Post 2 of 2:
3. There are similarities in how professional armies attack enemy leaders and key nodes via the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD) process. This targeting methodology is utilized by the US Special Operations Forces responsible for some of the most highly-publicized missions. F3EAD is a system that allows the Commander of these forces to anticipate and predict enemy operations, identify, locate, and target enemy forces, and to perform intelligence exploitation and analysis of captured enemy personnel and materiel. Central to the F3EAD process is the functional fusion of operations and intelligence functions throughout the military organization. In F3EAD, commanders establish targeting priorities, the intelligence system provides the direction to the target, and the operations system performs the decisive operations necessary to accomplish the mission. Weapons release, via aircraft or artillery, is the last step of a multi-step intelligence and operational planning process for AFP at the joint force headquarters.
4. Robert H. Scales and Douglas Ollivant have observed that '
Terrorist armies fight smarter and deadlier than ever'. This frightening new age is emerging due to several factors that professional forces fully anticipated and I would recommend reading the article for the four reasons they gave. Beyond the four reasons, at a broad level, the traditional comparative advantage of a professional army, has diminished, relative to terrorist groups.
5. In the 2017 Battle of Marawi, their DND ran out of certain types of ammunition and was fortunate that the US was willing to resupply them at short notice. The AFP also have very limited access to military grade UAVs, encrypted communications and most crucially, night fighting equipment (NFE); indeed, the only forces well equipped with NFE were those from Philippine SOCOMD and MARSOG. This meant the majority of forces were static at night. Lack of proper equipment slowed operational tempo and also resulted in 53 unnecessary AFP deaths in the Battle of Marawi. There were instances where their initial reinforcements were trapped for up to 5 days. For more details see the 2 links and video in paragraph 6 below.
Ken Conboy's 'South East Asian Special Forces', published by Osprey some years ago has detailed information on a number of Philippine army units. The only recent books in English that I have come across that has some mention on the Philippine army are 'Imperial Grunts' and 'Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts' by Robert Kaplan. In these books, there are sections in which the author describes his visits to U.S. army green beret teams deployed in the south, providing training to the Philippine army and humanitarian asistance to the locals.
6. ISIS is trying establish their Caliphate in the Philippines. ASPI has a report,
The Marawi crisis—urban conflict and information operations, that examines both the capability aspects of kinetic hard power and the lessons from soft-power information operations. Fundamentally, the Battle of Marawi was a battle by individuals and small teams. While the AFP had access to overwhelming offensive support, armoured fighting vehicles, unmanned aerial surveillance and close air support platforms, the city was not free of terrorists until every building had been deliberately cleared. The AFP describes the approach that it developed for the systematic recovery of the city as ‘SLICE-ing’ (strategise, locate, isolate, constrict and eliminate). It strategised by dividing the city into three sectors, each allocated to the Philippine Marine or Army units with armoured vehicles and artillery attached.
- The ground work for SLICE was laid in 2017, when the Department of National Defense (DND) upgraded of 44 units of existing M113A2 armored personnel carriers of the Mechanized Infantry Division by equipping them with a new Remote Controlled Weapon Station (RCWS), and converting 5 existing M113A2 APCs to Armored Mortar Carriers. Elbit supplied the Dragon Overhead Remote Controlled Weapon Station (ORCWS) mounted with a 12.7mm heavy machine gun, which proved its worth during the Battle of Marawi in 2017, and in other skirmishes on operations against terrorists groups.
- The 2017 Battle of Marawi also demonstrated that it takes NFE, a high standard of C3, combat trauma management and interoperability with supporting arms (such as precise joint fires and armoured engineers) to fight and win in the urban environment — sadly things which are lacking for the AFP. Feedback received after training, was that these skills would have reduced the number of casualties.
- One Company from the AFP’s 2nd Infantry Division employed over 10,000 mortar rounds in 3 months. Offensive support came primarily in the form of Close Air Support, intimate support from mortars, and employing 105mm guns in a direct fire role. Despite the extraordinary firepower was employed to enable the seizure of Marawi City, the AFP failed to dominate the avenues of approach (resulting in trapped or isolated initial forces). ‘Murder holes’ were also utilised in stairwells. Knowing the AFP would have to make entry to clear the building, the ISIS snipers would cut a hole through the stair well and sit off some distance. Once the AFP made entry the ISIS sniper would have a clear line of sight of the door way and stairwell entry allowing him to score a centre of mass hit.
- The AFP failed in gaining mobility in the break in battle, despite its amour and it also failed to surprise the ISIS insurgents — who were prepared to give battle. ISIS sharpshooters utilized ‘murder holes’ with hides overlooking choke points, bridges and obvious avenues of approach with excellent fields of fire, or onto killing zone where AFP would dwell. They would then knock a medium size hole in a wall and then, if possible, knock a smaller hole in the adjacent room. From the adjacent room they would often set up their hide, allowing them to engage from depth with relatively good cover from fire and concealment. ISIS teams regularly flew commercially available UAS to likely counter-sniper locations, to identify the AFP hides. AFP snipers also faced the challenge of fleeting opportunity—exposure time of enemy targets was typically very short, and at short to medium ranges of unknown distance.
- The ISIS laid siege to Marawi City on 23 May 2017, lasting 153 days and becoming the longest urban war in Philippine history. It took the Philippines at least twice as long as comparable urban battles and attributable to capability shortfalls, and training, which the AFP acknowledged. To make matters worse, AFP platoons had not conducted extensive training in combat trauma management, and their Role 2 and Role 3 equivalent medical facilities were not accustomed to the very high volume of casualties which can be expected during urban fighting—a significant number of which were non-battle injuries.
- With the help of outside partners such as Australia, Singapore and the US, the AFP sought to address their short comings. SAF's assistance included sending a C-130H to transport humanitarian supplies, use of the SAF's urban training villages for AFP troops, and a detachment of UAVs to enhance ISR.
- Observers should not try to understand the Marawi operation through a lens of AFP training shortfalls, as it discounts AFP strengths and also risks underestimating both inherent challenges in an urban fight. The AFP was able to conduct last mile delivery of water, food, fuel and ammo to its soldiers to enable them to win the fight.
- This Australian documentary below explains the Australian train and assist program and why this remains a breeding ground for ISIS. Official death toll for the battle in Marawi stood at 1,131 (919 terrorists and 165 soldiers and policemen) with over 1,000 injured and also took the lives of 47 civilians.
7. In addition, the May 2017 Marawi crisis 'is a failure of government to act based on sound and timely intelligence,' terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna said (See:
'PH failed to detect signs that led to Marawi' – expert). The government had, as early as 2014, prior knowledge of the links between ISIS and extremist groups in Mindanao, but down played it in the media. The military had also been monitoring Isnilon Hapilon, and knew when in 2016 he convened a meeting with other ISIS aligned groups on mainland Mindanao (See:
this pdf). In 2016 June Hapilon was appointed Emir in the Philippines. In April 2017, a month before the siege, it was learnt that the military had intelligence suggesting that the terrorist group would dispatch militants. In a speech, Gunaratna pointed out that the Marawi siege is not an intelligence failure, but ‘
an operational failure.’ He explained that before the Marawi siege, the Philippine intelligence community had already produced 4 reports on the "build-up" in Marawi.
8. The AFP has started a modernisation process but need to maintain or speed up the tempo for procurement. I wish them good luck, as they will need it.
