Agree totally, I tend to use Wiki as much to find the references as to read on the topic.
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0
- Thread starter OPSSG
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Wiki is an interesting source to look at when a defence announcement is made.
Generally it is updated very quickly with references supplied.
Good research will always rely on multiple references but as a rough guide to the basics, Wiki is OK.
Regards S
Agree to the need for a more robust capability delivered within the next 10 years, if not sooner.Size probably isn't the key factor.
Crewing probably is, over the life of the ship, in pretty much any modern western nation, the crewing costs will far exceed procurement platform costs. It is fairly easy to allocate budget to build or buy, much harder to recruit, train, retain, crew. Particularly as the RAN and the ADF are expanding in other areas.
Australia isn't particularly/overtly concerned with costs of things like steel, labor to manufacture, fuel, engines, combat systems, radars, and soon missiles etc. Many of these things can be supplied locally, and across the fleet. There is a priority for endurance and range as those have significant effects on availability, operation and projection of power.
The A140 is particularly attractive due to its potential low crewing and its ability to carry sizable arms like a 5", 32VLS, 8 x antishipping missiles, torpedo's and CIWS (although no longer a minimally crewed frigate).
With Corvettes, crewing quickly escalates, why have a 2000t corvette with a crew of 80-90 with a crew of a 90 gets to Mogami, or 100 could get you into a A140. The A140/Type31 also has the advantage of a RN crew pool to assist training or pilfer/lateral recruit off.
Niche capability in the RAN still means 3 ships minimum (1 continuously deployed), with 6 or more being preferred. So the question comes up where do we crew these from? Do we build less of something else, to build more of these?
The argument for them is the one that is being hammered by ASPI. Henderson/Osborne could likely build these. They would create new VLS in ships in less than 10 years. Possibly.
I would say locally the government is coming under increased pressure to deliver, something, projected within the next 10 years. There are some harsh words being put on Dutton via the media at the moment.
Dutton’s bringing ‘sexy’ back to defence
The politician’s tough talk on China underscores the growing importance of the defence portfolio - traditionally a ministerial graveyard.www.afr.com
Dutton is a likely successor to ScoMo. Since moving into defence, his image has improved. But not if things don't start appearing. Not fully staffing the Nuclear taskforce and having no good news initiatives to announce running into an election put them into a bit of a bind. Tillets piece outlines areas that there will be much more press on. The lack of confirmed ship building projects "in the pipe" is also a concern for SA/WA as well as defence concerned voters. its all fixable, but the environment in Australia political, is getting aggressive. With the Election, shadow minsters will start attacking minister portfolios.
I know in many western countries defence spending is unsexy. That isn't the case in Australia. On the announcement of AUKUS and nuclear submarines, a huge shift in policy, the biggest backlash was "where is the tangible outcome to this announcement". The electorate didn't really care about upsetting France, or the EU (and our still non-existent FTA). Or nuclear questions. Or the expense. None of that is a deal breaker.
While DT is probably more than a little biased toward defence, with China openly stating in the Australian press it wants to "Crush Australia". The threats are no longer just theoretical. The voters want to see more than just tough talk, they want action.
The challenge is China , time , money and making a decision.
The China challenge wont go away or will time.
Defence seems to have money, which begs the question of making a decision!
Currently government is willing to make some very big calls on projects not meeting our expectations.
Subs, helicopters,combat management systems.
It certainly is difficult to believe such decisions would have been made five years ago.
Going forward I feel the script of predictability has changed.
Both sides of politics seem open to support increased defence expenditure.
So federal election aside, could we see some big changes to current ship builds in 2022.
Or as I suggested in post #375, the CONSTANT of what is currently planned stays the same.
Interesting times
Regards S
Regards S
Precisely.
And there are plenty of platforms across the ADF that can do that - from F-35, Wedgetail, Triton, Hobarts, Anzacs etc
Networking makes all this achievable
MB
ESSM from a VLS is a very flexible weapon.
It can handle the full range of air threats from incoming ASM's to slow moving helicopters.
Something not to be dismissed is its ability to also engage surface targets.
While not a dedicated large ASM, it's 39 kg warhead would be catastrophic to small or medium sized vessels and a deterrence to anything larger.
Certainly distributed capability as apart of the fleet is a plus, but with Block two ESSM with it's integral active radar homing capability, even a small VLS equipped vessel gains an independent SAM and anti surface capability.
Hmmmmmm if only!!!!!
Regards S
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Ah huh, just ask the USN and Turks what happens when a carrier accidentally fires to live Sea Sparrows at a destroyer during an exercise.
en.m.wikipedia.org
TCG Muavenet (DM 357) - Wikipedia
en.m.wikipedia.org
John Newman
The Bunker Group
Dear dear dear, here we go again, RAN fantasy fleets!
Well it is Christmas time, the silly season.
We’re all familiar with the movie catch phrase “show me the money!” what about “show me the manpower!”.
As it stands today we have the following:
Henderson:
* Austal - Patrol Boat construction
* ASC West - Collins MCD and sustainment
* BAE - Anzac upgrades and sustainment
* Civmec - Arafura construction
Osborne:
* ASC - Collins FCD - to be followed by Collins LOTE - and eventually SSN construction
* ASC ships - Arafura construction - Likely to be followed by the DDG upgrade
* BAE - Hunter prototyping - to be followed by full scale production - yes delayed by 18mths (not 18yrs!).
Not all of the above are any where near a ‘full’ workforce either, growth is still required, especially in the short term, firstly for Hunter.
So I ask the question again, “show me the manpower!”.
When AUKUS was announced there was a minor update to the NSP:
Shipbuilding/sustainment Osborne:
Shipbuilding/sustainment Henderson:
I don’t want to be the Christmas Grinch, but seriously??
Anyway, it’s the last day of the year, back to reality!
Cheers,
Well it is Christmas time, the silly season.
We’re all familiar with the movie catch phrase “show me the money!” what about “show me the manpower!”.
As it stands today we have the following:
Henderson:
* Austal - Patrol Boat construction
* ASC West - Collins MCD and sustainment
* BAE - Anzac upgrades and sustainment
* Civmec - Arafura construction
Osborne:
* ASC - Collins FCD - to be followed by Collins LOTE - and eventually SSN construction
* ASC ships - Arafura construction - Likely to be followed by the DDG upgrade
* BAE - Hunter prototyping - to be followed by full scale production - yes delayed by 18mths (not 18yrs!).
Not all of the above are any where near a ‘full’ workforce either, growth is still required, especially in the short term, firstly for Hunter.
So I ask the question again, “show me the manpower!”.
When AUKUS was announced there was a minor update to the NSP:
Shipbuilding/sustainment Osborne:
Shipbuilding/sustainment Henderson:
I don’t want to be the Christmas Grinch, but seriously??
Anyway, it’s the last day of the year, back to reality!
Cheers,
Well,I did notice that the RAN had the largest numbers of graduate officers this year since the 1950s, so maybe something is being done about additional manpower.
Navy welcomes largest group of new officers in seven decades | Defence News
Almost 300 Royal Australian Navy (RAN) members have completed officer training in 2021 – the largest cohort of new officers to graduate in a single year since the 1950’s.This week, 125 RAN members graduated from the New Entry Officers’ Course (NEOC) at the Royal Australian Naval College in...
John Newman
The Bunker Group
Maybe so, but what about the manpower required to actually build the ships??Well,I did notice that the RAN had the largest numbers of graduate officers this year since the 1950s, so maybe something is being done about additional manpower.
Navy welcomes largest group of new officers in seven decades | Defence News
Almost 300 Royal Australian Navy (RAN) members have completed officer training in 2021 – the largest cohort of new officers to graduate in a single year since the 1950’s.This week, 125 RAN members graduated from the New Entry Officers’ Course (NEOC) at the Royal Australian Naval College in...news.defence.gov.au
Available and really pissed off.
Graduate engineers and apprentices are being employed instead of highly experienced, competent and capable trades, technicians, technical officers and designers who built and maintained the FFGs, ANZACs, Hobart's and Collins.
I'm one of them, I applied for what was basically the job I had on the DDG build but was eliminated from consideration in favour of someone half my age with a degree who would have to learn on the job. A stack of former colleagues have left shipbuilding all together or been employed in lower level roles than they held twenty years ago.
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That's a challenge that is certainly not unique to Australia - but it's more about very specific skill shortages rather than a general potential workforce shortage. There's many ways to address specific skill shortages, which existing programs are already addressing at both the state, federal and enterprise level.
It's hard to see it as an insurmountable challenge when by contrast, developing the sovereign ability to build, sustain and operate SSNs is considered achievable. And in that case, we're talking about far more specific skills, a far smaller global talent pool and much longer training lead times.
For the most part, everything that has been said and discussed has been in line with the strategic assessments, timelines and objects set out in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update. Fantasy, for me at least, implies a lack of underlying policy to support and provide evidence of need.
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I should add, many at ASC were made redundant then rehired in lower level, lower paid jobs by BAE or by companies contracted to BAE.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
One issue (or rather, a host or interrelated issues) with the skills associated with shipbuilding is that they too take time for personnel to be trained, developed and gain experience. In fact, the whole national shipbuilding plan was/is intended to achieve this in a way that is sustainable for long periods. Part of the issue Australia has with naval shipbuilding currently is that previously, the RAN had boom and bust periods that caused yards to function and train needed personnel because orders were placed. Unfort once the orders had been met, there were no (or not enough) further orders to sustain the yards or workforce, causing yard closures and workers to be made redundant. This in turn led to a lack of skilled workers when the RAN was ready to place new orders after periods of time.
A concern I would have, if the shipbuilding workforce would be increased to meet the theorized demand for additional vessels would be the question, "what comes next?" once these theorized vessels are completed. Is the overall increase in the size of the RAN expected to be maintained, sustained, and retained long-term? Or will the overall naval shipbuilding workforce in Australia suddenly find itself with a glut of skilled workers and insufficient work to keep them all busy and/or retaining their skills. Or even worse IMO, would an increase in the workforce size cause the plan for sustainable shipbuilding nationally to fall over, because the overall work gets completed sooner than planned to keep the existing workforce occupied and then there are no follow-on orders ready.
RAN 1980
1 carrier crew 1300
3 DDG crew 330 each
2 FFG crew 180 each
6 DE crew 250 each
15 PB crew 19 each
We had more people at sea when we had 60% the population we have now. In addition there was less reliance on contractors for maintenance and support.
On the civilian side, CODOC alone was hiring and training more apprentices, technical cadets and engineer / naval architect cadets than the entire industry is now.
1 carrier crew 1300
3 DDG crew 330 each
2 FFG crew 180 each
6 DE crew 250 each
15 PB crew 19 each
We had more people at sea when we had 60% the population we have now. In addition there was less reliance on contractors for maintenance and support.
On the civilian side, CODOC alone was hiring and training more apprentices, technical cadets and engineer / naval architect cadets than the entire industry is now.
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Takao
The Bunker Group
So, many years ago in a Staff College brief, then HNC was briefing on RAN strength. When detailing # of ships and # people I couldn't help but notice it was about the same as the 196x fleet, except we had more ships. And some of those were workforce pigs - CFA engine room crew for instance - that modern ships don't need.
I nudged by senior Naval officer mate and asked why. His answer was to wave his hand around. About 3/4 of the RAN students came from desk jobs and would go back to similar. That's fine, there is only so many ships. But heaps of those jobs were Joint - ones that either didn't exist in the 60s or were filled by Army. Now Joint is essential and it's one of our massive strengths, but the RAN should have grown throughout the 90s to meet the new ADO paradigm. Gosh, once I suggested that we consider cutting Army in half to boost the RAN - something that generally didn't get much time around the Army side of the office.....
There is an assumption that if you don't do something for six months it's like you've never done it before. I call BS, most people I know with years of experience get back up to speed very quickly. My wife is amazed when I pick up a tool and start doing things to a higher standard than someone who currently works in the field. Easy answer, it takes years to learn how to be a toolmaker, but you never forget, studying engineering, working in systems engineering t&E etc. doesn't mean I forgot my trade experience.
Absolutely, it all comes down to fleet size, drumbeat and a strategic choice of build site.
Firstly, there’s been very in depth reports previously linked to which show that a larger fleet size makes for easier ‘juggling’ in assuring continuous shipbuilding.
Secondly, it’s worth noting that for large, ASX listed enterprises like Civmec, their facilities and workforce are not just dedicated to shipbuilding, I.e. Shipbuilding is but a segment of their overall construction. Their core skill is precision steel fabrication. They work from contract to contract like any large enterprise in that game. If they so happened to strike a deal with a bidder to provide the construction side of things, they have the workforce to pivot to the most lucrative job available - especially the type which guarantees a set return over a number of years.
They didn’t build one of the largest covered shipbuilding halls in the Southern Hemisphere just to build OPVs and patch up ageing ANZACs. Their hall has four lanes, only one being required for OPVs. Their own company statements say it’s an investment in being able to take on more work such as additional naval shipbuilding under the existing plan.
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Todjaeger
Potstirrer
I have not worked in shipbuilding, nor do I possess much in the way of skills in welding, but I can attest that the phrase, "use it or lose it," does indeed apply to a number of skills which takes both training to acquire, then experience to hone. How long it takes for a person's skills to degrade to the point where they would need re-training, and/or how long it would take a person to get back up to speed, would be dependent on both the person, and the specific skills which need to be either re-learned or honed. At the same time though, it is also possible that in the interim phases were a potential or former skilled yard worker was out, that there could be material or process changes which would need to be learned, which someone who was not idled following a lack of work would have been kept up on.