I'm not sure crewing issues would be a reason to not go ahead if it were otherwise a good idea. If we are going to grow capability and combatant numbers, crewing will have to be addressed. It's also an issue with the SSN pivot, maybe more so but it's not stopping that.
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0
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I thought the idea was we would not take on the PLAN by ourselves.Yes
You are right the authors credentials are hidden under the nom de plume Admiral Prune with the stated reason to escape ADF censure as a current ranking RAN officer. In any case, it is not the credentials of the author so much as the coherency of the arguments. The key characteristics of the coming threat are identified as are ADF shortcomings in meeting those. These are not my ideas and probably are not even original, but the recent announcement from Navantia and the continued cloud over Hunter might warrant reassessment.
Admiral Prune: Defending Australia Part 3 of 4: What sort of ADF do we need? - Pearls and Irritations
Commentators suggest that the Morrison Government is attempting to frame a “khaki election”. It would be far better were it a “blue election” - sea and sky blue.johnmenadue.com
In essence, the US assessment is the coming naval surface battle with the CCP in the Indo-Pacific will be a "missile on missile" confrontation where numbers of VLS cells is a deciding factor. ASW will be a secondary consideration. As most readers here know, RAN surface combatants don't compare well with CCP vessels on VLS cell numbers and future RAN combatants such as the Hunter class don't address this either.
The solution proposed is attractive because it not only addresses capability requirements to meet the threat but delivers outcomes faster with potentially better cost control.
The solution is to commence building US Arleigh-Burke flight III destroyers in Adelaide ASAP to replace the existing Hobart's and retasking the Hobarts (while also building more of them) to replace the Anzac frigates. The Hunter class would be abandoned.
This would have these effects:
1. New vessels would be delivered to the RAN more quickly.
* Navantia's offer for three additional Hobarts by 2030 could be taken up.
* ABII construction in Adelaide is likely to be faster than Hunter with the latter still in design phase until at least 2024. If Hobarts are constructed in Spain, this would not impact on the ABIII build and we might see at least one of these by 2030 as well) A Spanish Hobart build would not involve sovereignty effects because of the previous in country Hobart build.
2. Resulting force structure would better suited to the forecast "missile on missile" confrontation with the CCP.
The ABIII's 96 VLS cells doubles Hobart's 48, which in turn is 6 times Anzac's 8.
3. Costs may be more predictable.
Although difficult to compare, Hunter class costs are a bigger risk.
Although I can hear many of you pointing out that the Hunter's are focused on ASW, the more pressing capability in the Indo Pacific theatre is missile and air defence which may not be so for European navies. Both ABIII and Hobart possess good ASW capabilities anyway and capability in this area would still be improved with this initiative.
Do you expect us to match them missile for missile?
A naval surface battle in the Pacific would most likely involve the US, UK, Japan, Sth Korea and a number of other players.
The ASW focus of the Hunters serves two roles, a complementry role within a larger force and defence of our own SLOC.
Something which is vital for our continued survival as an independent nation.
Yeah, but if we don't really know Hunter's final config, that's a worry in itself for mine. This is where costs really blow out and delays occur and I dont know if we have the luxury of that risk at them moment.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Indeed, the USN following experiences dating back to WWII IIRC, have whose role aboard ship is specifically damage control. This in theory would provide crew to do damage control whilst other crew can continue to 'fight' the vessel. The 'extra' personnel for damage control also might be why USN vessels which suffered significant damage as a result of attacks (USS Stark and USS Cole) were not lost despite the damage and casualties suffered. BTW when I double-checked the numbers, it looks like there were between 16 and 21 'extra' USN crew vs. RAN crew for essentially the same class of vessel.
Or to put it another way, ~10% of USN crew is going to be specifically for damage control. If the RAN continues its normal practice, this might mean that the RAN could run an AB DDG with a crew of 'only' ~290 vs. a USN crew of ~320. Given that the Hobart-class DDG has a crew of approx. 180 per the RAN website... two RAN AB's would have a crew requirement equal to three Hobart-class DDG's or ANZAC-class FFH's.
Without getting into any of the other issues, of which there are a number, the ability to have sufficient numbers of crew with the right/necessary skills to actually crew a vessel does need to be taken into consideration. If not, then vessels might be in RAN service but essentially serving as dock queens due to lack of personnel. While the RAN can expand the number of personnel so that more vessels and/or ones with higher crew requirements can have crews, this is still something which takes time. In fact, this can take years for personnel suitable for specific posts to be developed.
John Newman
The Bunker Group
What do you mean “but if we don’t really know Hunter’s final config”?
Is there any reason why you, or anybody, not currently inside the Government, Defence or the shipbuilder should know the “final configuration”?
As is with all Defence projects, some information is in the public domain, and other information is not, OPSEC.
We need a credible sovereign deterrent and yes, hopefully we will have our allies along side. However, our contribution is not up to the mark for the Indo-Pacific. Compare newer ROK and JMSDF vessels, which are really quite comparable to the ABIII. Hobart only looks decent only compared with certain Western European navies.
No I don't need to know, just pointing out that it is probably not yet stable and consequently cost and delivery schedule would also still be uncertain.
John Newman
The Bunker Group
Hang on.
You also said “that’s a worry in itself for mine”, but how do you know what to worry about or not?
The problem is that what gets reported in the general media (and the so-called professional defence media too), is often not based on real facts, it is full of “the sky is falling” speculation that is rarely challenged.
I’ll give you an example.
Today on the ASPI Strategist website, Marcus Hellyer wrote an article that was factually incorrect.
I was in contact with Marcus this afternoon to point out the errors, and guess what? The article has been updated.
I rarely believe what is written or said in the public domain, not without research and fact checking.
Rock the kasbah
Active Member
This is really interesting and important
So if we go full on call up, all hands on deck
In today's modern era how long is it gunna take us to get sorted aka ww2
Are we losing all our pros and equipment while we organise ourselves?
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Really hard to say, without knowing more about the circumstances. I would expect the sort of drastic build up of personnel and kit like in WWII to no longer be a realistic scenario due to both the increased potential lethality of modern kit, but also the complexity of it. Complexity which requires time to manufacture as well as special skills to utilize. The basic gist would be that if a war were to break out, the forces available to use would be the ones a nation has already established and trained. Raising new/additional forces after a major war has broken out would most likely not be able to crank out replacement personnel with the needed skills fast enough to make up for combat losses and/or kit would be lost/damaged faster than it could be repaired or replaced.
It's not just us, it's everybody. It's easy enough to train a warm body to haul ropes, chip rust, load guns, and drink rum and in an emergency like WW2 they can be dying at sea in months.
Not so easy to train crew to do all of the above AND operate highly complex systems and not so easy to find suitable bodies when we've unaccountably stopped breeding enough kids to train. All of which means fewer recruits and much slower build up. To fight a war where weapons are likely to be more fearsome than ever.
oldsig
(Sorry Tod, you beat me to it)
Well yes I agree, one can easily be misled by sensationalist media. If you are suggesting Hunter is truly on track for early delivery and gaining additional VLS, then yes, better to let it run given the already sunk costs. Taking up Navantia's offer for more Hobarts and using them to retire Anzac's or keep them in reserve would still work in that scenario.
BTW I assume you are referring to Marcus Hellyer's clarification of the difference between JSM and NSM?
@BSKS You are banned from replying in this thread for two days because you ignored the Moderators red ink instruction not continue the discussion regarding the recent Navantia DDG offer, acquiring DDG-51s, Klingon death stars etc., so don't do it again.
Ngatimozart.
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John Newman
The Bunker Group
Ngati,
Well, you saved me the trouble of making an in-depth reply to the recently departed.
Thanks mate!
“And another one bites the dust......” (for two days at least).
Well, you saved me the trouble of making an in-depth reply to the recently departed.
Thanks mate!
“And another one bites the dust......” (for two days at least).
I know your a NSW man and all that and your mother was a dropbear, but its bad form to gloat.
And no you can't eat the victim. The consumption of long pork is illegal in Australia for some strange reason.Can you link the article you refer to please John.
Going Boeing
Well-Known Member
I believe that it’s this one: Making sense of Australia’s salvo of missile announcements | The Strategist
Upgraded Hobarts are a fantasyland thought bubble proposed by those with little knowledge of naval procurement.
There are multiple posts in this thread explaining why this is so therefore a reread of the thread over the last few days would be a good idea.
Can we please retain some sense of reality regarding the RANs current acquisition programmes in terms of both manpower and budget. Any deviation from this needs to recognise that reality.
John Newman
The Bunker Group
Hi Bob,
This is the Marcus Hellyer ASPI article from yesterday:
Making sense of Australia’s salvo of missile announcements | The Strategist
The government delivered a barrage of missile announcements over the past couple of days. It’s not easy to distinguish what’s new from a semi-announcement of something that’s already been announced or is an existing part ...
www.aspistrategist.org.au
Below are the two ‘original’ paragraphs he wrote (just as well I copied and saved them):
“Acquisition of the NSM raises some interesting issues. Integrating the NSM onto the F-35A has always been part of the capability program since it’s the only long-range anti-ship missile that will fit inside the F-35A’s payload bay. Arguably, it was delays to the integration of the F-35 and NSM (clearly the international Joint Strike Fighter consortium that sets the work program doesn’t regard a maritime strike weapon to be as high a priority as we do) that led to the government’s July 2020 announcement of a Plan B for maritime strike, which is to integrate the long-range anti-ship missile (LRASM) onto the Super Hornet.
“But this announcement says the NSM is being acquired for the navy’s major surface combatants, not for the F-35A. Certainly NSMs are a major improvement over the Harpoon missiles currently in navy service, particularly in terms of range and stealth. But the NSM don’t have the range of the significantly larger LRASM, so it would be interesting to hear why Defence opted for NSMs over LRASMs, although it’s always possible that LRASMs could still be acquired.”
After an email exchange with Marcus Hellyer, he ‘updated’ those two paragraphs:
“Acquisition of the NSM raises some interesting issues. Integrating the NSM’s sister missile, the JSM (joint strike missile), onto the F-35A has always been part of the capability program since it’s the only long-range anti-ship missile that will fit inside the F-35A’s payload bay. Arguably, it was delays to the integration of the F-35 and JSM (clearly the international Joint Strike Fighter consortium that sets the work program doesn’t regard a maritime strike weapon to be as high a priority as we do) that led to the government’s July 2020 announcement of a Plan B for maritime strike, which is to integrate the long-range anti-ship missile (LRASM) onto the Super Hornet.
“But this announcement refers to NSM being acquired for the navy’s major surface combatants, not JSM for the F-35A. Certainly NSMs are a major improvement over the Harpoon missiles currently in navy service, particularly in terms of range and stealth. But the NSM doesn’t have the range of the significantly larger LRASM, so it would be interesting to hear why Defence opted for NSMs for its ships over LRASMs, although it’s always possible that LRASMs could still be acquired.”
Plus this little note in the footer of the article:
“Note: This article was updated to clarify the difference between the NSM and JSM (8 April 2022, 1530 AEST)”
As you can see, the original article inferred that NSM and JSM were in fact the ‘same’ missile, they are not.
NSM is surface launched (ship or land), JSM is air launched.
Why does it matter?
Here’s the problem, you’ve got a person in a senior position at ASPI writing articles that are clearly wrong and inaccurate.
If he can’t get it right, what hope for the general media?
You can understand why most of us old timers here on DT have virtually zero respect for what is written in the general media regarding Defence.
This is not an isolated problem, we also had a garbage post on APDR this week regarding Boxer, the list goes on and on.
Cheers,
(My original post regarding the Marcus Hellyer error is in the ADF Thread, post #2,105)
YouTube video for Sea Air Space 2022 video by Xavier (forget his last name) reporting for Naval News, Day 1, April 6th, just outside Washington, at 9.52, shows the intergration of a NSM to a MH 60 Romeo helicopter. Sorry I can't paste the link, as my workplace blocks yt videos and I'm typing from work. Thought I'd type it here given the NSM's being bought and we have MH60's.