NZDF General discussion thread

[Novascotiaboy]

40 Deg south

After a quick read the two points that stood out to me were;

Page 18. Minister sought advice on air transport options and chose to not act on the advice. Presumably C17 but not stated.

Page 47. Total expenditure on the C130 upgrade $261 million.

Other than that just typical known financials.

 

[40 deg south]

40 Deg south

After a quick read the two points that stood out to me were;

Page 18. Minister sought advice on air transport options and chose to not act on the advice. Presumably C17 but not stated.

Page 47. Total expenditure on the C130 upgrade $261 million.

Other than that just typical known financials.

Thanks Nova. It's a bit above and beyond the call of duty for someone in your remote northern fastness to read through it.

I'm confident the (rejected) advice on a transport acquisition was the aborted bid for the last C-17. Hence my scepticism that the govt will change it's mind and make a late bid for the remaining white-tail.

The Defence Ministry indicated an indicative pathway for paying for it, by deferring the new naval acquisitions and cutting back hours and airframes in the C-130 and B757 fleets. The government presumably didn't want to disrupt the naval programme, and weren't willing to inject additional funds to allow both sets of purchases to go ahead. Probably because that would have imperiled the politically-crucial surplus in the government accounts.

I can't help wondering if we will look back on the failure to purchase a couple of C-17s as one of the great missed opportunities in NZ defence procurement.

 

[Novascotiaboy]

40Deg south

Believe it or not I have read every document that I can find online from cover to cover related to the NZDF since the inception of the internet. I have had a love affair with your country ever since I was a kid. My interest in military affairs is just one component of my interest in New Zealand.

NZ spent a quarter of a billion dollars on an ill advised upgrade of the oldest flying C130's in military service only to get ten years extra at the most out of them. The lowest price won the contract for the Project Protector fleet and how much has been spent since to realize functional assets? The ACF was disbanded in an effort to redirect funds to other military programs but did that really happen? $700 million for eight NH90's that don't have auto fold rotors. The LAV's were bought to a single turreted design when it was known they wouldn't fit in the existing C130 fleet. But there have been glimmers of hope in the form of the AW109 A/LUH's, the ANZAC frigates although three would have been better, the T-6's, the MHOV trucks, and the entire small arms replacement program.

Let's hope these recent successes will continue with the Endeavor replacement, the LOSC and the third OPV. I think the right decision will be made regarding air transport in the form of anything other than A400.

P8 IMHO is a bridge too far I am afraid. Serious consideration needs to be given to alternatives that will allow sufficient numbers and allow other programs to be funded concurrently. Let's hope that the Japanese really want to promote their P1 and C2 aircraft as I believe this is the right decision on three points. Politics, capability and cost effectiveness.

The NZDF is a quality outfit with exceptional people past and present giving their all for their country. Like Canada, your government needs to move past the 1% of GDP that it spends because each year that goes by only allows the deficit in equipment and resources to continue to grow.

Canadian by birth, German in ancestry, Kiwi wannabe.

 

[kiwipatriot69]

Nova, i couldnt have put it better myself.although i have read the Lav purchase itself was largely responsible for the release of funds saved from axing the ACF. Mind you, had we decided to upgrade our M113 along with Australia we would have ended up with a outsized vehicle anyway, with all the redundancies and issues they had with the programme. Agreed, i cant help but think there is a danger one project like P8 or another could be prioritised to the detriment of other purchases, the right balance is needed, or preferably, more money injected into the budget overall.

 

[Novascotiaboy]

Kiwipatriot69

My comment regarding the LAV purchase was related to buying all vehicles with turrets. I would have considered the basic infantry section carrier without the 25 mm turret for a portion of the buy along with specialist vehicles like engineering and recovery vehicles plus ambulances and mortar carriers.

The question I have always had was why all 105 with turrets? What was the threat driver for the decision? It's very well understood that the South Pacific threat is minimal as no adversary in the region has even a lick of armour nor anti armour capacity. IIRC the Scorpions numbered in the mid twenties and there were seventy some M113's in various models none of which had more than a pintle mounted HMG.

Even a split of 50 with and 55 without would have provided a mixed fleet with a more flexible ability to respond to threats.

Even a mixed fleet of tracked and wheels would have had more flexibility in the South Pacific. But all this is moot as the wheels are in the dirt and you have to live with them now.

 

[RegR]

Kiwipatriot69

My comment regarding the LAV purchase was related to buying all vehicles with turrets. I would have considered the basic infantry section carrier without the 25 mm turret for a portion of the buy along with specialist vehicles like engineering and recovery vehicles plus ambulances and mortar carriers.

The question I have always had was why all 105 with turrets? What was the threat driver for the decision? It's very well understood that the South Pacific threat is minimal as no adversary in the region has even a lick of armour nor anti armour capacity. IIRC the Scorpions numbered in the mid twenties and there were seventy some M113's in various models none of which had more than a pintle mounted HMG.

Even a split of 50 with and 55 without would have provided a mixed fleet with a more flexible ability to respond to threats.

Even a mixed fleet of tracked and wheels would have had more flexibility in the South Pacific. But all this is moot as the wheels are in the dirt and you have to live with them now.

The 25mm LAVs were the compromise between the loss of the fire support from the scorpions and the requirement (at the time) to equip both battalions with organic lift rather than just one and share as per. Ambitious as the chances of sending a full LAV equipped battalion on ops (nevermind 2) and requiring an entire complement in NZ to train, re-train, rotate with back in NZ is somewhat overkill. The extra firepower is the key here as with no organic "tank" support this is our hitting power per se and if we did require to move LAV quickly by air then chances are firepower would be a key enabler especially for the small numbers we would be able to move anyway, therefore the turret would still be favoured regardless of our own ability to transport them by air (for now). Want a .50 then just as easy to fly in 2 armoured pinnys (C/W its issues).

I think they are finally starting to realise one size does not suit all applications, especially for us as I would argue even NZLAV would struggle, overkill, unsuited to most regional island scenarios in terms of size, weight, mobility, application issues etc. The lighter tracked M113s still had theirwork cut out for them in ET and this is no doubt the type of op they would utilise LAV as response versus Solomans, Bougainville types anyway. Hopefully they rectify this and take note from the SF project in terms of a range of vehicles to better suit varied missions, not sure if that means a tracked option but definately consider size, weight and armament options.

On the C17 issue, has anyone considered that maybe we did not "miss" our oppourtunity but merely did not select it as per any other project? Every project talks up assesed capabilities as they are doing exactly that, selling it, along with providing pathways, considerations, costings, compromise and the like giving comparisons to assist in any eventual selection process, the shortened timeframe is what seemingly pushed it to the front of attention in this particular instance. Sure it has benefits but it also brings with it considerations to be factored in as an overall aqquisition for not only now but the next 40-50 years good an bad. The C17 is by no means a new capability and the other advantage of wide use within our allies is we actually already know it rather intimately, pros and cons, and could very well have been assesed, compared and dis-counted as per any other potential platform rather than we took too long to make a D and lost out. The thing with options is there are others, just need to select the right one and not always as easy as simply getting the biggest or the newest or the cheapest etc etc.

 

[John Fedup]

On the C17 issue, has anyone considered that maybe we did not "miss" our oppourtunity but merely did not select it as per any other project? Every project talks up assesed capabilities as they are doing exactly that, selling it, along with providing pathways, considerations, costings, compromise and the like giving comparisons to assist in any eventual selection process, the shortened timeframe is what seemingly pushed it to the front of attention in this particular instance. Sure it has benefits but it also brings with it considerations to be factored in as an overall aqquisition for not only now but the next 40-50 years good an bad. The C17 is by no means a new capability and the other advantage of wide use within our allies is we actually already know it rather intimately, pros and cons, and could very well have been assesed, compared and dis-counted as per any other potential platform rather than we took too long to make a D and lost out. The thing with options is there are others, just need to select the right one and not always as easy as simply getting the biggest or the newest or the cheapest etc etc.

This is just a guess on my part but perhaps the A400M was the front runner but then the stuff hit the fan with the A400M's development and by the time the re-thinking on what to do next was underway, the C-17s sales were faster than the re-think process. Canada's Afghanistan role made our C-17s possible. Had this mission not occurred, our pollies and military procurement people may well have missed the opportunity to acquire these jets. Maybe a miss on our part might have left a couple of jets for NZ to acquire.

 

[Rob c]

Nova, i couldnt have put it better myself.although i have read the Lav purchase itself was largely responsible for the release of funds saved from axing the ACF. Mind you, had we decided to upgrade our M113 along with Australia we would have ended up with a outsized vehicle anyway, with all the redundancies and issues they had with the programme. Agreed, i cant help but think there is a danger one project like P8 or another could be prioritised to the detriment of other purchases, the right balance is needed, or preferably, more money injected into the budget overall.

For the interested there was a treasury report about 2004 which showed the actual savings on the scraping of the AFC were less than $30m per annum. The figures put out to justify the scrapping which were over $100m included such things as the capital charge, depreciation, the proportional cost of run Ohakea and other proportional costs, etc, which of course can not be saved. The report was quickly pigeon holed for obvious political reasons.

 

[kiwipatriot69]

Yes, sold off a much needed capability for loose change,not thinking ahead. In my honest opinion, and i expect flak for this, the Nh90 and Lav 3 progammes were and incredible drain of funds , a refit of some m113 and earlier purchase of special operations vehicles for SAS,in middle east operations i would have gone for

Given the fact Lav 3 was so expensive, under used,and lacking in variants. Having the Heuys replaced with same numbers of A109 plus current trainers, would have given us twice as many rotary frames,yes less lift, but at only 6 million per aircraft, opposed to what, $70 million Nh90? More than enough savings for an extra frigate, and lease those 28 F16 offered at the time.

Surely defence must have seen the writing on the wall regards to South china seas, and seen an ACF, extra Frigate as much more important to security than armour we cant move, ditto for medium helicopter lift?

 

[Sam W]

South China Sea

With the current high tensions in the South China Sea, it is one of the most probable things to ignite a major conflict in which New Zealand would be involved. If the situation in the South China Sea continues to deteriorate, what would be the logical defense acquisitions that New Zealand could make (beyond what is already planned) to strengthen our position?

 

[ngatimozart]

With the current high tensions in the South China Sea, it is one of the most probable things to ignite a major conflict in which New Zealand would be involved. If the situation in the South China Sea continues to deteriorate, what would be the logical defense acquisitions that New Zealand could make (beyond what is already planned) to strengthen our position?

Some pollies with some intestinal fortitude.

 

[Rob c]

Some pollies with some intestinal fortitude.

If you dug up our pollies in a century or two how many would not look like this. any guesses or is it too obvious?

 

[ngatimozart]

With the current high tensions in the South China Sea, it is one of the most probable things to ignite a major conflict in which New Zealand would be involved. If the situation in the South China Sea continues to deteriorate, what would be the logical defense acquisitions that New Zealand could make (beyond what is already planned) to strengthen our position?

Ok, now for the serious answer to your question. There are quite a few posts in this thread that discuss this and I would suggest that the following post of Mr C's from 10th April 2016 answers your question reasonably well.

The NZG cannot do everything alone and it will never be able to fend off any significant asymetrical or conventional military or security threat. As long as it is able to provide responses to likely scenarios on its doorstep and also maintain a credible contribution to the regional and global security umbrella, noting that interdependency is a virtue in our limited circumstances, then I really think that realistically we doing OK. One thing it does have is through its relationships and contributions, its valuable membership of the FYES alliance. So overall the NZDF might seem a tier 3 player in the scheme of things, we actually have a seat at a very important tier 1 intelligence table. We are far more likely to know of any curveball thrown at us far earlier than most.

The NZDF has Seven main priority areas, however they have different degrees of emphasis and funding. They are all important and need to be resourced and recognised. The question regarding the future structure or solutions for the NZDF in the years ahead therefore need to be focused on sufficient resources that can achieve the following outcomes.

1. Maintain and protect the sovereignty of the ‘Realm of NZ’, its EEZ and its protectorates.

2. Provide as directed, contributions to coalition Task Forces using Land, Air and Maritime Force components alongside like-minded nations and formal allies. For example UNSC Chapter VII mandated Peace Enforcement scenarios.

3. Provide as directed, contributions to Humanitarian and Disaster Support within the Realm of NZ and the South Pacific or further afield if the NZ government choses.

4. Provide as directed, contributions of Land, Air and Maritime components to UNSC Chapter VI mandated Peace Keeping scenarios.

5. Provide as directed, contributions of Land, Air and Maritime components to Security and Stabilization Scenarios within the Pacific Forum region under the auspices of the Biketawa Declaration enabled under UNSC Chapter VIII.

6. Provide as directed, specialist equipment and personal to enable Multi-Agency Operations and Tasking assistance to the New Zealand Government.

7. Develop and support New Zealand’s military heritage & history, its Veterans community, and its international Defence relationships.

Of the 7 points above the one that needs addressing is point 2. Points 3 to 7 we actually are doing OK with. Some countries ignore a lot of those kind of soft or smart power activities, we are being good global citizens by doing so. We are not addressing the weaknesses in point 2 and should. By being able to contribute valid capabilities to potential higher level conflict scenarios we would also be reinforcing any potential security fish-hooks that may undermine our capacity to secure point one, which is kind of the overarching rationale.

But of course we have to and must, still maintain those policy points 3-7 as outlined above. I actually think the road map ahead is good with Future 2035 and the JATF approach. It is just that it needs to be substantially resourced better to get greater efficacy out of our expeditionary contributions to Chp VII coalitions. Ideally three capable frigates, the Endeavour replacement, LWSV, and a future MRASS at the heart of our naval expeditionary capability. The ability to rotate a CATG, and have the ability to concurrently a deploy if directed a LGT and a SpecFor capability and finally an improved strategic and tactical air mobility as well as integration into BAMS. Those capabilities would really have us able to make a solid contribution to any Chp VII scenario or regional security umbrella. What is missing? Well a multi-role air combat capability is obvious however the horizons on that are limited and would involve Santa Claus.

As Mr C states Point 2 is the one that really needs addressing:

2. Provide as directed, contributions to coalition Task Forces using Land, Air and Maritime Force components alongside like-minded nations and formal allies. For example UNSC Chapter VII mandated Peace Enforcement scenarios.

And that is where we have the problem. With regard specifically to the SCS situation, if that becomes hot then we would become involved whether we liked it or not. We would be dragged in. It appears that it would most likely be an air and sea based conflict so that means we would have air and sea elements involved. Hence we really need to strengthen our air and naval combat and surveillance forces sooner rather than later. unfortunately this requires substantial treasure and political will of which the later is significantly lacking. Part of the problem is that Kiwis ignore that fact that we are a maritime nation even though we have a reputation for being good sailors and do well at sailing.

 

[RegR]

Yes, sold off a much needed capability for loose change,not thinking ahead. In my honest opinion, and i expect flak for this, the Nh90 and Lav 3 progammes were and incredible drain of funds , a refit of some m113 and earlier purchase of special operations vehicles for SAS,in middle east operations i would have gone for

Given the fact Lav 3 was so expensive, under used,and lacking in variants. Having the Heuys replaced with same numbers of A109 plus current trainers, would have given us twice as many rotary frames,yes less lift, but at only 6 million per aircraft, opposed to what, $70 million Nh90? More than enough savings for an extra frigate, and lease those 28 F16 offered at the time.

Surely defence must have seen the writing on the wall regards to South china seas, and seen an ACF, extra Frigate as much more important to security than armour we cant move, ditto for medium helicopter lift?

Whilst I agree we may have initially aqquired too many LAV for the structure we are now geared towards (strangely enough gone full circle) whether or not LAV itself was the wrong choice is another question as I believe it does cover off scenarios just not all but again that is a big ask for any one vehicle platform. We do not have the luxury of being able to support multiple types like our allies to cover a wider gambit of missions so wheeled LAV is the compromise that is somewhat common to all and ticks the majority of boxes for our requirements as well.

The A109 is a good helo for what is envisaged for ie training and light support tasks but is woefully inadequate in battlefeild transport for army and medium lift. It can barely lift a det minus their gear nevermind a fully equipped section so in fact we would need to use more (alot more) frames to move a directed company lift in time so actually a false economy. The A109 is actually smaller than the huey so would infact be a step backwards for the most part if it was our main helo type. A medium lift helo also enables us range of other options in terms of lift and operation both civil and military that the A109 simply cannot do regardless of how many numbers you throw at it.

The thing when aqquiring these types of capabilities is not only the current situation but also trying to future proof whilst also not repeating the legacy issues of lessons learned so infact requires alot of thought and planning, a juggling act sometimes full of give and take to find a happy (or as close too) median. In short you pay for what you get and hopefully get what you pay for.

 

[Novascotiaboy]

RegR

When the original competition was run what was the key points that tipped the win to the NH90 over the AW139. The AW139 was designed as a Huey replacement and would have allowed more air frames to be acquired. The AW139 could have been in service sooner and would have delivered similar capabilities albeit without a ramp.

Given the low number of air frames acquired the NZDF is limited in the number of concurrent operations that can take place. Quantity has a quality unto itself.

Although moot now a fleet of fourteen AW139 and twelve AW109 would have provided a one for one replacement of the Huey and allow eight A/LUH for general utility missions plus four AW109 for training.

Using available sources a militarized AW139 would be less than half that of an NH90 with similar abilities. Definitely not equals but a very capable aircraft.

Using the current JATF concept a more appropriate mix of rotary aircraft would have been five AW101 in full navalized kit for use from naval vessels and as heavy transports, ten AW139 for medium domestic tasks and ten AW109 for utility and training. Again I realize that three types and more air frames would have never happened but just think of the capabilities that this would have offered.

Plus I think it could have been done at a similar or less cost as to what was purchased.

 

[40 deg south]

Australia and New Zealand—so near yet so far | The Strategist

New Zealand–Australia defence differences: what’s the big deal? | The Strategist

Couple of posts here from ASPI's The Strategist blog on the Aust-NZ defence relationship.

 

[40 deg south]

RegR

When the original competition was run what was the key points that tipped the win to the NH90 over the AW139. The AW139 was designed as a Huey replacement and would have allowed more air frames to be acquired. The AW139 could have been in service sooner and would have delivered similar capabilities albeit without a ramp.

Given the low number of air frames acquired the NZDF is limited in the number of concurrent operations that can take place. Quantity has a quality unto itself.

Although moot now a fleet of fourteen AW139 and twelve AW109 would have provided a one for one replacement of the Huey and allow eight A/LUH for general utility missions plus four AW109 for training.

Using available sources a militarized AW139 would be less than half that of an NH90 with similar abilities. Definitely not equals but a very capable aircraft.

Using the current JATF concept a more appropriate mix of rotary aircraft would have been five AW101 in full navalized kit for use from naval vessels and as heavy transports, ten AW139 for medium domestic tasks and ten AW109 for utility and training. Again I realize that three types and more air frames would have never happened but just think of the capabilities that this would have offered.

Plus I think it could have been done at a similar or less cost as to what was purchased.

Nova
Someone has previously posted in some detail on the selection process that led to the NH90 being selected - hopefully they can give a summary. As well as the AW139, the Blackhawk was a proven utility helicopter available at much lower cost.

My perhaps cynical suspicion is that the air force became overly fixated on a very shiny new toy, and were too willing to take vendors claims at face value.

On the other hand, at least they didn't order the Sikorsky S/H-92, which I understand was also seriously considered. Luckily for NZ, Canada took that bullet for us!

 

[ASSAIL]

Australia and New Zealand—so near yet so far | The Strategist

New Zealand–Australia defence differences: what’s the big deal? | The Strategist

Couple of posts here from ASPI's The Strategist blog on the Aust-NZ defence relationship.

An interesting POV from each side of the Tasman.
The only point I wish to make regarding Robert Ayson's assertion that Australia needs more focus and relevance in the Pacific is, that the Pacific is relatively benign and of lesser importance than the Indo/SE Asia to Australia's security (and to NZ for that matter). Naturally PNG, Solomon Is and Fiji could be trouble spots but again, the ADF is well,equipped to deal with them, the question is, could NZDF with its current capability?

 

[t68]

Australia and New Zealand—so near yet so far | The Strategist

New Zealand–Australia defence differences: what’s the big deal? | The Strategist

Couple of posts here from ASPI's The Strategist blog on the Aust-NZ defence relationship.

Very thought provoking couple of paragraph, would be interesting to see what would happen, something mirroring Singapore perhaps capabilty wise?

It’d be unkind to suggest that New Zealand’s principled approach to world affairs is only possible because of Australia’s more pragmatic approach.* But the idea gains traction if you perform the thought experiment of erasing Australia from the map. What would New Zealand’s foreign and defence policy look like in such an alternative world?

 

[ngatimozart]

Very thought provoking couple of paragraph, would be interesting to see what would happen, something mirroring Singapore perhaps capabilty wise?
"It’d be unkind to suggest that New Zealand’s principled approach to world affairs is only possible because of Australia’s more pragmatic approach.* But the idea gains traction if you perform the thought experiment of erasing Australia from the map. What would New Zealand’s foreign and defence policy look like in such an alternative world?"

When you cut and paste something from a published source please provide a link to that source. It prevents any allegations of plagiarism and breaches of copyright laws. This is the link: Australia and New Zealand—so near yet so far | The Strategist

Well if for some reason that Australia were to disappear from the map, we'd win the netball and the rugby league hands down but would have nobody to fight with over the origin of the pavlova. On the more serious note, there sure would be a big panic in Wellington. As a thought experiment NZ would of had a different history from 1642 onwards because you would be looking at alternate timelines, so that's what you would have to base your thought experiment on. What differences would there be to the colonisation of NZ and subsequent NZ history.? What impacts would have the non existence of the Australian land mass have had on the Pacific War during World War 2? Those two major events would have informed the NZ world view significantly.