A multimedia exploration of Yemen's multi-faceted civil war.
www.ecfr.eu
1. The British established a colony in Aden in 1839 and remained there until withdrawing in 1967, when Aden joined other southern regions to form an independent South Yemen republic. In 1970, a socialist republic was declared, which forged close ties with the Soviet Union.
2. North Yemen became a republic in 1962 and the neighbours remained separate until 1990, when they finally signed a unity accord, merging the two states into one following two short-lived wars in 1972 and 1978.
3. Houthi controlled territory can only be around the size of what was the former North Yemen — so it is obvious that they can’t ‘win’ the war in Yemen. The northern predominantly Zaidi tribal confederations of Hashid and Bakil have been crucial to the success of the Houthi advance, while tribes in the south that are part of the Madhaj confederation like Bani Hilal and Al Awalik in Shabwa and Yafae in Abyan have fought alongside the pro-Saudi coalition, protecting their territory while benefiting from the vehicles and arms provided by the UAE and Saudi members of the coalition.
4. I hope the above link with maps (of Houthi controlled areas in 2015, 2017 and June 2019) for background reading clarifies instead of the two of us continuing this conversation ahistorically?
But it doesn't explain why you think they Houthis should favor such a settlement, and it doesn't explain why anyone would reasonably expect them to. They've gotten where they are today through force of arms, with considerable Iranian aid. Their enemies weren't interested in a negotiated settlement, until they failed in their offensives, over and over again. It seems me that the logical conclusion here is for the Houthis to defeat their enemies, and then re-organize the country internally, ideally with a new representative government. This makes far more sense to me then striking a deal with an opposition that's propped up from abroad by obvious enemies.
5. Formed in 2017, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) has 26 members, the STC includes five governors from Southern Yemen and two former government ministers. And the STC’s militia can fight effectively. If the STC is attacked, UAE will provide them with war materials and close air support. Emirati backing was crucial in helping the STC gain Aden, which has been under its control since 2018. This means the Houthis have no hope of winning in the South. The Houthis can’t win the war in Yemen (as they lack the logistics and STC has control of a key port). Please tell me:
Q1: What are the Houthis hoping for in this 2020 round of fighting?
6. You also seem to show no awareness that the Houthi controlled area is under a naval blockade — which means whatever arms they get from Iran is only in drips and drabs.
(i) Look at the maps in the link — while they may have won some recent battles, the Houthis have no hope of gaining back all the territory they controlled in 2015 (and much less win in the South) — lack of logistics limits their ability to advance and control a hostile area for long.
(ii) Iran, as backer of the Houthis, has been badly damaged in the salvoes of an oil price war. But the most significant damage that is necessitating a scaling down of Iran’s ambitions in Yemen is the emergence of the coronavirus in Iran and also as a global emergency that is depressing global oil demand. Iran's health ministry on 5 Apr 2020 said the coronavirus death toll in the country had reached 3,603, and only admits that 58,226 people were infected (when the real figure is estimated to be half a million infected). The daily toll has been rising by at least 100 deaths for the past few days.
(iii) Even in Houthi controlled areas, like in the city of Sana’a, there is chronic water shortage. Wells there now extend up to 1,200 meters in the ground, with water levels in the aquifer now dropping by six meters a year. UNDP programme officer Qahtan al-Abahi was quoted saying that the lower the water table, the lower the quality of the water. “The water is becoming more salinized,” he said. He spoke about a rise in kidney ailments. Solutions to the water crisis in the north have been put forward— but fighting prevents any attempt at a solution.
Feanor said:
They're winning the war, why would they not keep pushing forward? In fact, what makes you think they would at any point be "satisfied" with anything less then a complete defeat of the Hadi loyalists, and a complete expulsion of Saudi Arabia and all of its allies?
7.
@Feanor, I hope the above link helps as I cannot make heads or tails of what you say. Once the infections spread, it is estimated that cases will double every fifth day. Please tell me:
Q2: What does winning look like?
8. Yemen—the poorest country in the region—is beset by persistent challenges that affect the quality of life of Yemeni citizens. The current war has catapulted the country into a deeper humanitarian crisis that will aggravate endemic humanitarian needs and leave citizens more vulnerable to shocks for years to come.
9. Even in a scenario where a ceasefire is called and stabilizing governmental processes were put in place, the lack of state capacity or infrastructure suggests that humanitarian responses will extend far beyond the ceasefire. Long-term trends like water shortages, urbanization and population growth have long been identified by international organizations as issues to which policies can be directed to help Yemen cope.
10. I may be just dense but what you say does not make sense to me — Saudi Arabia shares a 1,800 km land border with Yemen — Oman shares a 288 km land border with Yemen. Oman continues to provide humanitarian assistance to Yemenis to alleviate their suffering, maintain stability along its border and enhance historical cross-border ties. “Omanis look at Yemenis as human beings without trying to be superior,” said Ahmed Yahya Ahmed, who traveled in 2018 from Yemen to Sultan Qaboos Hospital in Salalah, Oman, to seek medical treatment for his sick father. The collapse of Yemeni state institutions and the civil war means Saudi Arabia and/or Oman will always have a vote as to what happens in Yemen.
11. Despite Yemen’s upheavals since 2011, Mahra province has not been affected economically because it relied on Omani markets to obtain fuel and food, depending especially on a major shared market, the Al-Mazyounah, which is a few kilometers from Yemen’s Shihen border-crossing. This explains why Mahra province managed to remain economically autonomous from the other provinces. If the Houthis’ goal is the complete expulsion of Saudi Arabia and all of its allies, it is totally unrealistic. I can’t believe you can adopt this unreasoned stance without justification or providing additional context.
12. Forgive me for having to admit that I do not know how to post further replies to you (as I cannot understand what seems to be a selective cherry picking approach). If you provide more context, I might be able to better understand your approach.