I wouldn't waste your time on a troll and nutter @MickB. Preceptor's swung his ban hammer on this one because of his off topic rants elsewhere on here that the Mods have had to suppress. Created a lot of work for the Mods he has.
The Situation With Iran and the Strait of Hormuz
- Thread starter Pentaprism
- Start date
Thank You
Yeah, looks like the Saudis didn't take it seriously either....
John Newman
The Bunker Group
No doubt the Saudis need to look into this seriously, very seriously, but maybe just a slight difference between a civilian land based oil facility and a naval task group out on the high seas perhaps?
I could be wrong, but I get the impression they didn't have a really robust air defence system. I think that they thought that the facilities were fairly safe from air attack. Looking at how they've prosecuted the Yemeni war so far, I get the impression that their leadership aren't exactly the strongest of military thinkers.
I would like to think, that one of the wealthiest countries on earth, equipped with some of best military hardware money can buy, in a country that borders others, and is currently at war, would detect incursions into their airspace.....
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Their performance indicates otherwise. Despite the huge investments in state of the art military kit, these clowns are failing miserably against a country that fits the label the Donald used. This shouldn't be a surprise, a bunch of second tier entitled royals running things, what could possibly go wrong?
Never worked with Arab militaries I take it?
No, but I worked with plenty in oil and gas when I was with Halliburton, and most of management was western in places like Kuwait.
I assume that the Saudis would employ plenty of ex US, UK etc " advisors" to actually use the stuff....
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
To keep the kit operational I have no doubt western commercial companies have their people in country. After all most purchases include multi-year comprehensive support. Now whether military advisors are routinely in place, don't know. Certainly the command over the kit would be one of the forementioned entitles who were likely awaiting instructions from even more entitled types. It appears from what I have read, there were no attempts at intercept. Perhaps others here can provide more info on this.
Pentaprism
Member
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #111
Are Drones and Cruise Missiles invisible to Radar? I would have expected this area of the World to have saturation Radar Coverage which would show precisely where any incoming fire originated. The US has considerable assets in the Region and the Saudis are one of the biggest Arms Buyers in the World. I am therefore startled such a Salvo made it to the middle of Saudi Territory without being tracked. If a similar salvo hit Israel or the US or Russia or China would there be any doubt where it came from?
When the Tankers were attacked in the Straits of Homuz I was pretty sure it was a false flag, just didn't make sense to me for Iran to risk War just to do minor damage to a couple of Tankers. This attack on the Saudi Refineries looks a bit extreme to be a false flag especially as the US doesn't seem to want to go to War anyway. But it is interesting that nobody was killed and all the pieces hit were able to be repaired fairly quickly. And barely believable that they aren't sure where the attack came from.
So at this point I see 3 possible scenarios;
1) The US is staging a series of false flag attacks with the end gaming being claiming they had no choice but to attack Iran and then mount a huge strike aimed at taking out all vital Irani Military Missile systems and Assets. Basically second Iraq War again minus the Ground Invasion.
2) Iran is not going to accept the Sanctions and has decided to create ongoing mischief in the Region in an attempt to force the US to lift the Sanctions. They have calculated the Saudis/US either don't have the capacity or the will to go to War with them and will prefer to negotiate rather than deal with ongoing disruptions and uncertainty
3) The Houthis actually did it. Less likely than the other options but I am not convinced it is impossible. It certainly represents a step up in their offensive capabilities from what they have achieved in the past. But they clearly have access to Iranian Weapons so what would stop the Iranians supplying them with Cruise Missiles & a fleet of High Tech Drones?
When the Tankers were attacked in the Straits of Homuz I was pretty sure it was a false flag, just didn't make sense to me for Iran to risk War just to do minor damage to a couple of Tankers. This attack on the Saudi Refineries looks a bit extreme to be a false flag especially as the US doesn't seem to want to go to War anyway. But it is interesting that nobody was killed and all the pieces hit were able to be repaired fairly quickly. And barely believable that they aren't sure where the attack came from.
So at this point I see 3 possible scenarios;
1) The US is staging a series of false flag attacks with the end gaming being claiming they had no choice but to attack Iran and then mount a huge strike aimed at taking out all vital Irani Military Missile systems and Assets. Basically second Iraq War again minus the Ground Invasion.
2) Iran is not going to accept the Sanctions and has decided to create ongoing mischief in the Region in an attempt to force the US to lift the Sanctions. They have calculated the Saudis/US either don't have the capacity or the will to go to War with them and will prefer to negotiate rather than deal with ongoing disruptions and uncertainty
3) The Houthis actually did it. Less likely than the other options but I am not convinced it is impossible. It certainly represents a step up in their offensive capabilities from what they have achieved in the past. But they clearly have access to Iranian Weapons so what would stop the Iranians supplying them with Cruise Missiles & a fleet of High Tech Drones?
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Some of this can and probably will be covered in a thread specifically about IADS, or Integrated Air Defence Systems, however there are several things which some people seem to need to have pointed out.
One of the first is that in order for something like a drone or a cruise missile to be detected by a radar system, the system needs to be on, pointed in the correct direction, and there needs to be a direct path between the two. If a drone or cruise missile is flying at a low altitude, then it can potentially cross a long distance while remaining below the radar horizon, which basically means the curvature of the earth would shield the approaching drone/missile from detection until it was either close to the intended target, or a radar system en route.
Secondly, Saudi Arabia is a large country, roughly 2.1 mil. sq. km, which means that it can be quite difficult to maintain radar coverage over the entire area, particularly given the relatively low population density and dispersal of population centres. As a result of this, I do not make the assumption that there is radar saturation coverage. There would likely be a significant amount of coverage near/around certain parts of Saudi Arabia, but I expect there are holes in that coverage as well.
Thirdly, the main strike location was in Abqaiq, which is ~50 km from the coast, which means that it is hardly in the middle of Saudi Arabia. To put some things into perspective, if a LACM was flying towards Abqaiq over the Persian Gulf at an altitude of 30 m, and there was a radar system in Abqaiq mounted 30 m above ground level, the radar system would likely not be able to detect the inbound LACM until it was within ~50 km of Abqaiq. That is also assuming that the conditions are perfect, the radar system is functioning correctly, the operators are competent, etc.
As for knowing the point of origin for the launch, unless there was some sort of ISR coverage of the launch location at the time of launch... then that it unlikely to be known. Instead we have an apparent vector, which strongly suggests that the Houthi claim is false given the location of their strongholds being in basically the opposite direction from where the strike came in from. IMO it would be far more likely that the strike was Iranian in origin, either launched directly by them, or by one of their other surrogates/proxies at their direction.
Iran has miscalculated, but such escalatory behavior is consistent with the Iranian strategy of fighting for regional hegemony and consistent with the internal logic of its regional military interventions. These actions reinforce the theocratic-military ideology of Iran’s elites. In fact, the first Iranian attack against Saudi oil pumping stations occurred on 14 May 2019, when two explosives-laden drones were launched from Jurf as-Sakar, Iraq. Iran has lost all neutrals in this attack (even in the very, very, very unlikely event that Saudi Arabia does not retaliate via military force).
Under Trump, he is not going to use the US military strike Iran but he can increase the risk to Iran for any further actions. IMHO, Iran has mis-calculated. AEGIS Destroyers and additional Patriot batteries will be deployed by the US to plug these radar gaps before Saudi counter strikes to come (see: U.S. Destroyer Arrives Off Saudi Arabia Amid Plans To Bolster The Kingdom's Air Defenses). Saudi Arabia is testing its civil defence sirens nationwide and getting reading for the action-reaction cycle once the counterstrike begins.
UAE and Saudi Arabia are buying time to prepare and improve defences (see: U.S. to deploy military forces to Saudi Arabia, UAE after drone attacks on oil sites) for future action against Iranian launch sites. Everybody is buying prep time while investigations and diplomatic moves are made. Iran needs to be smacked at the right time by Saudi Arabia (and Trump will sit back with sanctions staying the same, more or less — with Saudi Arabia having to reimburse the Americans for the costs incurred). The Americans have skin in the game by sending air defence batteries but are not the lead nation to respond to Iran’s aggression.
All 3 scenarios are wrong, at this stage. How did you manage to get it all 3 wrong? Sorry about pointing out the obvious.
Under Trump, he is not going to use the US military strike Iran but he can increase the risk to Iran for any further actions. IMHO, Iran has mis-calculated. AEGIS Destroyers and additional Patriot batteries will be deployed by the US to plug these radar gaps before Saudi counter strikes to come (see: U.S. Destroyer Arrives Off Saudi Arabia Amid Plans To Bolster The Kingdom's Air Defenses). Saudi Arabia is testing its civil defence sirens nationwide and getting reading for the action-reaction cycle once the counterstrike begins.
UAE and Saudi Arabia are buying time to prepare and improve defences (see: U.S. to deploy military forces to Saudi Arabia, UAE after drone attacks on oil sites) for future action against Iranian launch sites. Everybody is buying prep time while investigations and diplomatic moves are made. Iran needs to be smacked at the right time by Saudi Arabia (and Trump will sit back with sanctions staying the same, more or less — with Saudi Arabia having to reimburse the Americans for the costs incurred). The Americans have skin in the game by sending air defence batteries but are not the lead nation to respond to Iran’s aggression.
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Boagrius
Well-Known Member
Very well put and I think this speaks to a common misconception about GBAD systems in general. It is easy to draw a mental range ring around a given GBAD system (Patriot, S400, whatever you like) and assume that the system will be able to hit anything that ventures inside of it. The reality is that the radar horizon and surrounding terrain features can create significant gaps in coverage - especially at lower altitudes. I assume this problem formed part of the rationale behind the (now defunct?) U.S JLENS program.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
As I understand it, yes with respect to JLENS.
One of the other realities, which I suspect mobile GBAD system users do not fully realize (or at least admit to) is that their detection capabilities are particularly susceptible to the masking effects of terrain and ground clutter. A fixed site radar system can be tested and configured to provide the most possible coverage as well as mapping out where some of the radar 'blind spots' are. A mobile transceiver would most likely not be operational at a given site long enough for the crew to necessarily realize that something like a ridge line 10 kn away is either blocking their radar, or reflecting a return back to them and it would be extremely unlikely that a crew would be able to effective map out coverage dead zones.
I suspect that Saudi Arabia has a properly designed, conventional IADS but any system will have gaps and coverage issues that were exploited by Iranian intelligence to feed targeting info for the large scale attack which occurred in 2 waves giving Saudi personnel time to take cover. The numerous Houthi attacks served as a decoy to focus Saudi minds on their border with Yemen. In many ways, the Saudi system is too high end for the relatively low cost Iranian attack —which was not particularly effective given that some of their missiles mis-fired (which reduced damage) and the damage was repaired so quickly. There instances where the Iranian drones hit a target but the explosion failed to penetrate the tank. Iran’s missiles are also not reliable in this attack, as some of them misfired.
The international press have been given access to the site, which means it is not a false flag attack (or at least very, very, very unlikely to be a false flag attack).
The international press have been given access to the site, which means it is not a false flag attack (or at least very, very, very unlikely to be a false flag attack).
Singapore has its own version of JLENS, to cue the ASTER 30 missiles for its IADS. This radar system deployed in 2016 uses two tethered Aerostats due to tall buildings on Singapore’s main island and other nearby land features that are blocking the radar horizon. According to MINDEF, the aerostat will offer 24/7 radar coverage within a 200km radius. It’s deployment up in the sky enables it to detect aerial and maritime threats. Currently, land-based ground radar are obscured by high-rise buildings. Being able to hover up to 600m above ground would circumvent that constraint.
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Pentaprism
Member
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #117
Mmm well my option 2 was that Iran did it and you are also saying that Iran did it so not sure how this is wrong? But anyway thanks for your insight.
I am interested that you believe the Saudis are going to hit back and you may well be proven correct. But it would be a massive gamble on their part, despite the impressive arsenal of Military Toys they have assembled their ability to fight effectively with them is doubtful at best. And they are currently making big dollars from their Oil Exports while Iran has been virtually squeezed out of the game. Getting into a full blown War with Iran surely puts their Position at risk. For these reasons I don't see them doing much at all unless Iran escalates again.
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Yes, it is very, very, very likely that Iran did the strike on Saudi Arabia — due to its sophistication, which was clearly stated in my prior post in page 5 of this thread.
To Iran, the sanctions is economic warfare — the US does not want to fight, as Trump believes he is winning.
The 1979 Iranian revolution created a militant Shiite theocracy that advances a hostile anti-Western form of Islam. The regime's foreign policy objectives include exporting its religious-political doctrine, empowering Shiite peoples abroad, undermining Western interests in the Middle East, and establishing itself as a regional hegemon. All of this takes place along geopolitical, military, economic, and ideological lines. For instance, Iran promotes a Shiite pilgrimage to Karbala in Iraq to undermine the hajj to Mecca. Iran also arms numerous proxy Shiite militias—from the Lebanese Hezbollah, to the Yemenite Houthi rebels, to a string of Iraqi militias including Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib Hezbollah. In the despairing words of an Iraqi bureaucrat: "You don't know what imperialism is like until you have been an Iraqi Arab dealing with Persian imperialists.
Iran and Saudi Arabia are on divergent paths with Riyadh attempting reforms led by Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MBS), and Tehran doubling down on its revolutionary goals. This will require long-term US pressure for robust reforms as difficult as that may be in Saudi Arabia, and the pursuit of strategies that encourage the Iranian regime's self-destructive impulses. MBS as Crown Prince is caught between ambition and credibility — in his geo-strategic plays.
Saudi Arabia aims to deter Iran using two main methods: denying benefits or imposing costs.
How much did Saudi Arabia pay for GWI? If you were MBS, watching to Donald at work, you too would hesitate at a US$600 billion or more potential bill, as MBS will need money to institute domestic reforms.
The Koreans (see: Trump says South Korea will pay more for US military protection) and Japanese have just completed 1 cycle of the Donald shakedown — which MBS is watching. Fundamentally, it is better for NE Asia to reduce reliance on the US, a path on which Korea has started, with its focus on China (as a counter weight to Japan) but I am not sure which way Riyadh will lean towards.
Option 2 as you presented it is problematic as it conflates US and Saudi interests, which can diverge. The Americans have the capability (to hit 400 to 800 targets in 1 night, for a 2nd strike, should escalation from a 1st strike be necessary, without fear of Iran) but lack the desire. The Saudis have the desire but would need to incur risk (because I suspect Iran will not tolerate even 1 a strike at their key facility). But it is also certain Iran can’t invade Saudi Arabia.
Both US and Saudi Arabia can do a 1st strike. It’s the consequence after the 1st strike that is the problem (or what I call escalation dominance). For Saudi Arabia, they have to take risk and plan for 1st strike to 5th strike and work out their game theory on Iranian responses. US has escalation dominance but it is a problem for Saudi Arabia. If you had split option 2 into 2A or 2B, one of your choices would be correct.
To Iran, the sanctions is economic warfare — the US does not want to fight, as Trump believes he is winning.
The 1979 Iranian revolution created a militant Shiite theocracy that advances a hostile anti-Western form of Islam. The regime's foreign policy objectives include exporting its religious-political doctrine, empowering Shiite peoples abroad, undermining Western interests in the Middle East, and establishing itself as a regional hegemon. All of this takes place along geopolitical, military, economic, and ideological lines. For instance, Iran promotes a Shiite pilgrimage to Karbala in Iraq to undermine the hajj to Mecca. Iran also arms numerous proxy Shiite militias—from the Lebanese Hezbollah, to the Yemenite Houthi rebels, to a string of Iraqi militias including Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib Hezbollah. In the despairing words of an Iraqi bureaucrat: "You don't know what imperialism is like until you have been an Iraqi Arab dealing with Persian imperialists.
Iran and Saudi Arabia are on divergent paths with Riyadh attempting reforms led by Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MBS), and Tehran doubling down on its revolutionary goals. This will require long-term US pressure for robust reforms as difficult as that may be in Saudi Arabia, and the pursuit of strategies that encourage the Iranian regime's self-destructive impulses. MBS as Crown Prince is caught between ambition and credibility — in his geo-strategic plays.
Saudi Arabia aims to deter Iran using two main methods: denying benefits or imposing costs.
- One, deterrence by denial involves convincing the aggressor that it will not reach its objective, or that the perceived benefits are of little or no value — but Iran sees continued attacks as having value, as it is militant Shiite theocracy that advances a hostile anti-Western form of Islam.
- Two, deterrence by imposing costs, or punishment, is about convincing Iran that the risk of suffering large losses is high and that the cost of a counter-attack significant. The Saudi military need to do a limited strike, to preserve deterrence (but Iran has said its all or nothing). If they don’t, Iran will hit them again and again with these pin pricks.
How much did Saudi Arabia pay for GWI? If you were MBS, watching to Donald at work, you too would hesitate at a US$600 billion or more potential bill, as MBS will need money to institute domestic reforms.
The Koreans (see: Trump says South Korea will pay more for US military protection) and Japanese have just completed 1 cycle of the Donald shakedown — which MBS is watching. Fundamentally, it is better for NE Asia to reduce reliance on the US, a path on which Korea has started, with its focus on China (as a counter weight to Japan) but I am not sure which way Riyadh will lean towards.
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The Saudis may buy a significant quantity of arms and use them, but that in itself does not guarantee that the Saudis will use them wisely. From my observations of them in the Yemeni war, they have performed poorly and their high command appears to lack any strategic and tactical knowledge and forethought. Going by what others (Def Pros etc., who have worked within the region) on here and elsewhere have said, the appointments to positions within higher echelons of Saudi C2, are more about position within the royal family, rather than military knowledge and individual capability.
I do not understand your reasoning for why this would be a false flag operation, apart from possibly reading too much John Le Carre or Tom Clancy. Yes the possibility exists that it could be a false flag OP, but who would stand to gain from such an OP? And more importantly why? Such OPs can go belly up very quickly and spectacularly with the team possibly being compromised and / or being caught and made to talk. And talk they eventually will, hence a big backfire. There are better and easier ways than a false flag to achieve the same or similar results in this particular case.
It is my firm view that the tanker attacks were carried out by the Quds Force of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC), because it is the type of OP that they specialise in, and they will have been supporting the Houthis. The IRGC are also a law until themselves and only answer to the Supreme Leader of Iran.
The possibility exists that this could happen, however attacks on non US ships isn't casus belli for the US. Whilst some within the US Congress and White House may have a hankering for a war against Iran, the general population doesn't and is growing weary of war after 18 years of it.
There is no reason for Iran to accept the sanctions because the US was the one to break the agreement, so in this case the US can be classed as the aggressor and that Iran is responding only to defending itself. However, by attacking neutral tankers and detaining other tankers it has turned Europe and others against it. That was its mistake and it has unfortunately played into US hands. The ongoing sanctions have also hardened Iranian resolve and any chances of rapprochement with the US by them are very, very low because the US, by breaking the agreement and reinstating sanctions, has proved to Iran that it cannot be trusted to keep its word and to abide by any agreement or treaty. So in Iranian eyes, why should they bother wasting energy and time negotiating with a deceiver, because they have nothing to gain.
Yes the Houthis could have done the OP and have fired Iranian supplied AShM at ships before, so we know that they have knowledge and skills in this area. However, LACM and UAVs targeted with pinpoint accuracy and allegedly with flightpaths from an opposite direction, hard to say.
Don't always go looking for the most nefarious and sneaky reasons for something happening when sometimes it is the simplest explanation that is the actual reason / cause. Each of your three scenarios have the possibility to exist, however each one has to be analysed and assessed on its individual merits, resulting in probabilities for each one being the closest to actual events. Of the three I think No 2 is the closest but still with a low probability because I don't believe that the US is the main target, but Europe and the rest of the world; the US the final target with the main objective being to drive a wedge between the rest of the world and the US over the US's current intransigence about the Iranian nuclear deal.
Not really true. Computer systems can predict low altitude coverage and gaps caused by terrain, it’s no secret it’s just physics.
For example:
Free Software Shows Radar Coverage