Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[John Newman]

Can someone please explain the possible advantages and disadvantages that become present with the smaller size of the CEA radar faces when compared to the F-5000 design. Also wouldn't the Australian T26 make more sense if the design used the 25mm Typhoon mount instead of the UK T26 30mm gun.

That said both released designs look very good! Hopefully BAE goes with 48 VLS cells.

Smaller radar faces? What?

What you are looking at are 'artists impressions', not final engineering diagrams, which of course are not in the public domain.

They are not released designs, they are purely artists impressions, it's more important to note what the contenders say, not a pretty picture of their proposal.

Don't get bogged down on a picture (because that is all it is, ok?), in fact, if you look at the BAE Facebook page there are two different artists impressions of RAN version of the T26, and apart from how they might look in comparison to an artists impression of an F-5000 or the FREMM version too.

CAE will do doubt come up with a spec for the radar, or already has come up with a spec, that will have certain dimensions, it will be up to the three different designers to make that fit on their particular design, not scale it up or down just to fit their individual design.

As far as a 25mm or a 30mm gun, again, we don't know what has or hasn't been specified in the RFT, all speculation.

And again as for the number of VLS, we only have Navantia at this stage saying that the F-5000 will have 48 cells, no word from the other contenders, or a clear answer to the requirement in the RFT.

Yes nice to see artist impressions, but that is all they are.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Smaller radar faces? What?

What you are looking at are 'artists impressions', not final engineering diagrams, which of course are not in the public domain.

They are not released designs, they are purely artists impressions, it's more important to note what the contenders say, not a pretty picture of their proposal.

Don't get bogged down on a picture (because that is all it is, ok?), in fact, if you look at the BAE Facebook page there are two different artists impressions of RAN version of the T26, and apart from how they might look in comparison to an artists impression of an F-5000 or the FREMM version too.

CAE will do doubt come up with a spec for the radar, or already has come up with a spec, that will have certain dimensions, it will be up to the three different designers to make that fit on their particular design, not scale it up or down just to fit their individual design.

As far as a 25mm or a 30mm gun, again, we don't know what has or hasn't been specified in the RFT, all speculation.

And again as for the number of VLS, we only have Navantia at this stage saying that the F-5000 will have 48 cells, no word from the other contenders, or a clear answer to the requirement in the RFT.

Yes nice to see artist impressions, but that is all they are.

48 strike. Given the current situation that would be base line.

35 mm would be my preference. 1 is okay 2 is more convincing.

Realistically these are likely to be put in the middle of it.

Ausgov should accelerate this.

Another nation is literally drawing up plans to nuclear strike Guam.time has run out.

We go with what we have.
All tender should be asked about quickest build and any up gunning.

Every navy project should be accelerated. Sm3 needs a launch platform.

 

[Milne Bay]

48 strike. Given the current situation that would be base line.

35 mm would be my preference. 1 is okay 2 is more convincing.

Realistically these are likely to be put in the middle of it.

Ausgov should accelerate this.

Another nation is literally drawing up plans to nuclear strike Guam.time has run out.

We go with what we have.
All tender should be asked about quickest build and any up gunning.

Every navy project should be accelerated. Sm3 needs a launch platform.

Any conflict that involves a nuclear strike anywhere will be long over before the first steel is cut on any of these.
When egomaniacs have control of nuclear weapons the future looks very grim indeed
MB

 

[Hazdog]

Any conflict that involves a nuclear strike anywhere will be long over before the first steel is cut on any of these.
When egomaniacs have control of nuclear weapons the future looks very grim indeed
MB

If you were in the business of solely trying to make the RAN fleet capable of BMD, you would first update the AGEIS system of Hobart class (to allow BMD) and with that upgrade, fit SM-3's.

No stuffing about waiting for a future class of ships, but actually using a class of ship that's role is air warfare.

That being said it would not be a bad idea to fit out the future frigates to have an increased AAW role and a limited BMD role. Changing the name could also be appropriate, i.e. Future Destroyer's?

The idea of the government going back on requirements would be very odd and likely increase the cost of the future class. Although it would be appropriate to change requirements to meet the ever-rising need for BMD. (It would be very interesting and very unlikely but Australia may be able to purchase build right's for 8+ Flight 3 Arleigh Burke class. Highly unlikely but... possible?) Please feel free to put your own opinion in on this.

 

[Volkodav]

I would suggest if BMD was a driver in deciding to accelerate SEA5000 the quickest way forward would be a minimum change batch of flight II Hobarts. Replace obsolescent equipment, introduce BMD upgrades and maybe some features offered in the F5000 but retaining SPY and other Hobart features. Refine the requirements for the remaining six ships while this batch are in build so they are ready to go once ship three starts consolidation.

Can't see it happening and it will still be time consuming but its the only way I could see an excellerated build happening.

 

[vonnoobie]

Practical question here.

Since we are dipping our toes into the water around the question of going full BMD capability how effective is said capability?

Is it best to intercept the missile early on? In which case Australia having BMD capable ships will be useless unless they are deployed off the Korean coast.

Can they be effectively intercepted when near Australia?

If they can be intercepted when near Australia is it better to have said system on a ship where it's capabilities can be held back by the ships limitations or have it land based where such limitations can be reduced.

Not saying we dont need or shouldnt acquire a BMD capability but rather questioning in what form we should have it as it is a lot of money to be invested.

 

[spoz]

The only really "proven" system, at least in the Western world, is the Aegis/SM3 combination which has demonstrated the capability to intercept in the coast phase (after boost burnout and before re entry), albeit in pretty benign test conditions. THAAD and the older Patriot are limited to the rentry phase where, in the case of an ICBM the problem is a difficult one. SM6 also shows some potential in this space but is still very developmental.

With I think one exception, a site in Poland, Aegis/SM3 is sea based. While I'm sure LM would be delighted to sell us some (6, 8, more?) to cover the country it would massively expensive. In the Hobart class we have the potential, if not the current capability, to do BMD so if you want it the logical course would be to build on that.

Not sure what you mean about ship limitations. If you are talking about the Aegis/SM3 combination, that's effectively the same wherever it is installed. If you mean they can't be inland, that's true (although by nature of the system/target not all that significant), but to be brutal about it, is that much of a concern in the Aust context? OTH, the mobility inherent in ships might actually be an advantage. Then the argument becomes "do you have enough ships" - one we're regularly considering on this Board!

 

[ADMk2]

Practical question here.

Since we are dipping our toes into the water around the question of going full BMD capability how effective is said capability?

Is it best to intercept the missile early on? In which case Australia having BMD capable ships will be useless unless they are deployed off the Korean coast.

Can they be effectively intercepted when near Australia?

If they can be intercepted when near Australia is it better to have said system on a ship where it's capabilities can be held back by the ships limitations or have it land based where such limitations can be reduced.

Not saying we dont need or shouldnt acquire a BMD capability but rather questioning in what form we should have it as it is a lot of money to be invested.

To be honest, if we are going to acquire a terminal BMD capability than a serious discussion needs to be had whether this should be THAAD based or naval based.

If we are only talking about acquiring BMD capabilities on the AWD the cost is going to be high and the capability extremely limited given how long ships tend to be offline for when they need servicing and how long they can be on-station for in this role, not to mention what deployment limitations this will place on the AWD's if we are assuming this BMD capability is to be used to defend continental Australia from BM attack.

We will only have 3 AWD's and if they are meant to be leading our naval task groups on deployments, then the requirement to do 'homeland' BMD will impact upon this significantly.

It seems very likely to me that something like THAAD whilst probably more expensive, offers significantly better flexibility in the role.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Any conflict that involves a nuclear strike anywhere will be long over before the first steel is cut on any of these.
When egomaniacs have control of nuclear weapons the future looks very grim indeed
MB

Yes and no. It is quite possible the Korean situation might be resolved one way or another, although, people have been saying that for over 60 years. Of course post Korea, that still leaves China and I don't expect recent Korean events to make the situation with China significantly better post some Korean conflict. Of course on top of that you have questions about US supremacy and other global situations and even regional situations.

I would think it worthwhile for the F-5000 to run with aegis with a BMD compatible baseline.

Australia really doesn't have enough ships (certainly not enough aegis) and equipment to go out and provide a convincing BMD umbrella. We are much better off ensuring the security of everyone in SEA by being off the coast of Korea.

 

[foxdemon]

The potential BDM capability of the AWD would be of use for defence of naval assets they are escorting (defence against DF-21). With only 3, that means likely 1 on station, it would not seem to constitute an effective national missile defence.

So what would an effective national missile defence look like? That depends on whether you think you can stop an ICBM strike or whether you plan to mitigate the results. The former is pushing what is technically feasible and won't be cheap. The later is doable. Let's look closer.

http://https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1209.html

This is a RAND paper on space weapons. It is a bit old but covers the basics. To have a dependable ICBM interception capability at ranges we need to consider would involve this level of technology. Even the Americans would be hard pressed to achieve this capability. I don't think we could afford it. And it would not be implemented for decades. But stopping ICBMs would require an extensive space based interception system.


So that leaves the second approach: mitigation. As with airfields, the idea is to reduce the effect of an attack. Hardening, dispersal, camouflage, decoy, recovery. What will they target? Our cities? Naval bases? Airfields? Political centres?

Hardening out critical infrastructure, hospitals, power generation, communications, would increase our ability to absorb an attack. Bankers for civilians is another example of hardening. Dispersal: evacuation plans for non-critical people from urban centres. Getting our ships out to sea ASAP is also dispersal. Distributing our planes to numerous airfields is dispersal. Camouflage and decoy is more relevant for mobile assets. I can't see how we can apply this to protecting fixed targets like our cities. Recovery: emergency services drilled and organised to copy with such a contingency. Organising citizen reserves to assist emergency services in a crisis. These are the things we can do practically to mitigate the damage of an attack.

Presumably an ICBM attack would involve nuclear weapons. Are our citizens educat d in how to cope with fall out? Are that stocks of secure medical supplies outside major cities to use in such an emergency? What expertise do we have for decontamination?

These are issues Europeans had to face back in the Cold War. We need to wake up and realise that Asia is now in the same situation as Europe was some decades ago. BDM is hopeful at best. We need a civil defence strategy to ensure our people are prepared for the worst.

 

[koala]

The potential BDM capability of the AWD would be of use for defence of naval assets they are escorting (defence against DF-21). With only 3, that means likely 1 on station, it would not seem to constitute an effective national missile defence.

So what would an effective national missile defence look like? That depends on whether you think you can stop an ICBM strike or whether you plan to mitigate the results. The former is pushing what is technically feasible and won't be cheap. The later is doable. Let's look closer.

http://https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1209.html

This is a RAND paper on space weapons. It is a bit old but covers the basics. To have a dependable ICBM interception capability at ranges we need to consider would involve this level of technology. Even the Americans would be hard pressed to achieve this capability. I don't think we could afford it. And it would not be implemented for decades. But stopping ICBMs would require an extensive space based interception system.


So that leaves the second approach: mitigation. As with airfields, the idea is to reduce the effect of an attack. Hardening, dispersal, camouflage, decoy, recovery. What will they target? Our cities? Naval bases? Airfields? Political centres?

Hardening out critical infrastructure, hospitals, power generation, communications, would increase our ability to absorb an attack. Bankers for civilians is another example of hardening. Dispersal: evacuation plans for non-critical people from urban centres. Getting our ships out to sea ASAP is also dispersal. Distributing our planes to numerous airfields is dispersal. Camouflage and decoy is more relevant for mobile assets. I can't see how we can apply this to protecting fixed targets like our cities. Recovery: emergency services drilled and organised to copy with such a contingency. Organising citizen reserves to assist emergency services in a crisis. These are the things we can do practically to mitigate the damage of an attack.

Presumably an ICBM attack would involve nuclear weapons. Are our citizens educat d in how to cope with fall out? Are that stocks of secure medical supplies outside major cities to use in such an emergency? What expertise do we have for decontamination?

These are issues Europeans had to face back in the Cold War. We need to wake up and realise that Asia is now in the same situation as Europe was some decades ago. BDM is hopeful at best. We need a civil defence strategy to ensure our people are prepared for the worst.

This has got me wondering what type of air defence any of our major city's have, I am aware that for Sydney our defence will come from f/a 18's from Williamstown and a few Army RBS' with reliance on our Jorn and radar systems.

My question is that fast jets with dirty bombs could only take a few hours from a rouge state (Nth Korea) to fly here with support.

I am not aware of any 24/7 defence plans for a rouge perpetrator and unlike WW2 I don't think Australia has any coastal and air defence contingency's.

I would like to hear from the boy's in service, if we are better protected than what I think.

Cheers Chris

 

[Redlands18]

This has got me wondering what type of air defence any of our major city's have, I am aware that for Sydney our defence will come from f/a 18's from Williamstown and a few Army RBS' with reliance on our Jorn and radar systems.

My question is that fast jets with dirty bombs could only take a few hours from a rouge state (Nth Korea) to fly here with support.

I am not aware of any 24/7 defence plans for a rouge perpetrator and unlike WW2 I don't think Australia has any coastal and air defence contingency's.

I would like to hear from the boy's in service, if we are better protected than what I think.

Cheers Chris

It's 7320 Km from the centre of North Korea to the centre of Australia, a bit more than a few hours flight time. There is only 3 Countries in the World with the Bomber/Tanker capability to do that mission, USA, Russia & China, the NK Air Force is designed around a Tactical War with South Korea not Intercontinental Bombing Missions.

 

[hauritz]

This has got me wondering what type of air defence any of our major city's have, I am aware that for Sydney our defence will come from f/a 18's from Williamstown and a few Army RBS' with reliance on our Jorn and radar systems.

My question is that fast jets with dirty bombs could only take a few hours from a rouge state (Nth Korea) to fly here with support.

I am not aware of any 24/7 defence plans for a rouge perpetrator and unlike WW2 I don't think Australia has any coastal and air defence contingency's.

I would like to hear from the boy's in service, if we are better protected than what I think.

Cheers Chris

While a country can plan for many contingencies, it can't prepare for all of them. In Australia's case the tyranny of distance is our best defence against any potential long range strike.

It is hard to imagine NK firing a nuke at Australia without being on the receiving end of some major retaliation from the US.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Australian cities aren't at risk of attack by aircraft, and are unlikely to be at risk of attack of ICBM. For an aircraft attack on the east coast cities you are still talking 8,500 km each way. Pyongyang to London or to Seattle is closer.

North Korea doesn't have any sort of aircraft that could cover that distance. While the Chinese might be able to get aircraft to travel that distance, it is not with in effective striking distance from any Chinese bases with useful conventional loads.

While an ICBM is possible, again unlikely. We would be close the ragged edge of their capability, accuracy and control would be minimal and the warhead would have to be tiny. Obviously the threat to the US would be just as great or greater, you are talking about a threat to mainland US.

There is minimal immediate direct threat to Australia in my view.

Guam is another matter.

NK actions aroung Guam, US bases in South Korea, Japan and around the wider region are a different matter. Obviously someone launching missiles at the US is not something the US is going to accept. Unlike Japan or South Korea, you can't get away with small scale skirmishes or engagements and assume that they will back off. Obviously if NK tactics did work, then China would be quite pleased to see a significantly reduced US presence.

A single ship is unlikely to be able to effectively deploy SM-3 and engage a target. You would want a whole system of multiple ships, sensors, planes, etc providing data.

With SM-3 you are really buying into the concept of mutual defence. The more comprehensive you can make that mutual defence the more likely you are going to be able to deal with the threats. NK can launch more than one ICBM.

But this is still band aid stuff. SM-3 still isn't 100% at intercepts even in good conditions. Ultimately the problem is NK, and further, the relationship between US and China.

But going forward, the strategic situation has changed.

 

[Hazdog]

Australian cities aren't at risk of attack by aircraft, and are unlikely to be at risk of attack of ICBM. For an aircraft attack on the east coast cities you are still talking 8,500 km each way. Pyongyang to London or to Seattle is closer.

North Korea doesn't have any sort of aircraft that could cover that distance. While the Chinese might be able to get aircraft to travel that distance, it is not with in effective striking distance from any Chinese bases with useful conventional loads.

While an ICBM is possible, again unlikely. We would be close the ragged edge of their capability, accuracy and control would be minimal and the warhead would have to be tiny. Obviously the threat to the US would be just as great or greater, you are talking about a threat to mainland US.

There is minimal immediate direct threat to Australia in my view.

Guam is another matter.

NK actions aroung Guam, US bases in South Korea, Japan and around the wider region are a different matter. Obviously someone launching missiles at the US is not something the US is going to accept. Unlike Japan or South Korea, you can't get away with small scale skirmishes or engagements and assume that they will back off. Obviously if NK tactics did work, then China would be quite pleased to see a significantly reduced US presence.

A single ship is unlikely to be able to effectively deploy SM-3 and engage a target. You would want a whole system of multiple ships, sensors, planes, etc providing data.

With SM-3 you are really buying into the concept of mutual defence. The more comprehensive you can make that mutual defence the more likely you are going to be able to deal with the threats. NK can launch more than one ICBM.

But this is still band aid stuff. SM-3 still isn't 100% at intercepts even in good conditions. Ultimately the problem is NK, and further, the relationship between US and China.

But going forward, the strategic situation has changed.

You make good points but instead of waiting around for the development of SM-3 IIB why not jump on and fund further and increased development. The missile allows for the interception of ICBM's. A capability that would increase the effectiveness of our major fleet units and will allow for the higher probability of interception of ICBM's heading towards Australia and its allies. With the rise and current level of Ballistic Missiles around the world, the use of BMD ships would provide a comfortable capability. If our AWD and Future Frigates were able to possess this capability Australian BMD will have a great start.

Sooner rather later Australia could procure THAAD (although oddly stated that THAAD would not meet our needs, by the government) and 10 or so AN/TPY-2 radars and control stations.

Land based AGEIS ashore would also provide a very quality capability and would be most likely be able to be an integrated system with JORN. This paired with land based SM-3 would likely protect Australia from an rouge nations and NK.

 

[hauritz]

You make good points but instead of waiting around for the development of SM-3 IIB why not jump on and fund further and increased development. The missile allows for the interception of ICBM's. A capability that would increase the effectiveness of our major fleet units and will allow for the higher probability of interception of ICBM's heading towards Australia and its allies. With the rise and current level of Ballistic Missiles around the world, the use of BMD ships would provide a comfortable capability. If our AWD and Future Frigates were able to possess this capability Australian BMD will have a great start.

Sooner rather later Australia could procure THAAD (although oddly stated that THAAD would not meet our needs, by the government) and 10 or so AN/TPY-2 radars and control stations.

Land based AGEIS ashore would also provide a very quality capability and would be most likely be able to be an integrated system with JORN. This paired with land based SM-3 would likely protect Australia from an rouge nations and NK.

I would want to see a lot of evidence that any sort of tactical ABM system was practical before Australia invests any money in them.

What can easily happen in this situation is that a political decision will be made to buy such a system just to give the voters the illusion that they are being protected.

Of course, it won't protect you against MIRVs and even if it hits a missile it won't necessarily stop it. Ballistic missiles aren't the only way to deliver a nuke either. You can fire them from a submarine situated just outside Sydney Heads, or deliver one in a pickup van right up to the door of parliament house. In fact just think of all the creative ways that terrorists find to deliver bombs to their targets ... only with nukes.

At best a ship based ABM system might be able to defend itself and its escorts.

 

[Hazdog]

I would want to see a lot of evidence that any sort of tactical ABM system was practical before Australia invests any money in them.

What can easily happen in this situation is that a political decision will be made to buy such a system just to give the voters the illusion that they are being protected.

Of course, it won't protect you against MIRVs and even if it hits a missile it won't necessarily stop it. Ballistic missiles aren't the only way to deliver a nuke either. You can fire them from a submarine situated just outside Sydney Heads, or deliver one in a pickup van right up to the door of parliament house. In fact just think of all the creative ways that terrorists find to deliver bombs to their targets ... only with nukes.

At best a ship based ABM system might be able to defend itself and its escorts.

I understand what you mean by any evidence, but have you heard of any other design teams or companies creating a system capable of intercepting a ballistic missile from a ship? I haven't. This capability is very new and would be a game changer for Australia and our Allies.

Your comment about other delivery methods of nuclear weapons is irrelevant, we have multiple organisations on the hunt for rogue nuclear weapons, we have the navy conducting anti-submarine warfare what I would believe to be constantly. What we are talking about is the possibility of another nation conducting a ballistic missile strike against Australia, not a terrorist cell. So the need for BMD is clear and should not be undermined by the idea that we should only do what we are doing now.

I look forward to hearing from you once again.

 

[weegee]

Hmas Adelaide

So it seems as though Hmas Adelaide is back at sea completing her Helo Trials.

Australian Navy LHD HMAS Adelaide returns to flight trials after dry docking | Naval Today

But does anyone know what exactly was wrong with both LHD's? I heard wrong oils were used but then the RAN stated they were serviced in accordance of the manufacturers requirements. I do recall cruise ships having a lot of issues with pods back in the day but would have assumed that was sorted now as they arent a new concept anymore.

 

[StingrayOZ]

You make good points but instead of waiting around for the development of SM-3 IIB why not jump on and fund further and increased development. The missile allows for the interception of ICBM's. A capability that would increase the effectiveness of our major fleet units and will allow for the higher probability of interception of ICBM's heading towards Australia and its allies. With the rise and current level of Ballistic Missiles around the world, the use of BMD ships would provide a comfortable capability. If our AWD and Future Frigates were able to possess this capability Australian BMD will have a great start.

Sooner rather later Australia could procure THAAD (although oddly stated that THAAD would not meet our needs, by the government) and 10 or so AN/TPY-2 radars and control stations.

Land based AGEIS ashore would also provide a very quality capability and would be most likely be able to be an integrated system with JORN. This paired with land based SM-3 would likely protect Australia from an rouge nations and NK.

SM-3 really is a development system. It is never going to be perfect, it will only be at best good. However, recent upgrades means it is likely to have reached its kinetic limit for a VLS, it is now more about software and sensors.

While we could go Aegis ashore, I don't believe it is warranted. No one is going to fire nuclear weapons off to Australia. We are too far away, too low value, too sparsely populated, not enough of an immediate threat to anyone and unlikely to be scared off by a nuclear threat. Sm-3 is more about protecting Japan, the US than it is about Australia directly. Conducting a nuclear strike against Australia because it is an US ally is internationally going to be very unpopular. Australia isn't a threat to NK by itself, it has no nuclear capability and is the largest supplier of raw materials and energy to China.

But Australia operating in the SCS and the sea of Japan and around Korea? Yes. It is far better we aim to protect everyone than try and build a small wall just for ourselves.

Part of the issue is the US and China relationship. China doesn't want them in the region and isn't happy about Japan either. It might be more amenable to have other allies like Australia take up a security role.

There is a huge lack of Aegis ships in the region, Australia would be essential in any sort of deployment.

 

[Todjaeger]

I understand what you mean by any evidence, but have you heard of any other design teams or companies creating a system capable of intercepting a ballistic missile from a ship? I haven't. This capability is very new and would be a game changer for Australia and our Allies.

Have you stopped to consider why there are not really other design teams working on developing a ship-based ABM capability? I suspect the reasons have to do with the perceived risk/value, especially when compared to the cost/complexity of developing such a capability.

Your comment about other delivery methods of nuclear weapons is irrelevant, we have multiple organisations on the hunt for rogue nuclear weapons, we have the navy conducting anti-submarine warfare what I would believe to be constantly. What we are talking about is the possibility of another nation conducting a ballistic missile strike against Australia, not a terrorist cell. So the need for BMD is clear and should not be undermined by the idea that we should only do what we are doing now.

Respectfully, the above is inaccurate IMO. Gov'ts make plans, and develop capabilities, all based upon scenarios involving various potential threats, the possible outcomes from those threats, and the likelihood of something going from a potential threat to an actual one. Indeed the term threat matrix refers to just that.

While I do not know this as a fact, I strongly suspect that the CoA threat matrix has the risk of a ballistic missile (nuclear or otherwise) attack upon Australia to be very low risk. There are only a handful of nations that are either capable of doing so, or could develop the capability in the near future. Further, there are basically no reasons or advantages for these nations to launch such an attack on Australia, and plenty of reasons against doing so.

So, with the idea in mind that developing and fielding an ABM system is likely to be complicated and expensive, and that there is very little ballistic missile threat, it would seem sensible for ADF efforts be directed in other areas. Especially since the ADF budget is not endless, and there are other capabilities that the ADF wants and needs.