South China Sea thoughts?

STURM

Well-Known Member
By the same token, at what point would the US consider the use of a tactical nuclear weapon in order to protect a highly valued asset or prevent a significant defeat?
And how far would the U.S. be willing to go to defend the Philippines in the events of things getting worse between the Philippines and China. No doubt the prestige of the U.S. would be at stake and the Philippines is a treaty ally but would the U.S. risk getting into a full blown war - with all its political and economic consequences - with China over the Philippines? Even after relations suffered following the pull out from Clark and Subic; the U.S. maintained that it would defend the Philippines from external threats but that this would not include threats arising over disputed areas such as the Spratlys. I suppose another question that can be asked is would the Philippines be so vocal and assertive without the knowledge that it was linked to the U.S. by a defence treaty?
 

tonnyc

Well-Known Member
I don't think US relationship with the Philippines nor its exact obligations with regard to the Mutual Defense Treaty are the major consideration here. A more important consideration is how the US will view the Chinese attempt to turn the South China Sea into a Chinese lake. I am not talking figuratively here. The Chinese is not claiming a mere EEZ in the South China Sea. Their own propaganda consistently say that the seas within the Eleven Dash Line is Chinese sovereign territory. I'm not quite sure whether this means something like territorial sea for archipelagic states or more like how continental states treat inland waters. I suspect, given the noise about ADIZ and the fact that China is historically a continental power, the latter.

(And before anyone tries to lecture me about Admiral Zheng He's expedition, let me remind you that his expeditions were shut down by his own government because they saw them as a waste of money and was never resumed.)

Presumably it is not in US interest to see the South China Sea turn into a Chinese lake. But how much effort is it willing to spend to counter the Chinese effort? That I can't predict, but the calculations on both sides will consider the Philippines as only a minor factor. (Sorry to the Filipinos out there, but the fact is that the Philippines is militarily insignificant compared to the two powers.)

If the Philippines start acting in ways contrary to US interest, the US will discreetly ask the Philippines to stop it. But if the Philippines does not stop, the US will just shrug and help someone else. Vietnam, maybe.

And if you look at actual events, we can see that the higher ups in the Philippines are well aware of the scope of the MDT. Actual military procurements are modest. Actual Philippine naval ships tries to evade the Chinese coast guard ships instead of confronting them head on. Chinese propaganda of course portrays everything as provocative. Buying FA-50 is a provocation. Sending supplies is a provocation. International arbitration is provocation. Asking for a joint communique in ASEAN is provocation. Anything that is not capitulation is provocation. But if we ignore the Chinese portrayal and examine things from an American POV (the question involves the US-Philippines MDT, hence the use of an American POV), then very few of what the Philippines did is actually provocative. I think there is that incident where a Philippine Coast Guard ship shot a Taiwanese fishing ship, but a. That's a low rank coast guard ship possibly overstepping his bound, not a high command order, b. It involves a Taiwanese ship, not a Communist China one, and c. It happened in the Luzon Strait between the island of Luzon and Taiwan.

Tldr version: it is never about the Philippines and its MDT. It's about the strategic implications of the South China Sea becoming a Chinese lake. The Philippines is just a minor actor and everyone knows it.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
is never about the Philippines and its MDT. It's about the strategic implications of the South China Sea becoming a Chinese lake. The Philippines is just a minor actor and everyone knows it.
My question still stands : in the event that things get out of hand between the Philippines and China [e.g. a chance encounter at sea between a Chinese Maritime OPV and a Philippines naval ship that rapidly spirals out of control; leading to one sided military action, which the Chinese - no surprises - will say is justified] how far would the U.S. be willing to go to defend or bolster a treaty ally? I'm not suggesting that the sinking of a Philippines naval ship will automatically result in the U.S. being involved in military action but there will be a U.S. reaction [in the form of an increased naval presence for example] and that in turn will lead to the Chinese responding.

If the U.S. didn't act what kind of message would this send to various countries linked to the U.S. via a defence treaty, what message would it send to China and what message would it send to countries who welcome the presence of the U.S. in the region as a counterweight against China? No doubt, the U.S. will publicly remind the various claimants to ensure things not get out of hand and no country, including China wants things to spiral out of control but things can happen unexpectedly at short notice and history is full of examples of countries being dragged to war because of treaty obligations.
 

tonnyc

Well-Known Member
I'm going to admit that I don't know and I'm going to speculate further that no one knows, including the government of the US.

The US isn't going to commit to any sort of "if China does this we'll do that" beyond what is already in the MDT because that will just restrict their options for no good reason. Instead, they will decide it when the incident actually happened according to the conditions at the time. Most likely in the form of increased naval presence, but if you want more specifics than that, nobody knows for sure.

I guess the upper bound limit on the possible actions is war, but that will require something bloody stupid on China's part, like perhaps attacking the Philippine main islands or attacking US ships which I can't believe China will do because there's no gain in doing that.

The lower bound limit on the possible actions is the US abandoning the Philippines to their fate, but that will require the Philippines to do something bloody stupid like declaring war on China on their own, which I can't believe they will do because they know the MDT isn't some magic document that will immediately drag the US to any and all conflict.

I realize that you aren't looking for vague stuff like this, but like I said, the US isn't going to commit on a specific course of action until they have to because why would they limit their options for no good reason?
 
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weaponwh

Member
sure there are hardcore nationalist in PLA, but the top level who actually make the decision are not stupid. there wont be any conflict any time soon, the recent ASEAN meeting shows china are using soft power to gain advantage. furthermore there were never a war between two major nuclear power, always proxy war. there could be misfire or mistake that could escalate into limited conflict, but recent communication establishment and rules for ships encounter between US/china in ScS and the fact PLA involve in RIMPAC shows both are cautious in ScS. china will bit its time and wait till its economy are #1 and till it has 3 CVBG or more, that wont happen till 2025 earliest, possibly later. by then it will be too costly to have even a limited conflict and CCP influence will be establish by default around that time due to its economy/military.
 

tonnyc

Well-Known Member
Well, weaponwh, by 2025 I'm hoping China will have softened its stance. Right now the hardliner's demand that all talk begins with the other party recognizing China's claim of sovereignty over the Eleven Dash Line is a non-starter. That's basically saying "you start by capitulating to our demand and then maybe we'll give you something in our magnanimity". I realize that the current Chinese leadership has no choice but to demand so because the hardliners would see anything less as a sign of weakness (and immediately start attacking the "weak" leader politically so they can replace him with a "strong" leader), but hopefully by then the political situation would have changed for the better.
 

weaponwh

Member
Well I didn't read any official article from other side saying they gonna make SCS into China lake, what they want for sure is the island/reef, its EEZ, as well as influence.

Before 2012, China/Phillippine both can fishing near Scarborough shoal, but after the stand off in 2012 China basically take over. Malaysia has good relationship with China despite dispute between them, mostly likely due to China carrot tactic. as far as 11 dash line that's ROC claim AKA Taiwan, China inherit from ROC in 47ish, but change to 9 dash line. The line is ambiguous, because they never SAID they claim entire SCS, but they didn't disclaim either.

Even by 2025-2030 China still needs support from ASEAN, and China will use its soft power 1st to achieve what they want, ex. Cambodia Laos etc. like I said carrot and a stick, by 2030 if there aren't any internal issue within China, both carrot and stick would be much bigger.

Unless ASEAN can gain significant economic gain from US, otherwise they would not go up against China. with dozen or so countries ASEAN, only Philippine/Vietnam has tense relationship with china right now, and I'm pretty sure China is sweet talk others including Vietnam to reduce their reliance on US and ease the tension by promising of investment/trade deal etc. TPP was a way for us to counter China one belt one road, but at the expense of further losing manufacture job for American.

There are other countries such as Indonesia, etc that occasionally has spat with China, but they also has spat with Vietnam/Philippines and other claimant, which is one of reason ASEAN not gonna align together against China, especially majority of these nations don't have dispute with China and many rely China for investment/trade.

The best scenario I see is china and other dispute countries made some agreement on resource sharing, and get these dispute solved soon, not sure they can get better deals as time goes on. I'm pretty sure China willing to talk, whether the deal is fair or not thats another topic. After 49, China has land border dispute with what 10 nations, most are solved over time, so discuss these deal is still possible before China get too strong.

I do not want to come across like the grammar police but, sentences start - and place names have - capital letters. At least try some effort to make the text that people have to read at least legible. I spent minutes whipping this into shape.
 
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Boatteacher

Active Member
well I didn't read any official article from other side saying they gonna make ScS into china lake, what they want for sure is the island/reef, its EEZ, as well as influence. .
A China lake is probably a fair analogy.

One author sums it up as follows
"While the Chinese Government as a whole continues to maintain "strategic ambiguity" over what the line actually means, key elements within it (the military, oil companies and southern coastal provinces) continue to act on the basis that China maintains a historic territorial claim to the whole sea."

And territorial in that sense means ownership; complete and absolute.

Given the aggressiveness of the nine dash line's claim, it's difficult to see any specifically affected country actually acceding to it and starting from there whatever reasonable "soft power" is employed. They might go quiet on the issue; but it would still be there. Laos and Cambodia might block any ASEAN sanction but in the end everyone knows why ASEAN is not commenting, so its lack of comment is of limited impact.

I'm not sure how commentators here see the Philippines matter escalating to the point of triggering US treaty obligations. I doubt you envisage the Philippines being invaded. I assume you envisage an escalating naval engagement around one of the disputed features; which even then would likely be one between a couple of smaller ships over a very limited time frame.

That might raise the question of whether US ships might thereafter patrol the area and intervene in any re-run. If that produced a direct kinetic confrontation between a US and Chinese ship, that would be scary. But I suspect the more likely outcome would be an awful lot of bluster and abuse from the Chinese, but an avoidance of direct conflict.

As an Australian I'd be just as worried about the next step being the Chinese carrying through their implied threat to shoot down an Australian reconnaissance plane on a FON exercise. After all, we're not in a position to launch an immediate retaliatory attack against the offending facility and I don't doubt that they'd smooth things over and prevent an escalation with the US by pleading it was an accident and someone exceeded their authority; while still knowing the point had been made.

Plus Australia could well be the subject of an economic attack; since we are a major supplier to China and they could simply go elsewhere (or run down the stockpiles they have been mysteriously building up recently).

All, as others have noted, after the G20 meeting.

As I've noted before, it really is time for the captains of industry (in the US especially) to consider their Chinese supply chains. They should be sacked to the last man if they plead a black swan event should it happen their firms or sources of supply become economic victims of a future dispute.

China is simply acting as a bully. This is shaping as a "peace in our time" moment and I would hope world leaders have learnt the lessons of submitting to the bully in those circumstances.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
well I didn't read any official article from other side saying they gonna make ScS into china lake, what they want for sure is the island/reef, its EEZ, as well as influence.
Well you must not have been looking to hard then. The official line for years has been that everything inside the nine dashed line is Chinese sovereign territory. No ifs, buts or maybes.
before 2012, china/phillippine both can fishing near scarborough shoal, but after the stand off in 2012 china basically take over. malasia has good relationship with china despite dispute between them, mostly likely due to china carrot tactic. as far as 11 dash line that's ROC claim AKA Taiwan, china inherit from ROC in 47ish, but change to 9 dash line. the line is ambiguous, because they never SAID they claim entire ScS, but they didn't disclaim either.
even by 2025-2030 china still need support from ASEAN, and china will use its soft power 1st to achieve what they want, ex. cambodia laos etc. like I said carrot and a stick, by 2030 if there aren't any internal issue within china, both carrot and stick would be much bigger.
unless ASEAN can gain significant economic gain from US, otherwise they would not go up against china. with dozen or so countries ASEAN, only phillippine/Vietnam has tense relationship with china right now, and I'm pretty sure china is sweet talk others including Vietnam to reduce their reliance on US and ease the tension by promising of investment/trade deal etc. TPP was a way for us to counter china one belt one road, but at the expense of further losing manufacture job for American.

there are other countries such as Indonesia, etc that occasionally has spat with china, but they also has spat with Vietnam/phillippine and other claimant, which is one of reason ASEAN not gonna align together against china, especially majority of these nations don't have dispute with china and many rely china for investment/trade.

the best scenario I see is china and other dispute countries made some agreement on resource sharing, and get these dispute solved soon, not sure they can get better deals as time goes on. I'm pretty sure china willing to talk, whether the deal is fair or not thats another topic. after 49, china has land border dispute with what 10 nations, most are solved over time, so discuss these deal is still possible before china get too strong.
China is not only using soft power in Asia. It is bullying and using everything short of open warfare. I just wonder if you are a Chinese apologist because you have offered nothing concrete too support any of your arguments.
 

weaponwh

Member
Well you must not have been looking to hard then. The official line for years has been that everything inside the nine dashed line is Chinese sovereign territory. No ifs, buts or maybes.

China is not only using soft power in Asia. It is bullying and using everything short of open warfare. I just wonder if you are a Chinese apologist because you have offered nothing concrete too support any of your arguments.
Like I said link? Not just some CCTV or some media drum up version, official document etc regarding this.
Ive been tracking these things since 90s. I'm not Chinese apologist, just tracking this for years. Yes, they not only use soft power but bullying tactic as well, but so does Vietnam/Indonesia on other claimant. It doesn't justify China action . What argument are you refer too? I already said they are claiming the reef/island, its EEZ and want influence in the region etc. But I never seen an official or foreign minister declare entire ScS is part of china. The reason its dash-line rather then solid line is because they want ambiguity, if no one stop them I'm sure they will change ScS into china lake, but if they encounter sever resistance, they will settle for the reef/island etc. Hence the dash-line, also both ROC/PRC has same line, does ROC want to make a Taiwan lake, doubt it? How about Vietnam claim, which is just ridiculous. Like I said I'm not justify china action, but looking at other claimant, clearly they also did some bully themselves, of course china been much big, it is throwing its weight around.

This is just one of many incidents regularly occur between all the claimant whether is China, Vietnam or other.

The 2013 Guang Da Xing No. 28 incident was a fatal shooting incident that occurred on 9 May 2013 involving the Taiwanese fishing boat Guang Da Xing No. 28 and the Philippine Coast Guard patrol boat Maritime Control Surveillance 3001, which led to the death of Taiwanese fisherman Hung Shih-cheng (洪石成) by gunfire from the Philippine vessel.[2]

The incident occurred in the high seas, within the overlapping exclusive economic zones of Taiwan and the Philippines. After the incident, Taiwan imposed sanctions and conducted a two-day "safety and rescue drill" with its Naval and Coast Guard forces near the waters where the incident occurred, on the grounds that the killing took place within its exclusive economic zone and the Philippine authority's action was in violation of international law. A Philippine official stated that the shooting was a reaction to the threat of being rammed.[3] The incident came under separate investigations by Taiwanese and Philippine authorities; Taiwanese authorities presented evidence of more than 50 bullet holes found on the fishing boat,[4] while Philippine authorities examined a video tape recording of the incident

http://www.wsj.com/articles/indonesia-blows-up-23-foreign-fishing-boats-to-send-a-message-1459852007

Indonesia destroyed 23 foreign fishing boats on Tuesday, as worsening relations over the disputed South China Sea drive countries to take tougher action to defend their maritime sovereignty.

Maritime and Fisheries Minister Susi Pudjiastuti said her agency sank 10 Malaysian and 13 Vietnamese boats that were caught fishing illegally in Indonesian waters
 

weaponwh

Member
A China lake is probably a fair analogy.

One author sums it up as follows
"While the Chinese Government as a whole continues to maintain "strategic ambiguity" over what the line actually means, key elements within it (the military, oil companies and southern coastal provinces) continue to act on the basis that China maintains a historic territorial claim to the whole sea."

And territorial in that sense means ownership; complete and absolute.

Given the aggressiveness of the nine dash line's claim, it's difficult to see any specifically affected country actually acceding to it and starting from there whatever reasonable "soft power" is employed. They might go quiet on the issue; but it would still be there. Laos and Cambodia might block any ASEAN sanction but in the end everyone knows why ASEAN is not commenting, so its lack of comment is of limited impact.
Consider the Vietnam line or ROC line or even phillippine line, which is just ridiculous. They all has ridiculous claim including china
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Indonesian media reports spoke of Malaysian boats being seized but when Malaysian consular officials from Kalimantan visited the crews of those boats; it was found found that not only were the crews unable to provide proof that they were Malaysians but were also unable to speak Malay. That aside, as far I understand it, none of the foreign boats that were sunk for operating illegally in Indonesian waters were in parts of the Spratlys when they were seized.
 

Bonza

Super Moderator
Staff member
WeaponWh, once again, can you please check the wording of your posts before committing them? Stuff like "Like I said I'm not justify china action, but looking at other claimant, clearly they also did some bully themselves, of course china been much big, it is throwing its weight around." is barely meeting the requirements for a conversation in English. Understand?
 

Bonza

Super Moderator
Staff member
Consider the Vietnam line or ROC line or even phillippine line, which is just ridiculous. They all has ridiculous claim including china
That doesn't make China's conduct any more tolerable, I don't understand why you appear to be having a problem with that concept. Not all claimants should be treated the same because they're obviously NOT the same. China's aggression in pursuing these claims, along with its place in the global order, makes it stand out from the other claimants. So stop trying to argue that they're no different to one another.
 

tonnyc

Well-Known Member
Consider the Vietnam line or ROC line or even phillippine line, which is just ridiculous. They all has ridiculous claim including china
The ROC line is basically the same as the PRC line because they're based on the same arguments. I agree that it is just as ridiculous as the PRC line.

The Vietnamese line is based on ancient historical claims. Same argument as PRC and ROC, just different maps. I personally do not place much weight on ancient historical claim and I will gladly agree that it is just as ridiculous as both PRC and ROC claims.

The Philippine line is based on UNCLOS, drawn from their main islands. As best as I can tell the islands they claim are within the 200 nautical miles EEZ from their main islands. We can probably discuss whether what they are doing on the Thitu island is within the scope of an EEZ, but the line itself are fine.

You are also ignoring the Malaysian, Brunei, and Indonesian EEZ lines. All three of those, and the Philippines, are based on UNCLOS. There are disputes in where to draw the lines, but these are not the same class of claims as China's line, which, by China's own declaration, is NOT based on UNCLOS but based on "ancient historical rights", whatever that is.

Look, what's your thesis here? Okay, so what is it that you are trying to say? That America shouldn't bother getting involved in the South China Sea? Because none of the claimants are right? Well, ignoring the case of Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia, whose EEZs you conveniently skipped, dude, tu quoque arguments don't actually work in international diplomacy. It doesn't even work here in DefenceTalk forum.

Now, since I don't feel making multiple posts, I'll just address a few other things here that you have brought up previously.

This is a link to the UNCLOS. Part 5 covers the Exclusive Economic Zone.

Article73

Enforcement of laws and regulations of the coastal State

1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention.

2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of reasonable bond or other security.

3. Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in the exclusive economic zone Article73

Enforcement of laws and regulations of the coastal State

1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention.

2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of reasonable bond or other security.

3. Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in the exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence of agreements to the contrary by the States concerned, or any other form of corporal punishment.

4. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels the coastal State shall promptly notify the flag State, through appropriate channels, of the action taken and of any penalties subsequently imposed.
However, Reuters reported that
China's Supreme Court said on Tuesday people caught illegally fishing in Chinese waters could be jailed for up to a year, issuing a judicial interpretation defining those waters as including China's exclusive economic zones.
Just in case some newbie comes in next month or next year and didn't bother reading from the beginning, let me reiterate that China is not claiming an EEZ. China is claiming sovereign territorial rights. The UNCLOS is not relevant for them because, well, because they say so.

This kind of stuff is why I said that China wants the South China Sea to be a Chinese lake.



Next, Indonesia's decision to destroy ships that were caught fishing illegally.

The legal framework behind the UNCLOS allows the coastal state to arrest the fishermen who are illegally fishing. Indonesia does that, puts them on trial, and if they are found guilty, fines them. The fishermen themselves get turned over to their respective embassies for repatriation. The fine for illegal fishing can include seizing the ship/boat for illegal fishing. The ship, having been legally seized due to its use in illegal fishing, now belongs to the state. Since it belongs to the state, the state can do whatever it wants with the ship. In the past they used to auction the ships and boats. They also had given the ships and boats away to local fishermen. And in the past they also had destroyed the ships and boats when there wasn't enough space in the Bureau of Fisheries holding docks (I think that's the right agency, but I could be wrong). You just didn't hear about it. What's different this time is that Indonesia no longer bother with auctioning and giving away ships and just skipped straight to destroying the ships and boats and does that in a public way.

Again, there is no equivalency between what Indonesia is doing and what China is doing. The ships/boats that were destroyed were confiscated legally, after due process. Why in the world you want to bring this matter into this topic puzzles me, as the two isn't related. Very few of the seized ships/boats were seized in the South China Sea. The majority was, if I remember the articles in Jakarta Post correctly, caught in Eastern Indonesia, well inside Indonesia.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
The majority was, if I remember the articles in Jakarta Post correctly, caught in Eastern Indonesia, well inside Indonesia.
The alleged Malaysian ships I mentioned earlier were seized off Kalimantan. There may have been a few foreign trawlers seized in the Natunas area but yes, the majority were well within Indonesian waters.
 

weaponwh

Member
The Philippine line is based on UNCLOS, drawn from their main islands. As best as I can tell the islands they claim are within the 200 nautical miles EEZ from their main islands. We can probably discuss whether what they are doing on the Thitu island is within the scope of an EEZ, but the line itself are fine.

You are also ignoring the Malaysian, Brunei, and Indonesian EEZ lines. All three of those, and the Philippines, are based on UNCLOS. There are disputes in where to draw the lines, but these are not the same class of claims as China's line, which, by China's own declaration, is NOT based on UNCLOS but based on "ancient historical rights", whatever that is.

Look, what's your thesis here? Okay, so what is it that you are trying to say? That America shouldn't bother getting involved in the South China Sea? Because none of the claimants are right? Well, ignoring the case of Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia, whose EEZs you conveniently skipped, dude, tu quoque arguments don't actually work in international diplomacy. It doesn't even work here in DefenceTalk forum.

Now, since I don't feel making multiple posts, I'll just address a few other things here that you have brought up previously.

This is a link to the UNCLOS. Part 5 covers the Exclusive Economic Zone.



However, Reuters reported that


Just in case some newbie comes in next month or next year and didn't bother reading from the beginning, let me reiterate that China is not claiming an EEZ. China is claiming sovereign territorial rights. The UNCLOS is not relevant for them because, well, because they say so.

This kind of stuff is why I said that China wants the South China Sea to be a Chinese lake.
look at the map

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippines_v._China#/media/File:South_China_Sea_claims_map.jpg
The 500km line, compare against all the "claim line, china or other" phillippine/china/Vietnam/malasia/taiwan all extend beyond the 200nm EEZ. Yes, phillippine also use historical claim for its dispute, all of them did. Malaysia seem more reasonable compare to others.

As for China claim entire ScS territory, listen closely to its foreign minister or official regarding ScS. They always mention island groups(paracel/sparatly), not entire ScS as its territory.

Further evidence can be seen at PRC submission of Note Verb in 2011 to UN, most are BS against phillippine, but the 2nd to last paragraph and some other sentence regarding what they claim. So they are Claiming the island and surround water as EEZ, I didn't see them mention Entire SCS base on 9-dash line as its territory water.

http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf





I never said US shouldn't get involved, by constantly appling pressure on china and other claimant, they will not claim the entire sea as own territory. My original argument was China made the dash-line ambiguous and depend on how much pressure apply on them, they will either claim entire ScS or step back and claim the island/reef in sparatly island(as shows in many official press conference and note verb submit to UN). These claim still overlapping with others such as phillippine/Vietnam/others, and its better for them to solved it sooner than later. None of them has that much moral high ground than China, it just media tend to focus on China.
 

weaponwh

Member
That doesn't make China's conduct any more tolerable, I don't understand why you appear to be having a problem with that concept. Not all claimants should be treated the same because they're obviously NOT the same. China's aggression in pursuing these claims, along with its place in the global order, makes it stand out from the other claimants. So stop trying to argue that they're no different to one another.
I never said China behavior is right, when looking at what Vietnam did in the 70/80s, or what Phillippine did on Second Thomas Shoal, China seem doing the same with much bigger scale.
 

Tsavo Lion

Banned Member
I never said China behavior is right, when looking at what Vietnam did in the 70/80s, or what Phillippine did on Second Thomas Shoal, China seem doing the same with much bigger scale.
From the Time article "Just Where Exactly Did China Get the South China Sea Nine-Dash Line From?":
“China was a continental kingdom not a maritime one,” she says. “Historically, we did not pay much attention to the oceans.” Indeed, after a burst of seafaring exploration during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), China’s emperors largely shut their empire off from the seas. As a consequence, Wang says, cartographic proof of China’s claims to the South China Sea is scarce. “We had no good maps during the Qing dynasty,” she says of the imperial age that replaced the Ming and ended in 1911. “The Qing just showed the South China Sea as a small lake.” ..“The discontinuous line,” says Wang, “means the national border on the sea.” The geographer clarifies further. “The dash lines mean the ocean, islands and reefs all belong to China and that China has sovereign rights,” she says. “But it’s discontinuous, meaning that other countries can pass through the lines freely.”.. Back in 2014, Wu Shichun, the influential head of the Chinese government-funded National Institute for South China Sea Studies, told TIME that the nine-dash line did not represent a blanket claim to all maritime space. “China has never claimed all waters in the U-shaped line,” he said. “From the historical archives from Taiwan and China, it’s clear that the line shows ownership of insular features within the U-shaped line.” A government statement reacting to the July 12 award may hint that official policy agrees that the line denotes all territory within the dotted demarcation, not all waters. Either way, the fact that ambiguity remains at all proves the complicated legacy of the nine-dash line.
IMO, the ambiguity is not intentional. But, "China is following America's example"! Google "What evidence does China offer to substantiate its claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea?"
Can anyone produce an old map with those areas clearly claimed by ancient SE Asian peoples? From "Historical Fiction: China’s South China Sea Claims" article premises:
..that the region’s past empires did not exercise sovereignty. In pre-modern Asia, empires were characterized by undefined, unprotected, and often changing frontiers. The notion of suzerainty prevailed. Unlike a nation-state, the frontiers of Chinese empires were neither carefully drawn nor policed but were more like circles or zones, tapering off from the center of civilization to the undefined periphery of alien barbarians. More importantly, in its territorial disputes with neighboring India, Burma, and Vietnam, Beijing always took the position that its land boundaries were never defined, demarcated, and delimited. But now, when it comes to islands, shoals, and reefs in the South China Sea, Beijing claims otherwise. In other words, China’s claim that its land boundaries were historically never defined and delimited stands in sharp contrast with the stance that China’s maritime boundaries were always clearly defined and delimited. Herein lies a basic contradiction in the Chinese stand on land and maritime boundaries which is untenable. Actually, it is the mid-twentieth-century attempts to convert the undefined frontiers of ancient civilizations and kingdoms enjoying suzerainty into clearly defined, delimited, and demarcated boundaries of modern nation-states exercising sovereignty that lie at the center of China’s territorial and maritime disputes with neighboring countries. Put simply, sovereignty is a post-imperial notion ascribed to nation-states, not ancient empires.
For the sake of the argument, even if it's true, the islands are harder to reach and settle than dry land and therefore, IMHO, since the Chinese started to explore & exploit that sea in their junks at least since the Han dynasty, while the locals in the area were using just rafts/small fishing boats & without any documented formal territorial claims to it by their leaders, today's PRC can safely rely on historical records to support her claims! From "Early Chinese Exploration":
China's maritime economic development began forming in the Zhou Period (1030-221 BCE). After about 2,000 years of continuous development, Chinese mariners were definitely able to travel around Asia and Africa. It may be that later ages of Chinese self-embargo and isolationism led to the idea that China was always a purely agrarian society. However, the level of maritime participation in the economy of China depended very much on the nature of who was currently in power.
In Chinese history, some emperors employed explorers to study the waters near China and other areas around the globe. Emperor Shi Huan Ti (the Qin ruler who united China) in 219 BCE, Han Emperor Wu about one hundred years later, and Ming Emperor Zhu Di in 1405 CE, all sent out skilled navigators and explorers. .. During the Warring States Period (475-221 BCE), Chinese explorers went on expeditions beyond Chinese territory in search of exotic medicines, especially an elixir for immortality. Such activities were vigorously supported by the authorities and reached a climax in 219 B.C.E. when Xu Fu sailed with 3,000 young men and women from Shandong to search for such an herb. ..Chinese seafaring really gained prominence at the end of the Song Dynasty (960-1279 CE). Chinese artifacts, and archaeological evidence, mostly in the form of shipwrecks, indicate the presence of strong maritime ties throughout coastal Asia during this time. There was extensive trade up and down the eastern coast of China, extending as far north as Korea and possibly as far south as Australia. Out of the long history of Chinese maritime culture and exploration, two of the most well known Chinese explorers are Xu Fu (sent out by Shi Huan Ti) and Zheng He (sent out by Zhu Di).
Also, from "Chinese exploration" on Wikipedea:
In 1975, an ancient shipyard excavated in Guangzhou was dated to the early Han Dynasty (202 BC – AD 220) and, with three platforms, was able to construct ships that were approximately 30 m (98 ft) in length, 8 m (26 ft) in width, and could hold a weight of 60 metric tons.
During the Three Kingdoms, travellers from Eastern Wu are known to have explored the coast. The most important were Zhu Ying (朱應) and Kang Tai, both sent by the Governor of Guangzhou and Jiaozhi Lü Dai in the early 3rd century. Although each wrote a book, both were lost by the 11th century: Zhu's Record of the Curiosities of Phnom (t 扶南異物誌, s 扶南异物志, Fúnán Yìwù Zhì) in its entirety and Kang's Tales of Foreign Countries During the Wu Period (t 吳時外國傳, s 吴时外国传, Wúshí Wàiguó Zhuàn) only surviving in scattered references in other works,[3] including the Shuijing Zhu and the Yiwen Leiju. .. During the late 4th and early 5th centuries, Chinese pilgrims like Faxian, Zhiyan, and Tanwujie began traveling by sea to India, bringing back Buddhist scriptures and sutras to China.[9] By the 7th century as many as 31 recorded Chinese monks including I Ching managed to reach India the same way. In 674 the private explorer Daxi Hongtong was among the first to end his journey at the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, after traveling through 36 countries west of the South China Sea.
Chinese seafaring merchants and diplomats of the medieval Tang Dynasty (618—907) and Song Dynasty (960—1279) often sailed into the Indian Ocean after visiting ports in South East Asia. Chinese sailors would travel to Malaya, India, Sri Lanka, into the Persian Gulf and up the Euphrates River in modern-day Iraq, to the Arabian peninsula and into the Red Sea, stopping to trade goods in Ethiopia and Egypt (as Chinese porcelain was highly valued in old Fustat, Cairo). Jia Dan wrote Route between Guangzhou and the Barbarian Sea during the late 8th century that documented foreign communications, the book was lost, but the Xin Tangshu retained some of his passages about the three sea-routes linking China to East Africa. .. Chinese junk ships were even described by the Moroccan geographer Al-Idrisi in his Geography of 1154, along with the usual goods they traded and carried aboard their vessels. ..
From 1405 to 1433, large fleets commanded by Admiral Zheng He—under the auspices of the Yongle Emperor of the Ming Dynasty—traveled to the Indian Ocean seven times.
With all of the above, it would be absurd to think that these islands & reefs in the S. China Sea were not explored and claimed by China in those times!
 
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tonnyc

Well-Known Member
You make it sound like "ancient maps" is a basis for what is an otherwise baseless claim.

There are ancient maps showing a much smaller China with the rest split between neighbouring kingdoms or splinter empires. Yet nobody thinks that those are valid arguments for, say, moving the Vietnamese border farther north, the North Korean border farther west, returning Inner Mongolia to Mongolia and ceding the Northern Plains to the resulting country, and so on.

We all agree that the above is ridiculous. So why should we take the "ancient maps" argument seriously? Accepting that argument also sets a very dangerous precedent, as other countries will be able to use "ancient maps" as an excuse to conquer smaller countries. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, one of the justifications that Saddam Hussein used was that Kuwait used to be part of Iraq during the Ottoman era and it was only action by evil colonialist British that Kuwait was wrongfully torn away from Iraq. As everyone can see, nobody took that argument seriously.
 
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