Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[DDG38]

Maybe I'm missing the point, so I'll risk being embarrassed in order to get clarification on this "non-penetrating" business.
I took it to mean that the periscope (or sensor mast) doesn't penetrate the *pressure hull* of the submarine being electro-optical rather than purely optical and still penetrates the water surface when in operation. Benefit being that the above water section of an electro-optical scope can be much smaller and more discrete, sweep faster and provide an image that can be shown on screens rather than in a small optical viewfinder AND allow a more leisurely inspection of the recorded electronic image after lowering the scope.
Some of the discussion here seems to suggest the periscope doesn't go above water at all, hence my confusion
oldsig

You're absolutely spot on, and the link @Pusser Tas provided reflects the same technology. Photonic masts don't require as much space and thus do not penetrate the pressure hull of the boat.

 

[Todjaeger]

Agree, and I think part of what we are butting up against is the fact that the USN hasn't really chosen an obvious Harpoon replacement as far as surface vessels are concerned. For the time being they seem to be content with NSM for the LCS and then leveraging their forthcoming stocks of Tomahawk Blk V, which will give them significant standoff range against both YJ18 and YJ100 for the foreseeable future.

In the absence of the latter in our inventory, I think a good argument can be made for weighing the 12 x topside NSM option against the 8 x topside LRASM that was mooted a few years ago (this with respect to Hunter and Hobart classes specifically):



As I've said before, the main reason is that it would give our most valuable surface combatants the ability to shoot from outside the range of the YJ18, which is probably the most dangerous threat AShM we face. The geek that I am, I plugged this into CMO (formerly CMANO) to give a better visual approximation of the difference(s) we are talking about.

The image below shows the approximate range rings for a Type 052D class DDG armed with YJ18 (left) against a Hobart class DDG armed with NSM (right).


The next shows the same vessels, this time with Hobart (right) armed with SM6 Blk IB:


Finally, we have the same vessels again, but this time we arm the Hobart with LRASM:


As you can see, the difference is actually quite dramatic (assuming the sim has the range figures in the right ballpark). Now, I want to emphasise that this is obviously an extremely simplified way to view things, since the problem of OTH targeting, among many other things, will limit just how much of a given AShM's range can actually be employed against a given target, and our vessels are more than likely to operate as part of a joint force coalition, not alone. That said, for a medium sized Navy that can ill afford to put its scarce vessels and people at undue risk, a topside LRASM in lieu of NSM on Hunter and Hobart has a lot going for it, with very little appreciable downside (IMO).

I just wanted to point out that a potentially sizable difference in the max ranges of long-ranged/standoff AShM is not quite as important as people might think.

I say that because without additional offboard assets, all of that 'extra' range is meaningless. Take NSM for example, it has a published range of 100+ n miles, which is significantly further than RAN ship A's radar horizon would enable onboard sensors to detect PLA(N) ship B kitted out with YJ18's. By the same token, ship B's radar would also not be able to detect ship A to launch the YJ-18's. In fact, the longer-ranged the missile, the greater that dependence on offboard assistance becomes. To provide a bit of context, a RAN MH-60R Seahawk, flying at 10k ft in support of a RAN FFG or DDG or even a RAN TF, could potentially detect ship targets at ~135 n miles. To provide sensor coverage out to 260+ n miles for a long-ranged LRASM target would likely require detection and cueing by an E-7 or P-8.

With the above in mind, I would think that the RAN would focus more on the smaller, lighter, and likely easier to fit and remove as needed NSM, with LRASM only being embarked if a strike mission might be in the offing. I would also anticipate that the RAN, in cooperation with the RAAF and/or allies, would focus on being able to neutralize, blind, or otherwise destroy potential adversaries' long-range surveillance capabilities, which would leave them unable to launch most of their long-ranged AShM.

 

[Boagrius]

I just wanted to point out that a potentially sizable difference in the max ranges of long-ranged/standoff AShM is not quite as important as people might think.

I say that because without additional offboard assets, all of that 'extra' range is meaningless. Take NSM for example, it has a published range of 100+ n miles, which is significantly further than RAN ship A's radar horizon would enable onboard sensors to detect PLA(N) ship B kitted out with YJ18's. By the same token, ship B's radar would also not be able to detect ship A to launch the YJ-18's. In fact, the longer-ranged the missile, the greater that dependence on offboard assistance becomes. To provide a bit of context, a RAN MH-60R Seahawk, flying at 10k ft in support of a RAN FFG or DDG or even a RAN TF, could potentially detect ship targets at ~135 n miles. To provide sensor coverage out to 260+ n miles for a long-ranged LRASM target would likely require detection and cueing by an E-7 or P-8.

With the above in mind, I would think that the RAN would focus more on the smaller, lighter, and likely easier to fit and remove as needed NSM, with LRASM only being embarked if a strike mission might be in the offing. I would also anticipate that the RAN, in cooperation with the RAAF and/or allies, would focus on being able to neutralize, blind, or otherwise destroy potential adversaries' long-range surveillance capabilities, which would leave them unable to launch most of their long-ranged AShM.

Yes, all valid points - hence why I acknowledged the difficulty associated with OTH targeting of long ranged ASCMs. Certainly easier said than done.

That said if I am to play devil's advocate, I would point out that - depending on where the notional conflict occurs - the PRCs long range ISR apparatus could be difficult to interdict. From ISR satellites to OTH radar to BAMS UAS, MPAs and LO UAS (eg. GJ-11), shutting down the long range ASCM threat by disrupting or dismantling the kill chain would be desirable but quite challenging.

Taking the devil's advocate hat off I can certainly see merit in the flexibility (and possible user friendliness?) of a topside NSM capability with LRASM saved for VLS cells when needed. I guess it will boil down to what the RAN wants from its vessels, and how they intend to use them.

 

[Todjaeger]

Yes, all valid points - hence why I acknowledged the difficulty associated with OTH targeting of long ranged ASCMs. Certainly easier said than done.

That said if I am to play devil's advocate, I would point out that - depending on where the notional conflict occurs - the PRCs long range ISR apparatus could be difficult to interdict. From ISR satellites to OTH radar to BAMS UAS, MPAs and LO UAS (eg. GJ-11), shutting down the long range ASCM threat by disrupting or dismantling the kill chain would be desirable but quite challenging.

Taking the devil's advocate hat off I can certainly see merit in the flexibility (and possible user friendliness?) of a topside NSM capability with LRASM saved for VLS cells when needed. I guess it will boil down to what the RAN wants from its vessels, and how they intend to use them.

My personal preference if the ADF were to get LRASM would be for it to be fitted for use from F-35 and P-8, and RAN ships and subs especially, with primary usage vs. C4ISR assets. OTH targeting, already a difficult prospect, would become drastically more complicated with a RAN sub were able to suddenly launch a half-dozen or dozen LO, low-flying LRASM at a UAS control station and comm relay which was a link in the kill chain.

ISR satellites and OTH radar systems to my knowledge, are able to provide awareness of potential long-ranged targets, but AFAIK lack the accuracy to provide target quality data which is where other systems like MPA, UAS, etc. would come in. All of these other systems are more easily engaged and/or disrupted.

 

[Boagrius]

ISR satellites and OTH radar systems to my knowledge, are able to provide awareness of potential long-ranged targets, but AFAIK lack the accuracy to provide target quality data which is where other systems like MPA, UAS, etc. would come in. All of these other systems are more easily engaged and/or disrupted.

This would certainly be intuitive, since the sensors on MPA, UAS etc ought to provide better resolution than what you would typically expect from satellites or OTH radar assets. That said, much of the "literature" I have managed to read on the emerging PRC ISR network (particularly insofar as it relates to their growing ASBM arsenal) suggests that they may be looking to use satellites and OTH radar to provide targeting data as well. Whether or not they can actually achieve this does not appear to be public knowledge, but the intent seems to be there.

Agree that LRASM would make a sound addition to F35, P-8A, Hunter and Hobart when required (on top of Rhino already planned). The beauty of it, at least in theory, is that it appears to have been designed as an autonomous hunter-killer weapon in its own right. Combined with its low observability, this should help it mitigate the targeting problem somewhat by cruising at higher altitude, passively "sniffing" out emissions from the target vessel(s) from a high vantage point. Meanwhile it also takes on targeting updates from 3rd parties over the course of its flight, with a descent to wavetop height in the final approach where it can mask itself both below the radar horizon and in surface clutter. In this context, I would expect that aircraft like the F35 and even forthcoming Loyal Wingman UAS might to be able to use their own low signatures to get close enough to localise targets and discretely pass on their whereabouts to the missile/swarm thereof.

Again, I imagine this is how it ought to work in theory, but the RAN would be considerably more aware of the practical realities than I am.

 

[John Newman]

Here’s an LM animation that shows how LRASM is designed to work:

Cheers,

 

[Boagrius]

...and something I picked up from the CSBA report I posted over in the US Navy thread - a decent depiction of the A2/AD environment that continues to develop in our neighbourhood. Whether it is NSM, LRASM or both, this (or an evolution of it) is the environment that faces our future surface combatants.

 

[Redlands18]

Here’s an LM animation that shows how LRASM is designed to work:

Cheers,

And it’s still the best AD of all, kill the Launch Platform first.

 

[Rob c]

And it’s still the best AD of all, kill the Launch Platform first.

With a range of more than 200 nautical miles (350 plus Km)you may not even know the launch platform is around until it is too late unless you have some good forward coverage of some sort and it is meant to be stealthy.

 

[DDG38]

With a range of more than 200 nautical miles (350 plus Km)you may not even know the launch platform is around until it is too late unless you have some good forward coverage of some sort and it is meant to be stealthy.

that's where your SIGINT/ELINT infrastructure comes into play. In a high threat environment the I&W resources would be considerable especially for 5EYEs partners.

 

[Redlands18]

With a range of more than 200 nautical miles (350 plus Km)you may not even know the launch platform is around until it is too late unless you have some good forward coverage of some sort and it is meant to be stealthy.

And the further out you force the Launch Platform to release the better your chances are of detecting and neutralising the Missile. The other thing about killing the Launch Platform is it could be carrying more then one Missile and also can’t return to base and reload. But AD starts even earlier then this with Strikes against Bases, C&C, Logistics you are going to try and neutralise the Enemy’s ability to launch in the first place.

 

[alexsa]

Maybe I'm missing the point, so I'll risk being embarrassed in order to get clarification on this "non-penetrating" business.

I took it to mean that the periscope (or sensor mast) doesn't penetrate the *pressure hull* of the submarine being electro-optical rather than purely optical and still penetrates the water surface when in operation. Benefit being that the above water section of an electro-optical scope can be much smaller and more discrete, sweep faster and provide an image that can be shown on screens rather than in a small optical viewfinder AND allow a more leisurely inspection of the recorded electronic image after lowering the scope.

Some of the discussion here seems to suggest the periscope doesn't go above water at all, hence my confusion

oldsig

Bang on...... non penetrating masts are becoming common give the advances in systems and the fact modern electro-optical systems are much better than the mark 1 eyeball in respect of periscopes. anything that reduces hull penetrations is a good thing.

The frustration I am having is the suggestion the mast does no penetrate the surface of the water which still appears to be a claim. I will be resolving this issue now.

 

[Rob c]

And the further out you force the Launch Platform to release the better your chances are of detecting and neutralising the Missile.

With a stealthy missile you will find that the detection range may be relatively short depending on the level of detection equipment fitted to the target and depending on the effectiveness of the missiles stealth profile and this may mean that effective countermeasures, both active (Guns or missiles) and passive are deployed at an even shorter range as fire control radars are more likely to be effected by the the stealth qualities of the stealth systems employed by the missile due to the short wave length they use for increased accuracy. . If the missile is programmed to fly under the radar horizon of the target then this also will shorten any detection and engagement time significantly. With very good stealth attributes you may become totally reliant on optical, infrared or lasers for detection and fire control with their current range limitations.

 

[CB90]

With a stealthy missile you will find that the detection range may be relatively short depending on the level of detection equipment fitted to the target and depending on the effectiveness of the missiles stealth profile and this may mean that effective countermeasures, both active (Guns or missiles) and passive are deployed at an even shorter range as fire control radars are more likely to be effected by the the stealth qualities of the stealth systems employed by the missile due to the short wave length they use for increased accuracy. . If the missile is programmed to fly under the radar horizon of the target then this to will shorten any engagement time significantly

In the traditional ship vs missile engagement this is true. However, for where the ADF is going in networked engagements with multiple paired sensor shooters, less so. Likewise, it’s only safe to assume the PLA is working on a similar capability, however far along they might be.

 

[Rob c]

In the traditional ship vs missile engagement this is true. However, for where the ADF is going in networked engagements with multiple paired sensor shooters, less so. Likewise, it’s only safe to assume the PLA is working on a similar capability, however far along they might be.

You still have to be able to detect the missile before you can counter it and a high level of stealth will make this difficult and in particular when the missile is below the sensors horizon until it is close.

 

[Todjaeger]

You still have to be able to detect the missile before you can counter it and a high level of stealth will make this difficult and in particular when the missile is below the sensors horizon until it is close.

Hence the reference to networked engagements and multiple paired sensors. A targeted naval vessel might not be able to 'see' an inbound LO missile, especially if said missile is below the radar horizon from the ship's onboard sensors. OTOH if the ship is receiving data from supporting offboard assets like other vessels or more importantly airborne platforms like a naval helicopter, E-7 or P-8, then the limitations of the ship's own sensors and positioning become less of an issue. The radar horizon for an ISR asset loitering at ~30k ft is likely to be 200+ n miles, to the point where I would think the issue at that range would be signal attenuation and/or clutter rejection filtering out returns from LO objects.

 

[Rob c]

Hence the reference to networked engagements and multiple paired sensors. A targeted naval vessel might not be able to 'see' an inbound LO missile, especially if said missile is below the radar horizon from the ship's onboard sensors. OTOH if the ship is receiving data from supporting offboard assets like other vessels or more importantly airborne platforms like a naval helicopter, E-7 or P-8, then the limitations of the ship's own sensors and positioning become less of an issue. The radar horizon for an ISR asset loitering at ~30k ft is likely to be 200+ n miles, to the point where I would think the issue at that range would be signal attenuation and/or clutter rejection filtering out returns from LO objects.

Yep but that limits you to only being able to be were these platforms are available and helicopters have a far more limited altitude and equipment capability. and we still have to have the gear, (which I have yet to see in general use) to see through the stealth abilities of the missile. I am not an expert but at what range can you reliably detect a stealth missile with todays technology as I would assume that having a lot smaller cross section than a stealth aircraft, that the missile would be even harder to detect . It is the stealth part of the equation that increases the problem many fold . Also how capable are aircraft like the P8 or E7 against modern stealth, as I have not been privy to reliable information in this regard. For instance at what range can E7 detect a F 35, and assuming a stealth missile is a lot harder to see, due to being smaller, we could assume that the missile detection range would be significantly less. The targeted ship would still have to have its weapon systems lock on to the missile and at what range against stealth would this happen and would this allow for time to have defence against simultaneous multidirectional attacks? One could argue that if you can only operate your ships under the cover of airpower why not just get rid of the ships and increase the airpower. Not something I would support.

 

[DDG38]

Yep but that limits you to only being able to be were these platforms are available and helicopters have a far more limited altitude and equipment capability. and we still have to have the gear, (which I have yet to see in general use) to see through the stealth abilities of the missile. I am not an expert but at what range can you reliably detect a stealth missile with todays technology as I would assume that having a lot smaller cross section than a stealth aircraft, that the missile would be even harder to detect . It is the stealth part of the equation that increases the problem many fold . Also how capable are aircraft like the P8 or E7 against modern stealth, as I have not been privy to reliable information in this regard. For instance at what range can E7 detect a F 35, and assuming a stealth missile is a lot harder to see, due to being smaller, we could assume that the missile detection range would be significantly less. The targeted ship would still have to have its weapon systems lock on to the missile and at what range against stealth would this happen and would this allow for time to have defence against simultaneous multidirectional attacks? One could argue that if you can only operate your ships under the cover of airpower why not just get rid of the ships and increase the airpower. Not something I would support.

You seem to be operating under the assumption that some form of radar detection has to happen before an ASMD engagement can begin. No matter how stealthy a missile may be, it still has to transmit and receive data to form it's target picture. And those transmissions can be intercepted, by multiple platforms both within and outside the engagement zone. There are many pieces to ASMD and active emitters are only one part of it. You will also not find accurate data on the detection capabilities of AWACS/modern air search radars against stealth as it's, well, classified for a reason.
Trust me, I've sat in the chair in front of ESM gear during live ASMD exercises and many things happen at once when a launch platfrom, either air, surface or sub-surface, is detected. I am not current on how ASMD has evolved to detect stealth missiles but I am confident in saying it either has or is in the process of working against them to expand engagement envelopes at sea.

 

[Boagrius]

Bang on...... non penetrating masts are becoming common give the advances in systems and the fact modern electro-optical systems are much better than the mark 1 eyeball in respect of periscopes. anything that reduces hull penetrations is a good thing.

The frustration I am having is the suggestion the mast does no penetrate the surface of the water which still appears to be a claim. I will be resolving this issue now.

Perhaps this is the technology causing the confusion?

 

[Gryphinator]

4th Arafura class laid down today. They are being made at at one hell of a pace. Anyone have a pic or 2 of the progress of the 1st?