Royal Air Force [RAF] discussions and updates
- Thread starter neil
- Start date
Yep, but it's the Aussies who are at the forefront of development and operations.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Turkey and S. Korea both ordered B737 AEW aircraft, and IIRC Australia received some royalties payments as a result, as some of the IP for either the radar or software is Australian-owned.
My recollection is RAAF were initially authorised by gov of the day to firm order 4 Wedgetail, but ordered 6 sets of the MESA radar, and optioned the 3 airframes rather than order the whole 7 they wanted.
Later they were authorised to order 2 more airframes to utilise the extra MESA radars that had bern purchased.
I assume RAAF argued to gov of day in initial purchase a saving if “bulk” order of radar allowed.
t68
Well-Known Member
I came across this on another forum I visit in regards to the AWACas replacement program, it appears SAAB is not a happy camper about a possable sole source selection of a Wedgetail. It appear they offered the MOD the classified data but was declined. Is this SOP or have they made up their mind on E7?
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/defence/SAAB-compiled-17-19.pdf
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/defence/SAAB-compiled-17-19.pdf
Interesting that they're offering to integrate it on the A330. It'd easily fit on an A320. It looks as if they're offering to fit it to A330s which would also be able to perform other roles, rather than requiring a new aircraft for each radar. I can see drawbacks to that.
Their claims about schedule & risk seem credible given their past performance, i.e. integrating the original Erieye on three different platforms from two manufacturers successfully, & the GaN Erieye-ER onto a fourth platform from a third manufacturer, again with no problems reported.
P.S. I was puzzled by SAAB saying five types, so looked it up: the first installation was on a Fairchild Metro, for development & testing. I'd not counted that.
Their claims about schedule & risk seem credible given their past performance, i.e. integrating the original Erieye on three different platforms from two manufacturers successfully, & the GaN Erieye-ER onto a fourth platform from a third manufacturer, again with no problems reported.
P.S. I was puzzled by SAAB saying five types, so looked it up: the first installation was on a Fairchild Metro, for development & testing. I'd not counted that.
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John Fedup
The Bunker Group
The A330 choice is interesting. What about the Europeans, why hasn’t SAAB been pursuing them or are they content to let the US and UK provide this capability? Had Brexit not occurred would the SAAB-A330 have received more attention?
We need something right now and both the RAF and HMG will be so risk averse it's not even funny. Not after the various failures and delays - there's a pattern developing here and truthfully, I'm fine with it - WAH-64 replacement ? Buy Boeing, get what everyone else got. MPA? P8, buy what the big dog in the yard uses..
Do I want to see time and effort spent on integrating tech into a new cab ? Nope. E7, just click add to cart and be done with it.
Not sure what you mean - are you talking about other NATO countries with E7 ? I think we're relatively unique in not having maintained our E3 fleet to the current upgrade path.
Thrice in living memory very rare cases of common sense and logic have occurred within the UK MOD. Don't discourage it. SAAB may be whinging about it, but they don't have operational Erieye on the A330, whereas Wedgetail is FOC with the RAAF and combat proven. The P-8 operated / bought by the USN, RAAF, RNZAF so again a good decision by the MOD because it is VfM and the best capability available.
Looks like the UK is shopping for more Chinocks.
UK explores purchase of 16 extended range Chinook helicopters
UK explores purchase of 16 extended range Chinook helicopters
I saw that - looks like they're going to be the sneaky pete standard for SFOR use if I read the requirements right - and that puts the nail in the coffin for V22 in UK service I think.
Warships IFR August edition has an incitedul commentary by “Sharkey Ward” titled “Strike Carrier Divide and Rule by RAF will Lead Only to Disaster at Sea”
I know that some of Ward’s musings are somewhat eccentric at times and not short of hyperbole but this article struck a chord.
I’ll paraphrase: The consensus in Whitehall is now the global maritime threat has become so serious to the UKs interests that defence in depth of the RNs new CBG is now required. UK politicians have ignored history and little has changed since Sharkeys service.
Fleet defence platforms need to be on site 24/7 fully integrated under the direct command of the CBG and without that defence and effective power projection is not possible.
And to the guts of his theme, “any nation that fragments 2C of carrier based aviation, unwisely handing it over significant parts to the land based air service, or relying on air cover provided from the land courts defeat”.
He goes on to state how both the Tornado and Typhoon (arguably) programmes were mismanaged by the RAF/MoD and illustrates the benefits of the Sea Harrier Invincible class programmes starkly shown in the FI campaign. (naturally he does)
He reports the strong rumours that more F35B acquisitions may be canned by the RAF in favour of more Typhoons, further he suggests that most of the defence spending black holes can be attributed to the RAF and suggests the costs of the QEs is nothing compared with the bloated RAF budget acquiring more aircraft than they need, Typhoons (GBP80b) with such limited range (750m)that they cannot intercept Russian Bears before weapon release (1500m) and AAR resources are lacking.
He then describes the failures of the RAF taking control of naval air between the wars by failing to invest in modern aircraft and by the time the RN gained control and reestablished the FAA in the late 1930s it was far too late and that cost dearly in both blood and strategic losses.
He finishes by suggesting that every successful expeditionary enterprise undertaken by the UK since the end of the war has been based on RN run and administered carrier based AirPower and that letting the RAF manage and be deeply involved managing maritime AirPower is a grave error and that one day it will cost the nation dear.
I know that the author has deeply held opinions but as a tactician who has experienced FAA operations on a minor scale and who has relied upon an airforce that may or may not arrive for exercises, I too hold his beliefs
I encourage all to read his commentary.
I know that some of Ward’s musings are somewhat eccentric at times and not short of hyperbole but this article struck a chord.
I’ll paraphrase: The consensus in Whitehall is now the global maritime threat has become so serious to the UKs interests that defence in depth of the RNs new CBG is now required. UK politicians have ignored history and little has changed since Sharkeys service.
Fleet defence platforms need to be on site 24/7 fully integrated under the direct command of the CBG and without that defence and effective power projection is not possible.
And to the guts of his theme, “any nation that fragments 2C of carrier based aviation, unwisely handing it over significant parts to the land based air service, or relying on air cover provided from the land courts defeat”.
He goes on to state how both the Tornado and Typhoon (arguably) programmes were mismanaged by the RAF/MoD and illustrates the benefits of the Sea Harrier Invincible class programmes starkly shown in the FI campaign. (naturally he does)
He reports the strong rumours that more F35B acquisitions may be canned by the RAF in favour of more Typhoons, further he suggests that most of the defence spending black holes can be attributed to the RAF and suggests the costs of the QEs is nothing compared with the bloated RAF budget acquiring more aircraft than they need, Typhoons (GBP80b) with such limited range (750m)that they cannot intercept Russian Bears before weapon release (1500m) and AAR resources are lacking.
He then describes the failures of the RAF taking control of naval air between the wars by failing to invest in modern aircraft and by the time the RN gained control and reestablished the FAA in the late 1930s it was far too late and that cost dearly in both blood and strategic losses.
He finishes by suggesting that every successful expeditionary enterprise undertaken by the UK since the end of the war has been based on RN run and administered carrier based AirPower and that letting the RAF manage and be deeply involved managing maritime AirPower is a grave error and that one day it will cost the nation dear.
I know that the author has deeply held opinions but as a tactician who has experienced FAA operations on a minor scale and who has relied upon an airforce that may or may not arrive for exercises, I too hold his beliefs
I encourage all to read his commentary.
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Poisoned well I'm afraid - Lt Cdr Ward is well known for re-arranging reality to fit his argument. See if you can find any of his comments about SRVL's being untried and untested and will never work for instance.
There's no way that the RAF want more Tiffy - maybe some F35A, I can believe that, but Typhoon, no. Limited range vs Bears seems a laughable comparison as the Bears have to travel a very long way to then get smashed in the face by an AIM-120C. I have considerable respect for Lt Cdr Ward as a pilot who fought for his country in 1982 but his articles usually have me shakiing my head in disbelief.
I understand his eccentricities but I took as the main thrust his desire to have the FAA administer, control and fly all the F35B’s acquired for the two QE’s and on that point I’m in total agreement.
t68
Well-Known Member
Agree that they should be under RN control but that puts the RN FAA ACF slightly smaller than the RAAF ACF, when you consider that to have enough aircraft to fill out both carriers(worst case) plus OCU and attrition airframes by my reckoning they will need between 84-90 airframes. I imagine those number were last seen RN FAA in the 1960's with F-4K Phantom & Blackburn Buccaneer S2
Different ships - different cap tallies. Different services each having different priorities and different politics.
The reasons are outlined in a Warships IFR of April 2018. The piece is written by Graham Edmonds “How to Avoid a Clash of Cultures and Operational Needs Hampering UK Carriers”
As background info I understand the plan is to standup 2 x FAA Sqdns and 2 RAF.
I’m unable to link however in summary:
Pilot currency in operating from carriers is vital and were RAF Sqdns not to routinely embark major deficiencies will occur because currency requires not only operational flying from the carrier but also equal time in a simulator.
In the Joint Force Harrier time statistics show that RAF embarkation time in carriers were low.
This not only effects pilots but ground crews also.
The on watch off watch embarkation plan between the four squadrons raises further operational and administrative differences, flying from sea operates from a different set of rules. There are no diversion airfields, the airfield/carrier is not in the same place from take off to landing and the scenery is unrelentingly unchanging.
Harmony rules differ between the services. RN personnel can be separated from home for up to 9 months, the RAF from between 3 & 4 months.
A question in the House of Lords enquired if Harmony rules for RAF persons serving in the new squadrons will be brought into line with the RN, answer, RAF Harmony rules will apply.
This lack of joint ness means that in a carrier deployment of 9months the embarked RAF chaps could be changed mid deployment at least once even twice.
This undermines the maintenance of operational capability, in the Harrier days RAF pilots on 3 month detachments rarely achieved a night flyingcapability, in the final years of the last Ark Royal’s strike carrier deployments the number of RAF pilots who qualified for Full Weather operations was very low if not nil.
Under these rules a surge to three embarked squadrons and then to be fully qualified is almost impossible without lengthy qualifying periods beyond the present administrative rules.
The shortcomings become readily apparent when the facts are laid bare.