IADS and SEAD discussion
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Big_Zucchini
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My 2 cents:
Today's hardware can be defined by software. An FPGA is just a board full of many raw resources, such as memory and processing power.
As long as your new software doesn't require more than the available resources, you can basically entirely reconfigure your hardware.
This is one way modern radars can adapt to filter their results differently. Two of the exact same radar can be split so one searches for slow and very low RCS targets, and one searches for fast, high RCS ones.
But that in itself requires the hardware to enable it in the first place. An FPGA is something that, although not new tech, is still slow to arrive in many armed forces, even those considered technologically advanced.
So we can assume a lot of the Russian hardware sold for a symbolic price is such that cannot be upgraded as easily as a software change. Or maybe it can be, but Russia may see some merit to selling these systems even if it puts them at risk.
The ability to define the hardware via software opens up a lot of digital tools, including analytical ones.
Sensor-fusion is one concept that takes the raw data from multiple sources, overlays it, and then analyzes it as one. Plot-fusion is basically this.
How can we overcome the obsolescence of systems made in the 60's without totally breaking down the systems? Make peripheral systems.
If one can grab the raw data from very old radars, convert it to a new protocol, and add a datalink to every system as an attach to the protocol converter, you can get a very cheap capability increase. But of course that means a new unified command center for these systems, and a potential vulnerability because they're now using transmitting datalinks.
One reason why it may not be prioritized is because it does take many engineer's hours, a resource sometimes more valuable than the money it takes, plus logistical hardships.
Regarding the missile segment I don't know.
@Feanor I thought this thread was edited and I couldn't see your comment. I will reply when I have the time.
Today's hardware can be defined by software. An FPGA is just a board full of many raw resources, such as memory and processing power.
As long as your new software doesn't require more than the available resources, you can basically entirely reconfigure your hardware.
This is one way modern radars can adapt to filter their results differently. Two of the exact same radar can be split so one searches for slow and very low RCS targets, and one searches for fast, high RCS ones.
But that in itself requires the hardware to enable it in the first place. An FPGA is something that, although not new tech, is still slow to arrive in many armed forces, even those considered technologically advanced.
So we can assume a lot of the Russian hardware sold for a symbolic price is such that cannot be upgraded as easily as a software change. Or maybe it can be, but Russia may see some merit to selling these systems even if it puts them at risk.
The ability to define the hardware via software opens up a lot of digital tools, including analytical ones.
Sensor-fusion is one concept that takes the raw data from multiple sources, overlays it, and then analyzes it as one. Plot-fusion is basically this.
How can we overcome the obsolescence of systems made in the 60's without totally breaking down the systems? Make peripheral systems.
If one can grab the raw data from very old radars, convert it to a new protocol, and add a datalink to every system as an attach to the protocol converter, you can get a very cheap capability increase. But of course that means a new unified command center for these systems, and a potential vulnerability because they're now using transmitting datalinks.
One reason why it may not be prioritized is because it does take many engineer's hours, a resource sometimes more valuable than the money it takes, plus logistical hardships.
Regarding the missile segment I don't know.
@Feanor I thought this thread was edited and I couldn't see your comment. I will reply when I have the time.
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I strongly suspect that for operators like Syria or Armenia, or worse yet Libyan warlords, the complexity of this solution makes it thoroughly unattainable. They likely wouldn't be able to operate a sophisticated modern IADS themselves without huge numbers of foreign advisers, and that's one "out of the box" so to speak, with all the pieces from the same-ish generation and designed to work together. Doing what you suggest implies a surprisingly competent operator at the institutional level with extremely poor hardware. It's not an impossible scenario but it doesn't fit any of the examples Sturm brought up, at least in my opinion.
Take your time, we all have limitations on availability.
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Would it right to assume that the FPDA's Headquarters Air Defence System [HQIADS] which links several Malaysian and Singaporean radars ; utilises fibre optics cables? Also; if I recall correctly the SAF's I-Hawks at one point in the past were the only assets permanently assigned to HQIADS.
Boeing supports Five Power exercise by enhancing situational awareness | ADBR
Upgrades undertaken by Boeing to the situational awareness picture utilised in the Combined Joint Operations Centre (CJOC) within Headquarters Integrated Area Defence System (HQIADS) is giving the members of the…
adbr.com.au
"Commissioned during Exercise Bersama Shield 2017 in May, the IADS Command and Control Information System (ICCIS) resides within the CJOC located at Royal Malaysian Air Force Base Butterworth. The new system integrates multiple data and sensor pictures into a single screen, as opposed to multiple screens under the legacy system; during exercises, this means commanders are presented with an integrated battlespace picture at HQIADS."
I remember a report from Janes in the late 1980's mentioning SA-5 Gammon sites in Libyan which had a heavy Soviet presence. If I'm not mistaken during the 'War of Attrition' Soviet personnel were also there and were actually responsible for a few of the kills.
Very interesting. Has this actually been done?
Apologies but I don't get it. What type of risks are you referring to?
Another reason might be particular users deciding that the whole exercise isn't worth the effort and that a better long term return of investment would be investing in new systems.
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Big_Zucchini
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Yes. I remember one Iron Dome radar was reconfigured by mistake to detect very low RCS targets, and it locked onto a burst of 23mm shells fired from Gaza, to which it responded with a salvo of rockets, halfway emptying a launcher.
Big_Zucchini
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- #26
This is a separate issue. If we look separately at day 1 attacks, and the core of a conflict, the arguments for air defense systems change.
Not really sure how to phrase my argument, so bear with me, please.
Consider country A with modern air force and IAMD, versus country B with equally modern IAMD but no air force.
Country A would have a decisive victory on day 1 because it would have the kinetic and mobility advantages, even if it was on the offensive. The results of day 1 are some damage to strategic assets and, say, 30% of the air defenses totalled.
After that, the tempo would tone down and a sort of air defense guerilla warfare can commence, Serbia style, where country B hides its defenses and occasionally takes shots at the enemy.
So what value does country B have in doing this? It keeps country A's aerial assets preoccupied and lowers their sense of security.
Countries that are vastly economically or technologically disadvantaged, and cannot pursue an aerial force, will benefit from bolstered air defenses for the reason I have explained above - lower the enemy's tempo and disrupt his mobility and sense of security, to keep the heat off every other service.
I'm sure any radar installation would be disrupted and any AEW would become a target, if they can get it.
What they can do is wait for Russia to develop its UAV fleet and take old models with various payloads, in exchange for more favors, and develop some niche capabilities. The Syrian government has renewed R&D in recent years, so that could help.
But generally, other than getting more political tripmine deployments, there's nothing they can do to fend off an offensive from any determined neighbor.
The problem is that countries with no effective/proper air can only rely on their AD network to a limited extent. Kosovo is a good example. Various factors including ROEs, the weather, terrain, size of Serbia’s AD network; as well as other reasons such as EW pods being unable to be reprogrammed rapidly - explained in “Air War In Kosovo” (Lambeth) - ensured that Sebia’s AD network was a major worry for NATO until the last day of the campaign and was never severely degraded. Ultimately however NATO airpower was still able do what it needed and go where it wanted.
The Aoache raid on Karbala was interesting. Everything went right for the defenders. They used mobile AA teams who were warned by spotters; the town’s power grid was switched off to alert the defenders that the Apaches had arrived. Several Apaches were damaged and the raid was aborted but the Iraqis never managed to replicate their success.
Only a few years previously SACEUR tried hard to get the Albania deployed Task Force Hawk and its Apaches to join the air campaign but reluctance at various levels prevented this from happening. Ironically it was the kind of punishment they took at Karbala; which led to the Apaches not seeing combat in Kosovo due to fears that they would be vulnerable. Even a plan for the Apaches to operate from the Albanian side of the border to engage targets of opportunity in Kosovo was denied. Wesley Clark goes into the Apache issue in great detail in his “Waging Modern War”.
The Aoache raid on Karbala was interesting. Everything went right for the defenders. They used mobile AA teams who were warned by spotters; the town’s power grid was switched off to alert the defenders that the Apaches had arrived. Several Apaches were damaged and the raid was aborted but the Iraqis never managed to replicate their success.
Only a few years previously SACEUR tried hard to get the Albania deployed Task Force Hawk and its Apaches to join the air campaign but reluctance at various levels prevented this from happening. Ironically it was the kind of punishment they took at Karbala; which led to the Apaches not seeing combat in Kosovo due to fears that they would be vulnerable. Even a plan for the Apaches to operate from the Albanian side of the border to engage targets of opportunity in Kosovo was denied. Wesley Clark goes into the Apache issue in great detail in his “Waging Modern War”.
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1. Tactics for Apache employment has also changed, with manned-unmanned teaming well established. It’s difficult or impossible to replicate IADS success at Karbala, unless a planning mistake replicates itself.
2. Operational art requires commanders to address four key considerations when planning and executing a campaign or major operation:
(a) What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced to achieve the strategic goal (ends)?
(b) What sequence of action (scheme of maneuver) will produce that condition (ways)?
(c) What resources should be applied to accomplish the sequence of actions (means)?
(d) What are the costs or risks in performing the sequence of actions (risk management)?
3. Without surprise, multiple directions of attack, the 2003 failure during the raid on Karbala, in hindsight is to be expected — in the US Army’s failure to answer (b), (c) & (d), via operational art.
4. That raid also used tactics that was inappropriate — it’s not a platform problem, it was an operational art and planning failure. Compounding this was a security failure— the US Army believe that the aviation assembly areas the US Army established in the Iraqi desert had been under surveillance by enemy observers. See this USAF analysis (which aims to sideline US Army aviation): Ambush at Najaf
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Army “X” has a requirement for a turret mounted gun to deal almost exclusively with the low to medium level UAS threat; whether ‘micro’ one’s detected at the last minute at close ranges flying at tree top level or slightly larger ones flying higher at slightly longer distances. Which would be more of an ideal solution : a minigun (with its high ROF) or a 20/25mm auto cannon (with longer range compared to a mini gun)?
In required the vehicle should also have the ability to deal with helicopters and low flying fixed wing aircraft. In addition to its turret mounted gun; a radar, FLIR, IR alerting device and data link; would there be a need for anything else to be mounted/fitted to the vehicle?
In required the vehicle should also have the ability to deal with helicopters and low flying fixed wing aircraft. In addition to its turret mounted gun; a radar, FLIR, IR alerting device and data link; would there be a need for anything else to be mounted/fitted to the vehicle?
Big_Zucchini
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- #30
Something that is at the very least a 30mm, and for a dedicated air defense, at least a 35mm. This is because programmable munitions are crazy expensive, and their cost doesn't grow proportionately to their size. So you might as well get a bigger bang if it costs the same per shot. In fact, it actually saves you money.
The explosive content and fragmenting elements grow exponentially with the diameter at a certain size range, increasing probability of hitting a target.
Air defenses based on guns always fire bursts, not single shots. The larger the diameter, the shorter the burst, and therefore lower expenses.
But then, you haven't really defined the vehicle. My answer was more along the lines of a K30 Biho-type vehicle.
If you intend to use a smaller vehicle, like a small truck, a cannon suddenly becomes impossible to use. Here's a solid setup on a JLTV:
FLIR is Forward Looking IR. Not sure what the other IR device you mentioned is, but generally if you have a radar, a day sight and a thermal sight, you're pretty much covered in terms of raw long range sensors. You have to use advanced algorithms to keep extracting more data from these.
For the shorter range, acoustics are a possibility, and one that is hard to fool, but physically vulnerable to damage.
LiDAR is another short range possibility, but it seems most armies at least that are leading UGV development have refrained from putting such sensors into service because they're radiating like crazy.
Terran
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This phrasing kinda becomes a trick question. The term Minigun refers directly to the M134 series an electronically operated 7.62x51mm multiple barrel gun. It is an excellent weapon for use vs very soft targets. Perfect if the threat is hand launched UAS. But nothing much bigger. Threats that size could be handled by small arms Or jammers. Or better yet by a laser. But as you said this hypothetical is a SHORAD with Helicopter and CAS planes in mind a Gatling gun in the 7.62 or below won’t cut it. It’s going to be potentially facing an attack chopper who packs probably a 20mm gun or better which will easily out range it. The same goes for a 12.7 or 14.7mm Gatling gun option.
To deal with larger types you would need a larger gun. Generally that ends up being the same calibers as Automatic cannon 20-25mm guns. Examples the M61 Vulcan 20mm gun used in the M167 VADS the GAU 12 Equalizer 25mm on the old LAV-AD. But as these are common on manned aviation CAS types the question of range is an issue. An ATGM off a Updated Hind is going to out range a Gatling gun type fired from the ground. Optimally you want a Missile with longer range to take out the larger threats. The Gun is generally the last line theses days. Meant for taking out cheaper drones and to Counter Rocket, Artillery and Cruise missiles that have gotten past every thing else. Low volume of fire in that can be made up for by warhead. As such larger caliber cannons can do the job. The 50mm OMFV gun for example seems sourced from a CRAM demonstration. The Russian 57mm gun also seems to be being pitch in this.
The next question then takes over what’s the Host vehicle. Larger hosts can handle larger weapons. Is it towed or mounted. A large APC type hull or a 4x4 or 4x6 truck. the Bigger the host the more ammo, heavier weapons can be mounted more sensors and radar. Yet end of day as a SHORAD this is the last line in the sand.
tequilashooter
New Member
In the Kosovo war aircrafts had anti-radiation missiles that were like 5 times the range of the interceptor missiles used by S-75s and S-125s but yet aircrafts were still shot down and even a stealth one. On paper, based on air to ground weapon ranges there should have been no casualties, but there were. Those interceptor missiles did not even have the range capabilities of the S-200 and only relied on command guidance instead of semi-active homing capabilities done by the S-200 for better accuracy towards aerial targets. Not saying that they should have gotten S-300s from Russia but S-200s could have gave a better assessment with a very good likelihood on raising casualties or receiving more pilots to be POWs. What are people's thoughts here if they have received S-200s? F-16Is are EW capable and we have seen a haaretz video on YT of one getting downed, than there were reports where one side argued the IL-76 got in the way and the other reported the F-16s used it as cover because they system lacked Friend or foe identification which is why in the Damascus region S-300s was deployed.
My concerns isn't the rules of the forum but rather the temperament of those here such as disagreements on some conflict results.
- Having active radar homing capabilities for interceptor missiles. The ARGSN used on the 9M317MA missile by Buk-M3 can autonomously track a 0.3m2 target from 35 kilometers away. 9M96MD and 40N6 are not only new missiles with active homing capabilities like the Buk-M3 missile but bigger in size hence even more powerful tracking capabilities than Buk-M3 missiles. Missiles will be either pointing on the bottom side of aircrafts when rising or pointing down on the topside of aircrafts and those always have the highest RCS reflections because of surface area. Air defenses before used either command guidance or semi-active homing.
- Electronic Warfare Systems. Despite having longer range weapons and knowing where the location of the SAMs were a lot of air to ground missiles were fired and most missed or took awhile to take out Serbian SAMs. Murmansk-BN was reported to jam a enemy radio station from 7,000kms away which means radio HF frequencies can be jammed on aircrafts, Krasukhas can jam LEO satellites and aircraft radars with a newer EW system to replace it sooner. Tirada-2 jams satellites 300mhz to 3ghz, Tirada-2S jams satellites at 3–30ghz, Bylina-MM jams satellites at 30–300ghz. Borisoglebsk-2 jams datalink communications from aircrafts to their weapons. Use of Pole-21, etc, etc.
- Newer short range air defenses. New Pantsir systems are being quadpacked giving it 48 to 96 missiles to intercept drones and PGMs. Also missiles have twice the range, radar twice the range, more precise warheads for smaller targets, and missiles have like twice the speeds that put it at 2km/s. Tor systems are getting new small cheaper than drone missiles. Short range air defenses are also being designed to deal with hypersonic weapons, well according to claims. Current pantsirs cant deal with PGMs or small sized drone. Even Tor is said to receive newer shorter missiles that are to be cheaper than drones. Current pantsirs according to Israels reports on the Christmas attack in 2018 said most of the delilah missiles on the 1st wave did not reach their targets(Russians state 14/16 were intercepted) but 2nd wave with gbu-53s did according to Israel's report. There are images all over the internet of downed TB2s so certain size drones it has effects on and even reports of some going back into operation 2-3 weeks later, but rather if the west pushes pantsirs are ineffective or the east posts images all over the internet of downed TB2s(even arguments that kubs and other outdated air defenses get mistaken for pantsirs which are a majority of Syrais air defenses than Pantsirs are), I trust Israel's report whom are more pro-US than pro-Russia because their report aligns with Russia's. I think Delilah missiles are more difficult targets than TB2s.
- photonic radars(I think this is going to be a problem later). Russian companies KRET, RTI, VEGA and the general designer of Russia's RWR gave ranges of 100ghz to terahertz ranges for the use of photonic radars. Yakhroma radar works in 4 bands including the 30–300ghz range meant to be autonomous with no human interaction. Stealth aircrafts are more than likely not prepared to deal with such frequencies in which the emergence of this technology might mean they have solved the atmosphere attenuation problem. There is also EW immunity because of the broad dynamic range of the radar of 200 decibels. If this is all worth the hype or not the F-35 is still considered a great investment to have until 2070 it will take awhile to start a photonic integrated circuit production, take awhile to replace current domestic MMIC radar based equipment and will take a longer time for it to be exported. They have demonstrated the antennas before Разработанная в рамках проекта ФПИ антенна вошла в Топ-10 изобретений 2020 года (fpi.gov.ru)
My concerns isn't the rules of the forum but rather the temperament of those here such as disagreements on some conflict results.
Boagrius
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Hi @tequilashooter, welcome to the forum. I am familiar with you as a poster as I have been known to skim secretprojects from time to time. Can you clarify what argument you are putting forward here? I can see you are making a number of assertions but I am not sure what you are ultimately trying to communicate/argue to the rest of us.
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Terran
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In the Case of the F117 we have to consider the other factors at play. The F117 was first generation stealth. It lacked any electronic warfare systems organic to its self and was dependent on an escort EA 6. In that event the EA6 which was based on Italy was grounded by rain. The Surbs knew that. Next it was flying a reused route. The Commanders of the air defense forces knew it was flying over that route again and again. So positioning along that route was a ready ambush. The commander of the unit had practiced rapid relocation of his unit and was operating under strict timing. When they did get the track on the F117 it was close about 12-14 km which for a SAM site is point blank. Having gotten a track when the bomber opened its bay.
So a combination of good planning, blind luck, good intelligence with a limited capacity vs complacency, bad luck, poor intelligence and excellent but limited capacity.
So a combination of good planning, blind luck, good intelligence with a limited capacity vs complacency, bad luck, poor intelligence and excellent but limited capacity.
Impressive and informative post. We have a Moderator @Feanor who is Russian speaking so he can go over the reference you posted and add it to his collection if he doesn't have it. His main interest is Russian military forces.
With regard to your last sentence, we do have some on here because of the nature of there culture and / or personality can get a bit excitable but generally the discussions whilst being sometimes robust are reasonably polite. The Moderators ensure that the situation doesn't get out of hand. That's why politics and religion isn't allowed. We do talk about politics IF it is in the context of defence. Religion we avoid like the plague.
They would likely have lost some more aircraft. On the other hand they likely would have put more effort into taking out those systems. I'm not sure this would have made a fundamental distinction. It's also my understanding that the S-200 is far less mobile. And isn't there a question of resources? Could Yugoslavia/Serbia operate a robust S-200 force in addition to everything else? Certainly not on the same budget. Extras cost extra. So what would they have to cut?
The aircraft was an Il-20 and it sounds like you're mixing two incidents. One was the loss of an Il-20 to a friendly fire incident with unclear details. The Russian and Israeli version diverges. The other is the downing of an Israeli F-16 by an S-200 earlier. The two incidents are unrelated. Also the S-300 isn't deployed in Damascus but in Mas'yaf, next to a Russian S-400 btln (maybe that counts as "Damascus region", I'm not up to speed on Syrian administrative regions).
Similar developments have occurred in aircraft as well (mass induction of LO for example in aircraft and munitions). The capabilities of standoff jamming have increased in similar ways and the benefit of the aircraft is that you can choose where and when to apply it, while the ground-based system has to be active for extended periods of time from a relatively stationary position (i.e. it's transmitting and can be found and potentially hit). More importantly everything you list is rare and in some cases cutting edge, even with the Russian armed forces. There is next to 0 chance of someone like Serbia operating that multilayered set up. This is not to say these aren't useful, they are and they offer important advantages over older systems. However against a top of the line operator like the US, or Israel...
And lets not forget Armenia lost an S-300 variant (granted an older one) to a loitering munition. What's the saturation point for an S-400 regiment with 10 Pantsyrs set up for SHORAD? Especially against small low-flying targets?
Yes and no. What you describe is under development not in service. It will definitely enter service, but when? Also there's a big difference between a few Russian air defense units having this, and mass induction. Or mass export. How many Land Forces air defense btlns still use Osa SAMs? How many air defense units still use the ZU-23-2? Russia can deploy the latest and greatest to a small war like Syria, and look very sleek doing so. A medium sized war? Less so. A large war? Exporting to allies? These things will happen, but they haven't happened yet and won't happen soon. As it stands the Land Forces PVO is getting two Tor-M2 btlns per year. The Serdyukov brigade structure had 30+ Motor-Rifle Bdes. That's 30+ btlns, not counting the Coastal Forces regiments (btlns with an extra battery really) that also needed re-arming (and indeed have been rearmed first due to their locations in Kaliningrad and Crimea). At current rates the Tor-M2 won't phase out all older systems until ~2035. Which is to say it won't phase them out at all since it's already a ~6 year old system and we will likely see a Tor-M3 before the Osa is completely replaced.
And by the way its far from clear that the small quad-packed missiles will be cheaper then drones. That's the hope, the reality remains to be seen.
A low-flying PGM moving in a carefully planned route against a single target should be a harder intercept then a drone flying at relatively high altitude, hunting enemy vehicles and infantry. As for hypersonic intercepts, iirc the last I read were experiments, possibly using the S-300V4 (it's in some ways more capable then the S-400). Not exactly SHORAD. Of course they're designing things to deal with hypersonic threats. But again, paper designs are a long way from reality.
Sure but this is even further off in the real of development. And has little to do with discussions of IADS and SEAD as it exists today or is likely to exist in the near future. It remains to be seen what 2030 will bring, right now it's 2021. And while you've enumerated interesting developments in the Russian military industrial complex, I can't help but wonder how you carefully dodged the area of lasers. Turkey has shot down UAVs in combat with lasers. The US is inducting them as SHORAD on tactical vehicles. The best Russia currently has is a scaled down version of Oko on a mobile platform, that can probably blind satellites. They demonstrated a tactical system recently, but perhaps I should call the system "tactical" because it required a BAZ truck for a platform. By contrast the Turkish combat laser is on an MRAP and shot down a Wing Loong, a similar-ish UAV to the Bayraktar (a feat you mentioned the Pantsyrs doing). You can't exactly have BAZ riding around in the same combined-arms combat formations as IFVs and MBTs. Or even APCs and MRAPs. They're far too vulnerable (and likely quite expensive). I'm not saying Russia won't get there, they very likely will. But they haven't so far...
Character limit has forced me to split posts.
Boagrius
Well-Known Member
Slight tangent here but perhaps they may also be geared towards point defence against PGMs... The problem posed by the SDB in particular springs to mind. Assuming that a strike package of F22/35 was able to get within range of the Pantsir(s) and whatever it was protecting, the capacity for each jet to deliver 8 of them at once strikes me as quite problematic. A single 4-ship flight could thus generate 32 x SDB, with 64 for two flights, 96 for 3... etc. The numbers rapidly become rather mindboggling as you add more flights of aircraft, (while the price of missing even a handful of SDBs could be quite high) so I could see the rationale behind trading some missile range for magazine depth in point defence.
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A 6x6/4x4 IFV. Anything smaller would not be able to adequately accommodate the turret mounted gun, radar, FLIR, etc.
I was thinking of something like the British ADAD; to detect IR signatures of targets. A jammer would also be needed but I suppose it doesn't necessarily have to be mounted on the same platform.
Sorry; what I actually meant was something along the lines of a M61 or a 2A38M.
It's primary purpose is to deal with UASs but it would also have a ability to deal with rotary and fixed wings targets which come within its engagement envelope.
Indeed but in this case it would be the main or only means of dealing with 'micro' UASs or even slighty larger ones whose low heat signatures would make them hard for IR homing MANPADs to deal with.
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Big_Zucchini
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Challenging this.
What's your source for this? The IDF, to my knowledge, has never given an official version on this, and the very use of Delilah missiles is scarcely mentioned, if at all.