Todjaeger
Potstirrer
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The idea that the US would be willing to export a key system which will be part of it's strategic nuclear deterrence, and thus risk the potential compromise of that element of the US nuclear triad is IMO some excessively optimistic thinking.Yep all well and good and a good post, but the whole point of my post was NG assertions that the LRB fleet had export bans and to my knowledge no there weren’t any except for the F22 which has the only official ban in place
As for the banning of weapons platforms that are nuclear capable both the F18 & F111 has nuclear weapons capabilities and the F111 was part of SAC, so I would not suggest it’s cut and dried. The Sec Def was quite happy for the RAAF to get F22 but the Congressional ban put the kobosh on that if the RAAF even wanted it
but untill such a time someone from congress places a ban on it it open for export potential
Yes, at a gov't to gov't, someone in a senior position in AUSGov could query the US State Dept. to see if they would be willing to permit such a sale, however I consider it quite unlikely that State would authorize such a sale. This would stop the export of B-21's before Congress would even get involved.
The time when Australia ordered the F-111C was back in October, 1963. This was a few years before the USAF signed the contract in 1966 for the FB-111A, which was the strategic bomber version for SAC. Yes, the RAAF did end up purchasing 15 F-111G's, which were the new designation for ex-FB-111's which had been reconfigured for tactical (or training) use. However, there is quite a difference between the RAAF operating combat aircraft which could theoretically carry/deploy a nuclear strike package, and the RAAF flying an aircraft with one of it's main roles being strategic nuclear strike/deterrence.
From my POV, people advocating for B-21's in RAAF service are not being realistic about the likely cost to acquire and sustain a B-21 Raider force. They are also (again, IMO and from my POV) not being realistic about how likely and willing the US would be to sell such an important strike capability, when doing so could end up seriously damaging strategic US capabilities.