Could you explain, from your perspective, why a ground based air defence network is ineffective (or can be made more ineffective via SEAD)?
In your reply, keep in mind my low knowledge base on Israeli efforts in Syria and hence do not understand the action, reaction dynamics of the SAM systems there. Please bear with my lack of background knowledge in this area — and would need to be educated by you on the IDF perspective.
My area of expertise is not related to air defense systems and aerial or mixed domain combat, rather limited to intelligence gathering and some aspects spec ops (which is a very broad topic in itself).
I also prefer concepts over specifics because solutions need to be structural, systematic.
To make things clear, I do not believe IAMD (there are many names for it, so I will use IAMD - Integrated Air and Missile Defense from now on) is ineffective. To the contrary - it is an essential and irreplaceable component of the mixed domain battlefield.
However, what I am saying, is that when non-equal opponents clash, e.g Israel vs Syria, and there is a situation of an air force conducting missions against an opponent with only air defenses and no air force of its own, the air force will always triumph.
There are multiple reasons:
1. Aerial assets are augmenting air defenses - In even the smallest countries with densest IAMD, there will be blind spots. With numerous planes always patrolling the borders, aircraft can fill in the blindspots, and are especially suitable for very complex threats such as cruise missiles, that are best countered when observed from above.
The best example IMO is Saudi Arabia's use of fighter aircraft to down drones and cruise missiles:
So without an air force, the IAMD array is incomplete and becomes much easier to exploit.
2. IAMD augments aerial assets - By providing extra detection capabilities and extra firepower, aerial assets can often operate from within umbrellas that provide them a thick layer of protection.
So in engagements between bordering enemies, e.g Russia and Ukraine, Azerbaijan vs Armenia, Turkey vs Syria etc, an IAMD allows the defending side to dedicate fewer platforms than the attacker does, by a significant margin.
Therefore by merely buying IAMD and investing in it, but not investing in an aerial fleet, one is not fulfilling the true potential an IAMD has to offer, and risking it.
3. The mobility advantage - in an environment of air power vs IAMD, it is clear air power is the more dynamic and mobile. This gives air power in inherent advantage in initiative as well.
4. The kinetic advantage - an aircraft has a speed and altitude advantage, therefore will use smaller, more agile, and cheaper munitions to defeat its ground opponents, compared to what an IAMD will have to use.
So air power can more easily adapt itself to fire further and outrange any ground element.
All in all, in an environment of air power vs IAMD, the air power has a massive inherent advantage, and so in examples like Serbia, Iraq, Syria etc, IAMD is either relegated to other functionalities that do not include kinetic engagement of aircraft, or is used to delay attacks as a one time use functionality.
And indeed, Serbian air defenses disturbed American operations, but American airpower fulfilled its missions nonetheless.
In Operation Allied Force, NATO was not fully prepared for asymmetric warfare, and that it’s air planners had initially assumed that Serbia would aggressively employ its air defenses and use its radars at a high level of activity – making major land-based air defenses easy to target; and NATO eventually faced a difficult set of targets due to Serbian deception efforts.
Yes, the suddenly popping and equally suddenly disappearing radars, have been a challenge, and today are a challenge (there are already technological solutions for that though). They have required the employment of more aircraft and munitions, but nonetheless the equation remained the same:
Serbian air defenses were hunted, and American airpower were the hunters.
The former Yugoslavia had long practiced tactics based on wars of attrition and “riding out” a Soviet-Warsaw Pact attack by not actively employing air defense assets. Serbia had had ample time to learn the lessons of the Gulf War, and had good access to Iraq’s experience during the post Gulf War period – including the lessons of Desert Fox.
Every armed force should anticipate its enemy to be as competent as possible, including dispersal and concealment. These are vital aspects of battle since the invention of ranged weapons.
So what? More challenges, but the equation doesn't change.
While Serbia did not have a modern air defense system, or extensive modern assets, it did have large numbers of assets that it could disperse efficiently and which were extremely difficult to target unless they emitted radar signals long enough to be targeted by anti radiation missiles.
Back to the technological solution I was talking about. The Harpy which was sold to Azerbaijan, has the option to hunt radars.
A radar hunting sensor is not very expensive, and when fitted to a loitering munition, can be a deadly hunter. Similar loitering munitions are widely available.
