Conflict in Yemen

[Feanor]

3. Given this latest attack in the middle of a global pandemic, Yemen's Huthi rebels will get no sympathy from me from this point going forward (if there is a coronavirus outbreak in Yemen).

AFP: Saudi forces intercept missile over curfew-locked Riyadh​

Saudi Gazette: Arab Coalition intercepts, destroys Houthi ballistic missiles targeting Riyadh, Jazan​

I'm not sure I can agree with this. The Saudis and their proxies still occupy a large portion of Yemen. I think it would be strange to expect the Houthis, who have seen their civilians suffer terribly under Saudi bombardment, to simply halt their successful offensive operations against the Saudis due to a virus outbreak in a country where civilians routinely suffer and die from preventable diseases due to lack of healthcare (they recently had a massive cholera outbreak, among other things).

 

[OPSSG]

I'm not sure I can agree with this.

1. This is an expected response from you, as you are consistently more indifferent to deaths than me, including preventable deaths from the up-coming large scale disease outbreak in Yemen, that is being accidentally spread by the Iranians.

2. In recent weeks the Houthis have taken control of territory in Jawf province including its main city of Hazm, which lies northeast of the capital, Sanaa, while it has also pushed into parts of the resource-rich Marib province, held by Yemen's internationally recognised government in the north.

The Saudis and their proxies still occupy a large portion of Yemen.

3. The Houthis are trying to gain more ground with the withdrawal of UAE troops in Yemen. Instead of being satisfied with their gains on the ground, they seek to enlarge the fighting to trigger a larger humanitarian crisis.

4. MARTIN GRIFFITHS, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, emphasized that the county is at a critical juncture whereby the parties to the conflict will either move it towards de-escalation and a resumed political process or towards greater violence and suffering that will make negotiations difficult. Pointing to the military escalation in Al Jawf, he expressed concern about the impact of the violence on the people of that governorate, where thousands of families have been displaced and require shelter and assistance. The escalation could trigger conflicts in other governorates, creating a new cycle of violence with devastating humanitarian and political consequences, he warned, calling upon the parties to exercise maximum restraint. Please take note of the following responses recorded at the UN:

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(i) Indonesia’s representative cautioned that the current escalation impedes humanitarian efforts and may prompt a return to the elevated levels of civilian casualties seen in 2018. He also reiterated calls for access to the deserted oil tanker Safer — moored at the port of Hudaydah — before it is too late to avert an environmental disaster for Yemen and the wider region.​

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(ii) The Dominican Republic’s representative also remarked on the escalating hostilities, warning that the fighting could jeopardize hard-won political headway and has had a devastating effect on civilians. A national ceasefire is urgently needed, and issues of justice and accountability cannot be ignored, he stressed. He also called attention to unprecedented swarms of locusts in Yemen’s desert areas.​

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(iii) Germany’s representative said it is “incomprehensible” that leaders in Sana’a treat humanitarian workers in a manner that calls into question the entire aid operation in the north. He called upon all parties to stop harassing humanitarian staff, facilitate unhindered access, lift bureaucratic restrictions and implement project agreements without delay.​

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(iv) Yemen’s representative said that the Houthis continue to obstruct United Nations peace efforts, adding that the recent military escalation is a sign that they were never serious about peace. They also continue to target hospitals and refugee camps in many parts of the country, restrict the movement of the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) and to target observation posts in that port city. Iran continues to supply the Houthis with military support while encouraging them to obstruct United Nations efforts, he said, warning that the situation could deteriorate further without international support.​

I think it would be strange to expect the Houthis, who have seen their civilians suffer terribly under Saudi bombardment, to simply halt their successful offensive operations against the Saudis due to a virus outbreak in a country where civilians routinely suffer and die from preventable diseases due to lack of healthcare (they recently had a massive cholera outbreak, among other things).

5. With the withdrawal of UAE troops, the conditions are more favourable for a political settlement that enables the Houthis to consolidate their control over areas they have already won by past fighting.

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(i) But they are greedy.​

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(ii) Currently, civilian casualties are rising again in 2020, with 187 killed or wounded in February alone, and that the figure amounts to more than 6 people every day and a 20 per cent increase since January. Much of the increase is due to fighting in Al Jawf and Marib.​

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(iii) Once the coronavirus pandemic hits — deaths will easily increase to 1,870 per month, in the 1st month and rising to 18,700 per month within 3 months (instead of 187 per month currently). And Iran’s aid to the Houthis will increase the rate that the virus is spreading through in Yemen.​

6. Keep in mind that the Houthi grip on Sanaa and the northern highlands appears fairly secure but the group has few domestic allies, having fought against most of the other major factions in Yemen, including Hadi loyalists, southern separatists, pro-Islah party militias, and loyalists of the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. This means that many areas of Yemen do not want to live under Houthi rule. Therefore, there is only so much blame you can level at Saudi Arabia.

 

[Feanor]

2. In recent weeks the Houthis have taken control of territory in Jawf province including its main city of Hazm, which lies northeast of the capital, Sanaa, while it has also pushed into parts of the resource-rich Marib province, held by Yemen's internationally recognised government in the north.

3. The Houthis are trying to gain more ground with the withdrawal of UAE troops in Yemen. Instead of being satisfied with their gains on the ground, they seek to enlarge the fighting to trigger a larger humanitarian crisis.

What makes you think that the goal is to enlarge the fighting and trigger a humanitarian crisis? In my opinion their goal is far less nefarious and far more straight forward. They're winning the war, why would they not keep pushing forward? In fact, what makes you think they would at any point be "satisfied" with anything less then a complete defeat of the Hadi loyalists, and a complete expulsion of Saudi Arabia and all of its allies? I would add this; why should they be satisfied with anything less?

Proving or at least supporting the idea that the humanitarian crisis in and of itself is their goal, as you state, is really hard. I can't help but wonder what pushed you to that conclusion. If you have some interesting reading on the subject, I would appreciate it.

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(iv) Yemen’s representative said that the Houthis continue to obstruct United Nations peace efforts, adding that the recent military escalation is a sign that they were never serious about peace. They also continue to target hospitals and refugee camps in many parts of the country, restrict the movement of the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) and to target observation posts in that port city. Iran continues to supply the Houthis with military support while encouraging them to obstruct United Nations efforts, he said, warning that the situation could deteriorate further without international support.​

I think they are serious about peace. It's just that peace to them would be the defeat of their enemies and complete withdrawal of the Saudis and all of their coalition partners, permanently.

5. With the withdrawal of UAE troops, the conditions are more favourable for a political settlement that enables the Houthis to consolidate their control over areas they have already won by past fighting.

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(i) But they are greedy.​

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(ii) Currently, civilian casualties are rising again in 2020, with 187 killed or wounded in February alone, and that the figure amounts to more than 6 people every day and a 20 per cent increase since January. Much of the increase is due to fighting in Al Jawf and Marib.​

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(iii) Once the coronavirus pandemic hits — deaths will easily increase to 1,870 per month, in the 1st month and rising to 18,700 per month within 3 months (instead of 187 per month currently). And Iran’s aid to the Houthis will increase the rate that the virus is spreading through in Yemen.​

This is a country where the pre-war child malnutrition rate was staggering, and some sources claim over 80 000 children in Yemen starved to death during the current conflict. Again, I'm not sure how sensitive they would be to the current coronavirus, or how well positioned they would be to do a whole lot about it, when even developed countries are having difficulties in curbing its spread. And I don't think the Houthi efforts can simply be attributed to greed. Their country was invaded by a foreign coalition, in support of domestic opposition, with a brutality that would make most currently reigning authoritarians blush. Now they are winning. Saudi Arabia has been bled and bled by their military failures, they've been both embarrassed and tangibly hurt by missile and UAV strikes against their infrastructure, their coalition is collapsing, and to top it off the price of oil is in the gutter. What better time for the Houthis to make their push?

6. Keep in mind that the Houthi grip on Sanaa and the northern highlands appears fairly secure but the group has few domestic allies, having fought against most of the other major factions in Yemen, including Hadi loyalists, southern separatists, pro-Islah party militias, and loyalists of the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. This means that many areas of Yemen do not want to live under Houthi rule. Therefore, there is only so much blame you can level at Saudi Arabia.

Perhaps my view of the conflict is colored by what I have seen and read about it, which is admittedly limited to the basic military and political layout. However I can't help but wonder, if they're fighting against all these domestic enemies, and a giant foreign coalition, and they're winning, how large and/or significant in influence can these other domestic groups be? After all, the Houthis are winning...

 

[Feanor]

@OPSSG It seems to be that you favor a negotiated settlement here, which has been a pattern in many conflicts across the third world, and there's something to be said for it. But it doesn't explain why you think they Houthis should favor such a settlement, and it doesn't explain why anyone would reasonably expect them to. They've gotten where they are today through force of arms, with considerable Iranian aid. Their enemies weren't interested in a negotiated settlement, until they failed in their offensives, over and over again. It seems me that the logical conclusion here is for the Houthis to defeat their enemies, and then re-organize the country internally, ideally with a new representative government. This makes far more sense to me then striking a deal with an opposition that's propped up from abroad by obvious enemies.

 

[OPSSG]

Mapping the Yemen conflict

A multimedia exploration of Yemen's multi-faceted civil war.

www.ecfr.eu

1. The British established a colony in Aden in 1839 and remained there until withdrawing in 1967, when Aden joined other southern regions to form an independent South Yemen republic. In 1970, a socialist republic was declared, which forged close ties with the Soviet Union.

2. North Yemen became a republic in 1962 and the neighbours remained separate until 1990, when they finally signed a unity accord, merging the two states into one following two short-lived wars in 1972 and 1978.

3. Houthi controlled territory can only be around the size of what was the former North Yemen — so it is obvious that they can’t ‘win’ the war in Yemen. The northern predominantly Zaidi tribal confederations of Hashid and Bakil have been crucial to the success of the Houthi advance, while tribes in the south that are part of the Madhaj confederation like Bani Hilal and Al Awalik in Shabwa and Yafae in Abyan have fought alongside the pro-Saudi coalition, protecting their territory while benefiting from the vehicles and arms provided by the UAE and Saudi members of the coalition.

4. I hope the above link with maps (of Houthi controlled areas in 2015, 2017 and June 2019) for background reading clarifies instead of the two of us continuing this conversation ahistorically?

But it doesn't explain why you think they Houthis should favor such a settlement, and it doesn't explain why anyone would reasonably expect them to. They've gotten where they are today through force of arms, with considerable Iranian aid. Their enemies weren't interested in a negotiated settlement, until they failed in their offensives, over and over again. It seems me that the logical conclusion here is for the Houthis to defeat their enemies, and then re-organize the country internally, ideally with a new representative government. This makes far more sense to me then striking a deal with an opposition that's propped up from abroad by obvious enemies.

5. Formed in 2017, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) has 26 members, the STC includes five governors from Southern Yemen and two former government ministers. And the STC’s militia can fight effectively. If the STC is attacked, UAE will provide them with war materials and close air support. Emirati backing was crucial in helping the STC gain Aden, which has been under its control since 2018. This means the Houthis have no hope of winning in the South. The Houthis can’t win the war in Yemen (as they lack the logistics and STC has control of a key port). Please tell me:

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Q1: What are the Houthis hoping for in this 2020 round of fighting?​

6. You also seem to show no awareness that the Houthi controlled area is under a naval blockade — which means whatever arms they get from Iran is only in drips and drabs.

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(i) Look at the maps in the link — while they may have won some recent battles, the Houthis have no hope of gaining back all the territory they controlled in 2015 (and much less win in the South) — lack of logistics limits their ability to advance and control a hostile area for long.​

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(ii) Iran, as backer of the Houthis, has been badly damaged in the salvoes of an oil price war. But the most significant damage that is necessitating a scaling down of Iran’s ambitions in Yemen is the emergence of the coronavirus in Iran and also as a global emergency that is depressing global oil demand. Iran's health ministry on 5 Apr 2020 said the coronavirus death toll in the country had reached 3,603, and only admits that 58,226 people were infected (when the real figure is estimated to be half a million infected). The daily toll has been rising by at least 100 deaths for the past few days.​

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(iii) Even in Houthi controlled areas, like in the city of Sana’a, there is chronic water shortage. Wells there now extend up to 1,200 meters in the ground, with water levels in the aquifer now dropping by six meters a year. UNDP programme officer Qahtan al-Abahi was quoted saying that the lower the water table, the lower the quality of the water. “The water is becoming more salinized,” he said. He spoke about a rise in kidney ailments. Solutions to the water crisis in the north have been put forward— but fighting prevents any attempt at a solution.​

They're winning the war, why would they not keep pushing forward? In fact, what makes you think they would at any point be "satisfied" with anything less then a complete defeat of the Hadi loyalists, and a complete expulsion of Saudi Arabia and all of its allies?

7. @Feanor, I hope the above link helps as I cannot make heads or tails of what you say. Once the infections spread, it is estimated that cases will double every fifth day. Please tell me:

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Q2: What does winning look like?​

8. Yemen—the poorest country in the region—is beset by persistent challenges that affect the quality of life of Yemeni citizens. The current war has catapulted the country into a deeper humanitarian crisis that will aggravate endemic humanitarian needs and leave citizens more vulnerable to shocks for years to come.

9. Even in a scenario where a ceasefire is called and stabilizing governmental processes were put in place, the lack of state capacity or infrastructure suggests that humanitarian responses will extend far beyond the ceasefire. Long-term trends like water shortages, urbanization and population growth have long been identified by international organizations as issues to which policies can be directed to help Yemen cope.

10. I may be just dense but what you say does not make sense to me — Saudi Arabia shares a 1,800 km land border with Yemen — Oman shares a 288 km land border with Yemen. Oman continues to provide humanitarian assistance to Yemenis to alleviate their suffering, maintain stability along its border and enhance historical cross-border ties. “Omanis look at Yemenis as human beings without trying to be superior,” said Ahmed Yahya Ahmed, who traveled in 2018 from Yemen to Sultan Qaboos Hospital in Salalah, Oman, to seek medical treatment for his sick father. The collapse of Yemeni state institutions and the civil war means Saudi Arabia and/or Oman will always have a vote as to what happens in Yemen.

11. Despite Yemen’s upheavals since 2011, Mahra province has not been affected economically because it relied on Omani markets to obtain fuel and food, depending especially on a major shared market, the Al-Mazyounah, which is a few kilometers from Yemen’s Shihen border-crossing. This explains why Mahra province managed to remain economically autonomous from the other provinces. If the Houthis’ goal is the complete expulsion of Saudi Arabia and all of its allies, it is totally unrealistic. I can’t believe you can adopt this unreasoned stance without justification or providing additional context.

12. Forgive me for having to admit that I do not know how to post further replies to you (as I cannot understand what seems to be a selective cherry picking approach). If you provide more context, I might be able to better understand your approach.

 

[OPSSG]

On 9 Apr 2020, it was reported that a Saudi Arabian-led coalition fighting Houthi forces in Yemen has declared an unilateral ceasefire, but it is unclear if the Houthi forces will also observe the ceasefire.

A statement from the coalition forces said: "On the occasion of holding and succeeding the efforts of the UN envoy to Yemen and to alleviate the suffering of the brotherly Yemeni people and work to confront the corona pandemic and prevent it from spreading, the coalition announces a comprehensive ceasefire for a period of two weeks, starting on Thursday."

The situation in Yemen has long been described as the world's worst humanitarian crisis. The war has cost many civilian lives and left the country on the brink of collapse.

 

[Feanor]

On 9 Apr 2020, it was reported that a Saudi Arabian-led coalition fighting Houthi forces in Yemen has declared an unilateral ceasefire, but it is unclear if the Houthi forces will also observe the ceasefire.

A statement from the coalition forces said: "On the occasion of holding and succeeding the efforts of the UN envoy to Yemen and to alleviate the suffering of the brotherly Yemeni people and work to confront the corona pandemic and prevent it from spreading, the coalition announces a comprehensive ceasefire for a period of two weeks, starting on Thursday."

The situation in Yemen has long been described as the world's worst humanitarian crisis. The war has cost many civilian lives and left the country on the brink of collapse.

The coalition had just taken another pummeling at al-Jawf, so they could certainly use the ceasefire. I have my doubts that the Houthis will follow suit, though you never know. I suspect they will at least attempt to finish up their operation in the governorate, which may not take that long.

Наступление в провинции Аль-Джавф

Свежее видео от хуситов посвященное наступлению в провинции Аль-Джавф. Показано наступление мотопехоты хуситов, бегство хадистов, занятие населенного пункта, захват трофеев (танки, ББМ, РСЗО, ствольная артиллерия, тачанки, бульдозеры, грузовики, автомобили) и амуниции, боеприпасов и прочего…

colonelcassad.livejournal.com

 

[OPSSG]

2021 Yemen Updates — Part 1

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1359589584011599872

1. A Houthi spokesman confirmed via Twitter the 10 Feb 2021 targeting of Abha International Airport and said that a total of four Samad-3 and Qasef-2K suicide drones had been used. According to the Yemeni Armed Forces, the Sammad-3 has a range of between 930 and 1,050 miles. In terms of appearance, the Qasef-2K is reportedly identical to the previous Qasef-1, which seems to be the Houthi name for the Iranian Ababil unmanned aerial vehicle. The Qasef-1 has a reported maximum range of 124 miles.

2. The Saudi government is also sending signals that it's ready to cooperate with the US on Yemen and make improvements on human rights in an effort to avoid a crisis with President Biden.

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(a) In this respect, there were two moves by the Saudi government. One, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal Bin Farhan met in Riyadh with the new U.S. envoy for Yemen, Tim Lenderking. Two, prominent women's rights activist Loujain al-Hathloul, who led the fight to allow Saudi women to drive, was released from prison.​

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(b) President Biden has promised a different approach. Biden also reversed the Trump administration’s designation of the Houthis as a terrorist organization. This move has been hailed by aid groups working in Yemen, who feared the designation would disrupt the flow of food, fuel and other goods barely keeping Yemenis alive. In a wide-ranging speech at the State Department on February 4th, Mr Biden excoriated the “humanitarian and strategic catastrophe” of the war in Yemen, now in its seventh year. There was no hyperbole in his diagnosis. More than 112,000 people have been killed in the fighting. With the economy devastated, four out of five Yemenis rely on aid to survive. Collapsing health and sanitation systems caused a years-long cholera outbreak; the United Nations warns of incipient famine.​

(c) Peter Salisbury, Yemen expert at the International Crisis Group, said Biden’s policy shift was “really welcome news” but “won’t automatically mean an end to the war.” 10 years since the fall of longtime autocrat Ali Abdullah Saleh in the wake of an Arab Spring uprising — a moment many Yemenis had hoped would lead to effective governance and greater freedom. Instead, a brutal war follow when the Houthis in late 2014 seized the capital, Sanaa, along with much of the country’s north, ousting the government of Saleh’s successor, President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi.​

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(d) US Secretary of State Tony Blinken also spoke to Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal Bin Farhan, after he'd already spoken to several other Arab foreign ministers. In the call, he stressed the need for the Saudis to take steps on human rights and end the war in Yemen.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1359942794639536129

3. Yemen’s new unity government was sworn in on 26 Dec 2020 before President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi in Riyadh, closing months of violence and political wrangling in southern Yemen provinces that weakened the anti-Houthi bloc. Led by Prime Minister Maeen Abdul Malik Saeed, the new government is formed of 24 ministers, representing major political forces in Yemen, including the powerful Southern Transitional Council (STC). See: Yemen’s new government sworn in, ending months of wrangling

4. Setting the new government’s priorities, the Yemeni president met with the ministers after the ceremony, in which he ordered them to focus their attention and efforts on addressing economic woes including managing a plunging currency, boosting revenues and defeating the Houthis, official news agency SABA reported. Hadi told the ministers that Yemenis are pinning hopes on this government to restore peace and stability to the liberated provinces, revive government bodies and unify forces to confront the Iran-backed Houthis.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1359218425747435522

5. It seems that this unity government in Yemen, can help with a transition to the end of the civil war there. But this unity government was targeted by the Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi led Houthi rebel group — it was a close call as the aircraft they arrived in (on 30 Dec 2020), was very nearly taken out by missile or drone strikes.

6. Houthi demands were outlined in a proposal in 2020, where they called for a nationwide cease-fire, the lifting of the coalition’s air, land and sea blockade and the reopening of roads in battleground areas. An interim period would follow, with negotiations among Yemenis over the country’s future. The Houthis insisted the deal be negotiated and signed between them and the Saudi-led coalition, clearly aiming to sideline Hadi’s government, Peter Salisbury, Yemen expert at the International Crisis Group said.

7. The Saudis demand the rebels surrender their heavy weapons, particularly ballistic missiles. The kingdom backs a 2016 U.N.-brokered draft proposal that would grant the Houthis a minor role in government and pave the way for elections. Hadi’s government insists any settlement include the return of his government to Sanaa. Biden’s cutoff of support, meanwhile, does not immediately set back the coalition’s ability to keep waging the war.

 

[Feanor]

In the meantime the Houthis appear to be pushing towards Marib, again. There have been reports of Houthi ballistic missile and UAV strikes against battlefield targets and field camps. There are continued reports of desertions among the Hadi ranks, and even some elements switching sides. It remains to be seen whether this is just a tactical success or a serious threat.

Новый раунд битвы за Мариб

В последние дни разгорелось масштабное сражение за столицу провинции Мариб. Хуситы оказывают давление практически по всему фронту и добились существенного успеха к западу от города, приближаясь к горному району, который прикрывает Мариб с запада. Ситуация для саудовской коалиции продолжает…

colonelcassad.livejournal.com

Дезертирство 6-й бригады

В Йемене более 150 солдат и офицеров 6-й бригады хадистов дезертировали с фронта и перешли на сторону хуситов. После улаживания формальностей, они планируют продолжить воевать, теперь уже на стороне хуситов против своих бывших коллег. Несмотря на все попытки остановить рост дезертирства…

colonelcassad.livejournal.com

This comes as the Houthis are no longer considered a terrorist group.

Revocation of the Terrorist Designations of Ansarallah - United States Department of State

The revocations are intended to ensure that relevant U.S. policies do not impede assistance to those already suffering what has been called the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Ansarallah leaders remain sanctioned.

www.state.gov

 

[OPSSG]

Part 1 of 2 — Hidden Hand of Iran: U.N. team finds Houthis launched Aden airport attack

1. An investigation by a UN team of experts found Yemen’s Houthis were responsible for a 30 Dec 2020 attack on Aden airport that killed at least 22 people as members of the country’s internationally recognized government arrived — which will lend itself to criticism of the Biden administration’s peace at any price approach in Yemen. Separate inspection teams by the United Nations and other Western powers have concluded that all the ballistic missiles and drones fired by the Houthis against Saudi Arabia came from Iran. It is believed that most of them were smuggled in pieces to Yemen and were assembled by the Houthi militias.

2. In Mar 2021, the Biden administration has made several policy shifts on Yemen to help bring this conflict to an end, including as Feanor has noted, the lifting the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation on the Houthis, imposed by former President Donald Trump.

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(a) The new Biden administration has vowed to take a more skeptical eye towards the relationship with Saudi Arabia — and to attempt negotiations with Iran for an updated version of the Iran nuclear deal that then-President Trump abandoned in 2018. But it hints at the seriousness with which military leaders at U.S. Central Command, which governs all American troops in the Middle East, takes the possibility of a war with Tehran.​

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(b) Middle Eastern nations — and any U.S. bases housed there — could have only minutes to react if Iran fires missiles. While many U.S. allies in the Middle East have advanced missile defenses including Patriot and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, those defenses proved imperfect against the kind of attack the Iranians launched against the Saudi oil refinery.​

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(c) In Feb 2021, Timothy Lenderking, the newly tapped U.S. special envoy for Yemen, was in Saudi Arabia to hold talks to finding a solution that would lead to a peace deal, so as to facilitate a peace deal that would lift a blockade to Yemen.​

3. For reasons unknown, Russia has blocked the release of the United Nations findings on the 30 Dec 2020 attack on Aden airport. The Russian mission to the United Nations did not respond immediately to a request for comment. The conflict became a regional proxy war as a Saudi-led coalition intervened to try and restore Hadi’s internationally-recognized government, which rules in exile in Riyadh, the Saudi capital. Both Houthi rebels and Saudi-led coalition forces have been accused of war crimes and rampant human rights abuses in Yemen. Indiscriminate coalition air strikes and rebel shelling have drawn widespread international criticism for killing civilians, hitting non-military targets and undermining peace efforts.

4. Six years into a war in which the Houthi rebels now control areas of the country that are home to 80% of Yemen’s population, UNSCR 2216 is outdated, most notably in its call for the Houthis to “immediately and unconditionally withdraw their forces;” this resolution was drafted by Saudi Arabia in 2015 to provide international legitimacy for its blockade and military operations.

5. According to some who are privy to Biden’s strategy to Yemen, an urgent first step to prevent millions from dying of famine in Yemen is for the international community to press Saudi Arabia for an immediate, unconditional lifting of the blockade on Yemen. And an essential next step, for successful peace negotiations, is for the Biden administration to push for a new, more balanced United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) to replace UNSCR 2216.

6. Biden’s attempt to get a peace deal has led Saudi Arabia to come under intensive attacks by ballistic missiles and explosive-laden drones for the past few weeks in an apparent attempt by the Iranian-backed Houthi militias in Yemen to force the kingdom to concede to their demands to end the six-year-long Yemeni War. However, robust Saudi air defenses have negated these attacks by intercepting the majority of the incoming projectiles. The Saudi Air Force has been using the Patriot PAC-3 as its main ballistic missiles defense system. It is also equipped with a variety of short- and medium-range surface-to-air missiles such as the Improved Hawk, Shahine and Mistral.

7. In a press briefing in the Saudi capital Riyadh on 8 Mar 2021, the spokesman for the Saudi-led Arab coalition fighting the Houthis in Yemen, Col. Turki al-Malki, said the coalition has destroyed most of the 350 ballistic missiles and 550 explosive-laden drones fired by the Houthis. “No country in the world has been able to confront these drones the way Saudi Arabia has,” he stressed.

8. “The accomplishments of the Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces (RSADF) are impressive… The RSADF is now the global leader in (ballistic) missile intercepts,” said David DesRoches, a professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at National Defense University in Washington DC.

 

[peterAustralia]

This thread is getting a little touchy, not very touchy, just a little. I have opinions (as do we all), I will try and be civil. As to Internationally recognised government, that can be interpreted as western nations deem that this force in Yemen is more to our liking, and thus we deem them to be legitimate. The same phrase is used in Libya, where one force is deemed the internationally recognised government. As far as Libya is concerned, after several years, I find it very hard to deem one side the goodies, and the other the baddies, at least in Libya it seems a power grab, I cant really say one side is any better or worse than another, can anyone? In Yemen, for many decades their was the country of North Yemen, and a separate entity known as the Aden protectorate. After awhile they were joined into one county known as Yemen. Before the British arrived in Aden, Yemen was not divided in two

As to the Houthis using ballistic missiles against Saudi Arabia, I am happy that I am not on the receiving end, but it is war, and Saudi Arabia invaded Yemen, and would thus appear a legitimate target. The bombing of the airport by the Houthis, again it is not nice, but could be argued to be a legitimate target. In the same way America and other nations bombed Haiphong, Hanoi, Berlin, Cambodia, Laos, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Indonesia, Somalia, Nicaragua, Yugoslavia, North Korea and more. For the record the Russians were truly terrible. When I was in Hanoi awhile back, I looked up in the sky, and thought, if I was walking on this exact same street when I was very young, there could have been American bombers in the sky above me dropping bombs on my head, I found it a surreal feeling. Nice place, but the traffic,,, ugghhh

I find it hard to say whether the Houthis or the Haddis are the good guys or bad guys or whether either is good or bad. I dont think the good guy - bad guys scenario really fits here. Saudi Arabia has almost the same population as Yemen, and yet in some ways if you listen to what some media sources say, it seems as though a Saudi life is deemed important, whereas a Yemeni life is less so. Saudi Arabia has oil and is rich, Yemen has no oil and is poor.

Saudi Arabia did invade Yemen. It seems they were concerned about Iranian Influence, and potentially having their access to the red sea for oil exports under risk from Iranian forces. If the south end of the Red Sea was blocked by Iranian forces, there would still be sea access for Saudi Arabia via the Red Sea and Suez canal. I do not know the level of Iranian influence in Yemen before the Saudi invasion, however it does appear that the level of influence at that time was modest. I think it fair to say that at the time of the Saudi Invasion, Iran had some influence in Yemen, but no control. As the conflict has progressed it appear that Iranian influence has increased. I like everyone would like the war to end, for everyone to get along, and resolve differences politically rather than militarily. A short aside, there is a fellow called Drew Binsky, an american that has travelled to 193 countries in the world, he has three to go until he has visited all. Drew has made half a dozen youtube videos about his trip to Yemen in late 2019, I would recommend them

 

[OPSSG]

Part 2 of 2 — Hidden Hand of Iran: Houthi sea mines endangering maritime traffic

9. On 14 Jun 2021, Breaking Defense reported that the Houthi rebels in Yemen have planted sea mines in the southern part of the Red Sea. According to Middle Eastern sources most of the naval mines are floating mines the Houthis release into the open sea. They are supplemented by networks of mines laid at a depth of 16 meters. They are triggered by the passage of ships above them.

10. Coalition forces managed to locate several such groups of underwater mines in an area south of Hanish Island in the Red Sea, last week, close to Bab al-Mandab. The U.S Navy’s amphibious assault ship, the USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7), is now in the Red Sea.

11. Iran famously mined the Persian Gulf during the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s, and appeared to be repeating similar tactics. The Houthis in Yemen are doing their own mining in the Red Sea, ostensibly to protect their ports from Saudi attack. However, in Nov 2020, an Egyptian fishing boat in the Red Sea reportedly struck a Houthi mine, killing three of its six crew, and there are reports of Houthi-laid mines drifting off from their original sites and heading who knows where.

12. The effectiveness of sea mines as a strategic tool lies not just in their immediate threat to an individual ship, but in the time and cost that must go into clearing waters suspected of harbouring mines. Such operations, even in a relatively limited area, can take weeks, or months.

 

[ngatimozart]

@OPSSG Where's Part 1?

 

[OPSSG]

@OPSSG Where's Part 1?

The 1st part on Iran’s hidden hand is here, in my prior post.

Part 1 of 2 — Hidden Hand of Iran: U.N. team finds Houthis launched Aden airport attack

1. An investigation by a UN team of experts found Yemen’s Houthis were responsible for a 30 Dec 2020 attack on Aden airport that killed at least 22 people as members of the country’s internationally recognized government arrived — which will lend itself to criticism of the Biden administration’s peace at any price approach in Yemen. Separate inspection teams by the United Nations and other Western powers have concluded that all the ballistic missiles and drones fired by the Houthis against Saudi Arabia came from Iran. It is believed that most of them were smuggled in pieces to Yemen and were assembled by the Houthi militias.

 

[Feanor]

As the houthi offensive continues to push back the hadis and their allies, they've used an attack helo, an Mi-24, for the first time in this conflict. This is a stark reminder that for all the photos of irregulars in sandals and civilian attire, the houthis do still have a large number of the Yemeni military among them. There is a good chance that some foreign aid was involved in getting the aircraft flight-worthy.

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[STURM]

I look forward to the day when a comprehensive account of the war is published. We know quite a bit about the innovative use of UASs and other weapons by the Houthis but a lot of stuff is still lacking, namely operational and tactical level ops conducted by both sides, the air war [number of sorties flown, ground threats faced and how targetting was performed], the back channel diplomacy, the full extent of assistance provided by Iran, other forms of assistance the Houthis may have received from sources apart from Iran and extent of intel and logistical support provided by the U.S. and other countries.

The war has seen the extensive use of UASs and ballistic missiles, as well as land based ASMs by the Houthis. On their part the Saudis and allies have deployed high end air and surface assets, the most capable the West was able to provide. The Saudis had their own version of the "coalition of the willing" but some in the coalition weren't very "willing" and pulled out. Some were there simply to benefit from Saudi and UAE largesse. Like Nasser in the 1960s, Saudi Arabia and others are bogged down in Yemen. Prior to invading Yemen, it's safe to assume that they never factored in the possibility of attacks on their sovereign soil being conducted with the regularity the Houthis have achieved and mantained.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

It quite boggles me that with the technological disparity, Saudi Arabia manages to lose ground to Houthis. In such situations we typically see either very slow progress or a stalemate.

 

[STURM]

I guess Saudi and its allies have joined the list of countries which thought that technological/material superiority would enable them to achieve their military and political aims.

One thing which crossed my mind is that there has hardly been any reports of the use of MANPADs by the Houthis. One would have thought that MANPADs would have been provided by Iran.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

I guess Saudi and its allies have joined the list of countries which thought that technological/material superiority would enable them to achieve their military and political aims.

One thing which crossed my mind is that there has hardly been any reports of the use of MANPADs by the Houthis. One would have thought that MANPADs would have been provided by Iran.

Iran has the liberty to provide them with more capable systems. Its robust arms industry allows them to replace expiring munitions, which in turn make great candidates for supply to frontline units.

 

[STURM]

No doubt but as I mentioned the Houthis seem to lack MANPADs which would be useful against low level Saudi, Emirati and Kuwaiti assets. One would have thought that the Houthis would have no shortages of Iranian supplied MANPADs.

An advantage the Houthis have is that even before the Saudi invasion there was an abundance of small arns and ammo in the country and I would assume the Houthis have the capability to produce mortar shells, grenades, etc.