Philippines Army Discussions and Updates

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
For armoured or mechanised infantry units, 81mm mortars are to light in their weight of fire and too short ranged. Conversion to 120mm is the right way to go, for its weapons effects.
Do you have the source for this?
The Elbit brochure details for a light tank and it’s FCS are here. Other parts of the discussion are Israeli DT member opinions on upgradability of certain legacy tanks as platforms, which needs no sources. Hope this helps.
 
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tonnyc

Well-Known Member

Basically FNSS will make one-man turrets of various calibers for the Philippine Army and help them put the turrets on their vehicles. FNSS already has the SABER turret which can be armed with 25 autocannon and I expect modifying that turret for 30 mm or 40 mm is well within FNSS' capability. The difficult part is with larger caliber guns. They may have some development projects for large caliber guns but I haven't heard of anything yet. Companies tend to tout their successes loudly because that's part of marketing, so the lack of news means they're pretty far away from ready yet.

That said, the PA can easily spend the next few years upgunning their light armoured vehicles with autocannons while waiting to see how the large caliber gun situation develops, so congratulations to both of them.
 
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STURM

Well-Known Member
A very interesting discussion about a little known Philippines army unit which played a major role in the Zamboanga Siege and Marawi. The guest speaker wrote a book about the unit and goes into interesting detail about the unit’s participation in the Zamboanga Siege and Marawi. Urban warfare gained at Zamboanga later probes useful at Marawi; for the unit and army as a whole. He also goes into detail about the long range sniper kills at Marawi and about a Norinco rifle which initially nobody wanted to use but later proved its worth.

With the possible exception of Myanmar; the Philippines has the army which has seen the most combat in the region; starting with the Huk rebellion; followed by the “civil war” against the MNLF: followed in turn with a king standing campaign against the NPA, MILF and groups such as BIFF, ASG and others.

 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
With the possible exception of Myanmar; the Philippines has the army which has seen the most combat in the region; starting with the Huk rebellion; followed by the “civil war” against the MNLF: followed in turn with a king standing campaign against the NPA, MILF and groups such as BIFF, ASG and others.
The big picture is the Philippines have not been able to truly defeat any of the insurgent groups. One might argue political factors, corruption etc, but Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia had faced and defeated communist insurgencies in their early history where they were equally under developed. It is telling that many of these insurgents are armed with weapons either captured from the PA or sold on the blackmarket by corrupt soldiers.
There are indeed brave soldiers and units that are carrying the load but enough of them that are not.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
The big picture is the Philippines have not been able to truly defeat any of the insurgent groups.
That may be true but it's worth noting that although Malaya keeps getting mentioned as a example of a counter insurgency campaign which was successfully implemented; the Huk rebellion remains little known. After a very rough period the Huks were defeated. Prior to that it enjoyed widespread support in Luzon, Mindanao and the Visayas and controlled large parts of the country.

With regards to "less developed" in the early years note that Malaysia's government had stronger control over the country; in contrast with the Philipines where federal control was weak in many parts of the country. On top of that the MILF and MNLF had widespread support from local communities.

Singapore had a communist problem but I'm not aware of it having an insurgency problem per see.

but Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia had faced and defeated communist insurgencies in their early history where they were equally under developed.
Granted but the circumstances faced there were different. Indonesia in the first decade of independence faced a major problem from nationalist groups in Sulawesi and Sumatra: they were well armed and had local.support. Malaya in the 1st and 2nd Emergency faced insurgents which had little foreign or local support and were poorly armed. On top of that the communists were from the Chinese minority group. It's often forgotten that Malaysia also faced an insurgency problem in East Malaysia.

is telling that many of these insurgents are armed with weapons either captured from the PA or sold on the blackmarket by corrupt soldiers
And weapons which were captured or obtained from different sources. Note that as the economy improved so did payscales; in general the average PA soldier is unlike his compatriots in the 1970's and 1980's. Morale is much higher now and there are far less cases of weapons being sold.
 
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STURM

Well-Known Member
There are indeed brave soldiers and units that are carrying the load but enough of them that are not.
I highly recommend this book. It has detailed info on the campaign against the ASG and the MILF but more interestingly [to me at least ] it has info on the fighting which took place in the 1970's and 1980's against the MNLF; as well as against the NPA.

A online source which had derailed info on past campaigns was ACIG. Most people are aware that the Philippines has had a long standing insurgency problem involving a number of groups but apart from the usual widely known stuff like corruption, the poor performance of some units, etc, there is in general a lack greater understanding on these campaigns; a lot of assumptions are also made. This is partly due to a lack of reliable widely available reporting on the subject.

Another campaign which remains little known is the Huk rebellion - in contrast to the widely known Malaya campaign. At one point the Huks controlled large parts of the country but over time the Philippines [with American advice and support - counter insurgency buffs will know the name Edward Lansdale] came up an effective military strategy tied in with a economic/political element which defeated the Huks.
 

Attachments

koxinga

Well-Known Member
ASCODII Sabrah Light Tank with their Armour division.

Looks like a single unit, probably delivered early for user acceptance testing and to meet contractual obligations. No news of the other asset (Pandur II wheeled gun system). High side profile.

 

koxinga

Well-Known Member

Basically FNSS will make one-man turrets of various calibers for the Philippine Army and help them put the turrets on their vehicles. FNSS already has the SABER turret which can be armed with 25 autocannon and I expect modifying that turret for 30 mm or 40 mm is well within FNSS' capability. The difficult part is with larger caliber guns. They may have some development projects for large caliber guns but I haven't heard of anything yet. Companies tend to tout their successes loudly because that's part of marketing, so the lack of news means they're pretty far away from ready yet.

That said, the PA can easily spend the next few years upgunning their light armoured vehicles with autocannons while waiting to see how the large caliber gun situation develops, so congratulations to both of them.
Looks like they went with the smaller 12.7mm

 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
It seems Philippine army plan to order and deploy five BrahMos batteries for coastal defense roles. The Philippine Navy already ordered three batteries of BrahMos for use by the Philippine Marine Corps for coastal defence.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group



According to this, Philippines Army wants to reactivate or more precise refurbished their old Scorpion. This is the version that still use 76mm gun rather then 90mm Cockeril gun that Indonesian use as newer version.

Don't have more info what kind of turret refurbishment that they plan, but as it's already been used by newer version, 90mm gun can be logical choice. However they can also choose 35mm gun like bushmaster.

Refurbishment still can be more economical choice, to maintain fleet. Despite new tanks is coming, as getting new Sabrah will cost them more that refurbishment of existing Scorpion. It is gap measure.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group

This system more in line with the need for shore based defense, in my opinion. At least that's toward Pinoy situation. However as they are previously already planning for Brahmos, Himars and now come out with this one. Just wondering if Philippines MinDef planners again falling toward Pinoy old habits of getting too much in planning but in the end detract implementation.
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member

This system more in line with the need for shore based defense, in my opinion. At least that's toward Pinoy situation. However as they are previously already planning for Brahmos, Himars and now come out with this one. Just wondering if Philippines MinDef planners again falling toward Pinoy old habits of getting too much in planning but in the end detract implementation.
I thought the Philippines was just "interested in" the M142 HIMARS, and also for the TYPHON, it seems just to be the same. Until now the only serious coast defence program is the Brahmos, i also don't think the Philippines will get the TYPHON soon if they have the budget for it. The system is just recently taken into service by the US, and none of the most closest allies with much larger defence budgets have ordered yet this system.
 
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tonnyc

Well-Known Member
Realistically if an army shows interest in a defense system now, it probably takes 5-6 years or longer before anything solid gets decided. So if the PA takes a look at the Typhon now, it will be at least 2030 before they propose the acquisition in the budget.

In another news, the Modernization Fund for the Armed Forces of Philippines is supposed to be 75 billion peso this year. However, only 35 billion of it is guaranteed. The rest is "unprogrammed" which is their term for "if we find extra money you can proceed". Given that 35 billion peso is a bit under $600 million, I think it's woefully underfunded. To be frank I am not sure why they bother with the "unprogrammed" category, but that's their politics.
 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
Realistically if an army shows interest in a defense system now, it probably takes 5-6 years or longer before anything solid gets decided. So if the PA takes a look at the Typhon now, it will be at least 2030 before they propose the acquisition in the budget.
Provided it can be sold by the US. Maybe Fillipino officials are just stupid or they know the facts but are posturing to make themselves look bigger or it's politics (see my last paragraph)

While MRC (Mid Range Capability) is operationally deployed on the field, it is still a prototype system. The operational deployment by 1st Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) is meant to iron out any technical issues, training, and other logistics.

Beyond the ability to give the Philippines a price tag (acquisition cost and sustainment cost), MCR/Typhon uses the SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles. These are the top end of US guided munitions which are (a) expensive (b) saleable only to a handful of trustworthy foreign clients (Australia, Japan) that can afford it and have sufficient level of expertises to run (e.g access to targeting) and operate. Maybe come 2030, it will be operational, but it remains extremely unrealistic and impractical if they end up with a few firing units and small number of missiles

The only sane reason I can think of is they know the realistic option is for the Philippines to "host" a permanent, forward deployed battery of TYPHON. This removes the cost and operational concerns and it remains a US asset. But for domestic politics, it is undesirable, so this talk about them buying.


The MRC achieved operational capability in 2023 upon completion of system testing, training, and delivery of the missiles. PEO MS will now conduct further prototype fabrication, fielding, future production, and lifecycle sustainment.
 
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