Middle East Defence & Security

[STURM]

He also expresses worry about other regional actors buying off the shelf nukes from Pakistan, perhaps hinting at Saudi Arabia.

That has been a traditional Israeli concern.

Saudi Arabia initially pumped in a lot of money into the Pakistani nuclear programme and has huge influence in the country. Given however that China also has huge influence with the Pakistanis (perhaps more so than the Saudis) and the fact that Pakistan's missiles have been reported to actually be Chinese made but with a "Made In Pakistan" tag, would China sit back and allow Pakistan to handover a nuke missile or device to Saudi? Is a nuke capable Saudi in line with China's interests?

Also, on paper Israel might be able to persuade the Saudis not to go nuclear in return for some guarantees with regards to Iran.

 

[John Fedup]

That has been a traditional Israeli concern.

Saudi Arabia initially pumped in a lot of money into the Pakistani nuclear programme and has huge influence in the country. Given however that China also has huge influence with the Pakistanis (perhaps more so than the Saudis) and the fact that Pakistan's missiles have been reported to actually be Chinese made but with a "Made In Pakistan" tag, would China sit back and allow Pakistan to handover a nuke missile or device to Saudi? Is a nuke capable Saudi in line with China's interests?

Also, on paper Israel might be able to persuade the Saudis not to go nuclear in return for some guarantees with regards to Iran.

Have to agree, China wouldn’t be too keen on SA nuke armed missiles, even if Chinese tech wasn’t present in “Made in Pakistan” military kit.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Morocco and Israel may sign a defense deal for the supply and co-production of kamikaze drones, aka loitering munitions:

Morocco and Israel to sign kamikaze drone deal

Israel’s defense minister is expected to visit the African country soon and sign defense cooperation agreements that would launch the drone production, among other efforts.

www.defensenews.com

Mitigating factor: Morocco was already somewhat friendly to Israel among the MENA nations, due to a substantial Moroccan population in Israel, between half a million to a million (depending on definition) out of 9 million people.

The anti-Israel crowd has used the hostile relations between Israel and the Arab world as a talking point against Israel. The Abraham accords and other non-related normalizations (Morocco is not part of the accords IIRC) have only changed this talking point to another - that Israel is trading with dictators which is something the west should not do.

This is merely an opinion of some of a part of the public, but we've seen fringe parties do have some impact so I will address this.

The more defense trade Israel has with its newfound allies, the more it can keep them dependent on it and deter them from changing their mind, particularly when it comes to the sufficiently abundant coups.

Furthermore, the Arab world likes to see each other as test subjects. If one country can normalize with Israel, others will examine it and follow suit. Same goes for arms trade.
This may be the catalyst for publicly known defense deals.

EDIT: Forgot to add that this report may be inaccurate as it talks about kamikaze drones but only mentions by name the Hermes 900, which is a high end MALE drone, definitely not a loitering munition.

 

[STURM]

Saudi Arabia confirms recent talks with Iran

Prince Faisal says the fourth round of talks between the two regional archrivals took place on September 21.

www.aljazeera.com

Saudi has confirmed talks have been held with Iran. Whilst it's extremely far fetched and naive to expect both countries to make up and be best chums, given the years of rivalry and distrust [the Iranians haven't forgotten that Saudi pumped billions for Saddam during the Iran/Iraq war and the Saudis like its American partner projects the narrative that Iran is largely responsible for everything wrong in the region] and the current Sunni/Shia Cold Wat being waged, it is hoped that some level of dialogue will be maintained to enable some level of undertstanding to be reached, in order to gradually reduce the instabilty and tensions that currently exists in the region.

Naturally there will be hawks in Saudi and Iran, as well as other countries who do not wish to see a thaw in Saudi/Iran bilateral relations.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Saudi Arabia confirms recent talks with Iran

Prince Faisal says the fourth round of talks between the two regional archrivals took place on September 21.

www.aljazeera.com

Saudi has confirmed talks have been held with Iran. Whilst it's extremely far fetched and naive to expect both countries to make up and be best chums, given the years of rivalry and distrust [the Iranians haven't forgotten that Saudi pumped billions for Saddam during the Iran/Iraq war and the Saudis like its American partner projects the narrative that Iran is largely responsible for everything wrong in the region] and the current Sunni/Shia Cold Wat being waged, it is hoped that some level of dialogue will be maintained to enable some level of undertstanding to be reached, in order to gradually reduce the instabilty and tensions that currently exists in the region.

Naturally there will be hawks in Saudi and Iran, as well as other countries who do not wish to see a thaw in Saudi/Iran bilateral relations.

Saudi Arabia and Iran collide in too many areas. Either they make peace and Saudi Arabia principally accepts Iran's activities all around it, and therefore accepts a disproportionate military threat and shows great weakness, or out of said weakness Saudi Arabia will cooperate with Iran and possibly become not only a liability to Israel, the US, UAE, and to an extent even Egypt, but may even become a somewhat hostile entity.

I am hawkish on Iran for 2 reasons: I am an Israeli and have to deal with regular wars affecting my way of life and economy, and an ideological reason.

But my attitude against Saudi-Iranian rapproachment is related instead to Saudi Arabia's need to stand up for its interests, fix its own flaws, and most importantly their ties to the west which give us a good position to make political and ideological changes for the better.

If we go with the extreme case of Saudi subjugation to Iran, this will strongly impact smaller western-oriented gulf and MENA nations. That is, it may force them out of the American sphere of influence into an eastern one.

 

[John Fedup]

Like your analysis. An Iran-Saudi Arabia rapprochement, as a basically ignorant observer, seems to be a bridge to far given both countries hardcore religious and military members. Both countries are a problem but as Iran seems to be much more militarily capable and are producing their own weapons to a large degree, they are the bigger threat. Together with Pakistan and Turkey, they keep stirring the ME boiling pot.

 

[STURM]

I would argue that Saudi is far more militarily capable - on paper - given the massive amounts it spends on its military. A lot of what Iran does militarily is in response to what the Gulf Arabs do and Iran's inability to keep pace. Saudi too has far more influence, it's seen as the leader of the Arab world, it has the wealth and it has the backing of the West. The past few years have not been good for Saudi, it failed to get Obama and Trump to hit Iran, it's bogged down in Yemen, Hezbollah is stil a major player in the Lebanon, it failed to be rid of Assad and a Shia government rules Iraq [the Iranians are grateful to the Americans for invading].

As to which is the bigger threat, it depends on who one asks and from which perspective. Both will undertake actions which they feel safeguards their core interests. Both see themselves as being under direct threat. Various regional actors are responsible for the state of affairs in the region but so are non regional countries.

My view is that there are no 'good players' in the region. Everyone is equally reponsible to a large extent, they all have blood on their hands and all practise hyprocrisy and double standards, in their desire or quest to safeguard their interests. Some level of compromise and understanding has to be reached. Failure to do that will reap benefits for some but will have negative consequences for ordinary people in the region. The longstanding decades long policy of trying to isolate and weaken Iran has failed [Iran is a regional power which also has lots on influence] and that's why Saudi [and possibly the U.A.E. ] is engaged in talks. Talks are intended to notch things down several levels and to create some level of trust and understanding but will not result in a drastic or major realignment.

Note that even before the Shah fell, Arab and Iranian relations weren't that chummy - this is due not only to the Sunni/Shia rift which spans centuries. Both tolerated each other but not much beyond that.

 

[John Fedup]

Yes, SA has spent vast amounts on state of the art military kit but their performance in Yemen shows their inability to use it, much less support it without foreign assistance. SA has been the leader of the Arab world and still is but SA isn’t sitting so high anymore.

 

[STURM]

Yes, SA has spent vast amounts on state of the art military kit but their performance in Yemen shows their inability to use it

Nonetheless on paper it is still much more powerful than Iran which is isolated and has cash issues. What Iran does with regards to acquring new capabilities and weaponary has to be seen in context of what its Gulf Arab rivals are doing.

Even if the talks result in nothing significant, some level of dialogue will be good for the region, even if certain quarters do not wish to see a thaw - even a slight one - in Saudi/Iran relations.

the leader of the Arab world and still is but SA isn’t sitting so high anymore.

Unsuprising : bogged down in Yemen, failed to be rid of Aasad, failed to prevent a Shia dominated government in Iraq, failed to convince two U.S. Presidents to strike Iran, failed to weaken and isolate Hezbollah and Iran despite years of trying and suffered a huge backlash from the murder of Khashoggi.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

So, Lebanon, huh?
Civil war seems to be brewing. We went from open condemnations of Hezbollah to attacking them in the streets after launching rockets on Israel, and now actual shooting between Hezbollah + Amal and the LAF (Lebanese Armed Forces).
The catalyst for these events has been a protest against a judge investigating the Beirut port blast, and the subsequent LAF firing on protesters.
The protesters were Amal/Hezbollah and we don't know whether they were legitimately protesting or somehow threatening the soldiers.
Immediately after, Amal and Hezbollah militants could be seen walking down the streets of Beirut in the hundreds, all armed with firearms and RPGs.

Shooting broke out later on between militants and the LAF.

Something something, broad side of a barn.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1448747375481262086

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1448934837746798615

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1448632221519073281

Considering Lebanon has very little to lose at this point, a civil war is likely.
Prominent actors could be Iran and Syria supporting Hezbollah, plus a Russian approved flow of Russian arms through Syria.
Others may include Turkey as a standalone, and the US in support of the LAF, possibly even France on its side. Israel may take opportunities to throw shots at Hezbollah, or could even support an equivalent of the 90's era SLA.

 

[STURM]

Considering Lebanon has very little to lose at this point, a civil war is likely.

It actually still has a lot to ''lose''. The country is already highly dysfunctional; a civil war would set things even further back with horrific consequences for ordinary citizens; those who do not have the means to flee to other countries.

The protesters were Amal/Hezbollah and we don't know whether they were legitimately protesting or somehow threatening the soldiers.

Amal was the prominent Shia militia in the 1980's before being displaced by Hezbollah. In addition to the Muslim Shia/Sunni groups and the Christians; we also have to factor in the Druze; a small but significant player.

Outside powers should be applying all possible the leverage/influence they have to help the Lebanese avert another civil war; rather than indirectly participating in it and taking sides; as was the case previously. Irrespective of how one feels about Iran and Syria; the fact remains that both have no wish for a civil war which would divert them from other pressing areas and would require them to expend scarce resources. A country which has a tremendous amount of influence on the Lebanese government is Saudi Arabia. Given that a civil war would benefit nobody; by right Lebanon's Arab neighbours, plus the United States which got embroiled in Lebanon in the 1980's and has a level of influence; should do all they can to pressure the Lebanese government; plus the local various players.

possibly even France on its side.

Possibly. France has a history of active involvement in the country. Lebanon after all was a French creation; sliced off from Syria to create a predominantly Christian state. France however will remember the high costs it paid for it's previous involvement in Lebanon; a similar cost was paid by Syria, the U.S. and Israel which found that getting in and creating proxy forces or taking sides was easy but getting out wasn't.

could even support an equivalent of the 90's era SLA.

Considering the circumstances in which the last round ended; you think so? Also, the geo political situation has slightly changed compared to the 1980's. It may not be in Israel's benefit or Lebanon's for that matter; for it to establish a 2021 version of the SLA.

For those interested in Lebanon; it's history during the Civil War; the part played by outsiders for their own selfish interests, how the Lebanese slaughtered each other [nobody's hands were clean]; plus the suffering and agony of ordinary Lebanese; I highly recommend Robert Fisk's 'Pity The Nation' and Thomas Friedman's 'From Beirut To Jerusalem'.

 

[OPSSG]

Considering Lebanon has very little to lose at this point, a civil war is likely.

1. I am not sure if a civil war will breakout but I am certain from the limited videos I have seen, the Shia Lebanese militia, and Hezbollah can’t shoot accurately. What I see are idiots with guns firing wildly, pretending to be soldiers.

2. Their shooting ability is so low that the Shia Lebanese gunmen are not going to hit their intended targets from more than 25m to 50 metres. In fact, they are in danger of shooting their own people trying to extract from a danger area. They don’t seem to understand arcs of fire — they are a danger to their own civilians running from the enemy into their own arcs of fire. The IRGC must be so proud of their militias — showing fighting spirit but demonstrating that they are idiots with guns.

The protesters were Amal/Hezbollah and we don't know whether they were legitimately protesting or somehow threatening the soldiers.

3. I am no expert but even from my untrained eye, based the 20 or so videos I have seen, the Shia Lebanese militia, and Hezbollah:

​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1448608436820889603

(a) don’t engage in mutual support or suppressive fire, to enable their fire teams to move forward (resulting in unnecessary deaths). I also don’t see any FCOs (or fire control order). An FCO will shout the distance and description of target, so everyone in a section can concentrate their fire to achieve fire superiority to move towards enemy positions. In the above video, the RPG gunner was killed crossing a danger area due to lack of suppressive fire or use of smoke grenades, to move forward; and​

​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1448620869807443977

(b) even when they aim but their firing position is so unstable that the gun jerks everywhere after each shot and causing unintended civilian casualties. Their shooting fundamentals are not there and they are literally wasting bullets. No wonder civilians are being killed. They are aiming at target A, at 125 metres to 150 metres away and hitting something unintended, at 300 metres away (i.e. 3 to 4 lanes away); when the weapons have an effective range of over 300 metres in aimed shooting. It may just be the camera angle, some are shooting at the enemy they cannot even see. If our army instructors see a recruit shooting, without aiming, they will be punished — but that seems to be happening more than 50% of the time in the videos I have seen in this round of clashes.​

 

[STURM]

The IRGC must be so proud of their militias — showing fighting spirit but demonstrating that they are idiots with guns.

My question is, who exactly are they? Actual Hezbollah and Amal combatants? If so were they Team A or B? Or merely supporters with little or no training?

Shooting on full auto without aiming [a few sources mention the African phenomenon of shooting with eyes closed] was a common occurence during the civil war, whether it was Amal, the Phalangists or the PLO. A large reason was the lack of any proper training, a lot of the combatants were civillians who became fighters literally overnight.

There was even a marked diffrence between Syrian units. Their most combat effective [including the SF units which gave the Israelis the most trouble in 1982] were mostly kept back in the Bekaa Valley and along the Beirut/Damascus highway. Units in the Beirut area were mostly low quality.

On Hezbollah, the 2006 war, as well as operations conducted prior and after the war shows that there is a marked difference in quality between units, some are competent and well trained, others much less so. Even with ATGW teams in 2006, some were accurate and displayed good fieldcraft, others were very inaccurate and poorly trained.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Considering the circumstances in which the last round ended; you think so? Also, the geo political situation has slightly changed compared to the 1980's. It may not be in Israel's benefit or Lebanon's for that matter; for it to establish a 2021 version of the SLA.

We shouldn't lump the whole 1982-2000 period into just one entity. From 1982 til 1985, Israel was doing very good. It had eliminated hostile players and established workable relations with some of the locals.

• Past 1985, it was overstaying, and another strategic mistake was the 2000 pullout that was seen a lot like a defeat. It didn't show a real purpose to stay for 15 years.
• Some failures should not deter from future attempts, especially if the failure points are known.

The average voice on the Lebanese streets is okay with working with Israel, so this is a medium stakes, high potential country.

This time if Israel wants in, its greatest challenge would be eliminating its opponents in a way that doesn't re-legitimize them, and keeps its potential allies united with it and not against it.

1. I am not sure if a civil war will breakout but I am certain from the limited videos I have seen, the Shia Lebanese militia, and Hezbollah can’t shoot accurately. What I see are idiots with guns firing wildly, pretending to be soldiers.

2. Their shooting ability is so low that the Shia Lebanese gunmen are not going to hit their intended targets from more than 25m to 50 metres. In fact, they are in danger of shooting their own people trying to extract from a danger area. They don’t seem to understand arcs of fire — they are a danger to their own civilians running from the enemy into their own arcs of fire. The IRGC must be so proud of their militias — showing fighting spirit but demonstrating that they are idiots with guns.

They are affiliated with Hezbollah but are nowhere near the average level of Hezbollah fighters. Hezbollah has elite units (chiefly Radwan counting thousands), many high quality regular soldiers, an extensive network of reservists, and then there are the guys you see in these videos.

Not only are the average fighters very capable and able to shoot accurately, but Hezbollah as a whole is capable of operating complex strategies and a wide spectrum of combat tactics.
Some of their fighters you'd have a hard time distinguishing from some countries' SoF.

In hardware, manpower, training, and strategies, they are far superior to the Lebanese Army. Their ability to rally party affiliates on a bring your own gun basis, is just an extra bit, and important for them to mount an extra fighting power in places they can't militarily hold in the conventional way.

 

[STURM]

I didn't look at it in one entity. I merely pointed out that it didn't end well and as various players experienced, getting in and involved was relatively easy, disengaging was harder.

You mentioned that from 1982 to 1985 Israel was "doing very good". During that period did it actually achieve the objectives it set prior to the invasion? Did it get the friendly government it wanted in Beirut? As for eliminating "hostile forces", sure they were largely neutralised but until the day the IDF actually left, the Syrians, the Iranians, Hezbollah, various Palestinian groups [if not the PLO per see] were still entrenched in Lebanon. Ultimately was the long Israeli presence in Lebanon, which came at a huge cost to the locals and Israel, worth the price?

One of the ironies is that when the IDF invaded it was initially welcomed by the Shia population. Another irony is that the Syrians intervened in the 1970's to prevent the Christians being defeated, which Syria feared would lead to Israeli intervention.
Those however are stories for a different time.

As for the "average voice on Lebanese streets being okay to work with Israel", I have no idea how one would define "average" in this context but to me it depends on who one asks and on which street. There's also the question of who really benefits from working with Israel, the Israelis or the locals? The locals, irrespective of their affliation or religon are only too aware of the consequences of being too involved with outside powers.

You're looking at things from an Israeli perspective, I'm looking at things from an overall perspective

Sure past failures should not deter future attempts but nonetheless clear and realistic political objectives have to be set, with tangible long term benefits.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

You mentioned that from 1982 to 1985 Israel was "doing very good". During that period did it actually achieve the objectives it set prior to the invasion? Did it get the friendly government it wanted in Beirut?

Getting a friendly government was not an objective. The objective was to end the incessant rocket attacks on northern Israeli cities. The means were a 40km buffer that would outrange most Palestinian artillery.

But the Palestinians were expelled by the local population, at least the PLO, which then nullified the need for said buffer. So staying those extra 15 was unnecessary and even damaging.

As for eliminating "hostile forces", sure they were largely neutralised but until the day the IDF actually left, the Syrians, the Iranians, Hezbollah, various Palestinian groups [if not the PLO per see] were still entrenched in Lebanon.

Hezbollah was legitimized in Lebanon by the perception of the IDF not as a liberator but as an occupier. The Lebanese wanted to do away with the PLO, but not pay for it with their sovereignty.

• That's how Hezbollah grew in size and replaced the PLO.
• Had the IDF withdrawn in 1985, Hezbollah would likely still be strong today, but it would arrive there much more slowly.

Ultimately was the long Israeli presence in Lebanon, which came at a huge cost to the locals and Israel, worth the price?

The long presence, no. The 1982 war, yes.

One of the ironies is that when the IDF invaded it was initially welcomed by the Shia population.

They were only happy about the Sunni PLO getting a whooping, free of charge.

As for the "average voice on Lebanese streets being okay to work with Israel", I have no idea how one would define "average" in this context but to me it depends on who one asks and on which street.

I am aware of the sectarian nature of Lebanon. That's why I phrased it that way. There are enough people in Lebanon as a critical mass to form a government that would normalize ties with Israel, without being a tiny minority.

There's also the question of who really benefits from working with Israel, the Israelis or the locals? The locals, irrespective of their affliation or religon are only too aware of the consequences of being too involved with outside powers.

Both. Easy. Israel has a higher GDP than all its neighbors combined. Not only that but also highly advanced industrial tech right at its doorstep.

Also, the mere lack of worry about a war that could set them back a decade at least in infrastructure and economy, is worth it. Every country neighboring Israel that made amends with it, instantly became more stable and prosperous (in proportion to how much it's willing to cooperate beyond peace).

Why would anyone not benefit from this?

 

[STURM]

Getting a friendly government was not an objective. The objective was to end the incessant rocket attacks on northern Israeli cities.

Not from what I've read and I can provide the sources if needed. Israel wanted a friendly Arab government on its flank, one led by a Christian led government which in due course would expel the PLO and other groups and would gradually get the Syrians to leave - this would have significantly improved Israel's security. As it turned out, Israel's plans for a friendly government [one it could also influence] were checkmated when the Syrians assasinated Gemayal.

Like other countries which got sucked into Lebanon, Israel was seduced and manipulated by the locals who were only to eager to get a foreign power on their side in order to square off against their compeptitors/enemies.

Hezbollah was legitimized in Lebanon by the perception of the IDF not as a liberator but as an occupier.

The perception of Israel not being a liberator but an occupier was one shared not only by Hezbollah but also other groups, not all of whom were pro Palestinian, Syrian or Iranian.

I am aware of the sectarian nature of Lebanon.

I'm glad you're and I actually didn't doubt it. I have however have to question your claim that the "average voice on Lebanese streets being okay to work with Israel". Depends on how you define "average" and on which "streets" do you ask the question.

Every country neighboring Israel that made amends with it, instantly became more stable and prosperous

As simple and clear cut as that? Would Egypt and Jordan fall into the stable and prosperous categories?

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Not from what I've read and I can provide the sources if needed. Israel wanted a friendly Arab government on its flank, one led by a Christian led government which in due course would expel the PLO and other groups and would gradually get the Syrians to leave - this would have significantly improved Israel's security. As it turned out, Israel's plans for a friendly government [one it could also influence] were checkmated when the Syrians assasinated Gemayal.

If you're talking about the objectives generated during the entire 1982-2000 period, then yeah I agree. You grab opportunities as situations develop.
But if you are talking about the reason for the invasion itself, then I would like some explanation. At least in every literature I've seen, the primary objective was to eliminate the rocket threat, and preferably for a long term.

The perception of Israel not being a liberator but an occupier was one shared not only by Hezbollah but also other groups, not all of whom were pro Palestinian, Syrian or Iranian.

But not all, and those who could see it as a liberator, or paint it as one even though Israel's goals were unrelated to liberation/occupation, rather its own security in the north, were viable candidates to become a local government. And a local government favoring Israel would be mutually beneficial.

As simple and clear cut as that? Would Egypt and Jordan fall into the stable and prosperous categories?

Note that I said "in proportion to how much they were willing to cooperate beyond peace".
For example, Jordan and Israel are not best buds. Very limited cooperation. Still, what Jordan gets, is immense - it gets a guarantee on water supply, resources like natural gas, and military cooperation mostly relevant to Jordan's internal security and the safeguarding of the current Jordanian leadership from external enemies.

Egypt is more cooperative with Israel, and although it does not need resources from Israel, it benefits from greater trade, profits from tourism, and also benefits in security. For example in their Sinai campaign Israel allowed Egypt to pour excess troops into the Sinai and itself participated in military operations against insurgents.

All these countries can sign peace treaties with Israel and end it there. Or they can accept a more comprehensive relationship and benefit from every aspect of Israel's economy. Having advanced technologies right at your doorstep, particularly those helpful for developing nations, is a huge benefit.

It's very difficult to argue against economic ties.

Furthermore, Lebanon is the most compromised country in the region. Through cooperation with Israel and ramped up sponsorship by the US, it could become a well defended, economically stable and strong country capable of providing its citizens with decent levels of welfare.

 

[STURM]

At least in every literature I've seen, the primary objective was to eliminate the rocket threat, and preferably for a long term.

The primary reason behind the invasion was indeed related to security, whether removing the threat posed by rockets or cross border raids mounted by Palestinian groups like the PLO, PLFP-GC, etc.

It was however also aimed with longer term benefits [also aimed at security] for Israel, namely having a friendly Arab goverment in Beirut which in due time, amongst various things, would expel the Palestnians from Lebonese soil and would also apply pressure on the Syrians.

As I pointed out, the Gemayal faction told the Israelis what they wanted to hear, painted a rosy picture. The Lebanese of course were adapt at dealing with foreigners, to seduce and manipulate them for maximum gain. Things started out well for Israel, it had its buffer zone, its proxy in the form of the Phalangists [the SLA as you're aware came later], weakened Assad and expelled the PLO. As the years when by however it got sucked deeper and deeper into the Lebanese morass [staying on presented risks but so did leaving which came much much later] and found that things were not as rosy as they initially were.

But not all

Naturally "not all' and that is exactly the point I was driving at when I pointed out that it was not only Hezbollah but other comnunities/groups which also saw Israel not as a "liberator" but as an 'occupier".

Egypt is more cooperative with Israel

Hardly suprising, due to Camp David it is the second largest recipient of U.S. aid and its rulers [after Sadat] have been traditionally been focused on regime survival rather than being hostile to Israel - why would Egypt not be cooperative?

It's very difficult to argue against economic ties

It is. In reality however the Arab states have to weight in various factors, not only economics but how it also benefits with the U.S, how it ties in with the Cold War waged with Iran, the mood of the population, etc. It's not just a matter of economics which of course plays a very vital part.

Something to consider also is what exactly is the mood of populations in various Arab states which have relations with Israel? If they had a chance to actually speak out or voice their opinion [which they don't], what would they say? From an Israeli perspective naturally its an all win situation with practically zero risk but the overall reality with regards for the Arabs is a bit more nuanced.

 

[STURM]

But if you are talking about the reason for the invasion itself, then I would like some explanation. At least in every literature I've seen, the primary objective was to eliminate the rocket threat, and preferably for a long term.

There are several published sources [which I would be happy to provide] which make mention of the fact that one of the aims of the invasion was to have a friendly Arab state on its flank, one led by a Christian dominated government and I have found an online source.

The 1982 Lebanon War and Its Repercussions for Israel’s National Security

The conquest of southern Lebanon in Operation Peace for Galilee, and Israel’s long sojourn in the area, had political and military justification. But defects in the IDF’s deployment during the ope

besacenter.org

'Israel’s 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee had two political objectives. The first, which was realistic and achievable, was to restore normalcy to Israel’s northern towns and villages after sustained rocket attacks had disrupted life there for many years. The second, which was unrealistic, was to expel the Syrian and Palestinian armed forces from Lebanon and secure a peace treaty with a second Arab country—a goal that required complete Christian control over Lebanon."