Afghanistan War

[OPSSG]

Part 1 of 3: The rise of terror networks that led to 9-11

Indeed but corruption is merely one of several factors why many would support the Taliban.

1. IMO, the types of terror networks that Gina Bennett first observed will again thrive under Taliban rule but I caution to say that these networks are no longer limited to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq or Syria. It’s not if another 9-11, will happen in America but rather, when it will happen again. The Taliban will say that they do not support ‘XYZ’ terror network but they are just giving lip service — simply because they will never fully ‘control’ the country — there will be movement of jihadists in and out of Afghanistan that is beyond their control.

2. Terror networks exist in the Middle East and Africa. Within South East Asia, itself, and Rodrigo Duterte’s incompetence in governance related matters will enable their undisputed territory to be used to stage and attack targets both within the Philippines and externally, in Malaysia and in Indonesia. This misguided government of the Philippines, despite its shortcomings, has a lot more control over its territory than the Taliban, is not able to stop these networks (even with CIA or ADMM plus support).

​

(a) Whether the US stays or leaves Afghanistan, these regional terrorist networks in the Middle East, in Africa and in South East Asia, are here to stay.​

​

(b) Given the huge Muslim population in the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia triangle (within ASEAN, at the best of times), our respective ASEAN governments can never eliminate the roots of these terror networks; but this is being managed via regional cooperation mechanisms. This counter-terror effort has local funding plus some Australian, American and Japanese funding support.​

​

(c) My great fear is that the conditions in Myanmar will result in the spreading of these types of terror roots in the ‘Golden Triangle’ (which is the narcotics hub of South East Asia).​

3. On 6 Aug 2001, the U.S. intelligence community warned, 36 days before 9/11, that Bin Laden intended to attack the US but the report lacked specifics. Most of the intelligence community recognized in the summer of 2001 that the number and severity of threat reports were unprecedented. Many officials told the 9-11 Commission that they knew something terrible was planned, and they were desperate to stop it. Despite their large number, the threats received contained few specifics regarding time, place, method, or target. The Bush administration declassified the document in 2004. I also highly recommend reading the original 21 August 1993 classified report by Gina Bennett (that has been declassified, for those who have never seen formerly secret documents).

​

(a) This 1993 report was entitled "The Wandering Mujahidin: Armed and Dangerous," that identified "Usama bin Ladin" as a donor who was supporting Islamic militants in "places as diverse as Yemen and the United States." Bin Laden's fortune had derived from his family's construction company, which was one of the largest in the Middle East. According to Bennett's 1993 analysis, bin Laden's funding had also enabled hundreds of Afghan Arabs to resettle in Sudan and Yemen. What the CIA was tracking was a network.​

​

(b) Bennett also published another classified analysis titled, "Saudi Patron to Islamic Extremists," in which she observed that bin Laden had founded a group called "al-Qa'ida in the 1980s." This was the first time that anyone in the U.S. government had identified al Qaeda as a threat, the existence of which was then a well-kept secret.​

​

(c) 33 years later, as the 20th anniversary of 9/11 approaches, Gina Bennett is a member of the CIA's Senior Analytic Service working as senior counterterrorism adviser at the National Counterterrorism Center.​

 

[STURM]

Unlike Daesh the Taliban are not as arrogant and have been fighting against forces using

I would also think that compared to IS who were living in gaga cloud cuckoo land: the Taliban are more “rationale”.

There is a sharp contrast between IS and Taliban people. IS people tended to come from more diverse backgrounds. The Taliban comprises mainly rural folk whose education is mainly limited to religious stuff; have no or little contact with women or different cultures and who live under long established tribal norms/structures.

 

[STURM]

IMO, the types of terror networks that Gina Bennett first observed will again thrive under Taliban rule

I doubt it.

For one the Taliban has learnt its lesson. They got kicked out because of ties with AQ. They won’t let it happen again.

Secondly; their ideology differs with that of IS and groups like it. They also have no desire to export their ideology and have been actively operating against IS elements in the country.

To most outsiders:Taliban and IS are the same, both with an extreme view of Islam (with the Taliban a lot of what they do are actually Pashtun traditions/culture); both “radicals” or “non moderates” (I actually dislike these terns as they can be very misleading) but both are very different.

 

[SABRE]

Good question. Even if the Kabul government unanimously agrees to a power sharing deal; the various warlords/militias (namely the non Pashtuns) will probably not. Also the question of what follows after a power sharing deal; will the Taliban be contend to share power (unlikely) or will it continue with attempts to eventually take over the whole government?

The Taliban have argued that Ghani government and its predecessor Karzai government are an extension of US occupation and thus they'll not accept their authority. This is almost an ideological stance. I doubt they'll give up on this. Then there is the arrival of Abdul Rashid Dostum and his overtures to the Afghan government. Not going into a long story, the body language on both sides is not reconciliatory.

The thing about the Taliban - of its any consolation - is that it has never been interested in spreading its ideology beyond the country”s borders; unlike AQ and IS. Whether thus will change remains to be seen - doubt it. A rare occasion when Afghan rebels actually attacked a target on foreign soil was when a faction attempted attacks on Soviet targets in Uzbekistan. With CIA support mujahideen crossed a river and distributed Korans across the border - part of the resistance against the Soviets and wasn’t driven by ideology per see. After a Soviet warning; such “activities” ceased.

Unlike AQ and IS the Taliban have been a state entity. Different dynamics.

True that they don't try to spread their ideology to other states but that is only when seen things directly. Indirectly their successes and behaviour potentially motivates likeminded elements across the borders to contemplate similar missions and behaviours in their respective countries.

Such deals are part and parcel: the way things have long been done. In 1996 when the Taliban sprang out of nowhere and advanced rapidly (helped by 4x4s supplied by benefactors in the Gulf); many deals were made. Even under the Soviet occupation various deals were made between the Mujahideen and the Soviets and the Afghan government - mutually beneficial.

In 1996 Afghanistan did not have a unified standing army. They were fragmented militias controlled by warlords and motivated by ethnic identities. In contrast, the Afghan military commanders who are making deals now are part of a seemingly integrated and centralised military structure. They were given trainings and more qualitative equipment by the U.S. and other countries. Yet they did not stand their ground. For now they all seem to be escaping to Kabul but what after that?

The one thing Obama did right was not to strike Iran; like a number of allies were urging. It would have created mote instability in an already unstable region; would not have solved the Iranian issue (unless one shares the delusional view that Iran and only Iran shares all or much of the blame for a lot of things) and in the long term would not have contributed to U.S national interests.

My interpretation of this is bleak. Obama not attacking Iran was definitely a good thing. But overall his foreign policy is riddled with indecisiveness and playing safe. I am sure the man would still be unable to explain why a large troops deployment was needed in Afghanistan, especially when all they had to do was sit in the barracks for most of the time. The entire strategy was like sending a large force to sit inside of a crumbling besieged fort.

 

[Hone C]

The types of terror networks that Gina Bennett first observed will again thrive under Taliban rule

I think this is a real possibility going forward, although not as likely to be so overt, also noting your caveat that these groups have a much greater geographic and virtual spread than under previous Taliban rule.

Untying the Gordian Knot: Why the Taliban is Unlikely to Break Ties with Al-Qaeda - Modern War Institute

When the political officer of the US embassy in Islamabad met with top Taliban official Jalaluddin Haqqani in the Pakistani city of Rawalpindi in May 1999, neither the US government […]

mwi.usma.edu

Asfandyar Mir makes the point that the Talibans association with AQ has come at a massive cost to the group, and the relationship has changed from that pre 9/11, with the Taliban keen to downplay their AQ ties due to international pressure.

Despite this, historical links, ideological alignment, popularity of AQ among rank and file Taliban, and marital ties among families of key leaders mean it's unlikely the Taliban can be persuaded to break ties with AQ. This contrasts sharply with IS, which opposed by the Taliban.

 

[STURM]

Unlike AQ and IS the Taliban have been a state entity. Different dynamics.

Both are also driven by different agendas and ideologies

True that they don't try to spread their ideology to other states but that is only when seen things directly. Indirectly their successes and behaviour potentially motivates likeminded elements across the borders to contemplate similar missions and behaviours in their respective countries

You could be right but the Central Asian states don’t have an environment ripe for the spreading of Taliban ideology - militant groups in these counties aren’t effective due to strong government pressure.

A complete Taliban victory could spell trouble for Pakistan - often overlooked. As you know Pakistan has a large Pashtun population and weak governance in those areas; not to mention disputes over the Durand Line

 

[STURM]

Mir makes the point that the Talibans association with AQ has come at a massive cost to the group, and the relationship has changed from that pre 9/11, with the Taliban keen to downplay their AQ ties due to international pressure.

Due respect to Mr.Mir but this is obvious and well known. The only reason they were toppled was because they provided refuge to AQ; no other reason. Also: does the Taliban actually still have ties with AQ? Or do people merely assume so?

Despite this, historical links, ideological alignment, popularity of AQ among rank and file Taliban, and marital ties among families of key leaders mean it's unlikely the Taliban can be persuaded to break ties with AQ. This contrasts sharply with IS, which opposed by the Taliban

AQ was never welcomed entirely with wide open arms by the Taliban. AQ became popular much later after “seducing” the Taliban leadership; with money: not ideology; even then some in the Taliban weren’t comfortable with AQ as they sensed trouble - read Rashid’s “Taliban” and Coll’s “Ghost Wars”.

Before and adter 11th September 2001 some in the Taliban even suggested handing OBL over but others pointed out it was against the Pashtun custom of providing refuge to those who asked for it.

They Taliban won’t make the same mistake twice after losing power due to ties with AQ - both driven by different agendas and ideologies. If anything they will come down hard on an IS or AQ presence in areas under Taliban control.

 

[STURM]

In contrast, the Afghan military commanders who are making deals now are part of a seemingly integrated and centralised military structure. They were given trainings and more qualitative equipment by the U.S. and other countries. Yet they did not stand their ground. For now they all seem to be escaping to Kabul but what after that?

Quite a few of the units which deserted or defected were low quality secondary units who were placed in isolated positions without adequate support; like the ones which fled to Tajikistan. Having said that; whether was in the 1980’s or 1990’s or present; making deals or switching sides is a well ingrained Afghan practice.

 

[SABRE]

Quite a few of the units which deserted or defected were low quality secondary units who were placed in isolated positions without adequate support; like the ones which fled to Tajikistan. Having said that; whether was in the 1980’s or 1990’s or present; making deals or switching sides is a well ingrained Afghan practice.

Well, congruent to what you say, Ismail Khan has switched sides and joined Taliban. Not that he had any other options, at least for now. The Taliban seem to have breached and taken over 207 Zafar corps. In fact, they were reportedly welcomed in as guests, had tea and all - except that they will now be hosts. They have, by default, taken custody of couple of Mi-35 gunships there as well.

 

[STURM]

If thing worsen we can expect the various ethnic groups to retreat into their territories to avoid being cut off, i.e. the Tajiks into the Panjshir valley. This will further weaken the Kabul government. The Taliban would do well to avoid non Pashtun areas and focus on Kabul and other areas still held by the government.

Figuring out what the government should do is somewhat harder given are they reacting to events moving too fast for them to control. Instead of making defeatist statements and talking about “pressing” the Taliban the U.S. should be doing all it can to assure its ally that as long as it keeps fighting; it’s assured of support. After all: the U.S. bears a large responsibility for the current cockup. Why are both even still in contact with the Taliban?

 

[Hone C]

...does the Taliban actually still have ties with AQ? Or do people merely assume so?

Al-Qaeda still 'heavily embedded' within Taliban in Afghanistan, UN official warns

A senior UN official says the Taliban is still tied to al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, in spite of US deal.

www.bbc.co.uk

US and UN assessments are that there is ongoing military cooperation and joint training, and that senior AQ figures are being sheltered within Taliban controlled areas.

The Taliban now control two-thirds of Afghanistan. How did it happen so quickly?

The Taliban on Wednesday seized three more Afghan provincial capitals and a local military headquarters in northern Afghanistan. The insurgents now hold some two-thirds of the nation as the U.S. and NATO finalize their withdrawal after decades of war. Bill Riggio, a senior fellow at The...

www.pbs.org

Bill Roggio has highlighted the Taliban's leverage of its AQ links to gain influence among Tajik and Uzbek groups in the north, outside of its southern Pashtun base, in the recent offensive.

I agree with you that the Taliban will crack down on IS activity within its territory. I'm not as convinced with regards to AQ, but hope time proves me wrong.

 

[STURM]

Problem with U.S. and U.S. assessments is they can be wrong ..

I have no doubt that there are AQ ir former AQ people still there but are they hiding there or waiting till the time is ripe to plan attacks? AQ as an organisation is fractured and weak; a shadow of its former self and the Taliban - for reasons explained - will not condone AQ attacks from its territory. Also; unlike in the past the Taliban has less need for AQ and AQ is not in a position to provide or dispense largesse.

 

[OPSSG]

Problem with U.S. and U.S. assessments is they can be wrong ..

I have no doubt that there are AQ ir former AQ people still there but are they hiding there or waiting till the time is ripe to plan attacks? AQ as an organisation is fractured and weak; a shadow of its former self and the Taliban - for reasons explained - will not condone AQ attacks from its territory. Also; unlike in the past the Taliban has less need for AQ and AQ is not in a position to provide or dispense largesse.

Thank you both for helping us learn more.

We have to accept that sometimes you share an opinion based on a certain viewpoint (informed by your extensive reading on the topic); another member may have data may leads to a different analysis.

It’s all good as in this case, Hone C was polite enough in providing you a source — which is counter to your viewpoint.

 

[STURM]

He did indeed and I appreciate it.

 

[SABRE]

This is a must read Twitter threat

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1426150160699174919

 

[Feanor]

There are reports that the Taliban has captured helos in working condition, and has managed to fly one of their Mi-17s. I wonder how airspace control is over Afghanistan. If it's poor, the ANA might face Taliban air strikes.

Сообщают, что талибы подняли в воздух, захваченный у афганской армии вертолет Ми-17

Сообщают, что талибы (запрещены на территории России) подняли в воздух один из четырех захваченных в аэропорту Герата вертолетов Ми-17 ВВС Афганистана. https://t.me/ChDambiev/9649

dambiev.livejournal.com

Динамика захвата талибами провинций Афганистана за период с 13 апреля по 10 августа 2021 года

Динамика захвата талибами (движение запрещено на территории Российской Федерации) провинций Афганистана за период с 13 апреля по 10 августа 2021 года. https://t.me/ChDambiev/9593

dambiev.livejournal.com

 

[STURM]

Kabul evacuations ‘sequel to humiliating fall of Saigon in 1975’

Back in June, as Taliban built momentum, Biden himself addressed Saigon parallels and dismissed them out of hand.

www.aljazeera.com

“Back in June, as the Taliban advance built momentum, Biden himself addressed the Saigon parallels and dismissed them out of hand.

“There’s going to be no circumstance where you’ll see people being lifted off the roof of an embassy of the United States from Afghanistan,” he said“

Various parallels have been made with South Vietnam. One I hope we won’t see is the U.S. eventually cutting off aid to a Afghanistan government which is still resisting; as was the case with South Vietnam due to internal U.S. politics. If things worsen will reach a stage where the Americans decide that spending money on an ally which is on its legs is simply not worth taxpayers money?

Another question is if the Taliban gains victory; will we eventually see them fighting amongst themselves? In the past it was different in that the Taliban was united under a single leader who ruled with a council. Come 11th September the Taliban scattered and various groups or factions gained more autonomy independence; i.e. some became closer to the Pakistanis; some became mote accommodating to ethnic groups, some became more uncompromising, etc. Even now when certain Taliban units do certain things: the question is whether they are acting on their own authority.

As for the leadership however; as Ahmad Rashid explained; it fully analysed the reasons it lost power and determined that it couldn’t completely go back to its old ways if it ever hoped of regaining power.

 

[SABRE]

There are reports that the Taliban has captured helos in working condition, and has managed to fly one of their Mi-17s. I wonder how airspace control is over Afghanistan. If it's poor, the ANA might face Taliban air strikes.

Сообщают, что талибы подняли в воздух, захваченный у афганской армии вертолет Ми-17

Сообщают, что талибы (запрещены на территории России) подняли в воздух один из четырех захваченных в аэропорту Герата вертолетов Ми-17 ВВС Афганистана. https://t.me/ChDambiev/9649

dambiev.livejournal.com

Динамика захвата талибами провинций Афганистана за период с 13 апреля по 10 августа 2021 года

Динамика захвата талибами (движение запрещено на территории Российской Федерации) провинций Афганистана за период с 13 апреля по 10 августа 2021 года. https://t.me/ChDambiev/9593

dambiev.livejournal.com

I have seen them capture at least 3 helicopters, including an Mi-35 at Kunduz air base. Two other were at 207 Zafar corps. From what I have seen the rotor blades were missing on all three. Thus all three were not in flying condition.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1426108560010788868

 

[Feanor]

I have seen them capture at least 3 helicopters, including an Mi-35 at Kunduz air base. Two other were at 207 Zafar corps. From what I have seen the rotor blades were missing on all three. Thus all three were not in flying condition.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1426108560010788868

This source indicates that 4 Mi-17s were captured in Herat alone (I saw the Mi-35 from a separate incident). Perhaps one of them had rotor blades? Or perhaps the rotor blades were found separately and installed? I'm sure, with the amount of ground they've taken, they must have someone in Taliban controlled territory with the knowledge.

 

[SABRE]

This source indicates that 4 Mi-17s were captured in Herat alone (I saw the Mi-35 from a separate incident). Perhaps one of them had rotor blades? Or perhaps the rotor blades were found separately and installed? I'm sure, with the amount of ground they've taken, they must have someone in Taliban controlled territory with the knowledge.

I have not heard or seen any info on this coming out of Herat. But it is always a possibility of them getting their hands on Afghan military assets. In the past the Taliban did have pilots capable of flying Russian origin helicopters like the Mi-17 and Mi-24/35. I am, however, unsure if they do now. Its been 20 years since anyone saw them with a helicopter.