www.bbc.com
Bang on in my view ... Analysis suggests it is a combination of canal effect and windage with too much speed (even though it was only 13 knots) to control the ship in the wind conditions. It appears the vessel deviated across the canal in the wind and the stern got sucked in. Not confirmed but some suggestion the vessel bridge crew (Pilot or Master) over corrected (and failed to counter the suction around the stern) with the ship then swinging quickly to Starboard pushing the bow into the other side of the canal. Inertia pushed the stern around and onto the sand.
It feels like you haven't go to the toilet for a week because of obstipatie/constipatie, and then at last you can release the pressure...
Pretty obvious in that video tracking that the ship lost control due to shallow water/canal effect. He got very close to the bank on three occasions before finally coming to grief. He started the transit at 9kts and increased to 14kts I presume because of the wind. I just checked the transit speeds of all other ships in the canal just now and 9kts seems the norm.
Had similar experiences on our Trent-Severn canal system. This system has forested areas adjacent in most areas so wind isn’t much of an issue for the most part. I think the master/pilot was between a rock and a hard place given the huge surface area and wind conditions. Had he maintained the lower speed what would happen? Perhaps a beam beaching which might have been easier to clear.
Actually a lower speed is part of the cure (but not too low). The faster you go the greater the pressure and suction areas. Once you get off the centreline and get you stern near the bank you are going to start seeing the stern being drawn to the bank. More speed and hard over is simply going to make it worse.
I would think the SCA would be thinking of regulation changes for these monsters.
It has been a while for me and the duplication of some parts was a thought bubble when I was last there. I understand the duplication allowed the north and south convoys to cross over north of the Great Bitter lake to almost double the number of ships that can transit each day.
www.defenseone.com
As noted in the article, a time honoured naval tactic. The RN has a long and glorious history in the use of that strategy. IIRC the last was OP CHARIOT the 1942 raid on the Normandie drydock at St Nazaire, by ramming HMS Campbeltown into the drydock gates, then exploding the 4 tons of amatol hidden in the bow later.Now that the Suez grounding has been resolved, here’s an article suggesting the world should take note as the next choke point crisis might not be accidental.
The Suez Grounding Was an Accident. The Next Blocked Chokepoint Might Not Be.
Military planners must bear in mind the tactic of blockships.
Further news on this incident, a support Vessel is going to be sent to aid her, what vessel this would be is yet to be determined. What if any Defence Vessels(either RAN or ADV) would be up to the task, I don’t know, that may depend on how close to Antarctica it will be.
www.businessinsider.com
A billion dollar shakedown that the insurance industry will take note of. Might make Putin’s Northern route more appealing.That's a lot......if its true.
I don't think that the operating costs of those tugs are that much.
Ever Given ship forbidden to leave the Suez Canal until its owners pay up to $1 billion in compensation for the chaos it caused
The Japanese-owned container ship may have been freed from the banks of the Suez Canal, but it is now embroiled in a dispute over compensation.
www.navalnews.com
Hardly a shakedown, that’s what insurance is for; you damage somebody else’s business and your insurance (hopefully) covers you - and certainly marine all risks normally covers ships owners for damages arising out of collisions, groundings etc. The issue might be who was held responsible; the ship’s master or the (mandatory) canal pilot?