Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

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t68

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We have 24 Romeo with the intension of have 8 avalible at all time for the surface fleet, but we won't have all our majors out at once.

Don't know the avalibilty rate for MH-60R but from source I have read over the years it generally is about 18 aircraft for 12 on the flight line, in the case of Hygua it still gives you same sort of capabilty of an ASW frigate with more help support, where as the LHD does not.

Putting 6x airframes on the ASW carrier gives more capabilty to prosecute a suspected submarine which may tip the favour into the surface combatant whilst not losing the capabilty of short changing your frigate force.

Other would have a better understanding than I, that's just from my perspective of course the AsW carrier would cost more it then you have more capabilty at the same time.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
I... At this time that ex USN ships were vetoed by the GOTD, the same people were seriously considering surplus RN submarines and signed up for modernised used USN helicopters.

Just imagine if the amphibious decision had been revisited and the RAN acquired an Ocean or Chakri Naruebet type LPH, San Giorgio class LPD, even Osumi or Endurance types.
IIRC that was when the Upholder class was available, wasn't it? The Canadians have had a very bad experience, but that seems to have been a combination of the subs deteriorating in storage & the Canucks not examining them closely enough.

I wouldn't recommend Chakri Naruebet. A very small Harrier carrier which makes a poor LPH. Oosumi wasn't available,. The San Giorgio class can't get most helicopters down to the hangar, but that could have been changed. A copy of Zr.Ms. Rotterdam, though . . . . better built than Ocean (done on the cheap, & it shows), hangar for up to 6 helicopters - what's not to like?
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
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IIRC that was when the Upholder class was available, wasn't it? The Canadians have had a very bad experience, but that seems to have been a combination of the subs deteriorating in storage & the Canucks not examining them closely enough.

I wouldn't recommend Chakri Naruebet. A very small Harrier carrier which makes a poor LPH. Oosumi wasn't available,. The San Giorgio class can't get most helicopters down to the hangar, but that could have been changed. A copy of Zr.Ms. Rotterdam, though . . . . better built than Ocean (done on the cheap, & it shows), hangar for up to 6 helicopters - what's not to like?
Exactly, there were many new build options at the time that the money could have been better spent on than the shagged LSTs that were left by the time we got back to the USN on the offer. I just threw in a few different designs with the word "type" to illustrate there were many alternatives. The truly ironic thing is the original project was for a new build LPD or similar with the surplus LSTs being seen as an opportunity to save money and get a second hull.

There was a Canuk exchange officer at COLSPO when I used to play with subs. The Upholders / Victorias were a problem and it wasn't just due to deterioration, they had some quite interesting design features that didn't make sense and in some cases were just plain dangerous. The most obvious is the unprotected electrical systems that were immediately under the conning tower and liable to get wet and catch fire in the event of water egress through the conning tower.

Actually Chakri Naruebet would do just fine, so long as there were a couple of them. With a normal air group of twelve helicopters and harriers, able to be doubled with deck park, a 3D radar, she would have added a significant capability to the RAN at minimal cost. LM2500 GTs and MTU 16V diesels, SPS-52, as well as fitted for but not with four Phalanx and an eight cell Mk-41 VLS and currently being upgraded with SAAB 9LV CS and Sea Giraffe, she would have significant commonality with current RAN systems. She would also be an excellent candidate for a version of the ANZAC ASMD upgrade.
 
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Volkodav

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Whilst I would love to see an Hyuga style platform I cannot see it viable in our situation. I agree that the focus has shifted back to ASW however all the other tasks continue and to forgo those extra frigates would denude the force.

The latest direction of doctrine within the USN and growing within the RAN is Distributed Lethality (there's a good paper in the October Proceedings) and this leads to many more SAG type operations but still requiring the HVU to be protected. This is not cheap on escort numbers and we have barely enough whereas the RN will be in crisis as this doctrine permeates western navies.

In a situation where we had say 4 DDGs and 12 frigates we could easily forgo a couple,of those frigate and acquire a DDH large and that would be our optimal orbit but within the restraints we have it becomes less viable.
Ironically sixteen skimmers is the number the RAN were meant to get, three extra to compensate for the loss of the carrier. Well the initial number was seventeen (so four extra), three DDG, six FFG and eight PF (ANZACs) that was progressively whittled down to the current eleven, the exact number we had when we still had a carrier (Vendetta had already been retired and Vampire was a training ship, while Sydney and Darwin had yet to be delivered).

If I recall correctly the ideal fleet, had Melbourne been replaced, would have been the carrier, three DDG, six FFG (the final two were ordered in 1980) and six high end ASW frigates to replace the River Class DE/FFs, so fifteen skimmers plus Invincible/Australia. The AOR Success was also meant to get a sister that was cancelled following cost overruns and budget blowouts on the project. Interestingly while the accepted narrative today is the yard sucked and the unions were to blame, according to a naval architect I know who was on the project, the issues with data/drawings supplied from France were the main issue, with lack of qualified and experienced trades and technical people, due to an extended period of limited or no work, running a close second. Sounds familiar doesn't it, just like the Australian Frigate Project from the 80s (design data was supplied not specifying units which resulted in some very embarrassing reworks) and the AWD now.

Obviously the biggest issue with the carrier Melbourne was she was a single ship when two or three were obviously needed, a situation that was meant to be addressed in the 70s when then Defmin Frazer announced the planned two ocean navy,in the late 60s, with three carriers and twenty three destroyers and frigates. I believe this was when the government became interested in helicopter carriers and Harriers, as they realised three CTOL carriers, even small CVS types, would be unaffordable. It was also when the DDL was an actual light escort, rather than the defacto DDG it evolved into, and when the RAN expressed interest in and partially funded the original Type 21 concept (slightly larger, faster and equipped with US combat systems).

I suppose, in a nutshell, had the RAN actually received the additional escorts that were meant to compensate for the loss of the carrier capability, or even the number of escorts planned even if we got the carrier, they would now have the hulls to trade off to pay for and support new carriers.
 

alexsa

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The ASW carrier is not going to work in isolation, and I'm not advocating replacing all our ASW frigate capability with a light ASW carrier, personally I think Volk is on the right track, I'm questioning do we need 9x ASW frigates?

Each escort will most likely have only have 1x MH-60R within flying distance of the main body, by having an ASW carrier we have options of either bring more hulls towards a possible contact along with its own helicopter or we can despatch more aircraft off the carrier by either relieving the helicopter insitu or extend operations by refueling from the frigate. GF has said on more than one occasion over the years the more helicopter in to prosecute a target the harder it is for the submarine to evade the screen, also depending on the level of capability with the ASW carrier we also have not lost any of the offensive/defensive capability of losing a frigate hull, with it's capacity for a larger hull mounted sonar plus MK41VLS plus multiple helicopters*

HMAS Melbourne (R21) was primary a ASW carrier it add or lost escorts depending on the threat level, and the mix of aircraft on deck was predicated on its tasking at the time,it would not be much different with a new light ASW carrier
You are still basing your assumptions around a single task force with the capability based on the helo carrier at the expense of more capable escort. It is unlikely that we will be able to confine ourselves to a single escort task. If we have a single carrier with the majority of aviation assets then you are denuding the layered defence and removing aviation from other escort duties.

Reducing the number of escorts to have a helo carrier when we have two LHD and a mirage of other aviation capable ships is a poor return. On investment. As noted before we need a broader escort capability and, if anything, more aviation assets to operate of the escorts, LHD, AOR and LSD-A.
 
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Volkodav

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You are still basing your assumptions around a single task force with the capability based onthe helo carrier any the expense of more capable escort. It is unlikely that we will be able to confine ourselves to a single escort task. If we have a single carrier with the majority of aviation assets then you are denuding the layered defence and removing aviation from other escort duties.

Reducing the number of escorts to have a helo carrier when we have two LHD and a mirage of other aviation capable ships is a poor return. On investment. As noted before we need a broader escort capability and, if anything, more aviation assets to operate of the escorts, LHD, AOR and LSD-A.
Where it really would have worked is back in the 80s when we had the Sea Kings that all of a sudden couldn't get to sea except on Stalwart and Tobruk, then Success, which in turn hobbled Ikara which relied on data fed from the Sea Kings dipping sonar to be used to best effect. We had high end ASW helicopters and ASW missiles in service that were rendered useless, and a surface fleet, suddenly lacking the Skyhawks, Trackers and large ASW helos that was left virtually defnecelss except when operating with allied carriers.

Only the six FFGs would eventually (almost a decade later) be capable of independent operations following the arrival of the Seahawks, though they were still markedly inferior to the DDGs with their lack of a 3D radar, even post FFGUP. The DDGs suffered from their lack of an organic helicopter, meaning they needed to operate with FFGs or allied ships so equipped to be able to adequately defend themselves, let alone be effective, while the River Class frigates, which also lost their Seacat missiles devolved into little more than patrol frigates / gunboats.

In fact after the loss of the carrier things got worse when the DDGs with their 3D radars and valuable command and control facilities were retired without replacement meant that even following the introduction of Seahawk and SM-2, it wasn't until ASMD started to roll out and more recently Romeo entering service that the RAN has begun to claw back some of its comparative capability.

Its not so much the things you can see that makes the difference, its the systems the layman is often completely unaware of that are critical to capability. SM-2 is little more than a longer range SM-1 without a 3D radar, and is very platform reliant for the best performance, Ikara without a dipping sonar was just a torpedo sling and we may as well have just had ASROC. A small carrier, preferably three of them, or even a similar number of Shirane type DDH or even just buying frigates that could operate Sea Kings would have helped, i.e. buying half a dozen later Batch II or Batch III Type 22s from the UK, but instead we spent a decade with the RANs sole ASW capability was ship launched light torpedos an hull mounted sonars.

To put it in context, imagine the RAAF was forced to accept Hornets with ballast instead of radars, or the army had to wait a decade between the retirement of the Centurion and the service entry of the Leopard (or maybe an M-113 with a 90mm gun would be a better analogy), maybe forcing them to retire their SLRs and M-60 GPMGs in the early 80s and having to use upgraded Lee Enfields and Owens until the Styers and Minimis arrived would be a better comparison. Though thinking on it, my understanding is by the mid to late 70s the AIM-9B used by the RAAFs Mirages were inoperable and the aging 30mm ammunition for their cannons was likely to explode on being fired, making the type effectively useless through until the Matra magic missiles were incorporated in the mid 80s. Also the army was actually forced to reintroduce 106mm recoilless rifles to the battalions after the retirement of Milan.
 

spoz

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Hm, well let's talk about the LPA acquistion since people seem to think we had some alternatives.

The situation: Dibb, Beasley and DoA 87. Until the mid 90s we had to justify everything against the defence of the continent, or at least Australian sovereign territory. Then, we had just lost the THSS to a combination of AF dislike of flat decks, Army lack of understanding of amphibiosity, and FDA and the aforesaid DoA perspective.

There was zero chance of getting anything, or so it seemed - and we needed to replace JB (and Vampire although that was then some years in the past) in the training role. A flat deck, which is what we would have undoubtedly preferred, just wasn't going to get up - the cry of the time was "the Navy is just trying to get a carrier by the back door". The Newports loooked like manna from heaven.

We ran a bunch of scenarios showing how useful such platforms would be to move army stuff to the NW area; not for amphibious lodgement and the like but for admin moves; and we proved that given the then state of Aust flagged merchant shipping it was unlikely we could get much there to help. But we initially justified the Bobseys on their use as training platforms. We did as thorough surveys of the LPAs as we could and picked the best two available. A small problem was that, understandably, the USN wouldn't dock them just for us.

A combination of requirements just got us over the line for what seemed like a fairly small investment at the time. The rest, good and bad, is, as they say, history.

Moving on to the Kidds. Costs (in both $ and personnel) and anticipated hull life to give return on investment were always the killers. There would undoubtedly have been resistance to buying second hand from the US again (and remember we also had experience with Goldsborough in that space) if we'd tried hard but it didn't get that far.

So far as I am aware there was never any serious discussion about acquiring the Upholders after the Collins build commenced. There had been in the sense of using that design and possibly taking over a couple of the Brit boats early on, but that was before the design was knocked out. That's not to say that there wasn't discussion of it around the bar in Plats or in the Kingston pub, but that would have been about all.
 

Volkodav

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Hm, well let's talk about the LPA acquistion since people seem to think we had some alternatives.

The situation: Dibb, Beasley and DoA 87. Until the mid 90s we had to justify everything against the defence of the continent, or at least Australian sovereign territory. Then, we had just lost the THSS to a combination of AF dislike of flat decks, Army lack of understanding of amphibiosity, and FDA and the aforesaid DoA perspective.

There was zero chance of getting anything, or so it seemed - and we needed to replace JB (and Vampire although that was then some years in the past) in the training role. A flat deck, which is what we would have undoubtedly preferred, just wasn't going to get up - the cry of the time was "the Navy is just trying to get a carrier by the back door". The Newports loooked like manna from heaven.

We ran a bunch of scenarios showing how useful such platforms would be to move army stuff to the NW area; not for amphibious lodgement and the like but for admin moves; and we proved that given the then state of Aust flagged merchant shipping it was unlikely we could get much there to help. But we initially justified the Bobseys on their use as training platforms. We did as thorough surveys of the LPAs as we could and picked the best two available. A small problem was that, understandably, the USN wouldn't dock them just for us.

A combination of requirements just got us over the line for what seemed like a fairly small investment at the time. The rest, good and bad, is, as they say, history.

Moving on to the Kidds. Costs (in both $ and personnel) and anticipated hull life to give return on investment were always the killers. There would undoubtedly have been resistance to buying second hand from the US again (and remember we also had experience with Goldsborough in that space) if we'd tried hard but it didn't get that far.

So far as I am aware there was never any serious discussion about acquiring the Upholders after the Collins build commenced. There had been in the sense of using that design and possibly taking over a couple of the Brit boats early on, but that was before the design was knocked out. That's not to say that there wasn't discussion of it around the bar in Plats or in the Kingston pub, but that would have been about all.
Upholders were definitely on the cards as John Moore wanted to scrap the entire Collins project as a political stunt and they were what was available. The RAN examined them in some detail and said no way. This is public domain and admitted to by Moore himself in interviews for the book on the Collins project, not just recollection's of gf and I.
 

t68

Well-Known Member
Upholders were definitely on the cards as John Moore wanted to scrap the entire Collins project as a political stunt and they were what was available. The RAN examined them in some detail and said no way. This is public domain and admitted to by Moore himself in interviews for the book on the Collins project, not just recollection's of gf and I.
Crikey I didn't know that they were going to scrap the Collins project, I have seen GF tales on a possabile 2nd Squadron using Upholders untill they had a look at the state they were in. I'm also fairly sure that Bomber Beazely has come out wishing they had taken up the options on the Collins class to either 8 or 9 boats.
 

hairyman

Active Member
I notice that both Japan and South Korea who both have more Aegis than us, are ordering more.It is clear that 3 are not enough, and our three would probably be the poorest of all Aegis destroyers with only 48 VLS. I would like us to have four more destroyers, 2 Aegis AWD, 2 general purpose, with tomahawks and other weapons. Maybe built on the German hull, and armed with at least 64 VLS.

And each to have room for two helicopters.

Shoot me down.
 

spoz

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Upholders were definitely on the cards as John Moore wanted to scrap the entire Collins project as a political stunt and they were what was available. The RAN examined them in some detail and said no way. This is public domain and admitted to by Moore himself in interviews for the book on the Collins project, not just recollection's of gf and I.
Like I said, no serious discussion! - we've examined hundreds of things over the years at the behest of various Governments or because there was interest in the Department - but real intent is something quite different. To take an example from further back in time, we once looked quite hard at the San Giorgios, but we never thought we would actually buy one; and there are plenty of others.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
I notice that both Japan and South Korea who both have more Aegis than us, are ordering more.It is clear that 3 are not enough, and our three would probably be the poorest of all Aegis destroyers with only 48 VLS. I would like us to have four more destroyers, 2 Aegis AWD, 2 general purpose, with tomahawks and other weapons. Maybe built on the German hull, and armed with at least 64 VLS.

And each to have room for two helicopters.

Shoot me down.
Sounds like the Baby Burke. If memory serves it would have come with 64 VLS. It also would have operated 2 helicopters so it would have been a strong contender for SEA 5000.

Gibbs and Cox were even the preferred designer and then they went with Navantia instead because it was "less risky"
 

gf0012-aust

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So far as I am aware there was never any serious discussion about acquiring the Upholders after the Collins build commenced. There had been in the sense of using that design and possibly taking over a couple of the Brit boats early on, but that was before the design was knocked out. That's not to say that there wasn't discussion of it around the bar in Plats or in the Kingston pub, but that would have been about all.
there certainly was.

I was in the room when VADM Chris Barrie basically had the discussion about why we would not get them and that they were a disaster in the making - in fact he made the reference that for all of the problems with Collins in that timeframe we were still better off fixing and possibly buying more of the class rather than invest in a second squadron of a different class and with huge problems of their own. There was an LO from the Canadian Navy present as well so it was even more of a curisoity for many in the room that the canucks bit that bullet after the Upholders were excoriated so clearly.
 

gf0012-aust

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Crikey I didn't know that they were going to scrap the Collins project, I have seen GF tales on a possabile 2nd Squadron using Upholders untill they had a look at the state they were in. I'm also fairly sure that Bomber Beazely has come out wishing they had taken up the options on the Collins class to either 8 or 9 boats.
Yep Moore was on a mission to kill them off despite the advice given about how the engineering and project management problems were just a point in time.

In fact he gave a briefing to industry where he went off the reservation and ignored the speech done by the naval LO of the time - and I know that as the RAN LO was sitting at my table and groaning because Moore had diverted from the speech that he had written and was speaking rubbish

Few people at the time were aware that Moore was dyslexic and fond of the amber and urine coloured imbibes, so there was always a concern that he was either loaded up or just compensating for his dyslexia. In the case of his rant at the Conf in 98 he was loaded up and letting his personal beliefs drive his decision making.

He made Stephen Smith look like a war gaming enthusiast in comparison
 

gf0012-aust

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Like I said, no serious discussion! - we've examined hundreds of things over the years at the behest of various Governments or because there was interest in the Department - but real intent is something quite different. To take an example from further back in time, we once looked quite hard at the San Giorgios, but we never thought we would actually buy one; and there are plenty of others.
No, there was serious discussion about standing up a second squadron of Upholders while Collins was remediated. VADM Chris Barrie and various others were dead against it. The investigations of the boats by RAN were also sufficient to treat the concept as something coming from the "good idea faeries" and were dismissed. It was part of the risk mitigation considerations around late delivery of Collins.

In fact, somewhere deep in the bowels of Defence, there would be VHS records (if not coverted to digital for archives) of VADM Barries 45min speech about it.

There were about 450 people in the room at the time as well. Allied friendlies, 5I's and restricted volume of invited industry.
 

t68

Well-Known Member
I notice that both Japan and South Korea who both have more Aegis than us, are ordering more.It is clear that 3 are not enough,
.
Just for curiosity sake's, now the third AWD hull is being built could they continue with a batch II AWD or would it take to long for the long lead item to arrive for a continuous build cycle?
 

Volkodav

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Was working in engineering at AWD when a crotchety old ex Vickers UK STO launched on a rant about the Collins and how the RAN should have bought Upholders instead. Though he had an interested audience of Navantia people and others new to defence there was a universal groan fron the ex subs people. I managed to ask him if he'd asked anyone from the RCN what they thought of them.
 

Volkodav

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Just for curiosity sake's, now the third AWD hull is being built could they continue with a batch II AWD or would it take to long for the long lead item to arrive for a continuous build cycle?
That would be my preferred option, even less risk than the Sea5000 version of the F-100 and an opportunity to full sort and derisk the future frigate. The problems as I see it would be whether the required second helicopter could be worked in, long lead items such as AEGIS, propulsion machinery etc. and whether it could be sorted out sufficiently on the signatures side of things to deliver the required ASW performance.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
I came across this nice little video of the first AWD and her sea trials. It is on the ASC facebook page. There is also another nice little video regarding the full cycle docking of HMAS Farncomb

https://player.vimeo.com/video/188766390
I actually found the video on the Full Cycle Docking of the HMAS Farncomb interesting. The 10/2 cycle will see it serve through to 2026. The Collins is next ... which will see it through to 2028.

It means that both boats will have to go through an additional FCD to continue serving until the first of the new submarines become available.

I wonder if we could find ourselves with another looming capability gap around the 2030s.
 
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