Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

ddxx

Well-Known Member
I have not worked in shipbuilding, nor do I possess much in the way of skills in welding, but I can attest that the phrase, "use it or lose it," does indeed apply to a number of skills which takes both training to acquire, then experience to hone. How long it takes for a person's skills to degrade to the point where they would need re-training, and/or how long it would take a person to get back up to speed, would be dependent on both the person, and the specific skills which need to be either re-learned or honed. At the same time though, it is also possible that in the interim phases were a potential or former skilled yard worker was out, that there could be material or process changes which would need to be learned, which someone who was not idled following a lack of work would have been kept up on.
But, someone of significant relevant experience wouldn’t be on the front line getting their hands dirty in *any* industry - their role would likely be in quality control, or other related roles. Identifying a good or bad weld or job doesn’t change. Methods, procedures, and efficiencies do.

Think of it like a senior Chef on the pass at a restaurant - they’re not actually cooking, but they choose which dishes go out and which dishes get remade. It’s a skill only a lot of hands on experience can provide which is a constant in quality control.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Well,I did notice that the RAN had the largest numbers of graduate officers this year since the 1950s, so maybe something is being done about additional manpower.


Just wondering if this course is the Army equivalent to Duntroon's officer course.
The later is an 18 month course compared to around 5 months for the NEOC.

Do both services come out with a commission of commensurate rank?

Just curious


Regards S
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I have not worked in shipbuilding, nor do I possess much in the way of skills in welding, but I can attest that the phrase, "use it or lose it," does indeed apply to a number of skills which takes both training to acquire, then experience to hone. How long it takes for a person's skills to degrade to the point where they would need re-training, and/or how long it would take a person to get back up to speed, would be dependent on both the person, and the specific skills which need to be either re-learned or honed. At the same time though, it is also possible that in the interim phases were a potential or former skilled yard worker was out, that there could be material or process changes which would need to be learned, which someone who was not idled following a lack of work would have been kept up on.
Things change, technology moves on but core skills remain. People moved back and forth from automotive, to shipbuilding, to mining construction and back again. Trade skills are transferable, technical skills are transferable, engineering skills are transferable.

What is lacking is consistency in management, structure, and systems thinking. There are too many senior people wearing blinkers and proud of it. People who believe that what others do is unnecessary or better done by others because the locals aren't skilled enough or competent enough.

There are those who believe that we should buy everything from overseas because they know how to manage contracts, but don't know how to manage projects, let alone how to manage a development project.

There are those who believe we should buy complex equipment from overseas and build simple stuff here, i.e. build patrol boats and buy frigates and submarines.

The silly thing is, our performance on major complex projects is often better than on anything other than a straight FMS buy where the US basically does everything for us. The problem is not our trades, technical, engineering or project managers, it's our product and contract managers and the lack of technical oversight and rigour in what are seen as simple procurements.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
So, many years ago in a Staff College brief, then HNC was briefing on RAN strength. When detailing # of ships and # people I couldn't help but notice it was about the same as the 196x fleet, except we had more ships. And some of those were workforce pigs - CFA engine room crew for instance - that modern ships don't need.

I nudged by senior Naval officer mate and asked why. His answer was to wave his hand around. About 3/4 of the RAN students came from desk jobs and would go back to similar. That's fine, there is only so many ships. But heaps of those jobs were Joint - ones that either didn't exist in the 60s or were filled by Army. Now Joint is essential and it's one of our massive strengths, but the RAN should have grown throughout the 90s to meet the new ADO paradigm. Gosh, once I suggested that we consider cutting Army in half to boost the RAN - something that generally didn't get much time around the Army side of the office.....
Did the term ‘trolling’ exist back then? :p
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
It’s the first of possibly a number of courses a new officer may have to undertake. The Navy training paradigm is quite different to the Army’s and to this the basic course you add whatever is needed to develop the individual.

It’s quite possible that officers on this course could be of LCDR rank; direct promotions from WO. OTOH, they could be 19 year old kids from school of Midshipman’s rank. Or lawyers or doctors who have just finished uni and are LEUTs. The further development needs of each is obviously very different.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
It’s the first of possibly a number of courses a new officer may have to undertake. The Navy training paradigm is quite different to the Army’s and to this the basic course you add whatever is needed to develop the individual.

It’s quite possible that officers on this course could be of LCDR rank; direct promotions from WO. OTOH, they could be 19 year old kids from school of Midshipman’s rank. Or lawyers or doctors who have just finished uni and are LEUTs. The further development needs of each is obviously very different.
Thanks for the reply

All for training and education
All for years of experience

Trust it works well for Navy as they grow in numbers.


Regards S
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
It’s the first of possibly a number of courses a new officer may have to undertake. The Navy training paradigm is quite different to the Army’s and to this the basic course you add whatever is needed to develop the individual.

It’s quite possible that officers on this course could be of LCDR rank; direct promotions from WO. OTOH, they could be 19 year old kids from school of Midshipman’s rank. Or lawyers or doctors who have just finished uni and are LEUTs. The further development needs of each is obviously very different.
People of my level of experience, so long as they satisfy Engineers Australia's requirements for Chartered Engineer Status, can be appointed directly to LCDR through NEOC. Conversely, LCDRs with engineering degrees are granted Chartered Status, irrespective of whether they have met a competent engineer in their lives, let alone needing to be one.
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
People of my level of experience, so long as they satisfy Engineers Australia's requirements for Chartered Engineer Status, can be appointed directly to LCDR through NEOC. Conversely, LCDRs with engineering degrees are granted Chartered Status, irrespective of whether they have met a competent engineer in their lives, let alone needing to be one.
I’m unaware of how current MEOs and WEEO’s qualify but during my time they were all trained in the RN (HMS Collingwood), served time at sea as deputies and finally as department heads at sea.
Most were more than qualified and more than competent in their at sea jobs.
Those who weren’t promoted to Commander were out of the service at 45.
The same applied to Senior Engineer NCOs, CPOs had to retire at 50 and POs at 45 IIRC
The CEAFAR company is one classic example of what ex “uniformed” engineers achieve.
During my time as head of operations at the worlds largest pearling company I only employed ex navy trade engineers and in all but one case they excelled.
So your comments re uniforms may apply to some you’ve experienced but, without knowing how current RAN engineers are trained, it would be a disservice to label them all “unqualified”.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I’m unaware of how current MEOs and WEEO’s qualify but during my time they were all trained in the RN (HMS Collingwood), served time at sea as deputies and finally as department heads at sea.
Most were more than qualified and more than competent in their at sea jobs.
Those who weren’t promoted to Commander were out of the service at 45.
The same applied to Senior Engineer NCOs, CPOs had to retire at 50 and POs at 45 IIRC
The CEAFAR company is one classic example of what ex “uniformed” engineers achieve.
During my time as head of operations at the worlds largest pearling company I only employed ex navy trade engineers and in all but one case they excelled.
So your comments re uniforms may apply to some you’ve experienced but, without knowing how current RAN engineers are trained, it would be a disservice to label them all “unqualified”.
Actually I've worked with some absolutely brilliant current and former MEOs, WEOs and technical sailors of all ages. My concern is specifically that the system Engineers Australia uses, automatically assumes that a given qualification and a rank automatically means the individual is competent and capable without them actually having to demonstrate that they are. The fact that certain individuals are encouraged to leave service and are not trusted to hold delegation shows that there are bad ones.

When there is a competent capable engineering manager or chief engineer determining who holds engineering delegation they can weed out the Dunning Kruger types and fakers, it is a real issue when there is a lack of experienced senior people who can identify the bad apples.

There are a disturbing number of not good enough people who have a very high opinion of their own genius, who are filling critical and senior roles on projects because the people appointing them are given a false sense of security by their chartered status and or the rank they held.

Engineers Australia are meant to ensure the people they grant chartered status to are competent, qualified and experienced. They fail at this because they rely on the qualification and resume over the person's actual performance. I.e. they may have been part of a team, or even led a team of competent individuals that others built and were carried by, or worse, damaged the performance of the team. As an individual they are useless or even dangerously incompetent and toxic but given chartered status anyway.
 

ddxx

Well-Known Member
Somewhat tying back in with @Volkodav ’s earlier remarks re RAN workforce and fleet, here’s a graph I put together for personal interest.

All numbers are permanent workforce from each financial year’s annual report as published by Defence, from 1999 through until the most recent. If only they included their own graph!

Growth in workforce (whilst good to see) has been somewhat below population growth over the period. In 1999 the Australian Population was ~18.93m, in 2021 it’s ~25.69.

However, the solid trend line in growth is very pleasing to see.

4BE34A8E-77AF-464D-A638-6B026FF24AC1.jpeg
 
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ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
The RAN requires something to replace the Choules and in reality it really requires two. The UK Defence Journal have published this article: Could ‘Ellida’ be Britain’s future amphibious assault ship? (ukdefencejournal.org.uk) about the possible future amphibious assault ship and Bay Class replacement for the RN.

However I don't think that it would be overly successful in that role because of the limited flight deck space. Having said that, given the capabilities that have been signed into it, I do think that it would make for an excellent amphib ops support ship and a logistics support ship when the Supply and Success are unavailable. As the Navy Lookout article states: In focus: the BMT ELLIDA multi-role and logistics vessel concept | Navy Lookout it can be adapted for liquid RAS as well. Of course the fuels carried would be nowhere near the quantity of Success or Supply.

Of course it doesn't have to be the Ellida design, but something along these lines, of a similar size and actually a few knots faster would be ideal. The Navantia Australia JSS design is one example: PACIFIC 2019: Navantia Australia Unveils Joint Support Ship Design - Naval News
 

John Newman

The Bunker Group
The RAN requires something to replace the Choules and in reality it really requires two. The UK Defence Journal have published this article: Could ‘Ellida’ be Britain’s future amphibious assault ship? (ukdefencejournal.org.uk) about the possible future amphibious assault ship and Bay Class replacement for the RN.

However I don't think that it would be overly successful in that role because of the limited flight deck space. Having said that, given the capabilities that have been signed into it, I do think that it would make for an excellent amphib ops support ship and a logistics support ship when the Supply and Success are unavailable. As the Navy Lookout article states: In focus: the BMT ELLIDA multi-role and logistics vessel concept | Navy Lookout it can be adapted for liquid RAS as well. Of course the fuels carried would be nowhere near the quantity of Success or Supply.

Of course it doesn't have to be the Ellida design, but something along these lines, of a similar size and actually a few knots faster would be ideal. The Navantia Australia JSS design is one example: PACIFIC 2019: Navantia Australia Unveils Joint Support Ship Design - Naval News
The plan to replace Choules, and replace with two JSS, is already budgeted for:


The two JSS ships will be built at Henderson, project has a timeline range approx 2026-2034, has a budget allowance range of $5.1b to $7.7b.

Certainly plenty of money allocated, but the Governments (Federal and WA), need to get a wriggle on regarding the new large dry dock and other infrastructure upgrades.

Contenders could anything from the Navantia offering up to Damens Karel Doorman (both are variations of the Enforcer design).


Anyway, certainly a big enough budget allowance planned.

Cheers,
 

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
If we keep increasing the number of HVU more escorts will be required (along with the required manning). IMHO the escort situation needs to be resolved before additional HVU (that required escorts) are bought on stream. With the AOR's, the LHD's and the Choules (or replacement JSS) it would appear that our entire combat power will be tied up as escorts (noting not everything is available all the time) and it will still be thin. Multiple groups will just make it worse but multiple groups are likely to be required in many circumstances.

A possible solution is to retain the ANZAC's a bit longer (2 to 3 years) as the Hunters are delivered to increase effective numbers at any given time. To make the increase 'permanent' the drumbeat of the Hunter build would have to increase to achieve the increase in hulls over the longer term with additional Hunters (or DDGx) added to the building run.

I don't see adding T31's, or any other variant of any other build, as the solution noting this would entails a separate logistics, support and training arrangement. Its worse if they are built overseas as the RAN would then be likely rely on suppliers outside Australia for spares.

As far as corvettes are concerned range is everything in the Australian context. This means they would effectively need to be frigates if they are to cover the escort role. I like the idea of additional hulls but they must be supportable, paid for and ...... be combat capable in the current environment (i.e. the problem to the North). You can only pack so much in a small hull.

Basically build on what we have planned .... but more of it.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
The RAN requires something to replace the Choules and in reality it really requires two. The UK Defence Journal have published this article: Could ‘Ellida’ be Britain’s future amphibious assault ship? (ukdefencejournal.org.uk) about the possible future amphibious assault ship and Bay Class replacement for the RN.

However I don't think that it would be overly successful in that role because of the limited flight deck space. Having said that, given the capabilities that have been signed into it, I do think that it would make for an excellent amphib ops support ship and a logistics support ship when the Supply and Success are unavailable. As the Navy Lookout article states: In focus: the BMT ELLIDA multi-role and logistics vessel concept | Navy Lookout it can be adapted for liquid RAS as well. Of course the fuels carried would be nowhere near the quantity of Success or Supply.

Of course it doesn't have to be the Ellida design, but something along these lines, of a similar size and actually a few knots faster would be ideal. The Navantia Australia JSS design is one example: PACIFIC 2019: Navantia Australia Unveils Joint Support Ship Design - Naval News
Will the RAN in ten years time mirror what is currently planned?
I just don't know.

Suggest a new DWP to give some clarity and reassurance for what is in the immediate pipe line of construction and some updated clarity for down the track.
Re Choules, we could go down many paths.

The RAN like the RN and other professional Navy's are reassuring their respective fleets needs and how best to cater for the challenges ahead.
The days of like for like replacements are passing.

For Choules replacement, a multirole vessel has appeal, but it will still need to fit within the big picture.

Interesting times.

Regards S
 

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
The RAN requ ires something to replace the Choules and in reality it really requires two. The UK Defence Journal have published this article: Could ‘Ellida’ be Britain’s future amphibious assault ship? (ukdefencejournal.org.uk) about the possible future amphibious assault ship and Bay Class replacement for the RN.

However I don't think that it would be overly successful in that role because of the limited flight deck space. Having said that, given the capabilities that have been signed into it, I do think that it would make for an excellent amphib ops support ship and a logistics support ship when the Supply and Success are unavailable. As the Navy Lookout article states: In focus: the BMT ELLIDA multi-role and logistics vessel concept | Navy Lookout it can be adapted for liquid RAS as well. Of course the fuels carried would be nowhere near the quantity of Success or Supply.

Of course it doesn't have to be the Ellida design, but something along these lines, of a similar size and actually a few knots faster would be ideal. The Navantia Australia JSS design is one example: PACIFIC 2019: Navantia Australia Unveils Joint Support Ship Design - Naval News
I am not sure there is much difference in the flight deck (noting this is a guess based on the images) as both the JSS and ELLIDA have two spots after with the MRH-90 on the JSS and an EH101 on the ELLIDA. But as you say both capable ships. I agree a higher speed would be nice noting the LHD's and AOR's run at about 20 knots.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
There are two cost verses capability gaps that need to be considered. The first is that between a disposable / not worth defending platform and a combatant able to defend itself, and the next is between a ship able to operate helicopters / UAV (and possibly STOVL) and a proper carrier.

The cost of the self defence systems of a combatant means that a corvette will cost you almost as much as a light frigate, even though it is the size of an OPV. Up gunning the OPV to corvette levels of capability is a waste of resources because it will not be survivable unless you add the defensive systems that would make it as expensive as a frigate. If you do not upgrade the OPVs defensive suite, the offensive systems you have fitted will do nothing more than make it a target and more likely to be attacked and sunk than if it was unarmed.

Once you have committed to a minimum offensive capability that entails a corresponding increase in defensive capability, it costs very little to increase the size to that of a full frigate that is more flexible, more capable, easier and cheaper to upgrade and maintain than a corvette.

When you then add the requirement for land attack, large ASW helos, AEGIS, area air defence, etc. you are repeating this process of making a larger more capable hull better value for money.

So if you want a minor combatant with a helicopter and antishiping missiles, that can defend its self, the sweet spot is a light or GP frigate, not a bombed up OPV.

If you want a ship capable area air defence, ABM, land attack etc. the sweet spot is a 8000 ton plus destroyer.

On the aviation side of things the magic number is six. The support facilities and personnel for a single aircraft is pretty much the same as for six aircraft. When hangaring helicopters on a ship, the largest number that can be effectively operated from a helideck and box hanger is six. Once you have a ship with six helicopters you have a target that needs to be defended. This is where a through deck design with its own defence capability becomes the more sensible and efficient option.

So long story short, the existence of the LHDs means the RAN needs more escorts than they have. Up gunning the OPVs is a non starter because they can't defend themselves and would need to be escorted.
 

aussienscale

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
A Hugh White article on SSK v SSN
IMO he's wrong. The comments state as much too.

A lot of the comments are wrong and misleading ! Not saying Hugh is correct, he does raise valid operational points, but some of the assertions in the few comments that are there are just plain wrong, price and endurance are just a couple of them :)

Cheers
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
A lot of the comments are wrong and misleading ! Not saying Hugh is correct, he does raise valid operational points, but some of the assertions in the few comments that are there are just plain wrong, price and endurance are just a couple of them :)

Cheers
White is compromised by his sincere belief that “Fortress Australia” should be our prime defence strategy.
In his view therefore, multiple numbers of SSKs close to Australia are the preferred solution but to give him his due, he does, in my view reluctantly, concede that there is a case for SSNs operating further afield.
 

Gryphinator

Active Member
Leader of the opposition on strategic fleet. We've discussed this here before. An empty election promise or vital asset that needs to be followed through?


 
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