.

So we are pulling Hobarts, Collins, and Anzacs out of the water, upgrading all of them, and building corvettes and refitting the OPV we have built? And new amphibious ships and riverine craft, and supply ships.. All of new classes? And Hunters?

November can't come soon enough.

I have been looking deeply into the F-105 and the F-110 class and wondering how much overlap there is between them and how the Spanish think they can deliver ships by 2030.. It seems the F-110 is "heavily inspired" on the f-105, and basically runs a modern F-105 configuration taking on US input during the FFGX program (clever Spaniards). The F-110 is only ~30cm narrower and 5 cm shorter than the 105 hull. Aegis, Spy6, 127mm, VLS, NSM, lm2500 in a better CODLAG, 2x30mm guns and MH60r all sound pretty familiar.

The F-110 is basically the hull offered for FFGX but slightly reconfigured. Which also explains why the spanish were still pouring money into this design.

What the Spanish may actually be offering is effectively F-110 hull, reconfigured into a main combatant (ie no flex space etc), with 48 VLS.

Which is why they are very confident they can build 3 by 2030, as they intend to build 6 by 2032 and first delivery by 2027, and they had started cutting prototype steel last year. All systems, services, items, long lead items are already contracted, ordered and either in storage awaiting fitting or in process for scheduled delivery. For the Spanish longer lead items for the last 3 could probably still be ordered and meet their required build time, particularly if they helped out an allied nation to do so.

One assumes with 1 or 2 Australian yards, assisting, they literally could ensure 3 ships are built by 2030. Even if Australia didn't have anything at all ordered or available. In fact they could probably build 4-5 ships by 2030 inconjunction with an Australian yard in terms of work capability.

I don't know if 3 new build Hobart's solve Australia's problems, but it would seem the Spanish offer is genuine. They are basically offering up a hot line and the first three ships/systems if we were interested. Ships they have already started building. Ships with commonality with our existing fleet, and with the sort of systems/weapons we want. With a navy we can operate with, with a class that won't be completely orphaned (Spain will end up build 6 of a very similar type just with a much lower VLS count and flex space). These replace Anzacs, and the Hunter build continues without the expectations of the world on its shoulders and we no longer need hunter class battleships with 64vls or 6000t corvettes to fill the gap.

There are are lot of crazy and impossible ideas floating around.

I wonder if the Spanish Prime Minister will Dominos it. You get 3 destroyers by 2030, or they are free. That would be a pretty good deal, and no one, not the British nor the Americans nor Asia could offer us anything better, quicker that we can sail and operate.

 

[swerve]

...The extra tonnage of the Type 31 (2,000 tonnes) is extra weight that has to be pushed through the water and that costs money....

This is frequently ignored. Yes, steel is cheap & air is free, but a bigger hull means bigger engines (not cheap) & more fuel. It'll also need a bit more maintenance.

 

[hauritz]

The estimated budget of between $5-6 billion makes me think the corvette idea might simply be the OCV that was originally proposed by the Rudd government back in the 2009 Defence White Paper.

Semaphore: Australian Offshore Combatant Vessels | Royal Australian Navy

Royal Australian Navy

www.navy.gov.au

Somewhat more capable than the Arafura but still a pretty basic warship.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Somewhat more capable than the Arafura but still a pretty basic warship.

The Arafura are pretty limited, even for an OPV. Even for a build based off the Opv80 design. Its got lower power engines so it will never be even a moderately fast OPV, and is even slower than the Darussalam design its based off. As pointed out in the article you linked, the Arafura would fall into the category of craft that could not keep up with other ships as part of a task force.

The OCV was a more capable ship, sitting above most OPVs but below a corvette. Probably carrying no missiles. Able to do fleet speeds (~22-25kt), armed, but perhaps carrying dismounted UAV/UUV systems. etc. It was more in mind of the LCS modular concept in terms of missions.

Common or near common body. We are a long way from that now. Damen and Fassmer had way more capable offerings that could have been fitted for, not with, as did lurrsen, Australia chose very, very low end capability for the OPV's, and then down speced from there. Any new design would be basically starting from scratch in terms of logistical support for systems etc, as basically nothing would go into a more capable vessel. So there is 2-3 years just specing, tendering, contracting, ordering for anything in that space, even based of commercial or common military spec. So what we have is very low end. Picking up wooden Indonesian fishing boats from far out islands or Australian harbour duties. I wouldn't even chance it with Vietnamese/Malaysian fishing boats, let alone Chinese fishing fleet vessels.

If we limit the OPV to say 12 contracted. There is a possibility that we could build some 4-8 more capable ships. Not corvettes. But medium capability OPV's/OCV. They could join the fleet in the 2034-2040 period or later.

 

[hauritz]

I have a feeling this whole thing may yet be linked to the proposed MCM vessels. The previous government stated that it would probably be based on the Arafura hull but that was certainly not a definite decision. The Arafura design is not the best choice for this sort of vessel. I think that regardless of whether we go for a corvette it would be necessary to find a more suitable hull for these vessels.

Just to quote from this link.

Semaphore: Australian Offshore Combatant Vessels | Royal Australian Navy

Royal Australian Navy

www.navy.gov.au

Deployed task group operations, particularly those in littoral areas, are becoming more important and more common, both for humanitarian and military tasks. Future task group deployments involving the new amphibious ships with their ability to carry large numbers of troops, may need the accompaniment of MCM and hydrographic configured OCVs. They would be tasked with environmental assessment and mine identification and neutralisation and in some cases would need to precede the main body of the task group to an area of operations.

What they are describing is definitely not a modified Arafura.

 

[seaspear]

The current RNZN OPVs were built to frequent the Southern Ocean but they did suffer damage and the assumptions that design was based on, have subsequently been found to be in error. Up until very recently it has always been assumed that the wave climate of the higher latitude North Atlantic Ocean was a sufficient template for Southern Ocean conditions, but recent research has found that significant wave heights in the Southern Ocean can be up to 1/3 higher than those in the equivalent latitude in the North Atlantic. That's a lot and means that ships being built for the Southern Ocean have to be built to a higher degree of strength. The RNZN took an Anzac frigate down there once on the 2000s. Never again because of the damage caused to the ship. Both navies actually require combatants that can handle those waters and that should've been built into the Hunter Class for the RAN and into future RAN & RNZN combatants. Australian defence appears to be somewhat blind to the geostrategic attractiveness of very resource rich Antarctica to resource hungry nations and the Treaty is after all only a piece of paper. We already have evidence of how some countries honour treaties and other agreements that they have signed and ratified. Some of those countries are currently active in Antarctica.

I have not been able to find the article but I recall reading that one of the differences between the Hobart class and the Spanish F100 hundred class were modifications to operate in cold weather it did not state operating in the Southern Ocean but I have not read that the Hunter class was to receive similar cold weather capabilities , I can understand a dedicated ASW frigate patrolling down which is heavier than the Hobart class down there

 

[Todjaeger]

Sure - the government made the decision, but does anyone believe that the government wrote the specifications against which the decision was judged? Or made the assessment and recommendation? Or that a year before contract award that the situation could not have been re-evaluated? Now, before we even have a ship sailing the oceans, there are reportedly concerns (identified and voiced on this very site, let alone within the RAN) on the utility of this class of vessels. This should be scrutinised heavily. The strategic situation has not changed that rapidly.

A billion here, a billion there. Pretty soon we will be talking real money.

As I understand it AusGov would have provided initial guidance on the acceptable scope of the project, which would have been some time prior to the 2013 DWP publication. The scope of the project, based off statements which have been made as well as what the OPV's are replacing, was for the RAN to acquire larger, ocean-going vessels to carry out the constab/patrol duties of the ACPB. From a cost perspective, it was replacing patrol boats costing ~AUD$30 mil. each, with larger and more capable patrol vessels costing ~AUD$300 mil. each.

If one were to contemplate corvettes, the price per vessel would have been more like AUD$600 mil. each.

One also needs to really look at and consider the timeline of SEA 1180. For instance, the competitive eval to select a designer and builder started in Nov 2015 as SEA 1180 Phase 1 Offshore Patrol Vessel program, per the ANAO report here. In order for a designer and builder of the future OPV's to be selected, the decision to order OPV's rather than corvettes, frigates, or something else would already have been made.

Now I suppose that prior to Lurssen getting selected in 2017 to provide the OPV design, a review could have been conducted which determined that ordering OPV's was inappropriate, but then either SEA 1180 would have to have been closed and a new project commenced, or all the preliminary work which lead up to SEA 1180 Phase 1 would have needed to be redone. This would then lead to a new set of ship requirements which the different designers could then work towards, before designers/builders get short-listed and finally a prime selected. Basically changing the 'rules' of the project would require everything to be restarted and redone.

I expect it would be similar to if there was an AIR project running to select a replacement LIFT, and then various people started advocating for the LIFT design to be changed to also be a combat aircraft able to sortie into/through hostile airspace, with other people even suggesting shortening the LIFT order to purchase more fighter aircraft.

My personal belief is that yes, the RAN will likely need more combatants between now and 2035 (quite possibly earlier) than are currently planned. Unfortunately though in order for more/new combatants to be in service for much of the peak demands (late 2020's into early 2030's IMO) the projects which would have ordered the new combatants should have started a decade ago or more. Looking through the 2013 DWP, specifically the strategic outlook, the DWP does indicate trends of rising tension but does not suggest large-scale conflict in the Asia-Pacific region being likely between 2025-2030, which is one of the concerns many have now. Basically it seems that the 2013 DWP expected conditions to be more benign than it seems is now expected. From a warship in service/availability POV that is a problem because of just how long it takes to get warships into service. Looking at the ANAO reporting on SEA 4000, first pass approval was in May 2005 or thereabouts, with IOC of the Hobart-class DDG reached in at the end of 2018 or start of 2019. Now the Hobart-class DDG did have some gov't ordered delays which added a couple of years IIRC, that still puts naval acquisitions taking 10+ years between project start/first pass approval and initial entry into service.

If the in service deadline to be useful is 2030, then projects would have needed to start ~2018/2019, and gov't would need to have approved the additional projects and also been willing to sustain them.