Afghanistan War

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part 4 of 4: Choice of fighting for victory or facing the loss of the voices of reason and the certainty of death
(b) I tend to think of the Afghan state as a Kitchen Cabinet, holding dried food and antique silverware, that is badly termite infested. It still looks solid but if you give it a hard kick, the structure holding the contents will collapse. The silverware is the educated Afghans that will scatter if the Kitchen Cabinet breaks. I see Iran as another colony of termites ready to move in and Pakistan as a colony of army ants interested in the dried food, with India as a ant-eater. The ant-eater is only interested in the ants, if they move in. As I see it, neither Iranian nor Pakistani influence is really good for building up Afghanistan as a nation state — what the country needs is more secular education. Only through more education will the country gain more silverware (aka educated Afghans) and have less termites (aka the Taliban movement).​

(c) After this round of fighting in this 43 year civil war, Afghanistan will revert to the way it was in the period between 1992 to 2000, before the Americans came. This was the time of the warring factions that included Ahmad Shah Massoud, an ethnic Tajik; Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Pashtun; and Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek. Back then it was a period of temporary alliances. The era of horror is back and the civil war will rage on.
No quantity of silverware can get rid of termites and it's completely possible to have a kitchen cabinet with no silverware at all, and yet no termites.

History marches on regardless of analogies. If everyone leaves Afghan alone to sort itself out, it will, somehow. There will be blood, and what emerges certainly won't be a democracy, but Afghanistan isn't an industrialized capitalist country, so expecting a democracy is a bit far-fetched to begin with. What Afghanistan needs is some sort of stable government, that's at least sane, so economic development can take place. Economic development is what produces the educated middle class that eventually wants democracy.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Feanor,

In your opinion: in order to ensure that the Afghans eventually have a truly democratic government; one fully accountable for all its actions and one fully inclusive of all ethnic groups; is there still a need for a certain number of foreign troops to remain indefinitely in order to support the Kabul government while it implements a holistic and concentrated long term socio/economic programme to sideline the Taliban and provide locals with an incentive to support the government?

Putting Pakistan aside; does Afghanistan neighbours actually have an interest in Afghanistan someday becoming truly democratic? The million dollar question : if there is no military solution in sight; do you feel that the government and the Taliban will eventually be forced to seek genuine political accommodation or are we going to see many more years of war with no victor?

Another question; the common criticism heard about the ARVN is thar the Americans built an army in their own image. One that has a huge logistics/support footprint which couldst sustain itself after the Americans left or American aid was reduced. Are there in your opinion parallels with the ANA? Is it really structured and equipped for the threat it faces?
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
In your opinion: in order to ensure that the Afghans eventually have a truly democratic government; one fully accountable for all its actions and one fully inclusive of all ethnic groups; is there still a need for a certain number of foreign troops to remain indefinitely in order to support the Kabul government while it implements a holistic and concentrated long term socio/economic programme to sideline the Taliban and provide locals with an incentive to support the government?
I think US invasions of both Iraq and Afghan, as nation building projects, were geo-strategic blunders of immense proportions. I think the US should have applied sufficient pressure to either get the Taliban to give up bin Laden, or done a more narrow-spec operation for the purpose of taking out bin Laden specifically. I don't think any foreign troops should have gone in for a long term occupation to begin with. I definitely don't think they should stay there longer.

Putting Pakistan aside; does Afghanistan neighbours actually have an interest in Afghanistan someday becoming truly democratic?
This is a very complex geopolitical question that I don't have a short answer to. One could write a book on the subject, and still fall short of all the considerations involved. Also the discussion of "truly democratic" and what democracy means without the economic component is a gigantic discussion of political economics far beyond the scope of this conversation. I think Afghanistan's neighbors don't want a failed state on their borders, and all have some sort of interests inside Afghan. Some of those interests coincide or are complementary, some clash.

In the strategic long term I think all of Afghan's neighbors would benefit from a stable and prosperous Afghanistan, and would suffer from an unstable and impoverished one.

The million dollar question : if there is no military solution in sight; do you feel that the government and the Taliban will eventually be forced to seek genuine political accommodation or are we going to see many more years of war with no victor?
I mean... there is a military solution in sight. A divided Afghanistan with various warlords ruling their territories. I think we need to stop thinking of nation-states as some sacred inviolable and eternal entity, because they're not any of those things. Afghanistan may fall under something resembling a single rule in one part of the country, and another rule in another part. The international community should be more open to recognizing status-quo statehood for countries like Afghanistan. This might mean a Uzbek-Tadjik northern Afghan with ties to the CARs, and a Pashtunistan south-east with ties to Pakistan. This might mean a single government that wins the fight using whatever internal powerbase it can. But letting the situation play out, letting the chips fall where they may, and recognizing the status quo is in my opinion the best way to move forward here. If the Kabul government can win and remain standing, let it, if not, play ball (at least to some extent) with whoever or whatever takes its place. If North Korea and Saudi Arabia are legitimate nation-states on the international arena, it's hard to see why an Islamic Afghanistan can't be.

Another question; the common criticism heard about the ARVN is thar the Americans built an army in their own image. One that has a huge logistics/support footprint which couldst sustain itself after the Americans left or American aid was reduced. Are there in your opinion parallels with the ANA? Is it really structured and equipped for the threat it faces?
I'm not knowledgeable enough about the ANA to answer this. What you describe sounds like a plausible criticism, and it's one hard to escape. When Russia built proxy forces in Ukraine, and trained up the SAA, they also copied their own force organizations and methods of fighting with sometimes more and sometimes less effectiveness. This is where I think letting the locals fight their own battles is a good idea, and providing them with support for what they are doing, rather then imposing entirely external approaches to war fighting. In this regard the SAA Tiger Force is a good example of an indigenous successful formation that benefited from outside aid, as opposed to the newly minted 4th and 5th SAA Army Corps.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
I think US invasions of both Iraq and Afghan, as nation building projects, were geo-strategic blunders
Were both invasions actually “nation building projects” in that in both cases there were military plans in place but what was lacking was a “what after plan”; a long term holistic socio/economic plan to get both countries on their feet again.

I tend to agree with the view that if genuine focus and efforts were placed on the socio/economic aspects; both countries wouldn’t have become the absolute disasters they eventually became. In the case of Iraq the plan or rather the illusion was that Iraqi oil money and a grateful Iraqi population would suffice to get the country in its feet; doing away with the messy beds for nation building.

As the old counter insurgency cliche goes : to defeat a counter insurgency; one has to build a country.

Naturally the U.S. and other militaries were extremely reluctant to get info the nation building business; there were issues between the Pentagon and State Department; reluctance to get the UN in, etc, but there was no getting around the fact that nation building was essential.

The international community should be more open to recognizing status-quo statehood for countries like Afghanistan.
In theory yes but in practice wouldn’t this create a dangerous precedent? In that a dozen other places might demand the same.

In this regard the SAA Tiger Force is a good example of an indigenous successful formation
Robert Fisk visited Syria and did a number of articles on the Tiger Force. He mentions how this unit eventually became much more effective than its Hezbollah and Iraqi counterparts. It learnt how to fight the war the way it needed fighting in a way Assad’s enemies were unable to respond.
 
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John Fedup

The Bunker Group
In Afghanistan’s case, better to leave them alone to sort their $hit out. As long as there is no export of terrorists, it is probably the best alternative for the rest of the world albeit not so great for Afghans as nobody wants to continue there for another 20 years ( even if funds were available).
WRT to Iraq, a different story. General Powell was right, if you break you own it. Iraq is likely going to become a huge problem once US forces and others leave. A caged Saddam, IMHO, was a much better option to counter Iran, again not so great for the Iraqi population though. Regime change is best handled by the locals. Can’t be much worse than stuff undertaken during the last 30 plus years.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part 1 of 6: Understanding Afghanistan as a multi-focal civil war

1. Afghanistan is in the middle of a 43 year multi-focal civil war. In conflict studies terminology, this means that there were lots of civil wars going on at the same time. There are a host of issues when looking at this multi-focal civil war in Afghanistan, prime among them are corruption, injustice, inequality and deceit by all parties. The hypocrisy is not just American or Pakistani. In my opinion, we should not try to understand the conflict in Afghanistan as a binary war between the Afghan Government and its coalition of “Popular Uprising Forces” vs the Taliban (and its sponsors the ISI in Pakistan. Because that is not all that is happening, as Dr Mike Martin explains:

2. Most of these mini wars are going on between families and tribes, over things like land, water rights and family feuds and control of drugs. All this other stuff has nothing to do with the simplistic government vs Taliban framing.

3. This framing is important because it allows local actors to paint their actions as part of a grand narrative. When the First Vice President of Afghanistan wants to place all the blame on Pakistan, he is using this framing to argue for resources from outside actors, like the Americans and the Iranians, in order to fund their local fight.

Q: If I were Joe Biden, would I be happy to endlessly fund an Afghan Government that is in Iran or China’s orbit?​

4. Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD), who serves on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said he discussed the situation in Afghanistan with Secretary Blinken, and there's "no chance" Biden changes his troop withdrawal strategy. From their perspective, it cannot be in American interest to continue waste its money to keep troops in Afghanistan, in a forever war. Thanks to Trump’s mis-steps in negotiating with the Taliban, 95% of US troops and gear are out of Afghanistan at this time.

5. President Ghani says one side is perpetuating war. He calls for a jirga (meeting) with the Taliban leader Haibatullah while questioning his whereabouts. A short period of self reflection by Afghans is needed, if they seek to win the propaganda battle against the Taliban — after reaching out by calling for a jirga, if not reciprocated, war is the correct path forward. EU envoy Andreas von Brandt and NATO Senior Civilian Representative – Afghanistan Stefano Pontecorvo condemned the killing of Dawa Khan Menapal, head of the Afghan government's media and information center, and asked the Taliban to stop “murdering those who stand for freedom speech and human rights.”

(a) I believe that birds of a feather flock together. Ismael Khan says several mullahs from Herat city have joined the Taliban and they are trying to convince him & the governor to surrender. On the other hand, two mullahs from the resistance front said they will fight to the last drop of their blood. Col. Naweed is also correct to point out that it is Afghan indifference toward their own nation and people — that has led them to be standing on the precipice.​
(b) Herat represents civilization, progress, critical thinking, poetry and more. Sadly within Herat, there are regressive figures like Mujibur Rahman Ansari, head of Herat’s Gazargah mosque. I wouldn’t be surprised if individuals like Ansari joined the Taliban. The problem is that the ISI is pouring fuel over this fire with no ability to control the level of violence afterwards.​

6. The Taliban leadership in Doha, asserted that they would stop Afghan territory being used for terrorism. But they can’t promise that because they don’t and never will control all Afghan territory. In the next 3 months as the fighting evolves, the Afghan National Army will show that the Taliban can attack towns and cities but usually can’t hold onto all of their gains. Even if in 2022, the Taliban get close to government — it will become clear that they cannot control the violence because most people are fighting for personal or local reasons.
 
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STURM

Well-Known Member
John,

Why is Iraq a different story? If outside powers for their own interests are going to impose regime change on a country with little or no democratic institutions; weak governance beyond the capital, a population heavily divided along ethnic lines and a failed economy: it’s the responsibility and in the interests of the country’s new owners to get the country back in its feet again.

Once U.S. forces leave Iraq won’t necessarily be a problem. Compared to Afghanistan it has stronger institutions; a stronger economy, a larger middle class and less immediate neighbours directly interfering in a major way. I would also argue (I could be mistaken of course) that despite being an “artificial” country created by outside powers: despite ethnic and other issues: there is a stronger sense of national identity in Iraq - in general - compared to Afghanistan.

Following his trashing in Kuwait; Saddam wasn’t a counter to anyone. He was a major problem for his people but not for Iran or anyone else. The only time he was a counter to Iran was in the 1980’s when the West and other countries supported him in the war he started against Iran. The greatest irony is that he later discarded his WMDs and wanted the West to believe him but wanted Iran and his population to continue believing he still had them.
 
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old faithful

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I saw a very interesting interview with Pakistani PM Imran Khan, where he explained why the withdrawal of US troops was a very bad idea with very bad timing.
He explained that after 20 years, with no military solution achieved, withdrawal of troops then sent a message to the Taliban that the Taliban had won. That left a political solution unlikely, as the Taliban now has the initiative, and can pretty much dictate terms.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
The fact that the U.S. was even willing to negotiate with them; after insisting for years that there was no place for the Taliban in a future Afghanistan, sent a clear message to the Taliban. Parallels with the situation in Vietnam where the position of North Vietnamese negotiators was immensely strengthened in the knowledge the U.S. was leaving.

A full Taliban victory may not necessarily result in a “problem solved” situation for Pakistan. The Pakistanis themselves have had major issues with various groups in FATA which share the Taliban’s ideology and who traditionally have been very independent. They also have sectarian issues which can get worse; not to mention long-standing unresolved border issues with Afghanistan.

The Afghan Taliban holds the initiative; it can continue to insist on dialogue whilst maintaining its offensive. Time is on its side. It also still has a wide support base from various rural areas in the country. Due to various factors winning over the population has been a major issue for the Kabul government and its foreign backers.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part 2 of 6: Understanding Afghanistan as a multi-focal civil war

7. Sad is a country that needs heroes but this new generation of heroes like Yar Mohammad Dostum have to rise to meet the Taliban threat and face down evil. Afghans have to make a choice to stand together and take charge of their own future regardless of the propaganda, information wars, statements, condemnations and irrelevant analysis and sound bites.
(a) Heavy fighting in several parts of Sheberghan town — the urban centre and most government buildings have changed hands between Jamiat militia forces and the Taliban few times. Unless reinforcements come, the Jamiat militia forces could be defeated by the Tailban.​
(b) For 20 years, America did not build a democratic institution in Afghanistan. Instead, warlordism and corruption became part of the country’s political culture. There are 4 other points I need to mention:​
One, due to warlordism, the Afghan government lacks people’s trust. As the Afghan government tries to remove warlords, they lose the trust of the regions where the warlords are based. They are dammed if you do and even more dammed if they don’t. This is part of the reason why the regime in Kabul failed to 'win the hearts and minds,' of the many factions in the rural areas.​
Two, the Taliban have Afghan spies in every national institution. The Afghan National Army was told to expect a storm in Herat, based on reliable intelligence and surveillance. Suddenly, the Taliban’s main thrust shifted towards Shibirghan, Kundoz, Nemroz and Zaranj. This completely caught the forces deployed off guard and the elite Afghan Commandos are left fighting skirmishes in Herat.​
Q: Who are the traitors in Kabul feeding the unreliable intelligence to the frontline?​
But then Kabul has always been full of traitors. In 2009, Ghani called Abdul Rashid Dostum, a “known killer,” but symbolically promoted him to Marshall, in a 2020 political move. A few months ago, President Ghani sent Dawood Laghmani as a governor to Faryab province, a the Dostum stronghold, to weaken Dostum; the people rejected the governor, and Ghani sent him to Ghazni. In a short while, this governor is expected to hand Ghazni over to the Taliban.​
Three, for many, the different factions that make up the Afghan government are seen as predatory and kleptocratic. A number of strategic villages in Shiberghan have fallen into the hands of Taliban. Heavy Taliban attacks since last night. A prominent anti-Taliban figure have told told reporters that: “ we need urgent reinforcements. Our fighters fighting for months. Taliban keep rotating their fighters.” There are also reports that Jowzjan Provincial Council Chief Babar Ishchi surrendered to Taliban in Khawaja Dakoo district to the Taliban. Elder Ishchi — father of Babar Ishchi accused Abdul Rashid Dostum of kidnapping him, torturing him. Switching sides to settle old scores with Dostum in Sheberghan makes perfect sense.​
Four, beyond the hard fight for territory, the battle for the narrative is almost as important. The Afghan National Army needs both the support of the city folk and also the majority of the mullahs. When you see a religious school donating blood for the injured that is a good sign.​

8. Zaranj town becomes the first provincial capital to fall to the Taliban without a single shot being fired — loss of revenue from Ziranj is about US$43.2 million p.a. in duties (plus another US$50 million in direct taxes), for the Afghan Government. When undeclared goods is included, the loss of revenue is estimated the US$176 million p.a. This part of the corrupt glue that held the Afghan elites together.

(a) India built and handed over the Zaranj-Delaram highway to Afghanistan in 2010. This critical project, connecting to Iran’s Chabahar Port (also run by the Indians), back then faced a lot of pushback from Taliban. In 2008, Indian BRO personnel were killed or injured in a terror attack on the highway project. As a major trader hub, Zaranj lies on the border with Iran — which makes me wonder what deal the Iranians and the locals did with the Taliban’s criminal network there — the trading town basically agreed that this money will now go to the Taliban.​
(b) By taking Ziranj, the Taliban also control a major source of water to Sistan Baluchistan with the intakes from the Helmand river sitting just south of the city. With Kamal Khan dam complete, it is possible to stop the flow of water to Iran. This ‘capture’ of regional capital Zaranj or ‘back room deal’ appears to be part of a strategy to choke off the Afghan government from the outside world and challenge its authority to man its own borders.​
 
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STURM

Well-Known Member
After taking Ziranj; if the Taliban gets closer to the Iranian border; I wouldn't be surprised to see an Iranian reaction: like when Iranian staff at the consulate in Mazar were gunned down. Lots of bad blood between the Iranians and the Taliban and the last thing the Iranians want is a Taliban presence directly across the border.

The question also is how able the government is in deciding where to allocate resources and how; given that unlike in the past the Taliban is attacking on multiple axes. Something it wouldn’t be able to do if it hadn’t some level of local support and a light logistical/support footprint compared to government forces. Another question is what is the level of coordination between the ANA and the various ethnic armed groups which are answerable to their own leaders?


A spokesperson for Nimruz’s police, who declined to be named for security reasons, told Reuters news agency that the Taliban had been able to capture the city because of a lack of reinforcements from the government.

Taliban sources said the group was celebrating, and Zaranj’s fall would boost the morale of their fighters in other provinces. A Taliban commander, speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity, said it has strategic importance as it is on the border with Iran.

“This is the beginning and [you will] see how other provinces fall in our hands very soon,” he said
 
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STURM

Well-Known Member
A 2nd provincial capital has fallen, Sheberghan, the home of Rashid Dostum. ANA reportedly retreated without much of a fight; although it’s not known whether they were lacking in outside support like in the case of ANA units along the border areas; including those who fled to Tajikistan. It’s still early days and the narrative might soon change but for now at least things look eerily similar to when the Talibs first swept to power.


Social media posts suggested the Taliban was welcomed by some residents of the desert city Sheberghan. They showed captured military Humvees, luxury SUVs and pickups speeding through the streets, flying white Taliban flags as residents – mostly youths and young men – cheered them on.

The Afghan security forces lost their morale due to intense propaganda by the Taliban,” a senior official from the city, who asked not to be named, told AFP


Perhaps to better understand what makes the Taliban tick and what motivates them to do what they do; we must first go back to history and look at how they swept out of nowhere: eventually taking step by step the whole country with the key exception of the Panjshir valley which they probably would have taken has it not been for events on 11th September 2001. Ahmad’s Rashid’s “Taliban” is highly recommended as is Tomsen’s “The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers“ and Sinno’s Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond”.
 
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John Fedup

The Bunker Group
John,

Why is Iraq a different story? If outside powers for their own interests are going to impose regime change on a country with little or no democratic institutions; weak governance beyond the capital, a population heavily divided along ethnic lines and a failed economy: it’s the responsibility and in the interests of the country’s new owners to get the country back in its feet again.

Once U.S. forces leave Iraq won’t necessarily be a problem. Compared to Afghanistan it has stronger institutions; a stronger economy, a larger middle class and less immediate neighbours directly interfering in a major way. I would also argue (I could be mistaken of course) that despite being an “artificial” country created by outside powers: despite ethnic and other issues: there is a stronger sense of national identity in Iraq - in general - compared to Afghanistan.

Following his trashing in Kuwait; Saddam wasn’t a counter to anyone. He was a major problem for his people but not for Iran or anyone else. The only time he was a counter to Iran was in the 1980’s when the West and other countries supported him in the war he started against Iran. The greatest irony is that he later discarded his WMDs and wanted the West to believe him but wanted Iran and his population to continue believing he still had them.
Intervention into Afghanistan was justified IMHO, Iraq wasn’t. The worst thing about Iraq, again IMHO, was all the blood and treasure wasted that could have made a difference in Afghanistan. I agree Saddam wasn’t much of a threat to Iran unless arms exports restarted. However his internal security apparatus would likely be far more effective in countering Iranian influence than the current government. Yes Iraq does have functioning infrastructure and institutions but they may be vulnerable to Iranian influence. I guess the world will find out how Iraq fares in the next few years.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Yes Iraq does have functioning infrastructure and institutions but they may be vulnerable to Iranian influence. I guess the world will find out how Iraq fares in the next few years
For a variety of reasons Iraq has more going for it than Afghanistan. It’s a “stronger” state; why despite its flaws is in a much better position compared to Afghanistan to deal with various challenges.

As for Iranian influence; both countries are neighbours and Iraq has a Shia majority. It is given that Iraq will be of major importance for the Iranians and that they would seek to have a certain level of influence there. Iran has its own reasons naturally but not all of what it does has to necessarily be damaging or destabilising for Iraq.

The Americans invading Iraq and creating the conditions which led to the Shias coming to power was a dream come true.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part 3 of 6: Understanding Afghanistan as a multi-focal civil war

9. On the one hand, Taliban often talk about how Americans failed 'winning hearts and minds'. On the other, it is even more ridiculous that the Taliban believe THEY could win hearts and minds of their fellow Afghans by attacking their cities in the worst ways imaginable, by using car bombs, by killing civilians, by sex slaving women, by targeting activists and officials.
(a) Kabul, until 1996 had 1.5 million population. When the Taliban invaded Kabul in 1996, its population shrunk to an estimated 500,000 (or to 1/3 of its former size). Between 2001-2021, Kabul’s population has grown to about 6.5 million people. Since June 2021, about 1 million refugees came to Kabul to seek refuge from the Taliban. These refugees or internally displaced persons (IDP) need urgent humanitarian support.​
(b) This means that if Kabul’s falls to the Taliban, 2/3s of its population (or 4 million people) will become IDPs or refugees. Lessons from the past may not always ward off doom, but they can provide insights into the present and even the future. Those in DT who read history knows that follows will be great suffering.​
(c) As Winston Churchill wrote, “those that fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”​

10. Will the neighbours, like Iran and Pakistan, resume trade and allow the Taliban to run the respective border posts? Or will the latest Taliban victories near the Iran border be pyhrric, denying themselves a source of revenue from funneling trade through crossings the was only recently in Afghan govt hands? A lot depends on regional countries. Pakistan who their biggest supporter, at this point is expected the allow trade at their border crossing to continue.

11. Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital of Helmand province is turning into Mosul of Iraq. Street to street fighting is ongoing between ANDSF and the Taliban. Civilians are caught in the line of fire as Taliban fighters use civilian homes as shelters.
(a) In this 20 year confrontation with the Taliban, as a fundamentalist movement and as a barbaric adversary (somewhat like the Han dynasty facing a never ending war with the Xiongnu), it is a pity that the American discourse on national security did not help American citizens better understand themselves. It remains to be seen if the Biden administration can avoid the same mistakes made by Emperor Wu Ti (141-87 BCE).​
(b) This reminds me of the great suffering during Seven Warring States period, the most popular retelling of being that of the ancient Chinese historian Sima Qian, where it starts in 475 BCE. The end date is usually defined as the establishment of the Qin Empire at 221 BCE.​
(c) The period is covered by two ancient Chinese chronicles, the Discourses of the States and the Intrigues of the Warring States. Of the Seven Warring States, Qin eventually grew to be the strongest and successfully annexed the other six states; Han was the first to fall, in 230 BCE, while Qi was the last to surrender in 221 BCE. The King of Qin, created the new title of huangdi (emperor), and became China's first emperor.​
 
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STURM

Well-Known Member
The worst thing about Iraq, again IMHO, was all the blood and treasure wasted that could have made a difference in Afghanistan.
Indeed. In 2003 the Taliban had been largely chased out of Afghanistan and the bulk of locals welcomed the presence of foreign troops. Diverting resources and attention to Iraq was a colossal blunder; the results are what we have today.

The failure to have a ‘what after” plan to get both countries politically and economically back on their feet was another major blunder. Nobody likes nation building: time and resource extensive and not what militaries are good at but it makes the key difference.

The U.S. has a good nation building record in Germany, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. U.S. aid and advice in introducing political reforms played a huge role in the defeat of the Huks by the Filipinos.


The war in Afghanistan and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Syria have shaped my generation's cultural image, similar to the Vietnam War's generation. In both instances, the U.S. entered the wars believing its martial superiority ensured victory and ended each war wondering what went wrong’
 

Hone C

Active Member

Kunduz is now under Taliban control, the fourth provincial capital in three days to be captured, with the government looking dangerously close to losing its traditional base of support in the north. The airport outside the city is still in government hands for now, with commandos and air support being flown in to attempt to retake the city.

The Commandos are currently shouldering the bulk of the fighting, but seem to be spread thinly, largely fixed in defending small enclaves in urban centres.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part 4 of 6: Understanding Afghanistan as a multi-focal civil war

13. In Sima Qian’s Shiji (literally translated, “Book on Historical Records”), we can reconstruct his attitudes towards the Han empire’s imperial expansion. There is an analogy to be drawn here with American hubris in fighting in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Often it is through confrontation with others that a people can better understand themselves.
(a) The way Sima Qian presents the Xiongnu people, is a reflection of his understanding of the mistakes of the Han empire and his emperor, Wu Ti — at that time, the northern barbaric nomads, fighting on horseback, were arguably the most troublesome enemy of the Han. In Shiji’s constituent chapter “The Account of the Xiongnu”, this work aims to reveal how the ancient historian reflects on his empire. For many Chinese, reading history is the opportunity to learn from past mistakes — thanks to ignorant imperial presidents like Trump, who prides himself as wilfully unaware of the mistakes of the past — Americans under his administration was unable to learn from history to avoid mistakes from the peace deal that resulted in the Fall of Saigon, in April 1975. The American agreement with the Taliban, signed on 29 Feb 2020, is equally flawed. "Trump's unfortunate deal with the Taliban was the beginning of the end,"Germany's defense minister said.​
(b) Grievances, Pakistan and infighting could not explain every incident of battlefield defeat. After Obama’s surge, when it was time for the Afghan government to stand on its own — Afghan police and soldiers were giving up in battle. The average soldier and policeman simply did not want to fight as much as his Taliban counterpart. As a result, the Afghan government was losing ground. Following the signing of a peace deal between the US and the Taliban, Afghan security forces have been racked by waves of violence. On the ground, Afghan government commanders have said they fear mounting casualties among their men are undercutting morale. Some Afghans are of the opinion that America has betrayed them, and a responsible withdrawal by U.S. / NATO was needed. But:​
Q: What have the Afghans been doing since 2014?​
(c) Keeping in mind that the U.S. and NATO combat mission formally ended in Dec 2014. If the Afghan National Army can’t fight after 7 years of help, maybe they are a force that can’t fight. Part of the reason for Taliban gains is local militias shifting away from the Afghan government. Let me share a quote, that I dislike, from a former US Marine officer who served in Afghanistan:​
“I can tell you from personal experience that infantry forces spent a lot of time during firefights just trying to get Afghan soldiers to shoot in the right direction or at all for that matter. You also hoped that they were not high on opium or marijuana before a combat patrol.”​
On the Afghan government and security forces amid Taliban gains, the Pentagon says: "These are their military forces, these are their provincial capitals, their people to defend and it's really going to come down to the leadership that they're willing to exude."​
Kunduz is now under Taliban control, the fourth provincial capital in three days to be captured, with the government looking dangerously close to losing its traditional base of support in the north. The airport outside the city is still in government hands for now, with commandos and air support being flown in to attempt to retake the city.
14. In 2001, Lt Gen. (retired) John F. Mulholland Jr. was a colonel who was in command of the 5th Special Forces Group and the 12 strong ODA 595. Within days of the Sept. 11 attacks, he helped plan the initial push into Afghanistan, a mission that would, enable the Northern Alliance and ODA 595 retake the city of Mazari Sharif. Dostum with the help of ODA 595 led his nomadic people charging into war the same way his ancestors had—on horseback and together with the Northern Alliance, they would topple the Taliban in a few months. For the first time in the then-roughly 50-year history of U.S. Special Forces, the soldiers of ODA 595 would be asked to lead an actual unconventional warfare campaign, partnering with indigenous forces to take down the Taliban government.
(a) If Afghanistan in 2021 is once again lost to the Taliban (both as a network with ISI support and as an extremist religious movement), the Biden administration does not get to shift the blame to Trump (for the deal made to withdraw American troops), as the US DoD under Secretary Austin well know that the logistically challenged Afghan National Army is not ready — I strongly believe that Biden has cynically decided that it is no longer an American interest to keep the corrupt regime in Kabul afloat — Pakistan (and by extension China), can own this problem going forward.​
(b) As I understand it, the Taliban going on the offensive to capture the fourth largest city in Afghanistan, Mazari Sharif. This city is the capital of Balkh province in Northern Afghanistan and it is from multiple directions. But the Jamiat-e Islami militia members, led by Atta Mohammad Noor, has mobilised against advancing Taliban.​
(c) In 2017, the relative security in Balkh province allowed reconstruction programs to move forward and additional international aid to be disbursed in the province. That allowed Noor, a former anti-Soviet and anti-Taliban militia commander from the largely ethnic Tajik Jamiat-e Islami party, to become the main source of political power in Balkh Province. But President Ghani, an ethnic Pashtun, had vowed to replace all of Afghanistan's provincial governors and dismissed Atta Mohammad Noor because he was seen as too powerful.​
(d) On 28 July 2021, the Washington Post reported that the remnants of the Northern Alliance, like Ahmad Massoud (son of anti-Soviet military leader Ahmad Shah Massoud), Atta Mohammad Noor and Abdul Rashid Dostum, were remobilizing under an umbrella. Former Vice President, Abdul Rashid Dostum (as the leader of the Junbish-i-Milli party, influential among the Uzbek ethnic minority), and Defense minister Mohammad met to discuss Dostum's proposal to retake the North, on 8 Aug 2021. As you know, Dostum and the 12 Americans in ODA 595, are the liberators of the city of Mazari Sharif from the Taliban, 20 years ago back in 2001.​
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part 5 of 6: Understanding Afghanistan as a multi-focal civil war

15. The popular anti-Taliban uprisings in Afghanistan are not signs of support to the corrupt and dis-functional Afghan government led by a Pashtun President and/or inept High Council for National Reconciliation (HCNR). President Ghani is more interested in coup-proofing and than in building an effective ANDSF; he spent a lot more resources, energy and time to sideline warlords (since the beginning of his presidency in 2014) than being an effective war time leader. Now he is trying to use these newly approved ‘Public Resistance Forces’ (formerly called ‘Public Uprising Forces’, a few days ago), to stop the Taliban advances.
(a) The uprisings are in support of the 307,000 strong Afghan National Defense & Security Forces (ANDSF) that is being partly paid for by foreign aid by 30 NATO member states that includes U.S. and Germany.​
(b) The Taliban are attacking the north early, as they want to prevent the former Northern Alliance from reforming and moving down south. The highway connecting Sheberghan with Mazari Sharif has been reportedly blocked after Taliban launched yet another assault to cut-off the 2 separate forces. The ANDSF are in a meat grinder of a fight with the Tailban in Dihdadi District. This northern Afghanistan district is situated in the central part of Balkh province, Afghanistan. It is not far from the capital of the province Mazari Sharif — about 15 km in eastern direction from the district capital Dihdadi.​

16. For the Americans, Afghanistan was a long war but also an experience. It feels wrong to cast the entire experience as bad or evil. Better, I think, to see both the good as well as the bad. In the ‘bad’ side of the ledger, SIGAR’s two previous anti-corruption assessments, as well as ongoing work on a third, have shown that the Afghan government has taken limited steps to curb systemic corruption and that more tangible action is required.
(a) The Afghan government often takes paper or process steps, such as drafting regulations or holding meetings, rather than concrete actions that would reduce corruption, such as arresting or enforcing penalties on powerful Afghans.​
(c) Given the low CPI ranking of 165, there is no simple answer of how Afghanistan should be governed or if in fact it can be governed at all in the next 5 to 25 years — the civil war in Afghanistan has lasted 43 years (with a 20 year American and NATO interlude) will continue until a victor appears.​

The Commandos are currently shouldering the bulk of the fighting, but seem to be spread thinly, largely fixed in defending small enclaves in urban centres.
17. In the ‘good’ side of the ledger, Afghan Commandos can fight but they are being misused as a first line general purpose infantry — the Afghan Police should be the first line of defence and the badly broken army (that out-numbers the Taliban) is the second line of defence — Pashtun politicians in Kabul have been told this again and again by the Americans that they need to fix the corruption in the army.

18. The commandos are a strategic reserve to retake hard fought objectives. Afghan force deployment by the Pashtun political idiots in Kabul ensures they have no reserves — wrong use of a military reserve is yet another ‘bad’ side of the ledger. While the Taliban managed to advance in parts of Sheberghan, the western parts of city are under the control of government. ANDSF has started a counter attack and clearance operation.

19. The horror of the progressive fall of major cities in Afghanistan need not occur. Like the other 3 towns (Sheberghan, Sar-i-Pul, Taloqan) that has fallen, Kunduz city centre has fallen and government backed forces are only holding onto the army base nearby, parts of the city or the airport — they are waiting for reinforcements before counter attacking.

20. Speaking to reporters, President Biden said the US was keeping the commitments it had made to Afghanistan, such as providing close air support, paying military salaries and supplying Afghan forces with food and equipment. But he said: "They've got to fight for themselves." As I see it, the Taliban have 4 ‘pros’ they need to have for successful insurgency:

(a) External sanctuaries like that in Pakistan.​

(b) Enough public support in the rural areas and from their network to extends beyond Afghanistan. Since 2015, the Taliban have significantly evolved its leadership council to include many leaders outside of the southern belt. One of the reasons for this was precisely to blunt the inter-tribal dynamics of southern clan-ships. This approach of expanding the Taliban leadership council and integrating emerging powerbrokers has also enabled new leaders across the country at finding a seat in the table and feeling more as ‘insiders’​

(c) Smart enough to attack where the Afghan National Army is the weakest — local militia support, like those provided by Babar Ishchi in Khawaja Dakoo district, is at times unreliable. Using Pakistani supplied motor bikes and vehicles captured from the ANDSF, the Taliban are ready to change their routes and focus of attack on a dime and reorient their logistics that flow in from Pakistan. The Taliban are better in military tactics, and in logistics. Their method of fighting is like a balloon: squeeze here and the air moves over there — it flexes under pressure, but the volume of forces used in these attacks remains constant.​

(d) More coherent than Afghan government, in governance, in tax collection, and in strategic communications. 80% of the Talibans funds in Nimroz were from taxing the cross border trade in legal goods (only 9% came from drugs). IMO, insurgencies do not happen in the void or solely as a result of a foreign hand.​
 
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STURM

Well-Known Member

It’s a sign of the times; how things have gone ratshit when the U.S. has to “press“ the Taliban to “end” its offensive. Meanwhile a U.S. official has described the situation as “ “clearly not going in the right direction” which is an interesting way of putting things - I was under the impression understatements was a British trait.

All peace talks and negotiations between the Afghans/U.S. and the Taliban should cease. Not doing so only emboldens the Taliban and demonstrates how weak and desperate its opponents are.
 
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