Naval Ship & Submarine Propulsion Systems

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
So my question is, whats the problem? why not add in more? e.g. replace the diesel?, are the cells taking up to much space?

thanks.
I spent a number of years working with french hydrogen fuel cells, german hydrogen fuel cells and australian ceramic fuel cells. The australian tech was then and is still regarded as the best mass per energy generation combination in the world. Unfortunately it was another great australian tech that didn't get any Federal support and they ended up basing themselves in Germany

But without further digressing, there is no direct relationship in HP/KW generation terms between fuel cell variants and dry/wet/saline battery techs

its like looking at a tesla e-car accelerate against a petrol engined super car - the drivetrain on one is a 1/5th of the physical mass - but the batteries/fuel tank mass comparison swings the other way

all the long range underwater USV tech I was exposed to used electric motors and sealed batteries. the tech duration capability under set conditions improved by 800% in 3 years - so the potential was enormous

I'd add that the world has also moved on beyond just LiPo banks, in smaller platforms there has been significant testing done using LiPo and super capacitors

the amercans did significant work using super conductors and super capacitors to achieve nuke like performance.

I can't comment on the absolutes of using the tech as you propose, but I can tell you that there are no constraints to be being able to do so.

there were developments when I was involved into using salt water as part of the hydrogen conversion process for fuel cells. IOW the ocean became your fuel tank.
 
Last edited:

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
The only kind of show stopper that will result in us going with one of the other option's in the contract not having favorable terms.

nope.

if they don't meet technical requirements then there is some largesse in giving the prime a capacity to deliver - however, in absolute terms, failure to comply could end up with the ADO going back to Govt and the NSC and Cabinet making a call.

there is a clear aversion to any major capital project coming into the projects of concern bubble, so review processes are geared to keep schedule, risk and KPI's in range. failure at any of the hi-level reviews where PMO and DoFA have people at the table would be the venues where it could be kicked up

so its not just about contractual terms breaches

If the contract goes ahead then I don't see any breakthrough tech being an issue, If it's really that great and available to us we would likely try and incorporate it if feasible into the SB-A1 hull.
again no. the clear concern for any major spend is a clear aversion by ADO and AustGov on being the lead customer on leading edge tech solutions - historically across a number of countries it has gone pear shaped. - despite all th best intentions of everyone involved.

despite some concern by some members that my responses are about being anti-french (it's a cheap shot but without foundation as I'm not) I am absolutely agnostic at the end of the day - my concern, my job, my security obligations etc are to protect the commonwealth - not "protect the govt" there is a subtle but very clear distinction between the two

people "like me" have an obligation to be frank and fearless in expressing our concerns, - whether its popular with some or unpopular with others is ultimately irrelevant. You can close your eyes and wish and hope - or you can accept the marketing as an absolute truth and take it on trust. I can point to more than half a dozen recent major projects where we got bitten on the arse. There is a clear aversion to a repeat of history

so where techsets are of questionable risk, the assessment and evaluation teams (which are the next step beyond the concept of the CEP assessment) have responsibility to test and accept all the merits offered up by the prime.

there is some obvious clear confusion in the publics mind that the CEP was a technical assessment and that everything offered up in the advertising is what we will get. - its not. The CEP is a down select of vendors and their associated submissions. Its a notional acceptance of their offer weighted by risk assessments on things like cost, capability, integration risks, delivery risks etc .......

I'd add, that if it was a german or japanese solution that got up, we would be just as vigorous in reviewing the offers.

the view that some have that I and others are coloured in our judgement because our preferred option didn't get up is something which I find personally offensive as it impugns my own personal professional integrity.

So where you see some of us (especially the blue and some of the green tags) passing on comment, there are reasons behind it.

Its not due some sense of "loss" because option G or J didn't make this cut.

"Forest for the Trees" springs to mind....
 

hypernova

New Member
Just wondering what your background is ? Not asking for direct specifics.

Myself, having been involved on both sides of the shed so to speak, have seen over the years on this site the difference of opinion, for lack of a better word, on many such matters as are being discussed. An insight on your background and industry knowledge will give others the ability to understand where you are coming from ?

An example is the current back and forth on Conops V Capability V Doctrine V Prime claims etc

This is not coming from an SA pov, but rather to try and cool things down here so we can discuss the subject at hand
Specifics? Why does it matter? At that point it just turns into a dick measuring contest doesnt it? The arguments stand and fall on their own merits.

But FYI PHD candidate in military history with a paper currently under peer review on the development of A2/AD in the western pacific. You can add to that 2 masters and an undergrad degree. I specialise in military theory and the application of modern theoretical tools, such as organisation theory, to understanding doctrinal developments - amongst other things. I do reseach in this space every day.

Thats all I meant about having a blue tag - not doubting your experience or expertise, but it would be foolish doubt mine simply because i lack one.
 

Preceptor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Thread to remain closed for the time being to provide a 'cooling off' period for members to members to slow down, read and process what has been posted. It is also to permit members, some of whom have been around long enough (posting or lurking) to know what sort of behavior is expected, to curb some of the exuberance and regain a respectful attitude towards other members. The Mod team has run out of patience with how posting has gone in the last few days. Since there have been no contracts signed, the actual design has not been completed, nor the development work completed, or the capabilities set (or how said capabilities will be achieved) it would therefore behoove members to not make claims of what the sub will have, or can do.
-Preceptor
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Thread re-opened after Mod discussions.

It will only stay open, if it remains on track and the conversation continues at an adult level.

Members who need to be banned, going forward have been notified by prior warnings given here.
 

hypernova

New Member
Mods, please take this post for how it is meant – a constructive addition to the discussion. I know this is a continuation of the earlier conversation, but this issue transcends specific platforms so it’s not really about SEA-1000 and is more about the link between platforms and doctrine. It is an honest attempt to contribute, but if it is too inflammatory I’m happy to take it down.

Todjager, I think this is going to be my last reply in this conversation, as it hasn’t been particularly fruitful, which has partially been my fault. Don’t take that personally, but I fear it has now devolved into somewhat of a moving feast with goalposts flying around. I was probably overly defensive/dismissive in my earlier post and for that I apologise. I hope you’ll appreciate I had the feeling of being ‘under siege’ a little bit as I have come to realise my position on these issues is somewhat controversial here, given the number of responses I received, and given they are in opposition to some obviously well respected members. I know you’ll want the right of reply and that’s totally fine, if everyone agrees then no one ever grows, learns or evolves. If I don’t reply it’s not because I don’t respect your opinion, but I think I’m just going to state my case here without referring to your last post, for fear of chasing this conversation down a rabbit hole which has little to do with the original point being made or putting out a hundred fires which does nothing to advance the discussion. So no hard feelings. :)

Fundamentally the problem here is a misunderstanding the role organisational information plays in all warfare and the way it drives the use and acquisition of platforms and technology. Remember at base this comes down to your argument that, and I’m paraphrasing here, “even if the future submarine did provide a higher transit speed, this will not necessarily have any bearing on how the platform is used because of CONOPs”. Feel free to correct me if I have misrepresented you. Essentially this argument transcends the specific technology at hand.

Let me start by simply changing a three words in that paraphrased sentence: “even if the F-35A provides a lower RCS, this will not necessarily have any bearing on how the platform is used because of CONOPs”. Are there any problems with that reasoning if the above is used to argue against the value of RCS reduction (i.e. a higher transit speed)? They should be obvious (essentially this is a model dependant statement). The reasoning is literally identical to the argument you originally made in this thread. So that’s the short argument, now for the long one (I apologise in advance for the length).

When any force commander confronts a tactical or operational situation, they are guided by the organisational information which governs the use and employment of the disparate force types at his/her disposal – doctrine – in order to not only pursue a specific set of operational outcomes, but maximise the synergistic benefits these separate force types provide when used in concert. Thus, a “CONOPs” document is purely the application of doctrinal principles to a given tactical or operational environment by the joint force commander. If you want a historical example of this interaction between doctrine and its employment there has been much research done on Petraeus’ Counterinsurgency and its successful implementation 2007/2008. It is thus, all about doctrine, especially when envisaging how a developmental platform will be employed.

The problem with your argument here is it essentially inverts the actual relationship between doctrine and technology at all levels – doctrine is a product of the technological environment, it is forced by circumstance to adapt to it. It doesn’t do so instantly, like water. Because it relies upon doctrinal innovation, which can be retarded by organisational and cultural resistance, or the influence of powerful individuals who have their head stuck in the last war and previous doctrinal paradigm (innovation inhibitors), it bends and moves slowly, like ‘plastic’. This evolution is driven by the organisation’s requirement to win wars, and the only way to do that is to leverage the technology you have at your disposal to gain some advantage at any of the levels of warfare. Thus, doctrine at every level is responsive to the capabilities of the technology the force has at its disposal: as technology changes, so must doctrine.

This is the major misconception here – any military does not simply sit there and determine in some arbitrary manner what is the perfect parameter for an arbitrary force type or platform. Napoleon did not stipulate a rate of march in excess of 20km per day simply because that is the perfect rate of march for any infantry division in any time period – what he “needed” from them – it was the best he could achieve with the technological tools at his disposal, and it was better than his adversaries. The organisational development of the corps gave him an advantage in operational mobility – just as a higher transit speed on a submarine would – which he wielded to achieve tactical superiority at Ulm, Austerlitz and Jena to meet his strategic ends by defeating the Austrians, Russians and Prussians in turn. With the mechanisation of infantry 20km per day was a woeful rate of advance for a US infantry division in 1944 when not in contact. With new technology, old paradigms become irrelevant. Thus, the whole idea that the RAN would simply ignore the increased mobility a new system could provide, simply because of the way it employed legacy systems or originally envisaged the manner of the new system’s employment is, again, unlikely. This is what makes AIR-6000 almost perfectly analogous. If any system provides significantly increased operational mobility because it is more technologically advanced, ADF doctrine will evolve to leverage that capability. Thus, when an operational situation confronts the force commander, said command will leverage the capabilities of the forces at his/her disposal to best achieve operational goals, in accordance with operational doctrine which guides the employment of force.

There are numerous examples of how doctrine and technology interact in the 20th century – Blitzkrieg and AirLand Battle are excellent simply because of the amount of material in English which describes their development. AirLand Battle stemmed out of the second offset strategy, which sought to replace the US nuclear arsenal as the primary means of offsetting Soviet material superiority. It leveraged US industrial strength in microelectronics to foster key technological advantages in areas such as communications and PGMs, in addition to several technological and organisational developments which arose from Vietnam such, as the maturity of modern air-mobility. As theses technological systems matured into platforms and weapons, the US army founded a doctrine around them known as AirLand battle, which intended to impose the concept of a nonlinear battlefield on the soviets.

The relationship between doctrine and capability is clearly evident here: the US army did not write FM-100-5 and then wait for the required technology to be developed, it essentially forged an operational doctrine designed to leverage those technological advantages to greatest effect by utilising enhanced mobility, ISR and precision fires to exploit soviet weaknesses such as predictable echelonment. Arguably the kind of encounter AirLand battle intended to force upon the soviets was simply not possible without the technological developments of the second offset, which in turn would not have been possible without macro factors such as the strength of the US microelectronics industry. We see these macro factors at play today in the difference between Russian and US T/R modules in FCRs, as an example. I’m sure the Russian Air Force would love GaN based AESAs but they simply lack the industrial capacity to develop that technology, so doctrine has to shift accordingly to account for technological inferiority.

Doctrine is reactive to technology. It does not drive technological development, though it can have some influence on platform design if there has to be major design trade-offs due to technological limitations. That’s the key point here, and it means there is no way the ADF would not utilise every advantage the technology at its disposal provides, including greater operational mobility of its submarine force. When that happens, and new technology is underutilised because of an out-dated doctrinal paradigm, this is considered an organisational failure, such as US tank destroyer doctrine in 1943 and 1944. Sure, in this case, sometimes range is more important than speed, sometimes the opposite is true, it all depends on the operational circumstance which confronts the force. The adaptive employment of the platform will not be arbitrarily limited by doctrine in the manner you describe: that just isn’t the way any effective military operates.

And just a final note: If you are going to argue that the submarine in question cannot deliver that capability, or if it can it won’t be of any advantage, here’s something we both need to remember. I’m not an electrical engineer. I know just enough about submarine propulsion to be dangerous :crazy. But one important thing I have learned on my path is to be well aware of what you do know and what you don’t. And, no offense meant here at all, I’m 99.9% sure you aren’t an expert in submarine propulsion either. Even if you were, so much is unknown about the technology involved that making ‘back of the napkin’ extrapolations based open source data on legacy systems is well beyond speculation: far worse than taking comments from the people who design the platform.

Anyways, might see you around the forums or the wider net. I’ll say hi if I do. :)
 

aussienscale

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Specifics? Why does it matter? At that point it just turns into a dick measuring contest doesnt it? The arguments stand and fall on their own merits.

But FYI PHD candidate in military history with a paper currently under peer review on the development of A2/AD in the western pacific. You can add to that 2 masters and an undergrad degree. I specialise in military theory and the application of modern theoretical tools, such as organisation theory, to understanding doctrinal developments - amongst other things. I do reseach in this space every day.

Thats all I meant about having a blue tag - not doubting your experience or expertise, but it would be foolish doubt mine simply because i lack one.
Guessing by that reply you took what I was saying the wrong way :)

Was not intended as a measuring exercise or anything of the sort, insights into relevant knowledge and experience gives context to what you are saying, nothing more. I have seen and been involved in numerous projects wearing several hats so to speak, and was just trying to highlight different perspectives and perceptions depending what side of the fence you have come from.

My question did not have anything to do with your comment on the blue tags etc, was just curious to your background. Just wanted to clarify that, all good, look forward to further insights.

Cheers
 

hypernova

New Member
Guessing by that reply you took what I was saying the wrong way :)

Was not intended as a measuring exercise or anything of the sort, insights into relevant knowledge and experience gives context to what you are saying, nothing more. I have seen and been involved in numerous projects wearing several hats so to speak, and was just trying to highlight different perspectives and perceptions depending what side of the fence you have come from.

My question did not have anything to do with your comment on the blue tags etc, was just curious to your background. Just wanted to clarify that, all good, look forward to further insights.

Cheers
Sorry, guess I was a bit defensive. Prickly start.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Given the size of this post, I might need to break my response down into different posts, for ease of composing (and reading, for that matter).

Fundamentally the problem here is a misunderstanding the role organisational information plays in all warfare and the way it drives the use and acquisition of platforms and technology. Remember at base this comes down to your argument that, and I’m paraphrasing here, “even if the future submarine did provide a higher transit speed, this will not necessarily have any bearing on how the platform is used because of CONOPs”. Feel free to correct me if I have misrepresented you. Essentially this argument transcends the specific technology at hand.

Let me start by simply changing a three words in that paraphrased sentence: “even if the F-35A provides a lower RCS, this will not necessarily have any bearing on how the platform is used because of CONOPs”. Are there any problems with that reasoning if the above is used to argue against the value of RCS reduction (i.e. a higher transit speed)? They should be obvious (essentially this is a model dependant statement). The reasoning is literally identical to the argument you originally made in this thread. So that’s the short argument, now for the long one (I apologise in advance for the length).
Umm... Not exactly an apples to apples sort of comparison, for a host of reasons. IMO a closer aircraft version would be, "even if the F-22 Raptor is able to sustain supercruising flight, this will not necessarily have any bearing on how the platform is used because of CONOPs”. This issue I have with the F-35 example, is that the LO features are basically passive and therefore there are not really any trade offs in how it operates, excepting the carriage of external stores. Using the F-22, with a choice of flying at high subsonic speed, or supercruising, then the trade off decision appears. Basically slower speed but longer range, or high speed but considerably shorter range. IIRC the F-22 could potentially supercruise for an entire flight apart from takeoff and landing, but that would limit the range (not combat radiius) to only something like 290 n miles, vs. a combat radius of ~400 n miles of which ~100 n miles would be supercruising. I cannot recall where I saw it or what the figure was, but if the F-22 flew at high subsonic and did not supercruise, the combat radius would be a bit higher, something like 600+ n miles.

In effect, the supercruise ability allows the F-22 supersonic flight at a more efficient rate of fuel consumption than using afterburners, and therefore permits longer supersonic flight (in terms of time and distance), but it still is not as efficient as subsonic flight. Hence most of the time the F-22 will be flying at high subsonic speeds, just like 'regular' fighter aircraft that cannot supercruise while armed.

The situation is likely similar with the future RAN sub, in that there will most likely be a trade off between speed and power consumption, with the higher the speed, the greater the rate of consumption. One of the things which is different with a submerged sub, is that power is consumed by sub systems whether the sub is moving or not and these non-propulsion systems might be considered a higher priority for power, which would likely cause a sub to transit at a slower, but more power efficient speed.

Now with the design phase getting underway, this is where some of the specific systems should start getting defined, which should determine power storage capacity and generation capacity, as well as what the rate of power consumption will be from the various systems. IMO it is wrong to assume that a sub would have a sustained transit speed of NN, when the prospective navy has not stated that and one does not know what that navy has as a priority for sub operations in terms of power consumption.

On a side note, from my POV it appears as though all the information coming out from DCNS about the future RAN sub has been written by their marketing people. Statements which present something as an absolute fact, like the following set my teeth on edge.

[url=http://dcnsgroup.com.au/what-we-do/sea-1000/ said:
Australia's Future Submarines[/url]]Pump jet propulsion means the Shortfin Barracuda can move more quietly than submarines with obsolete propeller technology. In a confrontation between two otherwise identical submarines, the one with pump jet propulsion always has the tactical advantage.
This is similar to some of the arguments the oxygen thieves at APA would make, as it either ignores or assumes certain facts, when there is no supporting facts or basis to do so. As gf posted a few days earlier, a direct comparison between diesel-electric prop vs. pump cannot be made, because there has only been a single pump built as an apparent test bed, and that has been sitting tied up and rotting away for a decade. The second is the rate of power consumption and load required would need to be identical for both hypothetical subs, given how the two propulsion methods are different, then it seems likely that the power requirements would not be identical. It would be like stating a GT, diesel, and petrol/gasoline engine, all rated for the exact same horsepower, would all provide the same rate of acceleration in the same vehicle, and burn fuel all at the same rate.

Comments like the above, and others from DCNS recently, remind me of some of the promises made about other Euro kit Australia has selected. I admit this does not leave me with a good feeling about selecting DCNS as the preferred prime. Aside from the whole issue of systems integration, I have concerns about just what tech Australia is receiving in the deal, who will own what IP, and what tech DCNS might be picking up in return.

Later on, I will try to tackle the difference between an evolution vs. revolution in technology.
 

knightrider4

Active Member
Todjaeger - Surely you would assume that the people who made the decision were exposed to information that both you, I & the commoner are not privileged to.

Whilst I am as unhappy as anyone with the selection, surely the right people, in the right places with the necessary information have made the logical choice...
I'm certainly an interested onlooker in this discussion but from what I gather to some of the responses from those here that do this for a living it appears that AIC has to some extent prevailed in the decision making process and therefore the selection the RAN preferred was not selected. If I'm wrong PM please.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Todjaeger - Surely you would assume that the people who made the decision were exposed to information that both you, I & the commoner are not privileged to.

Whilst I am as unhappy as anyone with the selection, surely the right people, in the right places with the necessary information have made the logical choice...
I would certainly assume that those making such decisions are granted access to information I do not have. Whether they all understand what they have been presented with, is another story.

Consideration also has to be given to the influence outside issues have upon defence selections. Navantia's F-100 design for the AWD being selected, despite the RAN's preferred design of the 'Baby Burke' is a good example, another would be Austal getting a piece of the steel-hulled PPB replacement programme, when that company has a reputation for and experience in working with aluminum, not steel. The selection of the MU90, the Tiger ARH, the MRH-90 version of the NH-90, etc. I could go on.

The impression I have formed, is that when the selection process goes with either FMS from the US, and/or the preferred option from the service, the programme tends to go well. It seems though, that when non-defence issues are what decides the selection process, problems tend to occur.

One of the big areas where the ADF (and other countries, for that matter) runs into trouble is with development of new kit. The E-7 Wedgetail took longer than expected to be developed and brought into service. IIRC consideration was being given at one point for terminating the programme. However, the RAAF knew that the Wedgetail programme was a new development programme. The same can be said of the AIR6000 programme and the F-35. Looking back though, it does seem like the MU90, NH-90, and Tiger ARH were all still in development, despite having been sold as completed/MOTS systems.

When looking at the design work needed to make the Shortfin Barracuda a workable diesel-electric sub, a great deal of development is required. Basically all of the internals of the sub will need to be at least re-examined, if not rearranged/designed if attempting to pull any design work from the SSN version. The change from a nuclear powerplant, to a diesel engine/generator and battery storage, along with the change in gearing also has to include fuel bunkerage. Diesel fuel shifts to a much greater extent that nuclear fuel rods, so a conventional sub has to manage changes in displacement as fuel is consumed which is not of concern in an SSN. Changes in displacement can then change the trim of the sub, which has to be taken into account. Then there is making sure that all of the various electronics can 'talk' to each other the way they will need to. There potential for the future subs to be very good, but there is a great deal of hard work, and a not insignificant amount of risk involved. With some of the apparent after the announcement marketing by DCNS occurring, I am concerned that the level of development and potential risk has or is being 'downplayed'. Again.

When viewed through the lens of who is (apparently) making the decision, and what criteria they would be using to decide, as well as who/what they will be listening to, caution and concern is justified IMO.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
I know the moderators of this site hate speculation ... but I thought this was an interesting article in the APDR.

It looks at the reasoning behind the selection of DCNS as the preferred tenderer for the Future Submarine Project and speculates that a nuclear variant of the sub may be an option for its later builds. Given that this project will continue well into the 2050's it is likely that a number of other propulsion options will be available by the time construction starts on the last boats.

Certainly the RAN does seem to have some recent history with wanting to leave its future options open ... LPH with ski jumps and 7000 ton ASW frigates for example.

It also discusses the possibility of a hybrid build. It suggests that DCNS will have most to gain by buying the ASC as it will give them control over the construction of the subs.

DCNS of France wins the CEP | Australian Defence News & Articles | Asia Pacific Defence Reporter
 

t68

Well-Known Member
I know the moderators of this site hate speculation ... but I thought this was an interesting article in the APDR.

It looks at the reasoning behind the selection of DCNS as the preferred tenderer for the Future Submarine Project and speculates that a nuclear variant of the sub may be an option for its later builds. Given that this project will continue well into the 2050's it is likely that a number of other propulsion options will be available by the time construction starts on the last boats.

Certainly the RAN does seem to have some recent history with wanting to leave its future options open ... LPH with ski jumps and 7000 ton ASW frigates for example.

It also discusses the possibility of a hybrid build. It suggests that DCNS will have most to gain by buying the ASC as it will give them control over the construction of the subs.

DCNS of France wins the CEP | Australian Defence News & Articles | Asia Pacific Defence Reporter

Yes I have seen the line of question from notable political reporters of the major broadsheets, but with the way a number of respected posters here saying over some quite time it dosnt seem to be logical as the design will be weighted on a conventional not suited to just pulling out the diesel and whacking a kettle in. Defeats the purpose from the little I understand.


If that is the long term planning seems to me the should have stuck with son of Collins then retendered in future for a nuc boat
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
Just a small correction, Sorry to nit pick.

Where memeber's have stated that the Russian Kilo class pump jet (B-871 Alrosa) has been tied up unused for a decade is not quite accurate.

It has been in use, How much use I cant say but some of them were international exercises (2011 Bold Monarch).
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Thread Closed for Mod discussion.

It will only stay open, if it remains on track and the conversation continues at an adult level - enough with this fantasy land discussion.
 
Last edited:

Preceptor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I know the moderators of this site hate speculation ... but I thought this was an interesting article in the APDR.

The Mod Team doesn't hate speculation. Indeed, most of the discussion on DT is speculation. However, we frown on unsubstantiated claims and speculation that is not grounded in reality. This article, and if there are other articles in the mainstream media that are similar, doesn't follow these guidelines.

To reiterate, debate and discussion is good, flights of fancy and speculation divorced from reality is not. The level of exuberance displayed by many along with suggestions of what it could mean 34+ years from now is getting out of hand.
-Preceptor
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Hi all,

Just sharing a recent post on the ASPI blog by Kim Beazley that I thought members might find interesting.

Australia’s future submarine—problems of politics

All the very best,

Massive
interesting to note that he touches on issues that have discussed long and hard on here - lets hope that some of the press understand the issues more now

quick common points:
1) have repeatedly commented on here about USN attitudes to RAN sub politics
2) have repeatedly commented on here about USN attitudes to RAN sub capability
3) have repeatedly discussed the reasons why the Japanese were a preferred builder
4) have repeatedly discussed the problems around converting from nuke to diesel
5) have repeatedly raised the development synergies such as the common combat room (which Kim has so eloquently hilighted in simple language

vive le france - for king and country. :)
 
Top