Territorial Defense/Resisting Occupation

[Redlands18]

This bombing seems to indicate a new kind of animal entering the game; one that broadcasts a warning for people to stay away before the blast?
Doesn't make them any less crazy, probably the opposite, but still something very new & unusual.

And as far as Defense issues go, an armed populace is a tremendous boon for the USA. It makes invasion & successful occupation of American territory an impossibility for an enemy power. "A gun behind every blade of grass", as some have noted, is a factual reality, and by comparison would make the Middle East seem like a vacation spot for an army of occupation.

And lastly; I thought that 5G was a dead issue.... ?

Tremendous Boon?
why don’t you try explaining that one to the Parents of
Virginia Tech
Sandy Hook
Stoneman Douglas
Columbine
And a Dozen or so more Schools.
Having a very heavily armed Populace in a Country that has virtually zero chance of being invaded anyway, considering the size and power of the US Military and the sheer Geographical difficulty in such an undertaking, is no excuse for allowing easy access to Assault Riffles for murderous Psychopaths.

 

[JohnWolf]

Tremendous Boon?
why don’t you try explaining that one to the Parents of
...

Nope, not going there.

Having a very heavily armed Populace in a Country that has virtually zero chance of being invaded anyway, considering the size and power of the US Military and the sheer Geographical difficulty in such an undertaking, is no excuse for allowing easy access to Assault Riffles for murderous Psychopaths.

No chance, 50 years from now? 100?
Try telling the PLA that the US is inviolable, they will take it as a personal insult.
And to clarify actual firepower; there is no easy access to Assault Rifles that can fire fully automatic. That kind of weapon costs tens of thousands of dollars with liscensing and fees and taxes and limited availability comes into it. Criminals don't go that route. In fact, Police use their weapons to commit crimes at triple the rate that Concealed Carry Permit holders do.
From a National Defense point of view, the real value of armed citizens is the sniper that can threaten a man-sized target from up to a Kilometer away, the urban ambushers, and the easy-looking victim that can turn the tables on an attacker in a heartbeat.
As things stand, even if the USA collapses into Civil War {an actual topic of discussion in some areas.... but the idiots indulging in that always fade away when I ask what they think a Civil War in a country with over 3,300 nuclear warheads would look like} there is still no chance of an enemy power taking a slice of America for themselves.
And that's all I have to say about it.

 

[Feanor]

No chance, 50 years from now? 100?
Try telling the PLA that the US is inviolable, they will take it as a personal insult.
And to clarify actual firepower; there is no easy access to Assault Rifles that can fire fully automatic. That kind of weapon costs tens of thousands of dollars with liscensing and fees and taxes and limited availability comes into it. Criminals don't go that route. In fact, Police use their weapons to commit crimes at triple the rate that Concealed Carry Permit holders do.
From a National Defense point of view, the real value of armed citizens is the sniper that can threaten a man-sized target from up to a Kilometer away, the urban ambushers, and the easy-looking victim that can turn the tables on an attacker in a heartbeat.
As things stand, even if the USA collapses into Civil War {an actual topic of discussion in some areas.... but the idiots indulging in that always fade away when I ask what they think a Civil War in a country with over 3,300 nuclear warheads would look like} there is still no chance of an enemy power taking a slice of America for themselves.
And that's all I have to say about it.

There's a lot to say to this, so I'll try to go in order.

From a National Defense point of view if a guerilla resistance movement was desirable the way to do that would not be to push for individuals to hoard private arsenals or even to socialize gun ownership as a desirable element of the culture. And you'll notice those things aren't actually being done. They're happening despite not thanks to efforts of the US government.

The way to do that would be to form territorial resistance units that work similar to the reserves, except they would train for guerilla warfare in their areas of residence, and keep their weapons stored in centralized locations. They would also have chains of command, available supply locations with food, water, and field-gear such as backpacks and tactical vests, for when they're needed. This would be far more effective than the lone gunman sniper taking potshots at Chinese paratroopers (a fantasy really).

But you'll notice this isn't being done either. That's because from a National Defense point of view planning to defeat the enemy through guerilla resistance is like planning to lose, or planning to win by taking horrific damage to your own country's infrastructure and population. Consider Vietnam. Arguably North Vietnam won against the US, but the human and economic cost is so high that it's a Pyrrhic victory at best, not dissimilar to the Mujahadeen "victory" in Afghanistan over Soviet forces, at the end of which Afghanistan turned into essentially a failed state and remains one to this day.

Planning for that kind of war is a questionable strategy at best, and downright idiotic at worst. Which brings me to the real point. In the modern world cases where another country successfully invades and annexes part of another state are relatively rare since WWII ended. The only recent example is Crimea, and it points in the direction of the real threat. Ukrainian civilians weren't taking potshots at Russian forces in Crimea not because they didn't have guns but because they didn't have the desire. Nevermind civilians, units of the MVD (troops of the interior) changed sides wholesale, and some Ukrainian military units even provided logistical support to Russian forces as they were occupying and annexing Crimea.

The real threat is not the Chinese marine or paratrooper marching on US soil, but the decay of the legitimacy of a state's government, and it's institutions. If the US government has the trust and support of its citizenry and it's organs and institutions are seen as legitimate, the US should plan to defeat a prospective invading force (be they Soviet or North Korean ) with conventional means, ideally at sea, given the geography, while keeping the nuclear option in it's back pocket. Whereas if the US as a nation-state decays to such a point that annexing a piece of it, or at least permanently occupying, becomes a realistic prospect, private gun ownership is unlikely to be the main problem the occupying forces will face. The biggest one will probably be the shipping costs of getting men and materiel across the ocean.

 

[Feanor]

No chance, 50 years from now? 100?
Try telling the PLA that the US is inviolable, they will take it as a personal insult.
And to clarify actual firepower; there is no easy access to Assault Rifles that can fire fully automatic. That kind of weapon costs tens of thousands of dollars with liscensing and fees and taxes and limited availability comes into it. Criminals don't go that route. In fact, Police use their weapons to commit crimes at triple the rate that Concealed Carry Permit holders do.
From a National Defense point of view, the real value of armed citizens is the sniper that can threaten a man-sized target from up to a Kilometer away, the urban ambushers, and the easy-looking victim that can turn the tables on an attacker in a heartbeat.
As things stand, even if the USA collapses into Civil War {an actual topic of discussion in some areas.... but the idiots indulging in that always fade away when I ask what they think a Civil War in a country with over 3,300 nuclear warheads would look like} there is still no chance of an enemy power taking a slice of America for themselves.
And that's all I have to say about it.

There's a lot to say to this, so I'll try to go in order.

From a National Defense point of view if a guerilla resistance movement was desirable the way to do that would not be to push for individuals to hoard private arsenals or even to socialize gun ownership as a desirable element of the culture. And you'll notice those things aren't actually being done. They're happening despite not thanks to efforts of the US government.

The way to do that would be to form territorial resistance units that work similar to the reserves, except they would train for guerilla warfare in their areas of residence, and keep their weapons stored in centralized locations. They would also have chains of command, available supply locations with food, water, and field-gear such as backpacks and tactical vests, for when they're needed. This would be far more effective than the lone gunman sniper taking potshots at Chinese paratroopers (a fantasy really).

But you'll notice this isn't being done either. That's because from a National Defense point of view planning to defeat the enemy through guerilla resistance is like planning to lose, or planning to win by taking horrific damage to your own country's infrastructure and population. Consider Vietnam. Arguably North Vietnam won against the US, but the human and economic cost is so high that it's a Pyrrhic victory at best, not dissimilar to the Mujahadeen "victory" in Afghanistan over Soviet forces, at the end of which Afghanistan turned into essentially a failed state and remains one to this day.

Planning for that kind of war is a questionable strategy at best, and downright idiotic at worst. Which brings me to the real point. In the modern world cases where another country successfully invades and annexes part of another state are relatively rare since WWII ended. The only recent example is Crimea, and it points in the direction of the real threat. Ukrainian civilians weren't taking potshots at Russian forces in Crimea not because they didn't have guns but because they didn't have the desire. Nevermind civilians, units of the MVD (troops of the interior) changed sides wholesale, and some Ukrainian military units even provided logistical support to Russian forces as they were occupying and annexing Crimea.

The real threat is not the Chinese marine or paratrooper marching on US soil, but the decay of the legitimacy of a state's government, and it's institutions. If the US government has the trust and support of its citizenry and it's organs and institutions are seen as legitimate, the US should plan to defeat a prospective invading force (be they Soviet or North Korean ) with conventional means, ideally at sea, given the geography, while keeping the nuclear option in it's back pocket. Whereas if the US as a nation-state decays to such a point that annexing a piece of it, or at least permanently occupying, becomes a realistic prospect, private gun ownership is unlikely to be the main problem the occupying forces will face. The biggest one will probably be the shipping costs of getting men and materiel across the ocean.

 

[JohnWolf]

There's a lot to say to this, so I'll try to go in order.

From a National Defense point of view if a guerilla resistance movement was desirable the way to do that would not be to push for individuals to hoard private arsenals or even to socialize gun ownership as a desirable element of the culture. And you'll notice those things aren't actually being done. They're happening despite not thanks to efforts of the US government.

The way to do that would be to form territorial resistance units that work similar to the reserves, except they would train for guerilla warfare in their areas of residence, and keep their weapons stored in centralized locations. They would also have chains of command, available supply locations with food, water, and field-gear such as backpacks and tactical vests, for when they're needed. This would be far more effective than the lone gunman sniper taking potshots at Chinese paratroopers (a fantasy really).

[Mod edit: Text deleted for trolling]

This centralized approach leaves the Guerrillas open to betrayal by Quislings (see Partisans in Europe during WW2) and is a needless complication given the situation in the US. Potential Partisans here already know each other, families and friends, and would be far harder to infiltrate ... as has been the case with so many insurgent operations in the Middle East.

Supplies have already been stockpiled, I don't know if you are aware of this but you just can't find ammo in the US these days for most calibers, at any price.

A de-centralized state of constant resistance is far harder to deal with than anything else, and M.I. will verify that be reason of their inability to deal with it. [Mod edit: Rubbish — what you say is untrue. And you must know that this statement is not true.

If resistance is conducted at group level, without coordination, any resistance of this sort of micro-scale resistance can be overcome in a meeting engagement by a platoon sized force.

But as insurgent/terror groups in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and so on have evolved, they have become more dangerous by behaving in a coordinated manner. Despite this mutation in insurgent lethality, American special forces in Iraq, the Israeli military (IDF) in her cross border conflicts have evolved deadly responses to insurgent groups. A quick review of the US military’s the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD) process, may be useful for a layman reading about it for the first time. See also: Defense planning in preparation for foreign occupation

When a situation arises to which the US considers deploying military forces, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and President (POTUS) require a range of options from which to address the situation. The joint operation planning process or JOPP provides a framework for the war fighter to gain a better understanding of the nature of the problems and objectives (see also this article on 'Design and Joint Operation Planning'). The purpose of military planning is to provide military options to the SECDEF and POTUS. These military options are considered a long with other options like economic sanctions.

This F3EAD targeting methodology utilized by the US Special Operations Forces is responsible for some of the most highly-publicized missions in support of overseas contingency operations (likewise the IDF would have a very similar process).

• F3EAD is a system that allows the Commander of these forces to anticipate and predict enemy operations, identify, locate, and target enemy forces, and to perform intelligence exploitation and analysis of captured enemy personnel and materiel.
• Central to the F3EAD process is the functional fusion of operations and intelligence functions throughout the military organization. In F3EAD, commanders establish targeting priorities, the intelligence system provides the direction to the target, and the operations system performs the decisive operations necessary to accomplish the mission. ]

The only answer to it would be the wholesale genocide of everyone in sight, and you don't see many governments out there willing to be so open about being worse than the 3rd Reich. Pol Pot's Cambodia comes to mind, and for a brief time, Rwanda, but that's about all for the last half Century.

But you'll notice this isn't being done either. That's because from a National Defense point of view planning to defeat the enemy through guerilla resistance is like planning to lose, or planning to win by taking horrific damage to your own country's infrastructure and population. Consider Vietnam. Arguably North Vietnam won against the US, but the human and economic cost is so high that it's a Pyrrhic victory at best, not dissimilar to the Mujahadeen "victory" in Afghanistan over Soviet forces, at the end of which Afghanistan turned into essentially a failed state and remains one to this day.

I think that if you ask them, most of those two populations would say that winning was better than losing.

Planning for that kind of war is a questionable strategy at best, and downright idiotic at worst. Which brings me to the real point. In the modern world cases where another country successfully invades and annexes part of another state are relatively rare since WWII ended. The only recent example is Crimea, and it points in the direction of the real threat. Ukrainian civilians weren't taking potshots at Russian forces in Crimea not because they didn't have guns but because they didn't have the desire. Nevermind civilians, units of the MVD (troops of the interior) changed sides wholesale, and some Ukrainian military units even provided logistical support to Russian forces as they were occupying and annexing Crimea.

I doubt that they were ever very serious about holding on to "the canker on the nose of the Ukraine". So what is the point? That California would welcome their Chinese overlords the way Silicon Valley already is?

The real threat is not the Chinese marine or paratrooper marching on US soil, but the decay of the legitimacy of a state's government, and it's institutions. If the US government has the trust and support of its citizenry and it's organs and institutions are seen as legitimate, the US should plan to defeat a prospective invading force (be they Soviet or North Korean ) with conventional means, ideally at sea, given the geography, while keeping the nuclear option in it's back pocket. Whereas if the US as a nation-state decays to such a point that annexing a piece of it, or at least permanently occupying, becomes a realistic prospect, private gun ownership is unlikely to be the main problem the occupying forces will face. The biggest one will probably be the shipping costs of getting men and materiel across the ocean.

And here we come to the real issue; what is the 2nd amendment really about?

It is about allowing the people to resist tyranny.

The very phrase "American Exceptionalism" is treated like a joke these days, so let's go with that. Why should the USA think that it is impossible for this nation to devolve into tyranny just as every other nation on Earth with an older history has, at some point in it's history?

This is our last-ditch insurance policy against that, when all is said and done.

It is about the Defense of We The People, not a power structure in the richest city in the country. (four of the five richest counties in the US are the ones right next to Washington D.C.)

The reason my belief is not shaken by the deaths of 20 children in one incident, is because the fact that 200 million people have been murdered by their own Governments in the last 2 centuries weighs a bit heavier on my mind.

 

[Feanor]

This is a thread for discussing defense planning in preparation for foreign occupation, and concepts surrounding the ability to mobilize large numbers of civilians outside of a normal draft process, to resist occupying or invading forces. I'm making this based on some discussion that took place surrounding the idea that an armed population is significantly more effective at resisting invading forces and/or can serve as a significant obstacle in its own right and should therefore be regarded as an element of defense planning.

Things relevant to this thread include territorial defense arrangements like Finland, volunteer formations of citizens rallying together to fight off a potential invading force, or resist a such a force after an invasion has taken place (like Ukrainian volunteer btlns) or even citizen-soldier concepts that allow large numbers of otherwise non-military personnel be gathered for defense purposes (even examples going as far back as Hellenic Greece may be relevant).

I'll divide this into two general areas, preparing for foreign invasion and opposing foreign invasion through territorial defense formations, and civilian-based formations, vs actual resistance groups acting under enemy occupation.

 

[Feanor]

I'll start us off with several points. In any armed struggle the key is organization, not the arms. Don't get me wrong, you need weapons, but the weapons are not primary. Many nations with little to no private gun ownership formed highly effective resistance forces during the Second World War, because the resistance was organized, often by former or even active service members, or respected members of their communities that could speak on behalf of a group with some internal legitimacy or respect. In this regard, it's extremely helpful that the resistance in question have some contact with either a sitting government in a part of the country not under occupation, or a government in exile, or if neither are available a provisional government in hiding. It gives individual members something to look up to, hope for, and gives the struggle a sense of purpose and belonging. This is why, for example, Soviet partisans could maintain large forces scattered across large areas and even act in coordination with Red Army efforts on the front.

This also allows different resistance groups to coordinate efforts with each other, and potentially identify each other, transfer resources and personnel (if one groups gets too large or too small) assign areas of responsibility, and coordinate for larger missions or disperse for multiple smaller ones. In this regard poorly armed but well organized structure can do far more damage by hitting where it hurts and coordinating their strikes, then many lone individuals or small groups acting solely on their own accord, even if they are far better armed. A key aspect of guerilla warfare is planning. There are no front lines, but there is also often no "victory" in the sense that even after a successful mission the enemy isn't defeated and running but quite the opposite funneling overwhelming forces into the area.

Final point on this subject. Resistance movements that are interconnected, and have a link to the "outside", either a foreign government in exile, or a legitimate domestic government on the other side of the front line, can often survive worse casualties, and fare better under enemy pressure, because they are connected to a larger whole. As a result a worse armed but better organized movement with good means of communication is the recipe for success. Ideally weapons could be available at the start of the war but even if they aren't they're extremely likely to become so in the course of it.

 

[Feanor]

Now on the side of preparation for enemy invasion or occupation, and the general use of territorial defense formations.

First off, the advantages of organization listed above all apply even more-so on this level. By preparing not for a large quantity of brave individuals and community-oriented groups but for an actual structure, a territorial defense formation isn't limited to dying heroically while taking potshots at enemy forces from the bushes. They can be used to supplement regular troops on the front line if one still exists, or even replace front-line troops in the immediate rear for security duties, freeing up for regulars to fight the battles (consider how many of Ukraine's volunteer btlns during the 2014 war were under the auspices of the MVD and engaged in security operations near the front line, allowing the regular Army units to focus on the fighting). They can also be trained in regular military jobs, allowing them to be used piecemeal as reinforcements to replace casualties. While a unit made up entirely of territorials is likely to be significantly less effective, replacing 10% of a regular line unit with territorials, due to casualties, will allow the experienced professional soldiers to quickly indoctrinate and share experience with the newcomers, making them far more effective. None of this directly relates to resisting enemy occupation or engaging in guerilla warfare but it shows how a structure trained for that purpose in its own right can serve in other ways too.

Second off, no matter how good someone is with a gun, being trained as part of a tactical unit is drastically different from being trained for individual marksmanship or even self-defense with a firearm. Merely having an armed population can provide some skilled shooters, but does nothing to ensure that those shooters can effectively engage targets even in small groups. Even the most underground of resistances will sometimes end up in a situation where they need to coordinate fire from several members of the group. And some of the larger organized resistance movements employ mortars, machine guns, and other crew served weapons that are highly vulnerable if operated without proper infantry support, and can be highly hazardous to friendly forces if operated without proper coordination. But they can be highly effective against enemy forces, if available. You may logically ask how a resistance movement can get machine guns and mortars. They're not exactly available for purchase. But this is where 1) preparation comes in, members can be pre-trained, and stockpiles can be kept in arsenals for when the time comes 2) they can often be picked up from retreating friendly forces or even looted from abandoned arsenals 3) they can be captured in battle from enemy forces. In point of fact historically resistance movements have launched entire operations for the explicit purpose of capturing specific types of weapons to use in their struggle.

This transitions us to my final point on this subject, for now at least. Supplies are very important and the best way to provide for weapons and gear to a friendly resistance is to set up stashes in remote and hidden locations in the countryside, the location only known to professional resistance leaders who can be trained in advance in peace time, or rare individual community members who are expected to support the resistance in times of enemy occupation. Undoubtedly some weapons will be lost, but this allows for larger quantities of weapons to be provided, for the weapon types to be standardized with the training provided, and for resupply to be a lot more straightforward since the weapons and ammo types are relatively few in number. It also allows for more sophisticated gear to be provided including communication equipment, and possibly even vehicles.

 

[Feanor]

Tl;dr the key to effective resistance is organization, planning, and conmunication. Weapons are useful and even essential but not primary. Resistance organizations that meet these requirements tend to be more resilient, and often can serve a purpose that goes beyond the scope of merely killing some occupying enemy soldiers.

EDIT: One more general point I've missed. Fighting the enemy through guerilla resistance on friendly soil is extremely costly. The casualties to be taken will be immense. Unlike the romantic image of brave resistance fighters taking out dozens of evil occupiers, and easily disappearing into the forest/mountains/concrete jungle reality is quite different. The occupying forces will kill resistance members, members of their families, and bystanders in huge quantities. Civilian infrastructure will take damage time and time again, and the occupying forces will often not bother repairing or replacing destroyed assets. The resistance group itself will be under tremendous pressure to stay a cohesive combat unit.

This is not a good or effective way to wage war. It's a desperate way. There are countries who plan for this, not because they are stupid, and not because they think this type of war is desirable over a conventional fight but because they believe it may become necessary and even unavoidable. Generally these are either countries that believe enemy invasion is likely and they cannot trust to their regular military to stop it (or better yet deter it), or these are countries that have a history of this happening in the past and are building on painful lessons.

Note that these circumstances don't apply to all countries. Arguably they don't apply to most countries. When advocating for a particular country to plan for this type conflict consider the time it takes to prepare this type of resistance (hint; it's years not decades) and consider the potential timeframe when such a conflict may occur.

 

[JohnWolf]

... They can be used to supplement regular troops on the front line if one still exists, or even replace front-line troops in the immediate rear for security duties, freeing up for regulars to fight the battles (consider how many of Ukraine's volunteer btlns during the 2014 war were under the auspices of the MVD and engaged in security operations near the front line, allowing the regular Army units to focus on the fighting). They can also be trained in regular military jobs, allowing them to be used piecemeal as reinforcements to replace casualties. While a unit made up entirely of territorials is likely to be significantly less effective, replacing 10% of a regular line unit with territorials, due to casualties, will allow the experienced professional soldiers to quickly indoctrinate and share experience with the newcomers, making them far more effective. .......

Interesting, but can we flip that on it's head and get a more economical result if the Territorials are vast in numbers?

I mean the Cadre concept; say we are talkiing about a Battalion here and the 10% are now the regulars, and are the NCOs, Staff, and the primary operators on the heavy weapons company.
Assuming literacy and high motivation, how long would it take to whip unit like that into shape?
How difficult would it be to organize a proper medical team, and how likely would it be that you would have to spend a lot of your 10% on that alone?
(ouch)

One thing working favor of such a group would be the fact that the locals all know each other. This is good for moral, since men are less likely to turn coward if they think that people they have known all their lives will see them do it, and remember.

 

[Feanor]

Interesting, but can we flip that on it's head and get a more economical result if the Territorials are vast in numbers?

I mean the Cadre concept; say we are talkiing about a Battalion here and the 10% are now the regulars, and are the NCOs, Staff, and the primary operators on the heavy weapons company.
Assuming literacy and high motivation, how long would it take to whip unit like that into shape?
How difficult would it be to organize a proper medical team, and how likely would it be that you would have to spend a lot of your 10% on that alone?
(ouch)

One thing working favor of such a group would be the fact that the locals all know each other. This is good for moral, since men are less likely to turn coward if they think that people they have known all their lives will see them do it, and remember.

Congratulations, you've just stumbled upon a traditional element of Soviet/Russian mobilization. Cadre units that are kept at various strengths varying from 85% to as low as 15% staffing, with the remainder made up by reserve citizen-soldiers called up in time of war. In principle this isn't a terrible way to run territorial defense, as long as you still have 100% staffed regular units available for anything other then the next big war. That having been said, as Russia has discovered, the two can be almost mutually exclusive unless the cadre units are relatively few in number, otherwise you end up having to try and maintain two armies at the same time.

My suggestion, by the way, was not that a regular unit have 10% vacancies to be filled by territorials. Rather that regular units, as they take combat casualties, can fill the gaps with territorials rather then entirely new recruits. This is another benefit of having territorial defense forces that are trained in a military fashion and have some central organization. Of course this runs into serious problems when the jobs require technical skills or particular expertise (radio operator, UAV operator, DM, mortar-man, anti-tank missile-man, etc.). So you get diminishing returns the bigger the portion of the unit.

Alternatively you could have the entire unit be part-timers, who train together regularly, but in that case you just get the US National Guard (or Reserve for any branch of service).

 

[JohnWolf]

i was thinking more in terms of parachuting the cadre into partisan territory, but the Red Army beat me to that one too.

Also, I really dislike the idea of bringing untrained civilians into a professional military unit. If it was my unit, I'd have to be a lot worse off than just 10% short to even consider it. But that's just me, and there is another option-
If they know the territory (pun intended) how about a Troop of Scouts? As Recon in the area they are familiar with, and with some supervision & commo men, they could be invaluable. I'd have real reservations about integrating them at the Company level, but at Battalion and REgiemnt the should do just fine.

And meanwhile --

Looking at this from the enemy POV, knowing that a large proportion of the people could be armed is going to give them something to think about. It could trigger a horrific series of massacres, but as the Germans found out, that only leads to bigger problems and an even worse situation for the occupier.
Unless the Front is nearby, the occupier does not have all that many troops to call on. They have to think about economy of force; forcing hundreds of people into cattle cars is not so simple when you know that a third of the people your Platoon is trying to push around could have a gun in their pockets.

Another complication is objectives, for either side. Is it area control, exploitation of resources (human and otherwise) or simply keeping transportation assets running?

Sure gets complicated quickly....

 

[OPSSG]

...but the Red Army beat me to that one too.

1. The cardre system is not unique to the Red Army — with its emphasis on offensive action. Resorting to territorial defence alone has a tremendous cost that my country is unwilling to bear. A typical conscript Singapore infantry battalion from 1 to 9 SIR, 1st Guards & 3rd Guards (with an army of 40,000 to 45,000 NSF conscripts, who are in their 22 month cycle, as part of the force). The Guards in particular, run a 3 week Guards conversion course, run by cadre from 7SIB. Each infantry battalion:

​

(a) has 3 rifle companies, and in these rifle companies the only full time experienced military professionals are at Company Commander and CSM level (typically ADF*, SF, Commando, Recce or Ranger trained or certified). Even the platoon sergeant is typically newly minted (and on his 1st tour in an operational unit) and 70% to 85% of the section commanders are NSFs;​

​

(b) each rifle company has its own Spike SR anti-tank section, team of designated marksman (M110 equipped); a MG section; and class 2 medic (who will upgrade the skills of the class 1 platoon medics), which skills are learnt externally, via sending them to school houses that maintain a cadre of trainers and specialist knowledge — for these Company support weapons;​

​

(c) each motorised infantry battalion has a scout platoon, a spike LR platoon and a mortar platoon equipped with the 120mm SRAMS MkII on the Belrex (along with the ATK XM395 or ST Engineering’s 120mm precision munition** mortar rounds). Compared to the previous infantry mortar, the Belrex Mortar Variant requires less manpower and deployment time. Additionally, a higher rate of fire is enabled through an Ammo Loading System. The Belrex Mortar Variant is designed to interoperate with the Mortar Ammunition Carrier Variant to speed up ammunition replenishment during operations. Although not designed to replace unguided mortars, precision munition** mortar rounds allows mortar platoons to eliminate point targets that would require 8-10 rounds using one or two. This lengthens the amount of time a vehicle with 25 rounds can operate and increases the number of targets it can engage without needing resupply; and​

​

(d) 70% to 80% of our infantry officers (trained for 9 + 38 weeks before Commissioning) are also conscripts, on their first tour of leading a platoon. It is the platoon NCOs (trained by the cadre at the School of Infantry Specialists) that provide the day-to-day leadership at the fighting core of these rifle platoons — who are in turn guided on finer points of TTPs, by the chief trainer — the CSM.​

*ADF stands for Singapore’s Army Deployment Force, which is an all professional infantry battalion, whose members have served in war zones; and benchmark with the US Marines. A lot of the TTPs in ADF is evolved from joint exercises in the US or from 6 years of serving in Afghanistan and Iraq.

**PM120 — is GPS guided with a maximum range of up to 8.5 km and a CEP of 10 m. The HE warhead contains 2.8 kg of TNT. ER HE also contains 2.8 kg of TNT and is fitted with a DM111A4/A5 nose mounted fuze. Maximum muzzle velocity was being quoted as 408 m/s; with the extended range round having a maximum range of up to 9 km. The ER RP contains three smoke canisters and is fitted with a MTSQ DM93 fuze, with a maximum muzzle velocity of 408 m/s and a maximum range of up to 9 km, ST Engineering said. The ER illuminating round has the same fuze, muzzle velocity, and range as the ER RP and has an illuminating intensity of 1.25 million cd. There is also the option of IR Illuminating.

2. Each year, thousands of the more motivated of these NSFs have volunteered to extend their service (typically by 4 to 6 months) and a few have passed selection to go to Northern Arabian Gulf in support of coalition objectives or inserted as LRRPs in Timor Leste (as part of past UN Chapter 7 operations).

 

[ngatimozart]

Looking at this from the enemy POV, knowing that a large proportion of the people could be armed is going to give them something to think about. It could trigger a horrific series of massacres, but as the Germans found out, that only leads to bigger problems and an even worse situation for the occupier.
Unless the Front is nearby, the occupier does not have all that many troops to call on. They have to think about economy of force; forcing hundreds of people into cattle cars is not so simple when you know that a third of the people your Platoon is trying to push around could have a gun in their pockets.

Another complication is objectives, for either side. Is it area control, exploitation of resources (human and otherwise) or simply keeping transportation assets running?

Sure gets complicated quickly....

It depends a lot on the occupier and how organised they are. If you look at the Coalition occupation of Iraq, they had no real plan for dealing with the aftermath of the war. This was in stark contrast to the occupation of both Germany and Japan at the end of WW2.

Now say the PRC occupied a country that was a mid power and had a similar social, economic, communications infrastructure to say Singapore. The occupied country has a territorial force that specialises in guerrilla warfare and sufficient war materials have been stockpiled at various locations in country to provide for an ongoing Partisan resistance.

We all are aware of what the CCP / PRC reaction is to any resistance to their rule. They have no sense of humour about it, and armed resistance will elicit a severe response. With the surveillance technology that they now use in monitoring their own population, they would make for a formidable occupation force security wise. If you look at what they are doing to Uighars, it would not be beyond the reasons of possibility to presume that they would act quite harshly and reprisals against the civilian population would be very much on the cards.

The reason why I used the PRC as an example, is purely because their being a totalitarian state, their surveillance capabilities and how they use them.

 

[OPSSG]

Now say the PRC occupied a country that was a mid power and had a similar social, economic, communications infrastructure to say Singapore. The occupied country has a territorial force that specialises in guerrilla warfare and sufficient war materials have been stockpiled at various locations in country to provide for an ongoing Partisan resistance.

Let me say 4 more points, to clarify:

1. There are only 2 countries that the PLA trains to invade and occupy — it is Taiwan and North Korea (in the event of a regime collapse); and only if the Taiwanese decide declare independence. The PLA(N) trains to fight against the USN and the JMSDF up to the 2nd island chain, to deter them from intervening in a Taiwan active hostility scenario; and the PLA are not planning to invade and occupy Japan proper.

2. Even though Singaporean troops have been training in Taiwan since 1975 (Exercise Starlight — 星光计划), China, in general, is not hostile to Singapore and they are not part of our threat matrix (for the Army). Below is a Jan 2020 Taiwanese news report of a Singapore Commando trainee who was taking part in a night static line parachute jump (as part of his Basic Airborne Course) in Taiwan on 18 Dec 2019 when he faced a "static line interference", which saw the line sweep across his neck. At a Taiwanese hospital, a MRI scan revealed that Pte Quek had sustained a cervical spine injury. A previous Mindef statement on 2 Jan 2020 said the Chief Commando Officer, Colonel Kenny Tay, had visited and spoken to him and his family at the hospital. This is a known risk for the 6,000 static-line parachute jumps conducted every year and occurs when the line is too slack, interfering with the jumper's exit. The 21-year-old was able to land within the designated landing area but he sustained injuries to the neck during the jump; and evacuated by our A330MRTT.

​

(a) If the PLA shoots at the SAF, it’s worse than a own goal. It’s like scoring a own goal and then deciding that head butting the referee is part of the game (in this case, the referee is ASEAN) — since 2008, we have an Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security Cooperation (ADESC) with the PLA; and in Oct 2019 the agreement between PLA and MINDEF, was enhanced, including the establishment of mutual logistics support arrangement with China.​

​

(b) Singapore has an omnidirectional deterrence policy but is not hostile to anyone, even if they have a track record of hostility to us (and here I am thinking of Malaysian antics in 2018).
​

3. China does have border disputes with countries like India or Vietnam, from time to time, but they do not stay, even after a border war.

​

(a) In the case of India in 1962, the PLA stayed for about a month after their victory over the Indian Army — a war that was caused by 10 years of Indian policy of armed hostility. The Aug 1952 Longju clash was not accidental but reflected the basic Indian approach to border disputes: territory claimed by India should automatically become Indian territory. This approach made the 1962 conflict with China ultimately inevitable. And by mid-1961 India’s attempted implementation of its territorial claims turned the border areas into conflict zones. Beijing’s urgent calls for diplomatic negotiations were being flouted and Indian troops were continuing to press forward in the western sector. Beijing decided there should be no retreat under Indian pressure. Since India was rejecting China’s calls for peaceful coexistence, Mao quipped, it should be confronted with ‘armed coexistence’.​

​

(b) In the case of Vietnam in Feb/Mar 1979, the PLA withdrew after 3 weeks and 6 days — with their invasion informally supported by ASEAN (at that time), as it reduced the likelihood of Vietnam going further south. In contrast, Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia for 10 years and 9 months, was resisted by ASEAN, through our supply of arms to the rebel groups.​

4. Back then, Singapore was hostile to Vietnam for their invasion of Cambodia (25 Dec 1978 to 26 Sep 1989) and supplied weapons to the Cambodian resistance. When Vietnam invaded Cambodia, they were a client state of the Soviets — see this Dec 1989 Rand note on: Clients and Commitments.

​

(a) In 1988, I went to Thailand with my infantry battalion to train in Exercise Cresendo — knowing that the Thai army was on the frontlines, facing the very real Vietnamese military threat.​

​

(b) Thailand was against the acceptance of Vietnam’s invasion, and cooperated with ASEAN (then comprised of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore) to oppose the Vietnamese occupation at the United Nations.​

​

(c) To this day, ahistorical Vietnamese netizens continue to take offence on the use of the word "invasion", preferring words such as "liberation" instead. To them, Vietnamese troops were seen domestically as putting an end to the Cambodian genocide carried out by the Khmer Rouge regime in the 1970s.​

 

[ngatimozart]

@OPSSG I was only using Singapore as a template for the level of advancement of the fictitious country the PRC was invading and subduing.

 

[OPSSG]

@OPSSG I was only using Singapore as a template for the level of advancement of the fictitious country the PRC was invading and subduing.

No harm, no foul. I know that you know; but casual readers may not know the region as well as you.

 

[Hone C]

i was thinking more in terms of parachuting the cadre into partisan territory

Looking at this from the enemy POV, knowing that a large proportion of the people could be armed is going to give them something to think about.

While the essentials of 'resistance' hasn't changed since the Akkadian revolts, I think a contemporary factor at play in this type of scenario is the repurposing of readily available consumer tech for military, or in this case resistance/guerrilla use. The "democratisation of lethality" is something we have seen play out in numerous recent conflicts.

Mobile phones, social media, voice over internet protocol comms, etc., etc. and likely future advances in AI, virtual reality & augmented reality technologies offer resistance movements different C2 and training techniques.

A "leaderless resistance" or remote control from command nodes in non targetable locations (possibly abroad as per the 2008 Mumbai attacks) may reduce or remove the need for cadre personnel to be physically infiltrated.
Similarly, training could be conducted using online E-learning or with simulation based trainers, and best practice/lessons learned passed on by video/live stream of attacks, etc.

In terms of weapons, while the focus of discussion has been on small arms & crew served weapons, the IED has been for decades the weapon of choice for insurgents. IEDs are simple to manufacture and use, and have proved devastatingly effective.
I would argue that access to precursor chemicals and electrical components is probably more important than pre-cached arms or an armed populace in establishing a viable armed resistance.
Additive manufacturing technology, such as 3D printing, allows limited manufacture of small arms, shaped explosive charges, and drones. COTS drones have been used by IS in Iraq and Syria, and improvised loitering munitions will probably feature in future insurgencies/resistance movements.

In the context of the above conversation, I think it would be a reasonable assumption that an urbanized, well educated and tech-savvy civilian population would be well placed to exploit current and emerging technologies in resisting a theoretical foreign invasion.

 

[Feanor]

While the essentials of 'resistance' hasn't changed since the Akkadian revolts, I think a contemporary factor at play in this type of scenario is the repurposing of readily available consumer tech for military, or in this case resistance/guerrilla use. The "democratisation of lethality" is something we have seen play out in numerous recent conflicts.

Mobile phones, social media, voice over internet protocol comms, etc., etc. and likely future advances in AI, virtual reality & augmented reality technologies offer resistance movements different C2 and training techniques.

A "leaderless resistance" or remote control from command nodes in non targetable locations (possibly abroad as per the 2008 Mumbai attacks) may reduce or remove the need for cadre personnel to be physically infiltrated.
Similarly, training could be conducted using online E-learning or with simulation based trainers, and best practice/lessons learned passed on by video/live stream of attacks, etc.

In terms of weapons, while the focus of discussion has been on small arms & crew served weapons, the IED has been for decades the weapon of choice for insurgents. IEDs are simple to manufacture and use, and have proved devastatingly effective.
I would argue that access to precursor chemicals and electrical components is probably more important than pre-cached arms or an armed populace in establishing a viable armed resistance.
Additive manufacturing technology, such as 3D printing, allows limited manufacture of small arms, shaped explosive charges, and drones. COTS drones have been used by IS in Iraq and Syria, and improvised loitering munitions will probably feature in future insurgencies/resistance movements.

In the context of the above conversation, I think it would be a reasonable assumption that an urbanized, well educated and tech-savvy civilian population would be well placed to exploit current and emerging technologies in resisting a theoretical foreign invasion.

Cached arms could include sophisticated in design but easy to deploy military land mines, and traps of various kinds. They can also include precursor chemical supplies and electrical components. That's the beauty of it, you can store whatever you need. By planning in advance you can also take strategic enterprises that produce chemicals or electronics and ensure that someone working there pre-invasion is part of the resistance and thus may be able to facilitate access post-occupation. Maybe even several someone's depending on the size of the facility.

 

[Feanor]

Also, I really dislike the idea of bringing untrained civilians into a professional military unit. If it was my unit, I'd have to be a lot worse off than just 10% short to even consider it. But that's just me, and there is another option-

So consider this. You're fighting a major war, your regulars and professional reservists are all already committed. You take battlefield casualties. What makes for a better replacement, a regular civilian put through basic training, or a territorial resistance fighter put through the same training?

If they know the territory (pun intended) how about a Troop of Scouts? As Recon in the area they are familiar with, and with some supervision & commo men, they could be invaluable. I'd have real reservations about integrating them at the Company level, but at Battalion and REgiemnt the should do just fine.

Sure, if the front line is near them, and friendly forces are advancing, then resistance force can provide valuable intelligence, and even coordinate combat actions with friendly forces.

Looking at this from the enemy POV, knowing that a large proportion of the people could be armed is going to give them something to think about. It could trigger a horrific series of massacres, but as the Germans found out, that only leads to bigger problems and an even worse situation for the occupier.
Unless the Front is nearby, the occupier does not have all that many troops to call on. They have to think about economy of force; forcing hundreds of people into cattle cars is not so simple when you know that a third of the people your Platoon is trying to push around could have a gun in their pockets.

Another complication is objectives, for either side. Is it area control, exploitation of resources (human and otherwise) or simply keeping transportation assets running?

Sure gets complicated quickly....

Not that complicated. An occupation force is going to start by requiring locals to surrender their firearms. All of them, likely under some serious penalty. Some people will comply, some won't. When they don't get as many as they think they should have, they will use informers and their own intelligence gathering capabilities to try and figure out who might be hoarding arms, and hit their homes with spot-checks, surrounding the house, going in, lining the family against the wall in the living room, and then tearing the place apart. They will certainly face the risk that some of the homes they're searching, the people are already carrying a loaded weapon, and have the presence of mind to use it, but far more often that won't be the case. Many people will surrender their weapons to protect their families from reprisals. Many will be found by the occupying authorities. Some may get away with hiding their weapons, but they unless they're part of a resistance, they're unlikely to do much good. And while the occasional lone gunman is annoying for an occupying force, it's unlikely to be a serious disruption. In locations with large numbers of hostile or problematic population filtration camps can be set up, rounding up primarily young men, and separating them from their families, and then searching the homes. Bear in mind most people don't have false walls and hidden arsenals underneath the floorboards.