South China Sea thoughts?

[weaponwh]

There's a big difference in this case. China isn't arguing a case under international law, but claiming that it has a special exemption, & the international laws which apply everywhere else (& which China cites in its own disagreements with other states elsewhere) don't apply to China. It's claiming that it can own the sea, several hundred km from the nearest part of China. That's unprecedented.

It's not just a disagreement over a particular decision, but a rejection of principles of law which China has agreed to. China's effectively saying "we agree that this law applies to other countries, e.g. Japan, but it doesn't apply to China".

well china just joint with other great power to ignore these decisions. do as I say not as I do. there are plenty cases where different power simply ignore the ruling. sure china is in the wrong but they gonna use other cases to defend their action. also so far I haven't read any article from china say they claim the entire ScS, just islands within it, and has EEZ right, they intentionally leave it as ambiguous. also isn't the same for the many claimant such as Vietnam/malasia/Taiwan/phillippine to claim huge part of ScS too. my opinion is all the claim are ridiculously Not just china.

 

[STURM]

also isn't the same for the many claimant such as Vietnam/malasia/Taiwan/phillippine to claim huge part of ScS too.

No it's certainly not the same. Malaysia does not claim reefs or waters that are very far from its coast and does not claim a large part of the South China Sea. Neither does the Philippines or Brunei. Granted, China has genuine grievances and concerns but what it should be doing is taking steps to calms things down; not steps that creates more uncertainty or issue statements that create more worry, like threatening to create a ADIZ. Instead of acting with some measure of sobriety, China reacted like a spoilt child after the international tribunal ruled in favour of the Philippines, by making threats and saying things that were just not true. It's not as if the rest of the world is ganging up on China or is taking active steps to prevent China's rise as a power.

 

[gazzzwp]

More military exercises planned this week and China have warned that any FON missions could end in disaster. Without doubt this is specifically aimed at the US.

An area S.E of Hainan is where the exercises will take place.

https://www.rt.com/news/351856-south-china-sea-drills/

China are indeed ratcheting up tensions and placing their military cards on the table.

What next?

 

[swerve]

...so far I haven't read any article from china say they claim the entire ScS, just islands within it,

Really? Then you've not read much, or you've read very selectively. What do you think the 9-dash-line is? What do you think Chinese leaders mean when they say that everything within it is their sovereign territory?

also isn't the same for the many claimant such as Vietnam/malasia/Taiwan/phillippine to claim huge part of ScS too. my opinion is all the claim are ridiculously Not just china.

BBBIIIIGGG difference. The others claim EEZs stretching out from their coasts. In some cases they claim islets, rocks, reefs & shoals as islands, & claim EEZs deriving from them. But all of this is relatively close to their own mainlands, & based on UNCLOS with fairly minor differences, mostly to do with whether islets, reefs etc. qualify as islands with EEZs, & who specific ones belong to. China's claim is qualitatively different. China claims the sea itself, far from its coast. It lays claim to waters closer to the mainlands & large islands of other countries than the shoals which it claims are Chinese islands, based on that ridiculous 9-dash line. It says that waters which under international law are the high seas are its territorial waters, not just an EEZ.

 

[weaponwh]

Really? Then you've not read much, or you've read very selectively. What do you think the 9-dash-line is? What do you think Chinese leaders mean when they say that everything within it is their sovereign territory?


BBBIIIIGGG difference. The others claim EEZs stretching out from their coasts. In some cases they claim islets, rocks, reefs & shoals as islands, & claim EEZs deriving from them. But all of this is relatively close to their own mainlands, & based on UNCLOS with fairly minor differences, mostly to do with whether islets, reefs etc. qualify as islands with EEZs, & who specific ones belong to. China's claim is qualitatively different. China claims the sea itself, far from its coast. It lays claim to waters closer to the mainlands & large islands of other countries than the shoals which it claims are Chinese islands, based on that ridiculous 9-dash line. It says that waters which under international law are the high seas are its territorial waters, not just an EEZ.

I did read quite few, I just didn't find any? if you can link some official Chinese article they said they claim entire ScS thatll be great? I remember both ROC/PRC use dash line to make ambiguous.

When looking at Vietnam or even phillippine claim, its clearly they extend the EEZ beyond their shore too. again I'm not say china is right, but the other has pretty big claim too.

 

[weaponwh]

No it's certainly not the same. Malaysia does not claim reefs or waters that are very far from its coast and does not claim a large part of the South China Sea. Neither does the Philippines or Brunei. Granted, China has genuine grievances and concerns but what it should be doing is taking steps to calms things down; not steps that creates more uncertainty or issue statements that create more worry, like threatening to create a ADIZ. Instead of acting with some measure of sobriety, China reacted like a spoilt child after the international tribunal ruled in favour of the Philippines, by making threats and saying things that were just not true. It's not as if the rest of the world is ganging up on China or is taking active steps to prevent China's rise as a power.

I agree Malaysia has less claim area and its less aggressive compare to china,vietnam. that been said some country basically behave like pot calling kettle black, ex Vietnam. I'm pretty sure Vietnam has more island under its control in Sparatly and claim its EEZ etc same as china or phillippine, and they forcibly occupied some phillippine island in the 70s.
I'm not claim china is right, but now they are arguing that the claim was established since 1947, way before UNCLOS(supposedly these case will only affect dispute/claim after UNCLOS was established). Anyway the case was about those island/reef has EEZ right Not about whos terroitory it is. Taiwan was the 1st reject the ruling against its island, and send warship afterward. I can see Vietnam or other that has reef under its control and use it to extend its EEZ will also be affected.
furthermore looking at case such as Taiwan-japan dispute in East regarding fishing right over Okinotori EEZ, its clear Japan is doing the same. so again I'm not saying china is right, but other nation did the same before, some country such as Indonesia actually fire upon Vietnam/phillippine/Chinese ships and sink it, which I think is more aggressive then block/shooting water canon.

After months of mounting speculation, the Permanent Court of Arbitration delivered its ruling on July 12 in the Philippines’ case against China over maritime disputes in the South China Sea. The tribunal ruled unanimously that Beijing’s attempt to turn the South China Sea into its own virtual lake violated international law, issuing a sweeping finding that Chinese claims to exclusive sovereignty over all the islands and shoals within the nine-dashed line — which encompasses 86 percent of the sea — have no legal basis. Prior to the ruling, the United States and its allies had already started criticizing China for pledging to ignore the final decision — which one Chinese official derided last week as, “nothing more than a piece of paper.” Sure enough, Chinese President Xi Jinping immediately rejected the decision. Going further, his foreign minister referred to it as a “political farce,” while China’s ambassador to the U.S. accused the PCA of “professional incompetence.”


It may seem un-American to ask whether China should do as we say, or, by contrast, as we do. But suppose someone were bold enough to pose that question. The first thing they would discover is that no permanent member of the U.N. Security Council has ever complied with a ruling by the PCA on an issue involving the Law of the Sea. In fact, none of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council have ever accepted any international court’s ruling when (in their view) it infringed on their sovereignty or national security interests. Thus, by rejecting the court’s decision, China is doing just what the other great powers have repeatedly done for decades.


From the day the Philippines went to court, China has argued that the PCA has no legitimate jurisdiction on this issue since it concerns “sovereignty” — which the text of the Law of the Sea treaty explicitly prohibits tribunals from addressing. When the court rejected China’s objection, Beijing refused to participate in its hearings and made it clear that it would ignore the PCA’s ruling. The United States and others have criticized Beijing for taking this stance. But again, if we ask how other permanent members of the Security Council have acted in similar circumstances, the answer will not be one we like.


When the Netherlands sued Russia after the latter’s navy boarded and detained the crew of a Dutch vessel in waters off of the Russian coast in 2013, Moscow asserted that the court had no jurisdiction in the matter and refused to participate in the hearings. It also ignored a tribunal’s order that the crew be released while the dispute was being resolved. After the PCA ruled that Russia had violated the Law of the Sea and ordered Moscow to pay the Netherlands compensation, Russia refused.


Anticipating the court’s ruling in the case brought by the Philippines, then U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron proclaimed: “We want to encourage China to be part of that rules-based world. We want to encourage everyone to abide by these adjudications.” Perhaps he had forgotten that just last year the PCA ruled that the U.K. had violated the Law of the Sea by unilaterally establishing a marine protected area in the Chagos Islands. The British government disregarded the ruling, and the marine protected area remains in place today.


The United States has never been sued under the Law of the Sea because — unlike China — Washington has not ratified the international agreement and is thus not bound by its rules. Chinese commentators have already emphasized this point in the mutual recriminations that have followed the court’s announcement.


The closest analogue to the Philippines case involving the United States arose in the 1980s when Nicaragua sued Washington for mining its harbors. Like China, the United States argued that the International Court of Justice did not have the authority to hear Nicaragua’s case. When the court rejected that claim, the United States not only refused to participate in subsequent proceedings, but also denied the court’s jurisdiction on any future case involving the United States, unless Washington explicitly made an exception and asked the court to hear a case. If China followed that precedent, it could withdraw from the Law of the Sea Treaty altogether — joining the United States as one of the world’s only nations not party to the agreement.


In the Nicaragua case, when the court found in favor of Nicaragua and ordered the United States to pay reparations, the U.S. refused, and vetoed six U.N. Security Council resolutions ordering it to comply with the court’s ruling. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. then, Jeane Kirkpatrick aptly summed up Washington’s view of the matter when she dismissed the court as a “semi-legal, semi-juridical, semi-political body, which nations sometimes accept and sometimes don’t.”

Observing what permanent members of the Security Council do, as opposed to what they say, it is hard to disagree with realists’ claims that the PCA and its siblings in The Hague — the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court — are only for small powers. Great powers do not recognize the jurisdiction of these courts — except in particular cases where they believe it is in their interest to do so. Thucydides’ summary of the Melian mantra — “the strong do as they will; the weak suffer as they must” — may exaggerate. But with the court’s ruling this week against China, it is no surprise that Beijing has chosen to respond just as other great powers have traditionally done.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/graha...952868.html?utm_hp_ref=worldpost-asia-pacific

 

[ralphy99]

So basically, China who signed an international treaty says it doesn't have to obey an international resolution pertaining to the treaty because........ the US who didn't sign the international treaty doesn't obey an international resolution pertaining to the treaty,.......

Chinese specious reasoning.

 

[swerve]

I did read quite few, I just didn't find any? if you can link some official Chinese article they said they claim entire ScS thatll be great? I remember both ROC/PRC use dash line to make ambiguous.

When looking at Vietnam or even phillippine claim, its clearly they extend the EEZ beyond their shore too. again I'm not say china is right, but the other has pretty big claim too.

There are innumerable Chinese references to waters which are well outside the 12 nautical mile limit as sovereign territory, & to waters within the (vague) 9 dash line as sovereign territory.

China's claim is qualitatively different from all others. Look at a map showing the claimed EEZs. As I've said, there are areas of disagreement & overlaps, but China's claim is different in type & scale. It claims pretty much the entire SCS, its claim extending well over 1500 km from undisputed Chinese territory. None of the others is anything like that.

Consider the Natuna islands. They are internationally recognised as Indonesian territory, including by China. They are inhabited by tens of thousands of Indonesian citizens. BUT - China doesn't recognise the EEZ of the islands. It's sent Coast Guard ships to protect Chinese boats illegally fishing in Indonesian waters. And this is despite Indonesia having tried hard to avoid involvement in the SCS disputes. China's picked a quarrel with a country which was trying to be friendly.

I don't think Japan's claim of an EEZ for Okinotorishima is justifiable, but it isn't in the same class as what China's doing. There's no overlap, no claim on waters that international law says belong to others. The same applies to the protected area in the British Indian Ocean Territory. It's a long way from anywhere else, not right up against the coast of another country.

 

[STURM]

I agree Malaysia has less claim area and its less aggressive compare to china,vietnam.

When Malaysia first laid claims to the area and occupied a number of reefs; it was prepared to defend those reefs if necessary; including any attempts to dislodge its troops from there and any attempts to interfere with the later reclamation works undertaken. Off course back then, the concern was not China but the Philippines and Vietnam. In 1999 a major operation was launched - this involved towing some living modules all the way from Peninsular Malaysia, all the way to the Spratlys. The living modules were intended to be anchored on 2 reefs as part of reclamation works to make them more habitable. The ships carrying the living modules were given a naval escort and military aircraft in East Malaysia were placed on alert. As it got closer to the Spratlys, the convoy was shadowed by ships and aircraft belonging to various countries; not all of whom were claimants in the dispute. China, Vietnam and the Philippines protested against the reclamation works. In addition to the 5 reefs it has a presence on Malaysia also claims other reefs that are physically occupied by the Philippines and Vietnam.

Malaysia Faces Dilemma With Cautious South China Sea Approach
[Tang Siew Mun, Malay Mail, 19/7/2016]

Malaysia has been an enigma when it comes to the South China Sea disputes. Despite being one of the five claimants, it has often maintained a sense of respectful silence that makes understanding its stance challenging, if not frustrating. True to form, Malaysia has yet to offer any substantive opinion on the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling in the Philippines-China case, beyond an official statement by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

However, a careful reading between the statement’s lines provides some insights into Malaysia’s position. The 213-word document contains five points that flows from the standard “ASEAN line” on the South China Sea. Predictably, it calls for the “full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China [DOC] in its entirety, and the early conclusion of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea [COC]”. It also affirms Malaysia’s belief that “all relevant parties can peacefully resolve disputes by full respect for diplomatic and legal processes, and relevant international law and 1982 UNCLOS”, referring to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

It is noteworthy that Malaysia called not only for the DOC’s implementation, but also stressed its full and effective implementation in its entirety to remind ASEAN and China that the COC is an integral component of the DOC. This is not an inconsequential point, as China’s diplomatic strategy has centred on sidelining the COC by focusing on working out the DOC. Whether intentional or otherwise, the lead sentence of the statement alludes to Malaysia’s position on the legitimacy of the tribunal by linking it to UNCLOS. The lead sentence reads: “The Arbitral Tribunal under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [1982 UNCLOS] issued its award on July 12, 2016.”

Given the sensitivities, Malaysian policymakers have taken to political subtlety to convey strategic messages to China. Malaysia’s cautious approach is understandable when viewed in a larger domestic and international context.

First, Malaysia has taken great pains not to antagonise China - its largest trade partner since 2009. Beijing’s deep pockets have reached far into the corridors of power in Putrajaya as China emerged for the first time last year as Malaysia’s largest foreign direct investor. In the last quarter of last year, China invested US$4 billion to acquire stakes and assets linked to the troubled state-owned investment firm 1Malaysia Development Berhad.

Second, Malaysia’s South China Sea policy is confounded by differing views among the line agencies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs leads with a forthright approach towards affirming Malaysia’s position in the South China Sea, which explains the strong and strident language supported by Malaysia in ASEAN positions. It finds support with the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, which reports to the Prime Minister’s Department. However, the Ministry of Defence has taken an “arms-length” approach toward the disputes.

Third, Malaysia does not stand to gain any strategic mileage from taking a stronger stance.The ruling against the “nine-dash line” effectively puts Malaysia in an advantageous position, as the two most contentious points - James Shoal and Luconia Shoal - falls within its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone [EEZ].

In addition, the ruling sits well with Malaysia’s confounding but long-held official position that it has no overlapping claims with China by virtue of its non-recognition of the contentious map. For the same reasons, there is no incentive for Malaysia to follow the Philippines’ test case to initiate arbitration against China. The PCA ruling is unlikely to alter Malaysia’s South China Sea policy, which will continue to be guided and dictated by domestic imperatives and less so by external factors. However, the ruling provides the legal basis for Malaysia to stand its ground in the face of Chinese assertiveness. At the same time, it might introduce an element of complacency among Malaysia’s policymakers in thinking that the country’s strategic goals have been achieved, especially if China backs down from its frequent incursions into Malaysia’s EEZ.

Kuala Lumpur, like Beijing, would like to sweep the South China Sea disputes under the carpet, but to do so would serve neither side’s long-term interests. In the best-case scenario, Malaysia might enjoy a temporary lull as China regroups in the wake of the crushing diplomatic and legal blow dealt by the arbitral tribunal’s ruling. Whatever the case, China will surely “return” to the South China Sea with added tenacity and unbending strength to defend what Beijing sees as rightfully theirs. One commentator opined that some quarters in China have referenced the tribunal award as the “legal Opium War”, which gives a hint at what is in store for Malaysia and the region. Malaysia should brace itself for the expected strong Chinese backlash. Notwithstanding Malaysia’s “special relations” with China, it would not be spared from China’s unleashing of its nationalistic fervour.

To be sure, Kuala Lumpur can ill-afford to continue its inconsistent approach on the South China Sea. Better coordination among line agencies would go a long way in communicating and protecting Malaysia’s interest in the area. Fundamentally, Malaysia faces a dilemma: reconciling its deepening relations with its largest trade partner with the uncomfortable reality that the same partner is also a growing security threat. This is an intractable political and strategic conundrum that Malaysia -and most ASEAN member states - have to address sooner rather than later.

but now they are arguing that the claim was established since 1947, way before UNCLOS

The 'nine dash line' first appeared on maps issued by the Koumintang government.

some country such as Indonesia actually fire upon Vietnam/phillippine/Chinese ships and sink it, which I think is more aggressive then block/shooting water canon.

Indonesia has a policy of seizing and later sinking trawlers caught operating illegally in its waters - this is not related to the Spralys issue though as Indonesia [as you're aware] is not a claimant. More recently, [if I'm not mistaken] an Indonesian [non naval] ship fired warning shots at a Chinese ship in the vicinity of the Natuna islands, which China does not claim.

In 1988 there was a skirmish between China and Vietnam, in the vicinity of Johnson South Reef which led to the sinking of 2 Vietnamese ships. In 1974 South Vietnam was involved in a battle with Chinese naval forces near the Paracels; in this incident the Vietnamese also suffered casualties.

Spratly Islands dispute defines China-Vietnam relations 25 years after naval clash | South China Morning Posthttp://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1192472/spratly-islands-dispute-defines-china-vietnam-relations-25-years-after

Lessons from the Battle of the Paracel Islands | The Diplomat

 

[gazzzwp]

U.S. military forces will continue to operate in the South China Sea in accordance with international law, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations John Richardson said on Wednesday during a visit to a Chinese naval base.

U.S. says its forces will keep operating in South China Sea | Reuters

Business as usual. The situation seems locked in stalemate awaiting further developments. In the meantime I presume China is still forcing away fishing vessels belonging to surrounding nations if they encroach within the 9 dash line?

 

[STURM]

Some interesting and valid points raised by the guests in this video.

[CrossTalk: China VS Lawfare]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oYg8IFftTjM

Meanwhile, there is an ASEAN meeting in Laos this weekend. The U.S. Secretary of State and the Chinese Foreign minister will be in attendance and the Spratlys will most certainly be a topic for discussion.

 

[cdxbow]

Some interesting and valid points raised by the guests in this video.

[CrossTalk: China VS Lawfare]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oYg8IFftTjM

Meanwhile, there is an ASEAN meeting in Laos this weekend. The U.S. Secretary of State and the Chinese Foreign minister will be in attendance and the Spratlys will most certainly be a topic for discussion.

The statement on the SCC from the ASEAN meeting has been released, and generated a rather wide range of views, many negative such as this South China Sea: Asean proven yet again to be ‘spineless’ | Free Malaysia Today A middling view Asean-China ties in need of a reset, ST Editorial News & Top Stories - The Straits Times and a more positive one.

All agree the ball is in now Chinas court. The Global Times on the other hand worked itself into quite a lather and gave Oz both barrels - ‘Paper cat’ Australia will learn its lesson - Global Times Bullying, insulting and probably not worthy of official diplomatic response. I liked the 'paper cat' analogy but they could have pushed the gag a bit further to a 'paper cut'.

 

[ngatimozart]

The statement on the SCC from the ASEAN meeting has been released, and generated a rather wide range of views, many negative such as this South China Sea: Asean proven yet again to be ‘spineless’ | Free Malaysia Today A middling view Asean-China ties in need of a reset, ST Editorial News & Top Stories - The Straits Times and a more positive one.

All agree the ball is in now Chinas court. The Global Times on the other hand worked itself into quite a lather and gave Oz both barrels - ‘Paper cat’ Australia will learn its lesson - Global Times Bullying, insulting and probably not worthy of official diplomatic response. I liked the 'paper cat' analogy but they could have pushed the gag a bit further to a 'paper cut'.

Yes the Chinese managed to bully ASEAN into not issuing a statement in support of the Philippines or any statement that condemned China in any way. Cambodia was the Chinese pawn within ASEAN and the Chinese Foreign Minister was there to make sure.

On another note, the author of this article believes that China will not have a real hissy fit about the loss of the case to the Philippines until September after the G20 Summit on 4th - 5th September in the city of Hangzhou. After that it will let rip. He believes that it thinks it can get away with it because the worlds attention will be elsewhere mostly focussed on the US elections and that US itself will be busy with the elections so will not be focussed as much on the SCS.

 

[weaponwh]

Yes the Chinese managed to bully ASEAN into not issuing a statement in support of the Philippines or any statement that condemned China in any way. Cambodia was the Chinese pawn within ASEAN and the Chinese Foreign Minister was there to make sure.

.

well isn't china using the carrot and stick approach with ASEAN, there are only 2 country in ASEAN that has high tension with china, rest are either neutral or want more $$ from china. pretty sure every country use these ways to get what they want. for the rest of ASEAN, they have their own interest, unless phillippine/Vietnam provide more interest for them, otherwise they are not gonna antagonizing china for phillippine/Vietnam.

 

[swerve]

Indonesia, Malaysia & Brunei all have quarrels with China over the 9-dash line. China recently sent gunboats to protect Chinese fishermen operating in Indonesian waters from arrest, to the fury of Indonesia.

 

[ozrock62]

There is an interesting editorial piece from the Chinese Global Times dated 7/3016 regarding Australia's support of the recent arbitration tribunal decision on the SCS titled "Paper Cat Australia will learn its lesson". I cannot post the link but maybe some of the senior commentators can do so. I would be interested to hear of any opinions on this article. Thanks.

 

[cdxbow]

There is an interesting editorial piece from the Chinese Global Times dated 7/3016 regarding Australia's support of the recent arbitration tribunal decision on the SCS titled "Paper Cat Australia will learn its lesson". I cannot post the link but maybe some of the senior commentators can do so. I would be interested to hear of any opinions on this article. Thanks.

I posted it in my post on previous page, last link.

 

[ozrock62]

Sorry. Senior moment. Missed it. Thanks.

 

[ngatimozart]

Sorry. Senior moment. Missed it. Thanks.

Don't worry, I get those too on the odd occasion Welcome to the forum cobber.

 

[ngatimozart]

There is an interesting editorial piece from the Chinese Global Times dated 7/30/16 regarding Australia's support of the recent arbitration tribunal decision on the SCS titled "Paper Cat Australia will learn its lesson". I cannot post the link but maybe some of the senior commentators can do so. I would be interested to hear of any opinions on this article. Thanks.

Normally I would not be overally concerned about Chinese media outlets mouthing off in such ways, which is usually par for the course. However this time around the massive loss of face incurred because of the loss of the Freedom of the Seas Mediation Tribunal case changes things. The PLA has a very vocal group of hawks who have been pushing for a strong reaction to the loss of face. Nothing will be done until after the G20 meeting next month. After that all bets are off so too speak. If these hawks / hard-line nationalists have a significant following within the PLA and the upper political echelon then the reaction may be somewhat strong. It depends on how much support such a view has in the Central Committee, Central Military Commission and most importantly the Politburo, Central National Security Commission and the Politburo Standing Committee. Out of those it will be the Central National Security Commission and the Politburo Standing Committee that will have the most input and influence on any final decision.

Militarily, at the moment, the PRC cannot match the US and its allies with in the region. Make no mistake that it would give a good account of itself but it would lose and end up with a very bloody nose. It would be debatable whether or not the US and its allies would have a fight on their hands but they would win at a cost. Russia would deign to become involved and it is not the military colossus that it once was. Both China and Russia are nuclear weapon states so in any conflict between the PRC and the US, the US and its allies will always have to be extremely careful in how far they can escalate the conflict before the PRC political leadership will decided to launch a nuclear strike. By the same token, at what point would the US consider the use of a tactical nuclear weapon in order to protect a highly valued asset or prevent a significant defeat?