The NZG cannot do everything alone and it will never be able to fend off any significant asymetrical or conventional military or security threat. As long as it is able to provide responses to likely scenarios on its doorstep and also maintain a credible contribution to the regional and global security umbrella, noting that interdependency is a virtue in our limited circumstances, then I really think that realistically we doing OK. One thing it does have is through its relationships and contributions, its valuable membership of the FYES alliance. So overall the NZDF might seem a tier 3 player in the scheme of things, we actually have a seat at a very important tier 1 intelligence table. We are far more likely to know of any curveball thrown at us far earlier than most.
The NZDF has Seven main priority areas, however they have different degrees of emphasis and funding. They are all important and need to be resourced and recognised. The question regarding the future structure or solutions for the NZDF in the years ahead therefore need to be focused on sufficient resources that can achieve the following outcomes.
1. Maintain and protect the sovereignty of the ‘Realm of NZ’, its EEZ and its protectorates.
2. Provide as directed, contributions to coalition Task Forces using Land, Air and Maritime Force components alongside like-minded nations and formal allies. For example UNSC Chapter VII mandated Peace Enforcement scenarios.
3. Provide as directed, contributions to Humanitarian and Disaster Support within the Realm of NZ and the South Pacific or further afield if the NZ government choses.
4. Provide as directed, contributions of Land, Air and Maritime components to UNSC Chapter VI mandated Peace Keeping scenarios.
5. Provide as directed, contributions of Land, Air and Maritime components to Security and Stabilization Scenarios within the Pacific Forum region under the auspices of the Biketawa Declaration enabled under UNSC Chapter VIII.
6. Provide as directed, specialist equipment and personal to enable Multi-Agency Operations and Tasking assistance to the New Zealand Government.
7. Develop and support New Zealand’s military heritage & history, its Veterans community, and its international Defence relationships.
Of the 7 points above the one that needs addressing is point 2. Points 3 to 7 we actually are doing OK with. Some countries ignore a lot of those kind of soft or smart power activities, we are being good global citizens by doing so. We are not addressing the weaknesses in point 2 and should. By being able to contribute valid capabilities to potential higher level conflict scenarios we would also be reinforcing any potential security fish-hooks that may undermine our capacity to secure point one, which is kind of the overarching rationale.
But of course we have to and must, still maintain those policy points 3-7 as outlined above. I actually think the road map ahead is good with Future 2035 and the JATF approach. It is just that it needs to be substantially resourced better to get greater efficacy out of our expeditionary contributions to Chp VII coalitions. Ideally three capable frigates, the Endeavour replacement, LWSV, and a future MRASS at the heart of our naval expeditionary capability. The ability to rotate a CATG, and have the ability to concurrently a deploy if directed a LGT and a SpecFor capability and finally an improved strategic and tactical air mobility as well as integration into BAMS. Those capabilities would really have us able to make a solid contribution to any Chp VII scenario or regional security umbrella. What is missing? Well a multi-role air combat capability is obvious however the horizons on that are limited and would involve Santa Claus.