Yep
run the build out of both yards in the short term
18 to 20 vessels is a big program !!!!!!!!!
Regards S
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run the build out of both yards in the short term
18 to 20 vessels is a big program !!!!!!!!!
Regards S
Takao
The Bunker Group
None of this makes sense.
One - the OPV has a mission and a design. Up-gunning it will cost money, time and capability. Changing it now will also delay its time into service. The Arafura's are needed now before the Armidale's run out of life.
Two - there has been considerable investigation into the MCM capability, starting with an increase priority/focus on it. An enormous amount of work has gone into ensuring that the balance between Arafura and MCM is met to ensure the best combination of compatibility and capability. Any other design will (a) reduce this, costing money and capability in the long run and (b) be delayed. Of all our fleets, the MCM is probably #1 or #2 that cannot be delayed.
Three - we need better MCM x years ago. Delaying them is unacceptable to the Army and the Navy...
Four - any new design, MCM or not, isn't going to be designed and accepted in a time period less than any Hunter delay. In a peacetime setting, two years to introduce into service a new platform? With all the training, sustainment and engineering approvals?
Five - building a CV or LHD in that time?...
Six - where is the money coming from? Every idea on this page costs hundreds of millions of dollars. What are we cutting? We just did a FSP - I can assure you there isn't bucketloads of $$ just hanging around not allocated.
Seven - where is the workforce coming from? I can tell you right now there are kids just in school who haven't given any thought to the Navy that will join in 2032; and their jobs are already allocated. Like $$, there isn't just a bunch of white uniforms sitting around doing nothing (well...**) and it's unlikely there are additional people in civvy street that can be recruited.
Assuming the Hunter's are actually delayed (and this isn't another misreading or made up fact), beyond these immediate issues, these are all a kit solution to something that is not a kit problem. A better question lies in asking why they are delayed. How is it that decades after Anzac and Collins started, despite all the claimed positives of a continuous shipbuilding program, despite all the money, we still can't design and build a ship on time? As someone who has strongly argued for domestic industry across Army, Navy and the Joint world, it's damn hard to make the arguments when mickey mouse shit keeps happening. There is obviously an issue somewhere, and judging by its persistence it's a cultural issue. Which will be hard to fix. But I'd rather spend the $$ and time on fixing that then a random, short-term kit fix
One - the OPV has a mission and a design. Up-gunning it will cost money, time and capability. Changing it now will also delay its time into service. The Arafura's are needed now before the Armidale's run out of life.
Two - there has been considerable investigation into the MCM capability, starting with an increase priority/focus on it. An enormous amount of work has gone into ensuring that the balance between Arafura and MCM is met to ensure the best combination of compatibility and capability. Any other design will (a) reduce this, costing money and capability in the long run and (b) be delayed. Of all our fleets, the MCM is probably #1 or #2 that cannot be delayed.
Three - we need better MCM x years ago. Delaying them is unacceptable to the Army and the Navy...
Four - any new design, MCM or not, isn't going to be designed and accepted in a time period less than any Hunter delay. In a peacetime setting, two years to introduce into service a new platform? With all the training, sustainment and engineering approvals?
Five - building a CV or LHD in that time?...
Six - where is the money coming from? Every idea on this page costs hundreds of millions of dollars. What are we cutting? We just did a FSP - I can assure you there isn't bucketloads of $$ just hanging around not allocated.
Seven - where is the workforce coming from? I can tell you right now there are kids just in school who haven't given any thought to the Navy that will join in 2032; and their jobs are already allocated. Like $$, there isn't just a bunch of white uniforms sitting around doing nothing (well...**) and it's unlikely there are additional people in civvy street that can be recruited.
Assuming the Hunter's are actually delayed (and this isn't another misreading or made up fact), beyond these immediate issues, these are all a kit solution to something that is not a kit problem. A better question lies in asking why they are delayed. How is it that decades after Anzac and Collins started, despite all the claimed positives of a continuous shipbuilding program, despite all the money, we still can't design and build a ship on time? As someone who has strongly argued for domestic industry across Army, Navy and the Joint world, it's damn hard to make the arguments when mickey mouse shit keeps happening. There is obviously an issue somewhere, and judging by its persistence it's a cultural issue. Which will be hard to fix. But I'd rather spend the $$ and time on fixing that then a random, short-term kit fix
Don't think any of the above is relevant to my comments, which in essence, only suggested bringing forward already planned capabilities to keep an existing workforce in place if Hunter work is delayed. Of course that last part is key....
Thanks Takao
One - Run the 12 x Arafura Class OPV's as is with no alterations, including "up gunning ."
Two - Didn't mention MCM because it is already in hand as a capability and priority.
As stated on the Navy website " The OPV design will support specialist mission packages, such as a maritime tactical unmanned aerial system, and into the future, rapid environmental assessment and deployable mine counter measure capabilities. "
The expense will be in the modular systems the OPV,s will carry. This is in other projects and are already budgeted for into the future.
Another variable is the unknown of the Strategic review announcement that up to eight additional vessels ( Potentially based on the Arafura Class ) will be acquired. This is the mystery bit............ will they be exactly the same, or be of a different design, or in fact maybe the same design but with fixed integrated MCM systems? Wait and see?
This is the part of the opportunity of having two classes of vessel and how we balance that mix.
Three - Agree, we have had a six vessel fleet for many decades from the current Huon class back to the older Ton class although not all ships have been in service for the life of the vessel.
With four active today and the governments announcement this force is to be "", then this clearly suggests the importance of this realm both today and into the future. I am an advocate for a increased MCM capability.
Four. - MCM is a developing art globally . Sailing the vessel into the danger zone is currently not the approach. Some unknowns here as both vessels and the systems they carry evolve. Suggest some existing MCM remote systems are acquired in greater numbers now and we monitor what works for us and build upon and acquire newer systems accordingly.
Five - The need for two Amphibious / Supply ships is already stated and will be budgeted for both for the vessels and those that crew them.
The LHD is still the fantasy stuff because it wasn't ordered originally, even though some in the Navy asked for it back in the day of original purchase .
I think it was the defence Minister who stated they" were out of control" or something to that affect.
With the two LHD's currently in service providing such amazingly good service over such a broad rage of activities its hard to think of another capability across the ADF that provides better service to defence and government.
As to time table ,Navantia Spain could easily build all three within the decade. Our two Supply Class ships will have been laid down and delivered within some six years...........Don't see a problem.
Six - Spend more or make difficult choices. If its the later, we will get much more national benefit from an additional LHD with crew and flying things than a couple of Attack Class Submarines.
Yes I understand all the consequences of that statement both for the platform and consequences to the production program.
And yes buying complicated defence kit is not like going to the shop and choosing one item over the other but the submarine program is where I'd rob Peter to pay Paul.
Seven - the ADF has to be a competitive and smart employer both now and into the future. Stating the obvious maybe!
Suggest a look at smaller high tech nations like Singapore maybe the way forward. This needs to happen across all of defence. I can see the increasing use of automation being key to answer much of the challenges. While not a substitute for all roles it will mirror the civilian work place where cost and efficiencies will constantly be sort..........there will always be a place for boots on the ground but Navy in particular with it's many technical systems is well place to take advantage in this area to enable vessels to operate with less crew.........................It will be a balance of many trade offs in ship numbers / efficiency / and out comes, but trust never in crew safety.
Ideally the 12 Arafuras will provide their existing job set including MCM with the six to eight additional MCM ships being of a larger class re directed in purpose with the kit I proposed to have an emphasis on ASW.
Keep building the remaining 10 in WA and a couple of additional OPVs in SA depending on the Hunter Class build schedule.
Keep both classes with like machinery and systems. Commonality is import for both cost, maintenance and training. Two sized vessels being constructed in an overlapping build. When design work is complete on the ASW OPV then some of these could be slotted in earlier within the existing build schedule......................After all they can still perform the constabulary stuff that is mooted to be needed now but be a higher end asset ready to support the majors in the late 2020's which is really what this conversation is about.
It's really just about adding some modest extra capability to only some of the ships we are already going to build.
This is not big dollars yet delivers a great out come for money spent.
The extra LHD however would be the icing on the cake.
Cheers
Regards S
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A key part of the plan is to build these larger support ships in Australia. They may have been budgeted for but that was for future years, not now. Bringing forward such projects to have the jobs go overseas won't do anything for us. The entire issue if such an issue actually exists is a possible work gap between the OPV's and Hunters. Building ships in Spain, acquiring corvettes etc won't fix anything. The one and only solution that can be quickly implemented is building an extra 2-3 OPV's while waiting on the hunters. They can either come from existing orders, be add one if budget and manpower allow or simply interim vessels before sold/gifted to border force, or any one of our neighbours that have the capability to use and maintain them. That is the only ship that can fill the gap if it exists, anything else is fantasy.
We had a ship building plan from the late eighties / early nineties that was cut back by Keating and killed by Howard. It was a plan supposedly paid for by not replacing Melbourne, freeing up cash to build greater numbers of more capable surface combatants. The thinking was helicopters on everything, point or area defence missiles on everything, and harpoon on everything.
The following is what I believe to have been the pathway to where we ended up.
Initially two US built FFGs were ordered as replacements for the Daring Class DDs, instead of locally built DDLs. They were recognised as less capable and effective than the DDGs they were supplementing and, not meeting the RANs requirements and inferior to other options examined. The numbers were increased by another two US built ships to replace the first two DEs as well, and then as I understand it once the carrier capability was canned, it was planned to build another six FFGs locally to replace the remaining DEs and increase surface combatant numbers over all.
Along the way there were defence reviews and rationalisation and privatisation of the industry and the submarine replacement program starting, with two additional FFGs being ordered built at Williamstown under the Australian Frigate Program. This was primarily to kick off local shipbuilding after a long hiatus with the Dutch M Class being considered as well before the in service FFGs won out.
The ANZAC project followed this, with the MEKO 200 winning out over the M Class (which had a lot of supporters in the RAN) and a cut down and bob tied Type 23. I have heard a rumour that the RAN did try to secure six full blown ASW configured Type 23s instead of eight ANZAC patrol frigates with their "for but not with" configuration, which would have been interesting as they could have made use of the FAA legacy Sea Kings.
Around this time a strategic analysis determined that in times of conflict the RAN would need to control various regional choke points to protect trade and prevent access by hostile forces. This required an increase in numbers overall, a substantial increase in capability for the eventual patrol boat replacement, i.e. a NATO Sea Sparrow / ESSM and Harpoon armed, missile armed helicopter equipped, corvette (the origin of the failed Super Sea Sprite acquisition)
As I understand it the initial assumptions and numbers recognised the extra capability of the DDGs over the FFGs and saw their replacement as separate to the eventual FFG replacement. This led to suggestions of a US or licence build of Flight IIA Arliegh Burke's to replace the DDGs and a stretched ANZAC or German Type 123 frigate to replace the first four FFGs.
Somewhere along the line three new DDGs, four FFG replacements and two FFG MLUs, became variously three new DDGs and six FFG MLUs (known as FFGUP), or no new DDGs, but six new FFGs and two FFGUP, and finally six FFGUP, the DDG replacement deferred, or rolled into the eventual FFG replacement, and the corvette brought forward to follow straight on from the ANZAC.
The final iteration saw corvette cancelled and pb's life extended, the FFGUP cut from six to four FFGs, a failed attempt to fit AEGIS and SM-2 to the already built and building ANZACs (ANZAC WIP). AWD kicked off as a DDG replacement, planned to be in service before the upgraded FFGs were due to retire, which would then be replaced by a new build type, which in turn would be followed by and ANZAC replacement.
Instead the un-upgraded FFGs were retired without replacement, the ANZACs received ASMD upgrade, and the AWD became a program to replace the four FFGUPs. PBs were replaced by glorified aluminium dingies with tentative plans to replace the eight ANZACS with six new frigates.
Considering the amount of time and money wasted stopping and starting ship building, kicking off projects, reducing and cancelling projects, moving builds around the country based of the political influence of local members etc. we haven't done too bad, especially when you factor in the LHDs. When people start talking about chopping and changing things I get very worried, especially as there are already impacts on the OPV project from a certain WA shipbuilder using political influence to gain access to the project they were quite deliberately, with good reason, locked out of.
The following is what I believe to have been the pathway to where we ended up.
Initially two US built FFGs were ordered as replacements for the Daring Class DDs, instead of locally built DDLs. They were recognised as less capable and effective than the DDGs they were supplementing and, not meeting the RANs requirements and inferior to other options examined. The numbers were increased by another two US built ships to replace the first two DEs as well, and then as I understand it once the carrier capability was canned, it was planned to build another six FFGs locally to replace the remaining DEs and increase surface combatant numbers over all.
Along the way there were defence reviews and rationalisation and privatisation of the industry and the submarine replacement program starting, with two additional FFGs being ordered built at Williamstown under the Australian Frigate Program. This was primarily to kick off local shipbuilding after a long hiatus with the Dutch M Class being considered as well before the in service FFGs won out.
The ANZAC project followed this, with the MEKO 200 winning out over the M Class (which had a lot of supporters in the RAN) and a cut down and bob tied Type 23. I have heard a rumour that the RAN did try to secure six full blown ASW configured Type 23s instead of eight ANZAC patrol frigates with their "for but not with" configuration, which would have been interesting as they could have made use of the FAA legacy Sea Kings.
Around this time a strategic analysis determined that in times of conflict the RAN would need to control various regional choke points to protect trade and prevent access by hostile forces. This required an increase in numbers overall, a substantial increase in capability for the eventual patrol boat replacement, i.e. a NATO Sea Sparrow / ESSM and Harpoon armed, missile armed helicopter equipped, corvette (the origin of the failed Super Sea Sprite acquisition)
As I understand it the initial assumptions and numbers recognised the extra capability of the DDGs over the FFGs and saw their replacement as separate to the eventual FFG replacement. This led to suggestions of a US or licence build of Flight IIA Arliegh Burke's to replace the DDGs and a stretched ANZAC or German Type 123 frigate to replace the first four FFGs.
Somewhere along the line three new DDGs, four FFG replacements and two FFG MLUs, became variously three new DDGs and six FFG MLUs (known as FFGUP), or no new DDGs, but six new FFGs and two FFGUP, and finally six FFGUP, the DDG replacement deferred, or rolled into the eventual FFG replacement, and the corvette brought forward to follow straight on from the ANZAC.
The final iteration saw corvette cancelled and pb's life extended, the FFGUP cut from six to four FFGs, a failed attempt to fit AEGIS and SM-2 to the already built and building ANZACs (ANZAC WIP). AWD kicked off as a DDG replacement, planned to be in service before the upgraded FFGs were due to retire, which would then be replaced by a new build type, which in turn would be followed by and ANZAC replacement.
Instead the un-upgraded FFGs were retired without replacement, the ANZACs received ASMD upgrade, and the AWD became a program to replace the four FFGUPs. PBs were replaced by glorified aluminium dingies with tentative plans to replace the eight ANZACS with six new frigates.
Considering the amount of time and money wasted stopping and starting ship building, kicking off projects, reducing and cancelling projects, moving builds around the country based of the political influence of local members etc. we haven't done too bad, especially when you factor in the LHDs. When people start talking about chopping and changing things I get very worried, especially as there are already impacts on the OPV project from a certain WA shipbuilder using political influence to gain access to the project they were quite deliberately, with good reason, locked out of.
Nice summation Volk, and agree, looking at the current path we have not done too bad at all, could have been better, but hindsight is a wonderful thing !
Do you think had we gone the T23 path, would it have been with the UK weapons and systems or do you think we would have changed to the US systems and weapons of the day ?
Was not aware there was an attempt to fit Aegis and SM-2 to the ANZAC's ? will have to see what I can find on that, do you have any reading on that at all ?
And agree, we have ended up in not too bad a position, could have been better with hindsight, but never the less, we are where we are ! Still have some faith in the general direction and intention of the ship building program and the bigger picture over time.
And fully agree that certain WA shipbuilders need to stick to making Aluminium fishing boats !!
Cheers
WIP (Warfighting Improvement Program) was a proposal in the mid 90s to add a phased array radar (never actually decided to be SPY-1) and a second Mk 41 where the space and weight had theoretically been reserved, alongside the present one. It would have been the same length (tactical) as that already fitted so wouldn’t have handled SM-2 but would have provided a better magazine capacity, 16 Sea Sparrow, in the days before ESSM appeared. There were also a number of other contemplated enhancements. It was abandoned because, quite simply, it wasn’t achievable on a hull of that size and ESSM appeared - and a suggestion of a hull plug was never seriously considered.
The first real proposal for a DDG-2 replacement in the late 90s was to acquire the Kidds second hand but that was knocked back in the context of the then financial, political and strategic environment, and in the aftermath of the perception of the LPAs in their then state.
The first real proposal for a DDG-2 replacement in the late 90s was to acquire the Kidds second hand but that was knocked back in the context of the then financial, political and strategic environment, and in the aftermath of the perception of the LPAs in their then state.
Thanks for that.
Wasn't SPY-1F in consideration for WIP?
I recall one of the reasons the Kidd's were canned was two FFGs would have to be dropped from FFGUP and retired to free up the required manning. This was said to be unacceptable as a minimum of six air defence ships was required to meet RAN operational obligations. Considering program was cut to four FFGs and they were replaced by only three DDGs the concern for quantity over quality does seem quite ironic.
Wasn't SPY-1F in consideration for WIP?
I recall one of the reasons the Kidd's were canned was two FFGs would have to be dropped from FFGUP and retired to free up the required manning. This was said to be unacceptable as a minimum of six air defence ships was required to meet RAN operational obligations. Considering program was cut to four FFGs and they were replaced by only three DDGs the concern for quantity over quality does seem quite ironic.
The numbers need to match the need that results from your strategy.
Personally I think we could reduce the Hunter buy to 6, with a target fleet of 3 Hobarts and 6 Hunters.
But my strategy may well be different to yours.
Regards,
Massive
This is always the key - something needs to be cut or the budget needs to be increased.
You can argue for an increase in budget giving the rate in which the strategic environment is changing. However, I wonder if we have the capability to deploy that budget given the enormous amount of activity that is already planned for the next decade.
Regards,
Massive
Good to see Junior Warfare Officers getting a taste of wind and salt spray the old fashion way.
Sail Training Ship Endeavour has been unable to continue her youth programmes during the COVID crisis and has been re-employed to introduce new officers to the sea.
im sure they will gain a better appreciation of the wind and waves by spending a few weeks here rather than standing 15metres above the surface on HMAS Choules.
Young Endeavour supports Navy training - APDR
Sail Training Ship Endeavour has been unable to continue her youth programmes during the COVID crisis and has been re-employed to introduce new officers to the sea.
im sure they will gain a better appreciation of the wind and waves by spending a few weeks here rather than standing 15metres above the surface on HMAS Choules.
Young Endeavour supports Navy training - APDR
Should put junior seamans branch ratings on it as well; ODs and ABs. Would give them a good background as well.
The build of eight additional Arafura sized vessels for the MCM role suggested in the Defence strategic review coupled with existing naval programs will satisfy any bridging capability if a gap appears in the Hunter Class program and provide additional employment in the Naval building sector nationally. Some prudent flexibility in construction between completing needs of SA and WA will need to be managed, but there is an abundance of work here .
Building the two new supply / Amphibious vessels overseas is not necessarily a bad thing!
There is a point where you have to draw a line in the sand and look at what you get for what you pay.
I have on previous post suggested there maybe an opportunity to combine this project with New Zealand's need for similar sized vessels. But at best you would only build four ships and stop.
Have we learnt the lessons of the need for a continuous build? Realistically we simply don't have the domestic market to build ships in the 20000K range. Our two Canberra Class are relatively new, New Zealand has just received a new supply ship and we will receive two of our own shortly. Sadly I just don't see the market for enough large ships to warrant a continuous build vessels of this size and the cost premium we will pay to have them is just not worth it.
I think the largest ship ever built in Australia was HMAS Success and that was laid down 40 years ago.
Building large ships in OZ is just not our gig so why do it?
We need to balance our domestic skills sovereignty with value for money
Navy and our ship building sector compared to most maritime nations around the world are doing very very very well.
Content with building Destroyers and smaller craft locally
Maybe we could ask the RAAF how many of their planes are of local build.
Ask Army how many more SPG's, Land 400 Phase 2 and 3 vehicles they could of had if they'd sourced them form over seas.
Part of my proposal of getting three vessels form OS and having a more robust OPV was the concern I have regarding time.
The "fantasy" I see is our fleet as is satisfying our maritime defence needs at the end of this decade.
Time and value for money must play apart in defence acquisitions.
Defence is not just about creating domestic employment.
Regards S
Ha! There are plenty of industry lobbyists and MPs in the big building in Canberra you'd have to explain and get them to accept as fast first.
I agree that we shouldn't be constantly talking about and pursuing large ship builds, but it's too easy a political football for MPs to kick around that it probably won't disappear from the national conversation anytime soon.
I will bite... on what basis do you think a 9 ship MFU combat set will work? It may be your view and you may have a justification .... so can you please provide it!
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Agree, just like the Berlin class AORs being built in Canada are not value for money. Perhaps with two more and a commitment to build a couple of JC class amphibious ships, domestic large vessel construction could be justified even if the costs were somewhat higher than foreign builds. “Somewhat higher” and Berlin class JSS built in Canada in the same sentence is an oxymoron. The Australian decision for building subs domestically is already a major addition to domestic ship building.
Large ships need large yards, which we don't have for building large ships. But most large ships (AOR etc) are mostly empty space and voids, so they amount of actual labor in steel fabrication is quite low. Compared to something like a submarine, which has huge amount of labor in welding, shaping, inspecting etc. Submarines are space shuttles, AOR's are shipping containers.
Destroyers have lot of compartments, compared to a OPV which tends to have less compartmentalization and bulkheads etc. OPV are so quick to fabricated because they are a lot simpler ship. Osborne is designed to build large complicated ships. OPV just aren't meaty enough.
If we are really keen to get a LHD, we could do as we did before. Get Spain to fab up the hull, fitout and island in Australia. BAE did it last time, they would just be doing it as Osborne. Probably ~60%+ of the money on labor would be spent here. The LHD's are certainly getting a work out, I think they have now spent more time at sea than just about anything the RAN currently operates, as flag for every indo-pacific mission we have conducted so far, and every major operation (rimpac and talisman). We can't afford even a minor issue with these ships, they are ADF center pieces.
Most of the LHD crew would come from de-crewing Choules to RFA levels or selling her, by the time another LHD is operational, she will be over 20 years old. Not tired, but also, not a spring chicken, will only be another few years before a big mid life refit. She would be the sort of ships that would find another home quickly, either in SEA or in South America. Crewed to 40-50, we could easily keep her operational until someone was interested.
I don't think cutting surface combatant fleet numbers is helpful. 12-14 is what we need and what we have always had. Cutting sub numbers threatens to derail the entire build program.
At this stage I just think we should be spitting our ships as fast as we can build them, even if they are going straight into reserve or low rotation use. Clearly things are not going well globally. China is getting worse. The US's problems are worse, the USN is openly having issues, the pandemic and economic issues it has created has further de-stabilised the situation.
Destroyers have lot of compartments, compared to a OPV which tends to have less compartmentalization and bulkheads etc. OPV are so quick to fabricated because they are a lot simpler ship. Osborne is designed to build large complicated ships. OPV just aren't meaty enough.
If we are really keen to get a LHD, we could do as we did before. Get Spain to fab up the hull, fitout and island in Australia. BAE did it last time, they would just be doing it as Osborne. Probably ~60%+ of the money on labor would be spent here. The LHD's are certainly getting a work out, I think they have now spent more time at sea than just about anything the RAN currently operates, as flag for every indo-pacific mission we have conducted so far, and every major operation (rimpac and talisman). We can't afford even a minor issue with these ships, they are ADF center pieces.
Most of the LHD crew would come from de-crewing Choules to RFA levels or selling her, by the time another LHD is operational, she will be over 20 years old. Not tired, but also, not a spring chicken, will only be another few years before a big mid life refit. She would be the sort of ships that would find another home quickly, either in SEA or in South America. Crewed to 40-50, we could easily keep her operational until someone was interested.
I don't think cutting surface combatant fleet numbers is helpful. 12-14 is what we need and what we have always had. Cutting sub numbers threatens to derail the entire build program.
At this stage I just think we should be spitting our ships as fast as we can build them, even if they are going straight into reserve or low rotation use. Clearly things are not going well globally. China is getting worse. The US's problems are worse, the USN is openly having issues, the pandemic and economic issues it has created has further de-stabilised the situation.
Hi Alexsa,
Thank you for you reply. I am happy to. I would add that I haven't seen a clear argument as to why the correct number is 12 - I would love to see this.
My argument for 9 is essentially one of prioritisation - there are other places I would rather see funds spent - and not necessarily on the RAN,
Please note that my strategic emphasis is on DOA - protecting against a very low probability, very high potential impact outcome.
My belief that the RAN destroyers and Frigates will typically be used in the following scenarios:
1. Supporting a Australian-led peace making/keeping mission in the South Pacific - acting as escorts for Australian amphibs and supply vessels and providing localised sea control in a relatively permissive environment
2. Contributing to an international coalition by providing an escort group - in an environment right up to intense conflict
I think this can be achieved with
While accepting that there are a whole range of other activities MFUs engage in, I am prepared to accept a smaller number of MFUs to trade off for other assets, focusing more on land power and, to a lesser extent, air power.
Indicatively, my target RAN would be something like:
12 Submarines
3 AWD
6 FFG (ASW)
3 AOR
3 Large amphibs (Mil spec) (as per current plan)
4 LST (~1500-2000t) (Mil spec)
20 Multi-role patrol/Min warfare ships (~1500-2000t) (Mil spec fitted for but not with self-defense suite)
5 Sealift ships (20-25,000t) (Civ spec - potentially leased)
Not that different from the current plan IMHO, but with significant resource savings.
Always interested in peoples thoughts and happy to be convinced otherwise.
Regards,
Massive
@Massive How do you define Defence of Australia?
- Is it just the physical aspect of the island continent of Australia?
- If so where is the defined limit of the continent?
- The Mean Water Level?
- The 12 nm limit?
- The EEZ, or
- The edge of the continental crust?
- What about the airspace above the continent. How high up do you declare sovereign Australian airspace?
- What about essential supplies that you have to import. How are they protected outside of the DOA area?
- How are you going to pay for all of this if your exports are in danger once they leave the DOA area and no ADF assets to protect them?
- Status