Hunter-class frigates won’t meet the RAN’s needs
Piece by Paul Greenfield and Jon Stanford on The Strategist.
Again with the claim of the 32 VLS on the Hunter-class. They provides no source on this - and I'm not inclined to trust them blindly after the recent JSM/NSM issue. That among other issues.
Even if feasible, rectifying these problems would require a new design. In principle, the changes required could be accommodated in a 10,000-tonne design, as exemplified by the Arleigh Burke. Australia is already paying an eye-watering $6.27 billion for the redesign of a ship that Defence once classified as ‘mature’.
If the necessary design changes prove impossible, however, the government should move rapidly to cancel the Hunter and order more Hobart ships to an updated design. This must include the installation of CEAFAR2, and the contract with Lockheed Martin to integrate it with Aegis should continue. Alternatively, we could seek to construct in Australia the Flight III version of the Arleigh Burke destroyer, again with the CEAFAR2 and Aegis. We could then use that as a basis for seeking involvement in the DDG(X) program. But time is of the essence. If nothing changes, the navy won’t deploy a single additional VLS cell for another decade.
As Gryphinator has already stated, they reach the conclusion that we should seek to invest into either the AB III or an upgraded Hobart-class with CEAFAR2 if their necessary design changes prove impossible. They complain, immediately prior to this, that Australia is paying $6.27 billion for the redesign of a ship Defence classified as mature. How do they expect either the Hobart or the AB III to be different in this regard? If the Hobart is to be redesigned, then the ship is likely not going to be brought into service any faster than the Hunters are now - meaning we still won't achieve any more VLS within the decade as they note.
The
concept of crewing the AB has been only recently noted, with the takeaway being that it will take time - whilst also costing a great deal, even to arm with the large VLS pools they have. This is at a time when a large RAN portion of the additional 18,500 personnel funded for out to 2040 will go towards the SSNs, which will already be a significant expansion of the service. Their point of the future being a missile-to-missile game may be relevant, though questions also then need to be raised as to why the USN is investing into the Constellation-class (with 32 VLS) and why Japan is investing into the Mogami-class (with 16 VLS). Not every task, mission or operation is going to be a missile-to-missile fight and ships are rarely going to operate alone in any peer conflict. This is also only relevant if the Hunters do possess the stated 32 VLS - which may not be the case unless I have missed something at some point. To be clear, more VLS on the Hunters would be ideal - though we work with what we have, not necessarily with what we want or need.
As
others on the thread have noted, ASPI seem to have their own goals in mind that do not necessarily align with Defence's own plans or that presented by Government. The Strategist has a wide variety of articles on excellent topics, though I fear it is becoming or has become a means of biased commentary in pursuit of particular agendas. The use of
loaded language and a lack of provided sources within articles is, imho, concerning...
One thing that did peak my interest is the highlighted difference in doctrine between the UK and Australia/US. Doctrine is complex and I'm sure there are many nuances to it, though I would have thought a great deal of overlap in how we tackle ASW? And, if true that we chose the Hunters with knowledge of our own doctrine, then what is the concept or thought driving this?
