The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
On the topic of platforms and munitions, there have been a lot of claims about russia using S-300 in an alleged ground attack mode.

Besides the claim I have trouble finding anything of relevance regarding actual information on this capability

Has anyone here insight into which missile is supposed to be used in that role?
Technically if you just add a navigation system like GPS to the missile itself, it can be used on any missile.
Big difference between surface-surface and surface-air missiles is the altitude at which you want them to end their flight.

US Navy uses SM-6 missiles for anti-ship missions as well, and there is ongoing work to make a land-attack system comprised of a mix of Tomahawks and SM-6 missiles.
 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
Russia and Iran are very much alike when it comes to their armed forces, in both buildup and conception. But Russia's and Iran's armed forces are both unbalanced in the exact opposite ways.
Russia has invested a lot of money into developing and producing better platforms, but lacks the munitions. A bit like giving an archer the best bow and ergonomic kit, but forgeting to take any arrows.
Iran develops munitions and very cheap platforms, but neglects the expensive core platforms. So a bit like taking a bunch of arrows without a bow.

Iran has mixed success in its respective region. It can subjugate smaller nations, and it can bring the hurt to some others - and Russia can do the same.
But when facing a determined and balanced foe, Iran's forces crumble.
If we follow the money, we know how the Iranians see their priorities (IRGC not the conventional armed forces)

They see missiles (ballastic) and special forces as delivering significantly more value than fighter jets. (E.g those rumour J10C, Su30s never materialize even when the arms embargo ended).I don't think they expect to fight conventional, peer level opponent directly either, but on their ability to retaliate.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
As you're aware the IRGC was born out of the realisation on the part of Iran's new leaders; following 1979; that the military contained many Shah loyalists and couldn't be trusted. As it stands we tend to hear a lot about the IRGC in the news and less of the regular military [both funded from different budgets] but I don't think we can go so far as to say the IRGC gets priority on funding.

On the missiles they are seen as Iran's main means of striking; whether in retaliation or as a first strike; beyond its borders given it doesn't have an air arm capable of doing so. No they certainly don't intend - if they can help it - to be engaged in open combat against a better resourced opponent and in Lebanon and Yemen they've achieved their political objectives using the means at their disposal without being in a open war. A lot of what it's doing now in terms asymmetric tactics is also influenced from the 1980's when Iran was bloodied in a series of clashes with the Americans who at that period was doing all it could to assist the Iraqis.

They know how far they can push things and what they can or can't achieve based on their capabilities. Some may have the impression that Iran is led by religious zealots who act solely on religion; this is simplistic nonsense. If that were the case the Iranian government would have collapsed a long ago given who its opponents are and how from the 1980's Iran has been so isolated.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Nikolaev-Kherson-Krivoy Rog.

A brief overall summary, while Russian and Ukrainian sources seem to differ about which villages are under whose control (for example Russian sources claim Pravdino remains disputed), the fighting seems to be focused around the first line of villages near the front, with the only exceptions being the Ukrainian push on Kiselevka (which apparently failed) and the capture of Sukhoi Stavok, but from which Ukrainian forces allegedly withdrew after coming under fire (Russian claim, neither confirmed nor refuted by Ukrainian sources that I know of).

A firefight took place inside of Kherson, allegedly a Ukrainian infiltrator team. However I suspect this may be the local resistance making a showing timed with the Ukrainian offensive, in the hopes of drawing Russian forces off the front line. Whoever they were, they were apparently defeated as Ukrainian forces didn't reach Kherson. The third link shows off allegedly the equipment and location of where the firefight took place.


VDV artillery strikes somewhere on the Kherson-Nikolaev axis. I can't tell what they're firing at.


Ukrainian T-64BV with infantry, narrowly dodges an ATGM.


Ukrainian strikes on the Antonov bridge continue. This is likely aimed at stemming the flow of Russian supplies and reinforcements.


Yesterday's footage of Ukrainian troops moving up for the offensive.


An influx of wounded has been spotted at the hospitals in Odessa. This is to be expected regardless of the success or failure of the actual offensive.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Russia is reportedly displeased with Iran's drones.
I won't go into detail, except to say that production quality may not be the only factor here. Russia's own Orlan-10 drones were seen using simple Panasonic cameras, and water bottles as fuel tanks (this is not to bang on Russia, it's actually quite the demonstration of wartime innovation IMO).
I have a couple of thoughts, starting with:

1) Beggars can't be choosers. Russia had knowledge since the 888 war that UAVs are not just the future but the present day and are desperately needed. Russia successfully ramped up domestic UAV production and development for tactical systems by the '14 war, and clearly had both knowledge of and access to MALE UAVs (name the Searcher MK2). If domestic programs were lagging the logical thing would have been to purchase larger quantities of these, as well as allocating additional resources to those programs.

2) We have yet to get confirmation of deliveries or combat use, but Russia is already unhappy? Russian troops are using commercial quadcopters and reporting good results. Here are purpose-made UCAVs. They can't be worse then dropping handgrenades from a quadcopter. I'm questioning either the displeasure itself being real, or the person providing that feedback having any clue about what's going on. Russia is short on UAVs of every type in this war. Any UAVs are better then no UAVs.

3) How did this information get out? UAVs whose presence has yet to be positively confirmed, yet we already have insider feedback? It's not impossible I guess, but tying in with 2), I'm skeptical.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Footage continues to emerge from the Ukrainian offensive.

A Ukrainian column near Vysokopol'ye got hit. Apparently 4 destroyed T-72M1s (3 M1s and 1 M1R) though I can only spot 3. One of the tanks has mine trawls. Also two abandoned trucks, and a BMP. It's not clear how they got hit, based on the unarmored trucks being in the column, I suspect this wasn't an attack but a column on the march that got hit, maybe by artillery.


More footage from Vysokopol'ye shows a ranger file column of Ukrainian infantry advancing along the tree line. Something tells me that if the enemy is watching you advance with minimal dispersion, single file, from a UAV, your future is not good. After that we see, apparently the same area, but after a Russian strike and with a burning tank, presumably Ukrainian.


Strikes on the Antonov bridge continue.


A prison in Kherson got hit. Unclear if any inmates are still there, and if not, who if anyone is using the facility. I'd like to highlight something here. We often see reports of strikes from both sides that appear to target things like non-military factories, schools, and community centers. In this conflict this infrastructure has taken center place as being used for improvised military storage facilities, and staging areas. Not only should we expect to continue to see this, but at this point my basic assumption is that if such objects are being targetted it's because some information was available that suggested it was being used for military purposes.


EDIT: More footage.

A long 3 minute video of apparently Russian strikes against Ukrainian troops in the recent offensive. To me this highlights Russia's preferred method of fighting, detect at maximum range, and pummel with artillery non-stop.


Apparently a Ukrainian soldier with a destroyed BMP, he survived by hiding in a fighting hole next to it.


Allegedly a destroyed Ukrainian T-72M1, Nikolaev-Kherson axis.


VDV mortar fires against Ukrainian vehicles near Snegirevka. Presumably they're using 120mm.


EDIT2: More footage.

Russian sources seem to be confirming the loss of Kiselevka.


Allegedly Ukrainian mech infantry riding BMP-1s getting hit by Russian VDV fires.

 
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seaspear

Well-Known Member
I came across this story and of the use of decoy Himars to lure rocket attacks on these and wondered why its not used more often?
Ukraine used fake wooden HIMARS to lure Russia into wasting cruise missiles (msn.com)
Also perhaps someone here might know if contracted Russian service members are able to leave after contract expiry ,it might be hard to expect service members to re-sign into a continuing military action and how this would effect Russia's troop numbers if a substantial number of experienced troops opted out
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
To me this highlights Russia's preferred method of fighting, detect at maximum range, and pummel with artillery non-stop.
Back to base question, whether Western supplies weapons will have enough capabilities to cut Russian artilery supplies. This is still new, but several previous incursion effort by Ukranian in that Front also shown basic Russian strategy. They lured Ukranian to the open fields, and pummel them with artilery barrage.

Typical attrition warfare dated back to WW1. All back to whose going to run out first.
 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
Out of scope of this thread so I won't go further.

As you're aware the IRGC was born out of the realisation on the part of Iran's new leaders; following 1979; that the military contained many Shah loyalists and couldn't be trusted. As it stands we tend to hear a lot about the IRGC in the news and less of the regular military [both funded from different budgets] but I don't think we can go so far as to say the IRGC gets priority on funding.
There are enough data points from SIPRI/IISS/DIA over the years to safely conclude that IRGC gets the priority. As far as I can tell, the latest reference and budget (FY22), IRGC's budget will be three times that of the Artesh.


Personally, I think their operational budget is far higher, given that IRGC have access to off budget sources and their own networks.

They know how far they can push things and what they can or can't achieve based on their capabilities. Some may have the impression that Iran is led by religious zealots who act solely on religion; this is simplistic nonsense. If that were the case the Iranian government would have collapsed a long ago given who its opponents are and how from the 1980's Iran has been so isolated.
I have no doubt that the Iranians are rational actors at the strategic level and it is a mistake to underestimate them. Where I am not that sure is at an operational level, how much control is being exerted on IRGC. Factionalism is very much well and alive in Iran.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Factionalism is indeed an issue in Iran as in many other places but with regards to IRGC they remain answerable to the Supreme Leader and I would seriously doubt they are engaging in actions which have not been authorised. As it stands we have the called moderates and hardliners. The latter claims that no matter how much Iran compromises the U.S. will continue to weaken and isolate Iran because the U.S. is driven by its selfish interests including the need to safeguard Israel.

The U.S. according to them does not want to see an Iranian/Gulf Arab rapprochement. There are elements from both factions who argue that Iran should have the means to assemble a nuke device because only a nuke device will safeguard Iran from regime change. They also point out it's hypocritical for the U.S. to deny Iran and nuke as Israel has it and it's even non kosher for Israel's nukes to be mentioned by the U.S.

The greatest irony is that the mullahs actually shut down the nuke programme when they came to power but reluctantly revived it when reports came in of Saddam's programme and the West turning a blind eye.

Anyway enough on Iran.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Please take the discussion on Iran to the appropriate thread. Iran should only be discussed in this thread as they pertain to the war in Ukraine.
 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
2) We have yet to get confirmation of deliveries or combat use, but Russia is already unhappy? Russian troops are using commercial quadcopters and reporting good results. Here are purpose-made UCAVs. They can't be worse then dropping handgrenades from a quadcopter. I'm questioning either the displeasure itself being real, or the person providing that feedback having any clue about what's going on. Russia is short on UAVs of every type in this war. Any UAVs are better then no UAVs.

3) How did this information get out? UAVs whose presence has yet to be positively confirmed, yet we already have insider feedback? It's not impossible I guess, but tying in with 2), I'm skeptical.
The article is actually referring to "serious technical failures in early tests" -- these could have been tests done in Iran, Russians were visiting already in June and July. The article is also referring to a "security official from an allied country whose government closely followed the delivery" -- so this intel is not from US intelligence. Could be any of the "numerous" US allies that would be interested in closely following this delivery of course, but my guess would be that Israel is the source of this intel.

It is impossible to independently verify this, but it sounds credible to me -- Times of Israel is also normally quite reliable (not that being "normally quite reliable" means much these days...)
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
There was mention of another customer being very unsatisfied with it's Iranian UAS; could have been Tigray or Ethopia.

From what I understand the Iranians are adapt at producing short range inexpensive and uncomplicated systems; we've seen them supplied to various non state players. I have no idea if the Iranians are able to produce the type of systems the Russians desire. If we look at the Aramco attack however; there was a certain level of skills and sophistication involved in coordinating and carrying it out.

To me the question which comes to mind is if the Russians need Iranian help because the Iranians are in a better position to mass produce UASs or because the Iranians have the tech that the Russians lack? I doubt it's the latter.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part 3 of 3: Various factors that may change the battle geometry
They lured Ukranian to the open fields, and pummel them with artilery barrage.

Typical attrition warfare dated back to WW1. All back to whose going to run out first.
7. Early in the conflict, it worked pretty well. At the 6 month mark, when Ukraine’s troops are more mobile with donated M113s, protected armoured vehicles, like the Bushmaster and lots of Polish T-72Ms in the ABGs, the effectiveness of such Russian tactics goes down.

Donations to form ABGs take time to train

In most cases I would agree with you -- that loss of MIC would be a huge issue. However is this case Ukraine is drawing upon support from a large number of countries, several of which have committed to long term support.
1. Australia alone has donated 28 M113AS4 APCs and 60 Bushmaster MRAPs. Likewise, Canada donated 39 Super Bison LAVs. When you add a tank company or two of T-72M1Rs donated from Poland, you have enough vehicles for a single ABG. Keeping in mind that in Apr 2022, Poland’s prime minister confirmed the country supplied its Soviet-designed T-72M1 and T-72M1R tanks to Ukraine

2. Since Apr 2022, the Polish Government supplied to the Ukrainian Army 100 T-72M1/M1R (M1R has minor upgrades), quantities of BWP-1 IFVs. In the same month, Americans donated 11 Mi-17 transport helicopters, 200 M113 APCs, and 300 Switchblade loitering munitions. In the video below, you can see driver orientation training being conducted.

3. The Americans donated M113s and that alone is enough for 4 ABGs (and theare not in the fight, yet).

(a) It’s pretty clear, that these gifts from these 4 countries when combined are intended to operate as multiple ABGs, each with its own organic recovery vehicles and loitering munitions.​

(b) Each ABG is a very powerful force construct, if there are trained Ukrainians to operate these donated weapons systems. And it will take months to train them to use these APCs as a fighting ABG (with dismount drills), cover movement, other screening tactics and vehicle recovery drills.​

Thus Ukraine will prevail.
4. Only if the Ukrainians use these armoured vehicles correctly, in an ABG with the correct fire support and don’t squander them in small scale fights.

5. France donated 18 155mm Caesar self-propelled guns (SPGs); which is enough SPGs to provide direct support for 3 ABGs.

6. Beyond Polish T-72M1Rs, other European countries are also stepping up to transfer their Soviet era tanks to Ukraine via swaps. For example, Germany will supply the Czech Republic with 14 Leopard 2A4 MBTs and 1 Büffel armoured recovery vehicle from industrial stocks. The Czech Republic in turn will supply T-72 MBTs in support of Ukraine.

7. The fastest way to get tanks to Ukraine would be for the US to just drop a lot of its stored Abrams into Poland, and Poland sending all its remaining older PT-91 Twardy tanks to Ukraine.

8. The downside of these donations: Ukraine is now faced with operating multiple platform types including many different calibres of munition with different production capacities, and must also maintain and repair these platforms, some of which are considerably more challenging than others.
8. In the early days of the fight, Ukraine was running out of everything, except anti-tank missiles (that was shipped in quantity).

9. Above, a positive demonstration that speed matters (for the featured M777 gun crew). Offensive action by Ukraine is no longer out of ammo; now that NATO & partners have supplied & converted Ukraine to 155mm ammo (or just limited by 152mm artillery ammo). In the latest US$3 billion military aid package from Team Biden, Ukraine is getting:
  • 245,000 rounds for 155mm howitzers
  • 65,000 rounds for 120mm mortars
  • 24 counter-artillery radars
With the new ammo on the way, they are now not limited in firing larger salvos to hit Russian area targets & the depth (i.e. Russian supply depots).

10. Above, the Ukrainian air force is able not only to conduct air patrols but also to fire HARM missiles against Russian SAM sites to suppress the radars. Further, to better protect the rear areas of Ukrainian troop build up, the US Army 6 NASAMS systems to Ukraine and also awards Raytheon a US$182M NASAMS contract for Ukraine’s air defence.

11. Ukraine's Kherson offensive, via 5 probing attacks, in a division plus sector, hasn't "failed". Claims that it has failed is likely to be just Russian propaganda. The fighting is also more concentrated & in limited areas. They are no longer spread too thin. It’s mass vs mass — with Ukraine’s forces being delivered to the fight at ABG level.
(a) As I mentioned in an earlier post, the Ukrainian Army has started offensive operation in direction of Kherson. This is not a WWII, massive offensive; the Ukrainian Army in this case decided to risk more, to throw a heavier punch.​
(b) In select battles, heavier punches will result in more Ukrainian losses. In 2020 Azerbaijan lost a lot of troops and tanks in the war's first 3 days trying to find gaps in Armenia's trench network and break through there. After that the Azerbaijanis overran the Armenians.​

12. Natalia Humeniuk, spokesperson for Ukraine's southern command, said that Ukraine had started "offensive actions" in the Kherson region and some other areas, though she did not give specifics. IMO, Ukraine’s offensive is a bit too early (not enough shaping operations) but we will see.
 
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koxinga

Well-Known Member
There was mention of another customer being very unsatisfied with it's Iranian UAS; could have been Tigray or Ethopia.
Ethiopia
To me the question which comes to mind is if the Russians need Iranian help because the Iranians are in a better position to mass produce UASs or because the Iranians have the tech that the Russians lack? I doubt it's the latter.
I think it is a bit of both. Russian drones today are somewhat limited in capabilities and used predominately for survillance (e.g Orlan series) with some limited use of offensive drones (e.g Lancet-3). Iran on the other hand would have more experience and variety in the offensive use of drones. Quality wise, it remains to be seen.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member

As this article mentions there are vast similarities with the war in Chechnya and the Ukraine; the lack of a sound military strategy in line with political objectives; the underestimation of the enemy; hubris and overconfidence on the part of the Russians and sending in troops unprepared and not in the required numbers.

My view is that in the 1990's the Russians actually had the means to.accomplish their military objectives had they planned accordingly and understood what they were facing. This is in contrast to the Ukrainian invasion where a Russian army which had been planning and structured to deal with different type of wars was not structured or fully equipped to undertake an invasion of this magnitude on the second largest country in Europe which was expecting to be attacked; had learnt various lessons from the Donbass campaign and had a large standing army; plus a large pool of manpower it could and mobilise.

The Russians also have an air arm which was not only I'll trained and equipped to conduct a strategic air campaign but as an excellent article in War On The Rocks makes clear; it would be wrong to judge the Russian air force on Western standards because the Russians employ air power in a different manner.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
11. Ukraine's Kherson offensive, via 5 probing attacks, in a division plus sector, hasn't "failed". Claims that it has failed is likely to be just Russian propaganda. The fighting is also more concentrated & in limited areas. They are no longer spread too thin. It’s mass vs mass — with Ukraine’s forces being delivered to the fight at ABG level.
(a) As I mentioned in an earlier post, the Ukrainian Army has started offensive operation in direction of Kherson. This is not a WWII, massive offensive; the Ukrainian Army in this case decided to risk more, to throw a heavier punch.​
(b) In select battles, heavier punches will result in more Ukrainian losses. In 2020 Azerbaijan lost a lot of troops and tanks in the war's first 3 days trying to find gaps in Armenia's trench network and break through there. After that the Azerbaijanis overran the Armenians.​
Ukraine has been successful on two sections, namely Ukrainian forces have apparently broken through at Sukhoi Stavok and are advancing behind Russian forces north of them, and Ukrainian forces have advanced directly towards Kherson, having taken Kiselevka. The other offensive have been repulsed so far, though efforts are continuing at Vysokopol'ye, and that section of the front is potentially threatened by the Ukrainian breakout at Sukhoi Stavok. At this point I believe Russia needs reserves to be able to counter-attack the Ukrainian push there. The traditional method of holding positions and bringing down overwhelming firepower won't work here.

All in all this is the biggest success Ukraine has had in offensive operations this entire war.

 
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