First commercial flights have resumed out of Afghanistan destination Qatar. Said a number of westerners and American citizens are aboard. They have landed but numbers unknown.
Afghanistan updates: Flight carrying Americans lands in Qatar
Official numbers from Biden state department claim 100-200 left behind. Unofficial (questionable) reports from outside sources have claimed from 500 to 1,500. Stranded since August 31. 5 have been known to have escaped.
1. This is good news. Qatar has a must do mission — help Americans stuck there (who want to get out), to depart Afghanistan.
2. I couldn’t care less about what the spokeswoman of China’s Foreign Ministry say about Afghanistan. The Chinese are going to attempt to paint the U.S. in a bad light. But that does not change reality — which is a power vacuum that regional powers will tend to fill — given how much the Taliban suck at governing.
(a) According to World Bank data, Afghan GDP - the total value of goods and services produced in an economy - grew from US$4 billion in 2002 to $20.56 billion in 2013. But growth slowed dramatically when, in 2014, most foreign combat troops - a key source of income - left the country with the departure of the ISAF.
(b) Afghanistan's GDP growth fell from around 14% in 2012 to as little as 1.5% by 2015. By 2020, the economy under Ashraf Ghani was in recession — a lack of investment in cold stores and packaging facilities has held back Afghanistan's ability to make more from fruit and vegetable exports, with at least a 1/4 of agricultural products reckoned to deteriorate after being harvested to such an extent that they cannot be sold.
(c) The new Taliban government desperately needs funds to function, but the Taliban has not been given access to overseas assets belonging to the Afghan central bank. To make matters worse, Afghanistan’s economic outlook is bleak, with real GDP forecasted to shrink by 9.7% in FY2021 (before the Afghan government under Ashraf Ghani fell) and see a further drop of 5.2% in FY2022, according to a Fitch Group analysis.
Don't overestimated Taliban abilities to keep Afghanistan under leashes if they can't provide livelihood for their citizen.
3. Agreed. Guns and goons only go so far. From what I see, the Taliban really don’t care about governing — they don’t care about buying Wheat and stocking it before winter closes some roads — to prevent starvation for 3 to 3.5 million people (more than 10% of their population), from Oct 2021 onwards.
(a) President Biden’s decision is boosting the natural order of things and forcing Afghanistan’s neighbors, who have more of a stake in Afghanistan attaining some political stability, to assume more responsibility. If the U.S. absence creates a vacuum, let countries that share a land border like Pakistan, Iran and China be sucked into it.
(b) Beijing’s contribution of US$31 million is just the start of a sucking sound. Even if the Chinese donated US$331 million, it will not make a difference given the expected economic decline of Afghanistan. It makes perfect sense for the Americans to stop-loss, given the estimated US$2 billion contraction in GDP for FY2021 (a forecast made before the fall of Kabul). This economic contraction is very serious and no amount of aid from China can make up for economic fundamentals.
4. There is an assumption buried within the confines of the U.S. National Security community that a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan will again revert to its pre-9/11 status as a safe-haven for international terrorism. That may not be true as there are other factors to consider. Many Afghans on Twitter are part of the diaspora and have a privileged role. They could use this platform in constructive ways, especially if they hear from their relatives on the return of al-Qaeda. Unfortunately, it seems that many of them are busy with enabling fake news.
5. Ruling Afghanistan is not just about having guns and goons in Kabul — the rural provinces and their needs matter too. As Daniel DePetris wrote: “None of this is meant to predict Taliban behavior or defend them in any way. Rather, it's to provide some perspective to the conventional wisdom. U.S. officials must be prepared for all scenarios.”
(a) While the Taliban and al-Qaeda have a relationship and will likely retain a relationship into the future (regardless of what the Feb 2020 Doha deal says), Taliban leaders are also mindful of previous errors in judgment where al-Qaeda was given a wide berth and resulted in a disastrous 20 years for the Taliban.
(b) During the Taliban’s first stint in power, the Taliban made a decision to welcome Osama Bin Laden into Afghanistan. They gave his network a significant support and latitude, as they needed his money to fight the Northern Alliance. Many Taliban weren't thrilled with OBL — his declaration of war against the U.S. and the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania was a fact that was displeased by the Taliban, who believed it was needlessly counterproductive to their staying power.
(c) Taliban restores dreaded Ministry for 'Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice' in Afghanistan. In 1990s, ministry enforced Taliban's repressive morality laws. The Ministry's feared police force were notorious for publicly punishing offenders — cutting off arms, hangings and other forms of punishment will soon resume.
6. Let me recall a few key moments in this 20 year war that impacted both the trajectory of the war and U.S.-Pakistan relations in Dec 2001. These were:
(a) the Bonn Agreement (a diplomatic initiative intended to establish the first post-Taliban government). The Bonn Agreement was a challenge, where all anti-Taliban groups had to assemble together, putting aside their own differences in order to agree to an interim agreement without the buy in of Pakistan; and
(b) the failed Tora Bora operation to apprehend or kill Osama Bin Laden. When Tora Bora happened, Pakistan came to know about it from other sources before it found out the news from the United States itself.
7. During the Tora Bora operation, Pakistan was providing logistical support to the US through the use of 3 military bases within Pakistan, and yet the United States did not take Pakistan into confidence regarding its Tora Bora operation. As a result of Tora Bora, a lot of Al-Qaeda members fled into Pakistan through the porous border. When US SEALs killed Osama Bin Laden, the 2011 operation that was naturally planned without the Pakistani state’s knowledge. This resulted in an awkward situation for Pakistan. What allowed the relationship to work during this time, was the backchannel contacts that helped diffuse tensions.