It's more complex than that. By Philippine law the TWG can not preselect an equipment by brand name or model number. It can specify minimum requirements and often this pretty much narrows down the field to a couple or even a single manufacturer, but in this particular case the list was selected from the bidder's offer.
So there was a specified budget (18 billion peso) and a specific set a requirement and a tender process. One of the bidder offered a package with those included at a price within the budget and they won the bid. Once they won the bid they changed the list, replacing it with cheaper equipment.
Several Philippine officers in charge of the bidding process refused to accept the change. They were overridden by their higher ups. A vice-admiral was forced to retire when he refused to comply. The changes then were signed off and now that's what the Philippine Navy got.
Look up Philippine news mentioning the frigate circa 2016-2018 for more details. You can find
a summary at Wikipedia but the usual disclaimer on Wiki stuff applies.
So in this one case the TWG (or at least it's pre-2017 incarnation) indeed did their best. The budget's ceiling was well published. The bidder, by participating, indicated their ability to meet the budget. The package they offered was indeed good. That the package was later changed, with the complicit acceptance of higher ranking officers and politicians, is indeed not their fault.
This does not change the fact that the whole thing is FUBAR, but there are people who did try their best but was stymied by their superiors both military and civilian.
1. Totally agree with your comprehensive reply — really appreciate your effort to be fair and balanced to the Koreans and Pinoys. Thanks to the man made islands in the South China Sea, the PLA(N)’s KQ-200 MPAs are able to refuel and operate for extended periods there to track the numerous American, Malaysian (2), and Vietnamese (6) submarines.
Dare I even ask this, but given HHI's track record for giving bribes, shouldn't it be asked what the motivation was for those superiors to accept the changed equipment package?
2. Given that the toothless Gregorio del Pillar Class OPVs have yet to install the AN/SPS-77 Sea Giraffe AMB 3D radar (given by the US), and the poor sensor and weapons fit of the Jose Rizal-class, it is safe to say the Pinoys are not serious or effective in upgrading their navy’s capabilities. That is why in any Philippine military procurement attempt there are local politicians whose interest it is to get a cut or else they will stop the deal.
(i) The Philippines has fallen 14 places in a year in Transparency International's 2020 corruption perceptions index, which was published in Jan 2020. A place Duterte was elected to clean up in 2016 now ranks 113th, on par with Kazakhstan and Zambia.
(ii) The Philippines has fallen 18 rungs in total on Duterte's watch. Many worry Duterte is merely empowering a new business elite -- his own, known as "
Dutertegarchs" -- and worsening the extreme concentration of wealth and power among a handful of landowning families.
3. In 2014, HHI Chairman Lee Jai-seong and some 150 executives from affiliates of the world's biggest shipbuilder by sales adopted a resolution not to give or take bribes. The HHI quote to win the contract was professionally done. If there is any bribes, I would be willing to bet HHI was given a choice behind the scenes — pay the corrupt Pinoys and continue the contract or lose money due to endless delays created by the Pinoys. But of course, I have no evidence of this sort.
They say the replacements are of equivalent quality and performance and everything is aboveboard and according to procedure. There is nothing to question. Move along.
4. I think this is a good way forward for HHI and it meets the Duterte Davos gang’s needs. The corruption levels in the Philippines is very high and they tend to blame others for their culture of corruption — in this case, I really don’t know who is telling the truth; and who is really at fault. I would chalk it up to inexperience by the Pinoys in military procurement.
(b) In this case, I don’t see HHI as causing this problem — rather I suspect they are the victim of a squeeze play by the Duterte Davos gang. Having taken away HHI’s margins, it can’t be realistic of the Pinoys to demand more changes when the Philippine Navy have even not bought or finalised the FFBNW towed sonar.
(ii) When the time comes, they have to pay for an engineering change request. It’s TWG’s fault for not specifying the type of towed sonar at the design stage.
5. I suspect if anyone is to blame it is the Pinoys but tonnyc will have better insight than me. As he said, “the whole thing is FUBAR, but there are people who did try their best but was stymied by their superiors both military and civilian.” I hope he will explain these allegations against the shipbuilder to me, as I don’t want to take blogger comments at face value.
6. Given that the Chinese Navy added 119 ships since 2005, being a US ally is not the possession of magical immunity idol — like many Pinoys seem to think.
- The defence of Korea for example is a Korean responsibility. The Prime Ministers of Australia and Japan will treat North and South with proper care and be carefully balanced in their responses to ROK. Australian and Japanese responses to Mar 2010 ROKS Cheonan sinking and Nov 2010 bombardment of Yeonpyeong in Korea, were carefully balanced.
- These incidents with a US ally demonstrated that if the stakes are high enough, no one really dares to or wants to escalate — keeping in mind that North Korea maintains nearly 6,000 artillery systems within range of major South Korean population centers, which it could use to kill many thousands in just an hour, even without resorting to chemical or nuclear weapons. Rand researchers assessed the magnitude of this threat in 2020.
- Being prepared matters. If the PLA(N) sinks a Pinoy navy boat, no war is expected as they are not prepared to respond. It is up to the Philippine Navy to develop the capability to shoot back. If they can’t do it, they will just have to back down in a confrontation. India found this out the hard way, when 20 of their soldiers well clubbed to death by the PLA at their border.
7. Washington is not taking sides in the long-standing territorial disputes. Rather, it is explicitly declaring that Beijing’s harassment of other states’ fishing and hydrocarbon development is illegal. This move is long overdue. Arcane debates over international law and the fact that the United States is not a party to the Convention on the Law of the Sea delayed unqualified and explicit backing of the 2016 ruling. Doing so now clears the path for U.S. policies to support allies and partners in their efforts to rebuff Beijing’s coercive maritime practices. The US Navy’s reassuring presence in the South China Sea not only limits the escalation options available to the PLA(N), it also limits the responses from the claimants — keeping the peace.