Don't disagree.
When does a vessel go from being an asset to a liability.
Well I guess it depends on the contingency.
Regards S
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0
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When does a vessel go from being an asset to a liability.
Well I guess it depends on the contingency.
Regards S
I disagree with his primary assertion.A Hugh White article on SSK v SSN
IMO he's wrong. The comments state as much too.
SSN vs SSK | Lowy Institute
Time on station or a numbers game? The answer depends on the mission for Australia’s submarine fleet.www.lowyinstitute.org
IF this fight materialises, does anybody really believe that the US wouldn’t welcome assets that would be significant contributors? In this instance would the US turn down a Squadron of Virginia or Astutes? Of course not. And this doesn’t just go for subs - AEGIS destroyers, 5th Gen air, SF, C-17 lift amongst other things.
meatshield
Active Member
I read this article today about Sub production in the US. One line jumped out at me "sheer luck in finding five unused nuclear reactor cores that could refuel some LA attack subs".
I wonder if the RAN might get one of these boats eventually.
US Navy avoided a 2022 ‘trough’ in submarine fleet size, but industry challenges threaten future growth (defensenews.com)
I wonder if the RAN might get one of these boats eventually.
US Navy avoided a 2022 ‘trough’ in submarine fleet size, but industry challenges threaten future growth (defensenews.com)
I suggest not ... the fact this was a circuit breaker indicates these vessels will be operated by the USN until a refuel is required. I understand these are the cores (the structure that supports the fuel) not a complete reactor.
The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency has approved the Sale of up to 800 AGM-114R2 Hellfire air to surface missiles to Australia.
adbr.com.au
US approves large Hellfire missile buy for Australia | ADBR
The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has announced that the US State Department has approved the possible sale of up to 800 Lockheed Martin AGM-114R2 Hellfire air-to-surface missiles for…
adbr.com.au
Scott Elaurant
Well-Known Member
Hello from a long time reader, first time poster. I am an Adelaide engineer with a personal interest in the outcome of the AUKUS submarine contract. I have worked on some defense civil engineering contracts but was never in the RAN. The closest I have come to submarines is playing Harpoon and watching Hunt for Red October. I respect the forum rules.
www.lowyinstitute.org
I also read this article and thought it flawed in multiple respects. For example, its time on station analysis compares SSNs and SSKs, each with 90 day endurance. Yet the latter does not exist. SSK endurance is 70 days max. SSN endurance is 90+ days. All the conclusions that follow are false.
Hugh White and others of his generation of defense planners spent many years maintaining a defense posture that assumed a peaceful SE Asia and wanted to keep it that way. That was fair enough in the 1990s/2000s, but is no longer relevant. It means White is not a neutral observer. AUKUS demolishes White’s previous work, and so White attacks AUKUS.
i have found many of the analyses of SSN cost equally spurious. Comparing the cost of an SSK built in South Korea with the cost of an SSN built in USA is not “apples with apples”. Often the subs compared are not even the same tonnage, when it is recognised elsewhere that naval construction cost is related to tonnage. To really understand the cost of RAN SSNs vs SSK cost we need to compare cost of an SSN and an SSK of similar tonnage built to the same standard in the same market. Ironically the only recent example (Barracudas) suggested the difference is far less than White claims. Also some of the SSN building costs are fixed not “per boat”, and so we will pay them whether we build one SSN or 10. For example, you can’t build 1/10th of a new lifting crane.
So, respecting forum rules, my personal hope is that we build an SSN fleet that does the job and we can afford to reliably maintain and crew, not the SSN fleet with the best toys. To me, that probably means a fleet of 8 updated Astutes, rather than 8 Virginias. In fact, it appears we could afford 9 or 10 Astutes for the cost of 8 Virginias, which is a significant advantage. We shall see.
One final comment on supporting infrastructure. I do not understand why we do not proceed with this immediately, as opposed to the end of 18 months. There is not much difference in cost between building a dock or construction pad 100m long or 140m. Assuming either would fit at Osborne we should proceed now to build any essential facilities needed at a size to fit Astutes or Block V Virginias. This would also future proof for building the replacement SSNR or SSNX in thirty years. In the mean time we could also repair any allied SSN that needed it locally, which would benefit all three AUKUS navies.
Sorry for the long first post. Thanks for letting me aboard.
SSN vs SSK | Lowy Institute
Time on station or a numbers game? The answer depends on the mission for Australia’s submarine fleet.
www.lowyinstitute.org
Hugh White and others of his generation of defense planners spent many years maintaining a defense posture that assumed a peaceful SE Asia and wanted to keep it that way. That was fair enough in the 1990s/2000s, but is no longer relevant. It means White is not a neutral observer. AUKUS demolishes White’s previous work, and so White attacks AUKUS.
i have found many of the analyses of SSN cost equally spurious. Comparing the cost of an SSK built in South Korea with the cost of an SSN built in USA is not “apples with apples”. Often the subs compared are not even the same tonnage, when it is recognised elsewhere that naval construction cost is related to tonnage. To really understand the cost of RAN SSNs vs SSK cost we need to compare cost of an SSN and an SSK of similar tonnage built to the same standard in the same market. Ironically the only recent example (Barracudas) suggested the difference is far less than White claims. Also some of the SSN building costs are fixed not “per boat”, and so we will pay them whether we build one SSN or 10. For example, you can’t build 1/10th of a new lifting crane.
So, respecting forum rules, my personal hope is that we build an SSN fleet that does the job and we can afford to reliably maintain and crew, not the SSN fleet with the best toys. To me, that probably means a fleet of 8 updated Astutes, rather than 8 Virginias. In fact, it appears we could afford 9 or 10 Astutes for the cost of 8 Virginias, which is a significant advantage. We shall see.
One final comment on supporting infrastructure. I do not understand why we do not proceed with this immediately, as opposed to the end of 18 months. There is not much difference in cost between building a dock or construction pad 100m long or 140m. Assuming either would fit at Osborne we should proceed now to build any essential facilities needed at a size to fit Astutes or Block V Virginias. This would also future proof for building the replacement SSNR or SSNX in thirty years. In the mean time we could also repair any allied SSN that needed it locally, which would benefit all three AUKUS navies.
Sorry for the long first post. Thanks for letting me aboard.
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Having worked with Hugh when he was FAS Strategic Policy in the late 90s, it was interesting to watch his views develop - from, and of course I’m simplifying, “all that matters is strategic strike” in the middle of the decade to “we live or die by small infantry tactics” post Timor. But you are right, in general terms we were looking at a fairly benign environment although that had changed by the early 2000s and particularly the thinking behind the 2000 white paper, at least inside the department. Then came the distraction of 9/11 and the involvement in ground ops against asymmetric foes in the Middle East, which somewhat lessened the focus on high end warfare for a while.
@Scott ElaurantHello from a long time reader, first time poster. I am an Adelaide engineer with a personal interest in the outcome of the AUKUS submarine contract. I have worked on some defense civil engineering contracts but was never in the RAN. The closest I have come to submarines is playing Harpoon and watching Hunt for Red October. I respect the forum rules.
I also read this article and thought it flawed in multiple respects. For example, its time on station analysis compares SSNs and SSKs, each with 90 day endurance. Yet the latter does not exist. SSK endurance is 70 days max. SSN endurance is 90+ days. All the conclusions that follow are false.SSN vs SSK | Lowy Institute
Time on station or a numbers game? The answer depends on the mission for Australia’s submarine fleet.
Hugh White and others of his generation of defense planners spent many years maintaining a defense posture that assumed a peaceful SE Asia and wanted to keep it that way. That was fair enough in the 1990s/2000s, but is no longer relevant. It means White is not a neutral observer. AUKUS demolishes White’s previous work, and so White attacks AUKUS.
i have found many of the analyses of SSN cost equally spurious. Comparing the cost of an SSK built in South Korea with the cost of an SSN built in USA is not “apples with apples”. Often the subs compared are not even the same tonnage, when it is recognised elsewhere that naval construction cost is related to tonnage. To really understand the cost of RAN SSNs vs SSK cost we need to compare cost of an SSN and an SSK of similar tonnage built to the same standard in the same market. Ironically the only recent example (Barracudas) suggested the difference is far less than White claims. Also some of the SSN building costs are fixed not “per boat”, and so we will pay them whether we build one SSN or 10. For example, you can’t build 1/10th of a new lifting crane.
So, respecting forum rules, my personal hope is that we build an SSN fleet that does the job and we can afford to reliably maintain and crew, not the SSN fleet with the best toys. To me, that probably means a fleet of 8 updated Astutes, rather than 8 Virginias. In fact, it appears we could afford 9 or 10 Astutes for the cost of 8 Virginia, which is a significant advantage. We shall see.
One final comment on supporting infrastructure. I do not understand why we do not proceed with this immediately, as opposed to the end of 18 months. There is not much difference in cost between building a dock or construction pad 100m long or 140m. Assuming either would fit at Osborne we should proceed now to build any essential facilities needed at a size to fit Astutes or Block V Virginias. This would also future proof for building the replacement SSNR or SSNX in thirty years. In the mean time we could also repair any allied SSN that needed it locally, which would benefit all three AUKUS navies.
Sorry for the long first post. Thanks for letting me aboard.
Good day Scott
Thank you for your post and welcome to you as a now active member. I completely agree with the underlying gist of your post. I do think that the 18 month period will be truncated and I understand the work on the Submarine yards has not halted, however, I am not aware of the status of the main construction hall.
Scott Elaurant
Well-Known Member
Thanks that makes sense of the evolution of White’s thinking. In the context of a more benign local environment I can also understand White and others not wanting to risk SSNs in the past for fear of provoking a regional arms race. But when the major regional power is already building the world’s largest navy and half a dozen other countries are building submarines that ship has sailed.
Scott Elaurant
Well-Known Member
Another issue I'd like to raise on the submarine saga, based on my holiday reading is about comparative costs. There is an amazing disconnect in “expert” opinion pieces on Australian nuclear submarines between the cost (everyone agrees it will be higher) and the choice of submarine (lots of the defense writers want us to get the US Virginia Block 5, seemingly regardless of price).
This article by government funded think-tank ASPI is a good example. It considers cost in evaluating how and where to build, but ignores costs in recommending what submarine design to build.
Yet the cost differences between the options are huge – in the tens of billions over eight boats. The current costs per submarine are:
Astute A$2.6 billion each (UK MoD current program cost)
Virginia Block 4 A$3.9 billion each (US DoD current program cost)
Virginia Block 5 A$4.8 billion each (US DoD current program cost)
Attack Class SSK A$7.4 billion each (Australian DfD final program cost for 12 with < 60% Australian content)
The cost to build them in Australia will be more. The local ship construction cost premium has been estimated at 1.3 to 1.5. There is no evidence that premium would be any different for each design. There would be additional costs to set up Australian nuclear sub construction and inspection infrastructure (billions) and operating costs for 30 years each ($200 million per sub or $1.6 billion per year x 30 years). The US boats have the largest crews and so highest operating cost as well as higher capital cost than the UK subs. Overall 8 UK subs are cheaper than 8 US subs by A$20+ billion to buy and A$10+ billion to operate over 30 years.
So you can see where this is headed. All options are expensive but some are far more expensive than others. The whole of life cost difference between the latest US sub design and the UK sub design is A$30+ billion – literally enough to build an aircraft carrier, or another squadron of ships. My background is in engineering and economics, not defense, so I won't comment on capability other than to assume the VLS in Virginia Class gives operational advantages. Still, when you want to compare capability, the capability comparison should not be between 8 Astutes vs 8 Virginias. It should be:
10 x Astutes vs
8 x Virginia Block 4 or
6 x Virginia Block 5.
Each of those options would have a similar whole of life cost. Are 6 x Virginia Block 5s more capable than 10 x Astutes? I find that hard to believe.
(The price of the French boats had become absurd and I only included them for purposes of comparison. Naval Group was charging the RAN more per submarine to build diesel Attack Class than they charged the French government to build their nuclear Barracuda Class Suffren).
For comparison, the Collins Class subs cost $850 million each in 1999, or about $1.5 billion each in 2022 A$. So important to note the real cost of building subs ourselves last time was actually cheaper than all current options in current $. Hence don’t let anyone say building in Australia is “too expensive”. Every western nation is expensive when it comes to building submarines.
This article by government funded think-tank ASPI is a good example. It considers cost in evaluating how and where to build, but ignores costs in recommending what submarine design to build.
Yet the cost differences between the options are huge – in the tens of billions over eight boats. The current costs per submarine are:
Astute A$2.6 billion each (UK MoD current program cost)
Virginia Block 4 A$3.9 billion each (US DoD current program cost)
Virginia Block 5 A$4.8 billion each (US DoD current program cost)
Attack Class SSK A$7.4 billion each (Australian DfD final program cost for 12 with < 60% Australian content)
The cost to build them in Australia will be more. The local ship construction cost premium has been estimated at 1.3 to 1.5. There is no evidence that premium would be any different for each design. There would be additional costs to set up Australian nuclear sub construction and inspection infrastructure (billions) and operating costs for 30 years each ($200 million per sub or $1.6 billion per year x 30 years). The US boats have the largest crews and so highest operating cost as well as higher capital cost than the UK subs. Overall 8 UK subs are cheaper than 8 US subs by A$20+ billion to buy and A$10+ billion to operate over 30 years.
So you can see where this is headed. All options are expensive but some are far more expensive than others. The whole of life cost difference between the latest US sub design and the UK sub design is A$30+ billion – literally enough to build an aircraft carrier, or another squadron of ships. My background is in engineering and economics, not defense, so I won't comment on capability other than to assume the VLS in Virginia Class gives operational advantages. Still, when you want to compare capability, the capability comparison should not be between 8 Astutes vs 8 Virginias. It should be:
10 x Astutes vs
8 x Virginia Block 4 or
6 x Virginia Block 5.
Each of those options would have a similar whole of life cost. Are 6 x Virginia Block 5s more capable than 10 x Astutes? I find that hard to believe.
(The price of the French boats had become absurd and I only included them for purposes of comparison. Naval Group was charging the RAN more per submarine to build diesel Attack Class than they charged the French government to build their nuclear Barracuda Class Suffren).
For comparison, the Collins Class subs cost $850 million each in 1999, or about $1.5 billion each in 2022 A$. So important to note the real cost of building subs ourselves last time was actually cheaper than all current options in current $. Hence don’t let anyone say building in Australia is “too expensive”. Every western nation is expensive when it comes to building submarines.
Welcome to the site, hope you find it enjoyable and insightful
Just a couple of quick points re pricing, every country costs their acquisition programmes differently, so these publicly available costings do not tell the whole story, it does not give a like for like drive away price as each country takes many different factors into account.
The UK cost is a pure construction cost only, showroom sticker price if you like, a lot of hidden extra's by the time you leave the showroom floor.
The US is different again and their price has included goodies into it, same things the UK will also have to pay for on top of the listed cost.
Australia price our programmes very differently to most of our allies, we have a whole of program approach, so you are not just talking having the actual build cost incorporated in the program estimates, but everything else for the life of the program, facilities, base upgrades, estimates on future re-fits, mid life cycles etc etc, so looking at the cost of the Attack Class cost and dividing it by 12 to get a number is not a true comparison with other countries submarines.
Also a then an now dollar conversion of the Collins Class really does nothing, first you are comparing or holding that up to the light compared to modern nuclear submarines. You are also freezing the tech and COGS, supply chain etc in that point of time when Collins first started, modern tech, increases in supply chains, tech improvements and advancement increase real cost over time and again does not give you a like for like comparison.
Hope that help ?
Cheers
I was just wondering if anyone knows what crewing concepts are currently used for each class in the fleet? I know that the Armidale Class are multi-crewed on a 3 crews for every two ships basis, but I'm not sure in regards to the rest of the fleet such as the DDGs, FFHs, LHDs, MCMs etc.?
Additionally, are the OPVs also intended to be crewed on the same 3:2 basis of the smaller Armidales they replace?
Additionally, are the OPVs also intended to be crewed on the same 3:2 basis of the smaller Armidales they replace?
Scott Elaurant
Well-Known Member
Aussienscale
Thanks and I accept all your points. I did try looking for cost breakdowns, being used to them in my own field (infrastructure) but they are conspicuously hard to find for subs and military programs generally.
Do you have any knowledge of the actual total program cost of the Astutes?
Looking through what I can find, obviously the cost of the first in class was much higher (2.2 billion PDS). There is also a 450 million pound program cost overrun referred to. Even if you combine those, divide by 7 and add to the list price of an Astute (= +200 million pounds), you still only get an Astute average price of A$2.95 billion, say A$3 billion each, in 2021 A$ which is still a lot cheaper (roughly A$1 billion each) than a Block 4 Virginia.
Thanks and I accept all your points. I did try looking for cost breakdowns, being used to them in my own field (infrastructure) but they are conspicuously hard to find for subs and military programs generally.
Do you have any knowledge of the actual total program cost of the Astutes?
Looking through what I can find, obviously the cost of the first in class was much higher (2.2 billion PDS). There is also a 450 million pound program cost overrun referred to. Even if you combine those, divide by 7 and add to the list price of an Astute (= +200 million pounds), you still only get an Astute average price of A$2.95 billion, say A$3 billion each, in 2021 A$ which is still a lot cheaper (roughly A$1 billion each) than a Block 4 Virginia.
From memory the RAN did away with the multi-crewing on the Armidale's a few years ago. A couple of MHC were multi-crewed for a couple of years a decade or so ago, mainly for border control work. Regarding the MFU's it has only really been trialed once with Arunta during her Gulf trip over Xmas 2007 into 2008. The crew was enlarged by about a 3rd and some of the crew only did 3 months of the 6 month deployment. There was still a number of the crew that did the whole 6 months. Other than that, I can't think of any others off the top of my head. Cheers.
Forum has been playing up. First unable to connect, then error messages, now I see @Volkodav in triplicate.
Feels vaguely like the way some threads go round and round and round...with the same arguments. At least Volko makes sense.
oldsig
It is a very hard to get the numbers, it is all spread over many programmes and many different budgets, to get a true cost is almost impossible unfortunately, and the US is even harder to get the true numbers, there is no simple answer unfortunately, the closest we will get to knowing is when we make a decision of either of the boats.
Not sure if @swerve would have a better understanding and can comment ?
With your pricing what does that include though ? again it will not be like for like, does it include the reactor ? The core ? what level of weapons systems and integration etc ? A lot of variables, it really is a nightmare trying to do true like for like comparisons.
Cheers
Cheers