Territorial Defense/Resisting Occupation
- Thread starter Redlands18
- Start date
One of the requirements of a cache is that it is non-attributable. Keeping arsenals hidden in your own residence is asking for trouble. As Feanor points out, this is especially true in the context of a military occupation.
In the later stages of a guerrilla conflict, when 'main force' elements are operating in a quasi-conventional manner, arms are openly carried in liberated areas, base camps, etc. Prior to that they'll be only taken out when needed for an action.
In the later stages of a guerrilla conflict, when 'main force' elements are operating in a quasi-conventional manner, arms are openly carried in liberated areas, base camps, etc. Prior to that they'll be only taken out when needed for an action.
As Hone said at that point the question becomes where is it better to store arms, in your own home, or in a neutral location? And who is in a better position to do that, an organization supported by the government, or private citizens on their own initiative?
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
I agree, storing in your own home is a risk from a occupation POV. Many US gun advocates believe in self defence so home storage is their MO. As for some kind of organization, I can understand why storage with government support may not be considered viable or safe for certain regions.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Not quite, at least in terms of attribution. That or the similar trend of burying caches in sealed, air & water-tight containers got started earlier, with a few cases I have heard of having been done following the Sandy Hook school shooting.
Pusser Tas
New Member
AFAIK the most successful civil operation was in Crete. With some UK help they managed to remove the German commander from the island.
Shootings of innocent civilians only further enraged the partisans. Language helped and the Greek Orthodox Church was firmly against the German occupiers.
There is a book and a movie about the removal of the German commanding officer, 'Ill met by Moonlight'
Shootings of innocent civilians only further enraged the partisans. Language helped and the Greek Orthodox Church was firmly against the German occupiers.
There is a book and a movie about the removal of the German commanding officer, 'Ill met by Moonlight'
JohnWolf
Member
Oh boy, this thread is getting interesting, lots of interesting branches to pursue just there.
I wish I had more time to get into that today, but I do have one issue; wouldn't the net have been sabotaged or taken over by the time the occupiers actually arrive? Or can that even be done, given that 90% of the web is "dark"?
JohnWolf
Member
A good point, but if the occupiers can't get to that point without an inordinate expenditure of manpower, would they back off and just let people be?
I suppose the nature of the occupier would determine that.....
One thing I noted in Iraq; Households were allowed to keep a gun in the early days, and this turned out to be a disaster. Insurgent gangs (criminals as well) simply armed themselves by ganging up on one family at a time, or kidnapping kids (and killing them in horrific ways if the family had already given up their guns). Our miscalculation was the idea that the Iraqis would react as a community to such threats, and that just didin't happen.
Civilian resistance cells would have to be in communication with each other, and loyal to each other, for such home-grow Partisan units to work effectively.
But the question is; how?
Also, going into my 100 million thread with an alternative use for an armed population in just a few minutes.
Post 1 of 3
1. You are out of your intellectual depth in your misguided attempt to broaden the discussion from insurgency USA to mis-using WWII examples. Before my rebuttal, let me state 2 more points:
2. In my rebuttal of your WWII example, I note that:
@JohnWolf, while Pol Pot's Cambodia was murderous, it was not as murderously clever as the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). It is clear that:
(i) You have taken some positions and made select throw away comments that cannot be defended or are ahistorical (as I shall illustrate below).
(ii) You have not backed down from either factual errors or other hard to defend positions (clearly shown by others a cross multiple posts to be ahistorical, lacking in context or plain wrong).
1. You are out of your intellectual depth in your misguided attempt to broaden the discussion from insurgency USA to mis-using WWII examples. Before my rebuttal, let me state 2 more points:
One, invasion of the USA is a rubbish scenario — because who is going to invade? The Canadians or the Mexicans have no capability to defeat the US military.
Two, you claim service and military expertise, while posting in a counter-factual manner, with a political agenda. Sadly, the more you ramble-on, the more factual mistakes you make. Readers across multiple countries are correcting your factual errors in your posts. Please reconsider your mode of engagement and to acknowledge past factual errors, where appropriate.
2. In my rebuttal of your WWII example, I note that:
(a) The IJA planned and conducted Pearl Harbour (7 Dec 1941) and the invasion of Singapore, as concurrent operations, in a master stroke of tactical brilliance. On 8 Dec 1941 (just before Pearl Harbour — due to time zone differences), Japan’s Malayan campaign began when the 25th Army, under the command of Lt. Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita, invaded Malaya.
(b) IJA troops launched an amphibious assault on the northern coast of Malaya at Kota Bharu and started advancing down the eastern coast of Malaya. Japanese forces also landed at Pattani and Songkhla in Thailand, then moved south across the Thailand-Malayan border to using tanks to attack and moved rapidly across the western portion of Malaya in bicycles. Despite the fact that British Royal Engineers destroyed over a hundred bridges the IJA was not delayed. This was due in large part to the extensive intelligence operations that had been undertaken prior to the battle. The IJA had obtained excellent maps of the region and native Indian guides that were waiting to lead the troops through the terrain.
(c) Malaya, better than any other target, embodied the spirit and achievements of Japanese intelligence. The Japanese Secret Services, and the intelligence web that they had created, had successfully constructed a realistic picture of the British Order of Battle. That intelligence web, consisted of diplomatic, military, and commercial components. The Japanese had also enlisted the aid of the local populations and paid informants. Some of those informants had were even British servicemen as in the Shinozaki incident. Several British servicemen over the previous years had been bribed into providing the Japanese with information on troop and weapons deployment, layouts of bases, and even the whereabouts of vessels of the Royal Navy.
(d) The IJA on 31 Jan 1942, forced the last organised Allied forces to abandon Malaya. In about 70 days, the Battle for Malaya had ended in comprehensive defeat for the Commonwealth forces and their retreat from the Malay Peninsula to the fortress of Singapore. Nearly 50,000 Commonwealth troops had been captured or killed during the battle.
(e) The IJA was so superior in their infantry tactics in jungle and manoeuvre warfare that the fighting in fortress Singapore only lasted from 8 to 15 Feb 1942 before the British surrendered. The SAF has studied this campaign in a 84 page pdf: Malayan Campaign 1941-42: Lessons for ONE SAF.
(f) In the Army Research Department, in Taiwan in 1941, LTC Tsuji Masanobu, the "god of strategy” gained an appreciation of jungle warfare conditions in Malaya. This was essential to the successful momentum of the Malaya invasion, all the way to Singapore — Tsuji was a militarist, a war criminal and an ultimate survivor, always escaping justice.
(g) In contrast to the British failure in WWII (to make joint-mindedness a central feature of their plans and those WWII operations that are seen by modern Singaporean leaders as a criminal military blunder), the integrated joint service plan by which the IJA invaded Thailand and Malaya is studied dispassionately in our officer cadet school and advanced officer courses.
(h) By late Feb 1942 the IJA had total control of Singapore after the invasion (and presented a $792.9 million dollar bill (in 2020 dollars) for the 1942 invasion and the bullets used for the mass murders in Operation Sook Ching). For 14 days between 18 Feb to 4 Mar 1942, all Chinese males aged 18-50 were ordered to report to murder/screening centres across the country.
3. Why would an invader back-off? They can have absolute control. Let me share one real world example of absolute control (without the need for too much manpower — 1 solider per 1,000 in population), in more detail to debunk JohnWolf’s line of reasoning.
(a) Operation Sook Ching lasted 2 weeks and was a systematic purge of perceived hostile elements by the Japanese military during the Japanese occupation of Singapore and Malaya, after the British colony surrendered on 15 Feb 1942. Conservative estimates put the death toll of the Sook Ching Massacre at 25,000. That figure represents approximately 3.14% of the total population of 795,000 at the time. Higher estimates of 40,000 dead would put that figure at approximately 5.03%.
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Post 2 of 3:
5. Defeat was probably unavoidable for the British Empire in Malaya after the fall of France in 1940, certainly after the attack on Pearl Harbor. But disaster, the rapid and humiliating collapse of the defence on the mainland in Jan and Feb 1942, need not have happened.
8. IMHO, it is nonsensical in international relations to think in terms of only offensive or only defensive warfare.
9. If war is a continuation of politics by other means, then surely, a decision of an offensive action or a defensive action, are but mere tactics that we can adopt at the same time using different brigades or divisions. Manoeuvre warfare as a school of thought, is well established since World War II and it is pointless for a Singaporean to think only of defence.
10. One important reason why Singapore fell to Japan in 1942 was the failure of the defenders; especially Malaya Command, to manage the inherent problems of fighting as a coalition in WWII. The frustration and pressure of retreat and defeat naturally magnified those problems. Interoperability in all respects, including moral and psychological, spells the difference between victory and defeat in coalition operations. That is why, the SAF must learn to work effectively with foreign partners.
(b) In step 2, the Japanese military authorities, used the Oversea Chinese Association (昭南岛华侨协会) to extort $50 million from the Chinese community in Singapore. Only $28 million could be found in 1942 and the businessmen were forced to borrow the remainder. The document of extortion was signed by 11 Singaporean businessmen. The first signature is that of Lim Boon Keng.
(c) In 1937, Japan started the brutal invasion of the Chinese mainland; and many ethnically Chinese Singaporeans contributed financially to resistance forces in China, trying to stop the Japanese. As such, even before Japan invaded the island, the Chinese in Singapore were viewed to be anti-Japanese and with suspicion.
(d) If you allow invasion instead of resisting at a distance, what is to stop the invaders to use Kempeitai tactics, against your insurgents USA scenario? The 1942 murders over a period of 14 days was under the command of a single Japanese LTC, work. The IJA was not just brutal, they were clinically brutal and in a systematic fashion.
(e) Total Defence Day is commemorated in Singapore on 15 Feb each year – the anniversary of the surrender of the British to the Japanese on 15 Feb 1942. We have a saying here: “you do not own what you cannot defend.”
4. Agreed. History tells us that a de-centralized state of constant resistance is not hard to deal with. You don’t need a lot of manpower to control a population of 795,000 (Singapore’s population in 1942). About a battalion of occupying troops, with paid informers from the locals, an ideology (i.e. the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere) and willingness to really terrorise the local population— see: New Syonan and Asianism in Japanese-era Singapore.
5. Defeat was probably unavoidable for the British Empire in Malaya after the fall of France in 1940, certainly after the attack on Pearl Harbor. But disaster, the rapid and humiliating collapse of the defence on the mainland in Jan and Feb 1942, need not have happened.
6. Agreed. Especially if, like the IJA, you have an evil plan, to murder 40,000 men, as step 1 for control of the many. In fact, step 2 paid for the costs of the invasion. The IJA’s brutality, tactical brilliance and strategic folly bears repeating here.
7. Any personnel augmentation system at a local level that you may suggest, cannot match the scale, scope and systems of a National system that I will describe below. To maintain unit cohesion, typically, the SAF takes 9 months to turn an infantry battalion operational and ready to be used in contingencies, under an active brigade HQ (that is the core of the SAF’s cadre system with more full time professionals in the Bde HQ and their specialist units)— provided that the infantry battalion, at the level below, pass their battalion proficiency test (at the end of 9 months, in a 2 sided exercise to test their capability).
(a) The conscripts in our system typically serve 22 months full time before they (as a NSF entire unit) get transferred as a cohort into our reserve management system — as a conscript army.
(b) Annual currency training for NSmen in the reserves is up to 40 days (but typically for less than 21 days) per year. More importantly, our NSmen are kept together in the same unit, for their 10 year reserve cycle.
(c) The 300,000 strong SAF, is so large that, if fully mobilised, we don’t have enough equipment or vessels — which means civil resource mobilisation and ships taken from trade in our war plans. The air force, except for air defence units, is almost all professional.
(d) Two other relevant observations from Clausewitz: “The defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offense” and “to defeat ‘the stronger form of warfare’ an army’s best weapon is superior numbers” (McRaven, 1995, p. 3). Therefore, Singapore needs numbers to remain focused on offensive action.
8. IMHO, it is nonsensical in international relations to think in terms of only offensive or only defensive warfare.
9. If war is a continuation of politics by other means, then surely, a decision of an offensive action or a defensive action, are but mere tactics that we can adopt at the same time using different brigades or divisions. Manoeuvre warfare as a school of thought, is well established since World War II and it is pointless for a Singaporean to think only of defence.
10. One important reason why Singapore fell to Japan in 1942 was the failure of the defenders; especially Malaya Command, to manage the inherent problems of fighting as a coalition in WWII. The frustration and pressure of retreat and defeat naturally magnified those problems. Interoperability in all respects, including moral and psychological, spells the difference between victory and defeat in coalition operations. That is why, the SAF must learn to work effectively with foreign partners.
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Post 3 of 3
11. The Singapore Army has 3 divisions, namely, 3rd, 6th and 9th Divisions for forward defence — with an efficient mobilisation system, that enables the activation of forces to One-Stop Mobilisation and Equipping Centres (MECs). These MECs will deploy full armed and equipped infantry brigades within hours. In 2018, the SAF demonstrated this capability by calling on 8,000 NSmen and troops from the 9th Division and its assigned units (e.g. 3 SIR, 790 SIR) to validate the Singapore Army's readiness to respond to a full spectrum of operations, including homeland security.
12. To speed deployment of 3rd, 6th or 9th Division upon activation, ammunition is delivered by the SAF Ammunition Command to the One-Stop MECs.
13. Australia and Singapore have close defence ties. On 23 Mar 2020, both countries signed a Treaty on Military Training and Training Area Development in Australia.The Treaty facilitates the SAFs’ enhanced military training access in Australia, and the joint development of military training areas and facilities in an expanded Shoalwater Bay Training Area (SWBTA) and a new Greenvale Training Area (GVTA) in Queensland, Australia. Advanced training facilities, such as the Combined Arms Air-Land Ranges and Urban Operations Live-Firing Facilities, will be built within the expanded SWBTA by 2024 and the new GVTA by 2028. Australia and NZ are likely to look favourably at any Singaporean request for the deployment of an Australian armoured brigade and a NZ infantry battalion (as part of FPDA), if requested. Such force contribution would greatly strengthen the SAF’s ability to conduct an effective defence of West Malaysia. Along with FPDA forces, Singapore’s forward deployment of a single 15,000 man a division (with the consent of Malaysia and Thailand), would enable the FPDA can fight to a stalemate any southward advancing enemy. Our scheme of manoeuvre (between 500 km to 800 km), is far away from the main Singapore Island.
14. Moving forward, in the era of great power competition, USSOCOM is not necessarily going to be in that fight because the whole idea of the strategy is to avoid a kinetic confrontation. As such, from 3 to 5 June 2019, Gen. Richard Clarke visited Singapore to reaffirm the excellent and long-standing defence relationship between Singapore and the US, and both countries' commitment to enhancing regional cooperation to address pressing security challenges, such as the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia.
15. Of course, Singapore will welcome the deployment of US Special Forces and a US Marine Expeditionary Force or the SAS and the Royal Marines (supported by F-35Bs from the Queen Elizabeth class carriers and forces from 3 Commando Brigade) to support concurrent offensive operations by our 2nd division thrown into battle. Upon first contact with enemy forces, a 2nd Singapore division will conduct a rapid-counter attack into the rear of the enemy to cut-off resupply; with both divisions serving as a hammer and anvil before the next phase of the campaign.
16. The only conceivable scenario in which the 21st century SAF will be fighting on its own is the direct defence of Singapore itself in circumstances where Singapore’s partners are unwilling, or unable, to assist its defence. The SAF operations in Cambodia, East Timor, CTF-151, Iraq and Afghanistan were part of larger multi-national efforts and we must assume this will remain the more likely scenario for a long time to come. The defence and fall of Malaya and Singapore in WWII provide a general warning in this respect.
12. To speed deployment of 3rd, 6th or 9th Division upon activation, ammunition is delivered by the SAF Ammunition Command to the One-Stop MECs.
(a) Ammunition is combat configured and pre-loaded into containers, ready to be delivered to the MECs.
(b) These innovatively designed 40-foot containers have side opening capability to allow immediate access to any pallet, and locking mechanism that removes the need for lashing belts, thus enabling quicker retrieval of pallets.
13. Australia and Singapore have close defence ties. On 23 Mar 2020, both countries signed a Treaty on Military Training and Training Area Development in Australia.The Treaty facilitates the SAFs’ enhanced military training access in Australia, and the joint development of military training areas and facilities in an expanded Shoalwater Bay Training Area (SWBTA) and a new Greenvale Training Area (GVTA) in Queensland, Australia. Advanced training facilities, such as the Combined Arms Air-Land Ranges and Urban Operations Live-Firing Facilities, will be built within the expanded SWBTA by 2024 and the new GVTA by 2028. Australia and NZ are likely to look favourably at any Singaporean request for the deployment of an Australian armoured brigade and a NZ infantry battalion (as part of FPDA), if requested. Such force contribution would greatly strengthen the SAF’s ability to conduct an effective defence of West Malaysia. Along with FPDA forces, Singapore’s forward deployment of a single 15,000 man a division (with the consent of Malaysia and Thailand), would enable the FPDA can fight to a stalemate any southward advancing enemy. Our scheme of manoeuvre (between 500 km to 800 km), is far away from the main Singapore Island.
14. Moving forward, in the era of great power competition, USSOCOM is not necessarily going to be in that fight because the whole idea of the strategy is to avoid a kinetic confrontation. As such, from 3 to 5 June 2019, Gen. Richard Clarke visited Singapore to reaffirm the excellent and long-standing defence relationship between Singapore and the US, and both countries' commitment to enhancing regional cooperation to address pressing security challenges, such as the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia.
(a) At SOFIC 2020, Gen. Clarke, Commander USSOCOM said: “Going after violent extremist organizations (VEOs) is not mutually exclusive to competing with great powers.” The capabilities required of Special Operations Forces fighting violent extremists in places like Asia and the Pacific serve a dual purpose.
(b) “By being there, we are also countering great nation states,” Gen. Clarke said to the National Defense Industry Association’s virtual SOFIC 2020. This dual role has implications for the defense industry, Gen. Clarke said. “No longer can we just build counter-VEO capabilities that serve a single purpose. As we look at the precision, lethality and mobility requirements as examples, we absolutely have to develop them so they can compete and win with Russia and China, but they could also work in a counter VEO fight,” he added.
(c) USSOCOM’s top priority is next generation intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability, Gen. Clarke said. That means sustainable ISR technology that “can provide the capability in both Great Power Competition and working for our SOF teams in remote, austere, short take-off-and land battlefields,” he said. Another priority is next-generation mobility and next-generation effects like the Hyper-Enabled Operator concept. The command is looking to equip the Hyper-Enabled Operator with a collection of useable data from lightweight, body mounted computers, cameras and other sensors to better navigate the future battlespace, which Clarke said would be increasingly “complex, dynamic and lethal.”
15. Of course, Singapore will welcome the deployment of US Special Forces and a US Marine Expeditionary Force or the SAS and the Royal Marines (supported by F-35Bs from the Queen Elizabeth class carriers and forces from 3 Commando Brigade) to support concurrent offensive operations by our 2nd division thrown into battle. Upon first contact with enemy forces, a 2nd Singapore division will conduct a rapid-counter attack into the rear of the enemy to cut-off resupply; with both divisions serving as a hammer and anvil before the next phase of the campaign.
(a) In geographic terms, the defence of Malaysia-Singapore is indivisible in any conventional war scenario. The backbone for operations in any in any conventional war scenario for the defence of Malaysia and Singapore will be provided by AirPower from the RAAF, the RAF and the RSAF. The key to understanding Singapore’s war plans is that coalition force contributors fight under the command of the relevant SAF division they are deployed with.
(b) Beyond the examples cited above, it may be of interest to you that I live in Singapore and in terms of asymmetry, via the measurement of land size, Singapore is the smallest country in ASEAN. But in terms of air power, it is second to none within ASEAN. If a US or a PLA general was asked to defend Singapore, within Singapore, the hypothetical general may tell you that such a plan is foolish or that it cannot be done effectively. Hence the need to take the fight outside of Singapore, as a defender confined to only within Singapore is at a tactical disadvantage.
16. The only conceivable scenario in which the 21st century SAF will be fighting on its own is the direct defence of Singapore itself in circumstances where Singapore’s partners are unwilling, or unable, to assist its defence. The SAF operations in Cambodia, East Timor, CTF-151, Iraq and Afghanistan were part of larger multi-national efforts and we must assume this will remain the more likely scenario for a long time to come. The defence and fall of Malaya and Singapore in WWII provide a general warning in this respect.
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