A fantasy is by definition imagining something that is impossible or improbable, and yet here we’re trying to “fantasise” with a strong dose of realism. It’s an incongruous idea, albeit one I support since I agree it would just be silly if we went off on complete flights of fantasy.
My argument though is that what I proposed - a carrier of a size and with a standard air group equivalent to the Cavour (but not the Cavour) and three additional Hunter Class frigates - is not so unrealistic. Not when you consider the heightened concerns about threats to our security that have led to the sensational decision (which many here did not believe until it was officially announced) to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. Improbable, but not impossible.
While I’ve ran the numbers below somewhat, I won’t go into the number one reason this is all improbable - though not impossible - and that’s the politics. It would require more funding, and that may mean tax hikes or cuts elsewhere, and either would require the political will. Possibly even a bipartisan commitment to smooth the waters.
I guess we can begin then with the question of how much a carrier, its aircraft and three extra Hunters would cost.
Well, for an upper limit on the carrier - noting that what I was actually suggesting was not this - you could look at the QE class. Estimated capital cost in 2019 was £3.9 billion - or about $7.3 billion on current conversion rates, though you have to allow a little for inflation. Remember this is the upper limit. A smaller carrier would cost less - in real terms.
Aircraft figures can be difficult because they often are given including line items in addition to the base fly-away cost. But we’ll go with it. Australia is said to be spending $17 billion on 72 F-35As. Just for a rough figure, let’s say 24 F-35Bs and allowing for its greater per unit cost, we might say another $7 billion. Add another 24 MH-60Rs, which - together with four or five of the AESA radar pods - will cost as much as another $4 billion or so.
Three more Hunters? Unit price could be as high as $5 billion by the time we’d be looking at 10 through 12. Call it another $15 billion.
We end up with a capital cost of, say, $33 billion - probably a little less since we used the QE class for the carrier, but maybe not. This would be spent over a period of time, of course, likely about a decade. It’s about two and a half times the allocation for defence acquisitions in the 2020-21 budget - and about $4 billion more than what is forecast to be spent on acquisitions in 2029-30 alone.
On defence expenditure overall, 50 years ago it was at 2.6 per cent of GDP and 10.7 per cent of total Commonwealth outlays. In 1975-76, the latter fell below the 10 per cent mark and it hasn’t returned since. Defence particularly suffered through the Hawke-Keating governments (note, not trying to be political, just a fact). The more recent increases are good news but we’re still not where we were. For this year, spending is expected to come in at between 2.09 and 2.27 per cent of GDP, and about 5.8 per cent of outlays (this figure may not include funding for the Defence Signals Directorate). The actual figure stated in the budget papers is forecast to be $43 billion.
On revenue, by way of an example, the GST and other sales taxes - but this is predominantly the former - was forecast to raise $75.9 billion out of total revenue of about $500 billion this year. So there’s one option - increase the GST to 15 per cent, raising an extra $37 billion, give half to the states (lowering some of their funding from other sources but still leaving them better off) and half to defence. That gives the latter an increase of 40 per cent a year.
Yet the fantasy here wouldn’t require that. Maybe a 10 per cent increase in defence expenditure over and above current planning but likely not more. And that could conceivably be funded through the revenue benefits of economic growth, though I would still think it would mean cutting expenditure, raising taxes or both - just not to all that a significant degree.
Like I acknowledged earlier when another poster pointed it out, personnel are a challenge. Possibly the greatest challenge.
The demographics are interesting. Year Book Australia 1961 says that the RAN had a strength of 10,519 as of December 1960. At that point we had a population of 10.4 million. In other words, about 1000 per million. Now, it has an approved strength of 15,500 and we have a population of almost 26 million - so it’s about 600 per million.
There’s the truth for you - long-term, the ADF has declined as a proportion of the population. But that’s not to say it would be easy to rectify this. There are opportunities anyone with an ounce of knowledge can see. It’s unhelpful, for example, to make young people wait to begin courses. Those who really want a defence career will wait, but others will go into different fields. It can’t be “fixed” altogether but it can certainly be improved. And that’s just the recruitment side. Retention would also need to be looked at.
What would I actually like to see though? It’s probably an increase over 10-20 years of about 5-6000 across the entire ADF and the Navy would get the largest share of that. That’s achievable.
Indeed, it’s all achievable. It’s improbable because of the politics, not because of the relative cost or the personnel challenges. But, as we’ve seen recently, the politics can change, the policies and plans can change, so it’s not impossible.
Sources: ABS, ASX, Australian Government Budget Papers, British MoD, ASPI.
BANNED FOR ONE MONTH FOR IGNORING TWO MODERATORS WARNINGS WRT TO CONTINUING TO DISCUSS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN THIS THREAD.
Ngatimozart.
