NZDF General discussion thread

[ngatimozart]

Regarding any reconstitution of an ACF or a facsimile thereof it, like Don C has said, needs to be determined what the requirements are. Once you have stipulated that, then you can start looking at platforms and whiz bangs. Mr C is keen on his F18Fs for obvious reasons, however we do not have the luxury of waiting until 2022 - 25, in order to make a decision about acquisition via FMS, because the production line will well and truly be closed by then. Used ones, if available, bring their own expensive issues. Maybe another platform, but what? Then there is the unspoken issue here regarding a combined Australia NZ F18F unit. That is one of sovereignty. It would be better, I think, that if any fast jet unit is stood up, it be wholly NZ owned and operated. The use of MPAs as Tod has suggested, for CAS, is worth looking at, however the collary is that this will only work in uncontested airspace.


What is required is a comprehensive assessment of the maritime and air risks and threats to NZ and NZDF forces in all environments. For an island nation with expeditionary forces, these are the two major threats and also the two major areas where NZDF has significant capability and capacity deficiencies, because of historical government ideologies around defence expenditure. These deficiencies need to be addressed and some form of understanding and agreements by government, regarding long term defence sustainment, capabilities, capacity and planning, so that these swings and continual degrading of capabilities can be avoided in the future.

Ah bugger that stinks of common sense. Can't have that. :sniper
:smash

 

[Rob c]

Feel free to disagree but I take it you are not familar with Joseph Nye or the Rice doctrine.

The insurance policy analogy has been regarded as too simplistic by International Relations specialists for many years now. Defence in the modern 21st Century context is all that but it is also also an economic enabler, diplomatic relationship enhancer, as well as possessing and using soft & smart power capabilities as well as traditional ‘hard’ combat power. The policy orientations of the NZDF as directed by the NZ government are from that perspective that are revealed by capabilities and resourcing beyond guns and bombs. Viz some of those points from 3 to 7.

For example the huge role Japan played in 2013 following the Philippines Typhoon was a classic case of smart power being used by the Japanese Govt via the JSDF. There was a major HADR operation undertaken but the mission had the clear communication of a implicit diplomatic message – we are friends we help … the PRC does not. It also sent a further message - how well the JSDF can be organised and deployed into urgent mission responses.

There is no doubt was a certain amount of smart power being used with respect to the responses by the OZ and NZ governments following Cyclone Winston in Fiji. Yes it is about the HADR aspect but it is also about repairing trust and strained relationships, and that Fiji can rely on its larger Pacific neighbours.

I agree with you in the wider context of what defence does when there is no requirement for defence to carry out its primary function. however the primary function has always been and still is to maintain the countries sovereignty, this is often overlooked by politicians as the other functions including International relations, are more visible, politically more acceptable and defence can be seen to be doing something for the taxpayer dollar. It is only right that defence should be used in these functions when not required for the primary function however we must not lose sight of that primary function, which has happened in NZ. The insurance analogy while not applicable for the wider defence function and International relations, still holds true for the primary function. I would repeat that Asia, by 2030 will be more powerful, economically and militarily to the combined NATO countries and is thought that in Asia there is a significant chance of conflict in the area. This means our outlook must change as we are no longer in a strategic back water but on the edge of what could be the worlds hot spot.

I would also remark that both Joseph Nye and Rice were more focused on international affairs from a political point of view and the use of defence in this context. not on the primary function. What also must be remembered is that this is an American view, due to the power of their armed forces no one is going to attack them in a conventional fashion. Therefore the focus of the use of the armed forces can change significantly. we are not that powerful to think we can do the same

 

[MrConservative]

Very good contributions so far.

With respect to the hypothetical arrangement with the RAAF one of the attractions is that they will be who we will be imbedded with at any chapter VII coalition or regional conflict. The synergies operationally are more coherent. The other attraction of the Shornets is that they as a platform do well in the very roles in which we would regain (and more), Maritime strike, interdiction, CAS were our previous key roles within a coalition task force environment. The F-16 was to add CAP contributions and around 850 training support hours per annum for joint service training exercises. I expect our requirements are not going to be falling to far from the free from what the F-16s would be doing now if we had continued with them. It is likely that around 2021/2022 we would have been looking to replace them anyway. If we had been flying the F-16 now with 75 Sqd & 2 Sqd, you would have to say that the F-18F would be in the mix as a replacement and an attractive one due to the operational synergies with the RAAF.

I agree with the sovereignty issue entirely. I do think that the FMS issue that Todj raised are valid. Not due to any reluctance to stop or stall things in a paperwork sense but more in a commercial reality sense - US defence industry lobbyists. My view is that the USG would widely support a return to a greater self reliance by NZ in principle. And of course the 'arrangement' difficulties I outlined in para 3 of post 3348. And of course the the closure of Shornet production within potential time frames is an issue for procurement of a Kiwi owned supplementary FMS order.

The fickleness of local politics. That is also a real ongoing issue which we are well aware. It comes down to firmness from a governmental stance and ignoring the chatter of the usual anti-defence suspects. (The problem of NZ Defence debate is that the reported narrative is only one way - oppositional - and the other side does not robustly argue back including the defence sector itself). The jointness or intergration of developing a NZDF-ADF arrangement around air combat curtails some of the accusations of over-reaching that we may have fiscally or politically than revising the pre 2001 arrangement of Squadron + OCU + Training model.

One thing that is clear cut in my view is that recovery of a strike capability in New Zealand has to slot in seemlessly with the operations and doctrines of our closest neighbour, and therefore the US. As Reg has pointed out it has to not be a vanity guesture. It has to add weight.

 

[Rob c]

Very good contributions so far.

With respect to the hypothetical arrangement with the RAAF one of the attractions is that they will be who we will be imbedded with at any chapter VII coalition or regional conflict. The synergies operationally are more coherent. The other attraction of the Shornets is that they as a platform do well in the very roles in which we would regain (and more), Maritime strike, interdiction, CAS were our previous key roles within a coalition task force environment. The F-16 was to add CAP contributions and around 850 training support hours per annum for joint service training exercises. I expect our requirements are not going to be falling to far from the free from what the F-16s would be doing now if we had continued with them. It is likely that around 2021/2022 we would have been looking to replace them anyway. If we had been flying the F-16 now with 75 Sqd & 2 Sqd, you would have to say that the F-18F would be in the mix as a replacement and an attractive one due to the operational synergies with the RAAF.

I agree with the sovereignty issue entirely. I do think that the FMS issue that Todj raised are valid. Not due to any reluctance to stop or stall things in a paperwork sense but more in a commercial reality sense - US defence industry lobbyists. My view is that the USG would widely support a return to a greater self reliance by NZ in principle. And of course the 'arrangement' difficulties I outlined in para 3 of post 3348. And of course the the closure of Shornet production within potential time frames is an issue for procurement of a Kiwi owned supplementary FMS order.

The fickleness of local politics. That is also a real ongoing issue which we are well aware. It comes down to firmness from a governmental stance and ignoring the chatter of the usual anti-defence suspects. (The problem of NZ Defence debate is that the reported narrative is only one way - oppositional - and the other side does not robustly argue back including the defence sector itself). The jointness or intergration of developing a NZDF-ADF arrangement around air combat curtails some of the accusations of over-reaching that we may have fiscally or politically than revising the pre 2001 arrangement of Squadron + OCU + Training model.

One thing that is clear cut in my view is that recovery of a strike capability in New Zealand has to slot in seemlessly with the operations and doctrines of our closest neighbour, and therefore the US. As Reg has pointed out it has to not be a vanity guesture. It has to add weight.

Totally agree with first 3 para's however I would add the following to the last para that while that para is highly desirable it cannot override our own needs or best interests.

 

[MrConservative]

Totally agree with first 3 para's however I would add the following to the last para that while that para is highly desirable it cannot override our own needs or best interests.

It is in our interests to be inter-operable with the ADF and from that the US forces in any platform. In particular something which is high end, complex and used in a NZ/OZ/US + like-mined coalition environment.

I would not add that as the paragraph 4 does not mean or imply in any way either that by having an air combat capability synergetic with the US or OZ doctrines or operations would ever subsume or allow us to not prioritize of our own interests, needs or own foreign and defence policy goals and I noted in para 2 the importance of sovereignty.

 

[Rob c]

It is in our interests to be inter-operable with the ADF and from that the US forces in any platform. In particular something which is high end, complex and used in a NZ/OZ/US + like-mined coalition environment.

I would not add that as the paragraph 4 does not mean or imply in any way either that by having an air combat capability synergetic with the US or OZ doctrines or operations would ever subsume or allow us to not prioritize of our own interests, needs or own foreign and defence policy goals and I noted in para 2 the importance of sovereignty.

Affordability will be the deciding factor and our basic needs, which may mean some thing simpler to allow us to get started. I stand corrected on the rest. It must also be kept in mind that we can often achieve great results from basic equipment. I was lucky enough to attend COPE THUNDER 1/83 with 75 sqn. This was a exercise to mimic the first 10 days of a war without killing anyone. It was complete with an F5E aggressor sqn lots of F4e's and A10's.Pluss our 8 A4's. During the exercise our pilots had about a 2 to 1 kill advantage over the F5's. We were the first unit in the exercises history to complete all of our missions and we did it a day early. So as the Americans were down on F5's due to serviceability issues, they asked us to become an aggressor unit for the last day. During the day our pilots had confirmed claims of 6 F4E's. At our happy hour (afterwards ) I was talking to an aggressor sqn pilot and he said that they soon learnt that if you saw an A4 and you were not above and behind it "you left the damn thing alone". 75 sqn was good .

 

[MrConservative]

I

I would also remark that both Joseph Nye and Rice were more focused on international affairs from a political point of view and the use of defence in this context. not on the primary function. What also must be remembered is that this is an American view, due to the power of their armed forces no one is going to attack them in a conventional fashion. Therefore the focus of the use of the armed forces can change significantly. we are not that powerful to think we can do the same

Concepts such as soft, smart and hard power are not solely an American world view. Defence is not an isolated concept that is ringfenced, nor are issues around sovereignty a purely military construct. Having a set capability of hard military power does not provide the guarantee of sovereignty and security nor is it its primary function - It is all a holistic requiring a myriad or direct and indirect capabilities and policy outputs and it is not just territorial either.

 

[MrConservative]

Affordability will be the deciding factor and our basic needs, which may mean some thing simpler to allow us to get started. I stand corrected on the rest. It must also be kept in mind that we can often achieve great results from basic equipment. I was lucky enough to attend COPE THUNDER 1/83 with 75 sqn. This was a exercise to mimic the first 10 days of a war without killing anyone. It was complete with an F5E aggressor sqn lots of F4e's and A10's.Pluss our 8 A4's. During the exercise our pilots had about a 2 to 1 kill advantage over the F5's. We were the first unit in the exercises history to complete all of our missions and we did it a day early. So as the Americans were down on F5's due to serviceability issues, they asked us to become an aggressor unit for the last day. During the day our pilots had confirmed claims of 6 F4E's. At our happy hour (afterwards ) I was talking to an aggressor sqn pilot and he said that they soon learnt that if you saw an A4 and you were not above and behind it "you left the damn thing alone". 75 sqn was good .

Wg Cdr J Lanham would have been the boss then. One of the best stick and rudder men we had.

Yes affordability is a major concern. It is all about what is appropriate and relevant. The A-4 was appropriate in its time. It is just that their is not anything like it around anymore pretty much anywhere near we will do business with.

 

[ADMk2]

What I am trying to develop here is a discussion about a graduated capability pathway undertaken by the NZDF over a period of years that transitions towards and integrates with an appropriate strategic weight and responsibility into an existing multi-role air combat platform, the F/A-18F, with our longest and closest defence partner. What I am not trying to do is raise in any form is a discussion around any other fast air type.

It is pretty simple. The RAAF will circa 2022/3 operate 12 Growlers, 24 F/A-18F's and a growing number of F-35A's at some stage 72+. This is about evolving a pathway to take over some responsibility for costs / partial ownership involved in operating a portion of those 24 F models, or alternatively buying through FMS additional airframes, with them operating out of NZ and thus picking up on the former Army/Navy joint training roles once undertaken by the A-4's - whilst also eventually providing for a Kiwi air combat component within a larger RAAF air task force contribution for any future Chp VII scenario. Plus of course the various other roles and options that such a platform can vicariously provide which have not existed since December 2001.

What I think you're over-estimating is the benefit that Australia gets out of what could only be described as an extremely generous gift, under such a scenario. In return for at best a limited degree of assistance under occasional tactical or operational circumstances that happen to align with our own and some reduction in funding from us.

We don't need help funding our Super Hornets from what I've seen and I am not aware that the introduction of Growler, F-35 (or any other RAAF capability for that matter) is predicated upon the draw-down of F/A-18F operations (in soley RAAF service). Furthermore our doctrine and strategy are predicated upon our existing force levels, not significantly smaller...

Our force structure is based on a minimum of four strike fighter squadrons. We played with the idea of reducing to 3 and trying to make up for the lack with advanced, long ranged and precise weapons, but the Government didn't accept that change in strategy (correctly) and chose to retain the full four squadrons. I'm not sure a day to day reduction of 12.5% of our air combat force (based on a notional 'squadron of 12 aircraft operated by RNZAF) meets our needs, just as Government wasn't convinced a 25% reduction in platform numbers was a good idea either.

A dual acquisition of an additional 12 aircraft would be a different story, and one well worth considering, though not without remaining problems given we convert pilots to the Shornets through the USN training scheme and have limited (ie: nil to none) capacity to prepare RNZAF pilots for this conversion through our lead in fighter training scheme.

I suspect the complexities involved in such a plan aren't vastly different to NZDF raising it's own, solely domestic capability, nor the cost much different and as always, it's a fundamentally ideological issue anyway. NZ prefers to cut off it's nose to spite it's face when it comes to potential combat capability.

 

[Rob c]

Wg Cdr J Lanham would have been the boss then. One of the best stick and rudder men we had.

Yes affordability is a major concern. It is all about what is appropriate and relevant. The A-4 was appropriate in its time. It is just that their is not anything like it around anymore pretty much anywhere near we will do business with.

The point being that we can achieve more from anything we have than just about anyone. How ever a possible start point could be a modern advanced trainer with good combat abilities such as the KAI TA or FA 50 I cannot remember if Lanham was there at that time, probably was. I remember Frank Sharp was the EX.O. and air display leader and due to pilot sickness Ohakea base commander who was there at the time, flew some of the missions, think it was GP CPT Boyes.

 

[MrConservative]

How ever a possible start point could be a modern advanced trainer with good combat abilities such as the KAI TA or FA 50

How will the F/A-50 work within the context of a RAAF led coalition that NZ will be part of?

Will it have any valid efficacy for us in a realistic way beyond training?

What is the F/A-50 like in the maritime strike role?

 

[weegee]

This talk of NZ and fighter aircraft might also be beneficial to the RAAF for other reasons.
I have heard from a person with current real world super hornet experience that the RAAF is having a bit of an issue getting enough pilots to come through the system and man the planes we have. I think something to do with the growlers coming on line?
But if nothing else if we could get extra personnel to take some pressure off the training/selection system that would have to work in both countries favour surely? Picking the "best of the best" from both countries so to speak.

 

[Rob c]

How will the F/A-50 work within the context of a RAAF led coalition that NZ will be part of?

Will it have any valid efficacy for us in a realistic way beyond training?

What is the F/A-50 like in the maritime strike role?

I would imagine would be to team them up with RAAF Hawks as they are slated for ground support in a combat situation. , however has a performance envelope mid way between the Hawk and the F18. It is configured to carry anti ship missiles, and has a weapon load similar to an A4, but with significantly better speed (mark 1.5) and climb (39000 f/min). It has a multi mode radar and can carry air to air and air ti ground missiles. It is a contender to replace the T38 when that happens. Paper exercises, have it level pegging with a F16C in a dogfight situation.

 

[MrConservative]

What I think you're over-estimating is the benefit that Australia gets out of what could only be described as an extremely generous gift, under such a scenario. In return for at best a limited degree of assistance under occasional tactical or operational circumstances that happen to align with our own and some reduction in funding from us.

We don't need help funding our Super Hornets from what I've seen and I am not aware that the introduction of Growler, F-35 (or any other RAAF capability for that matter) is predicated upon the draw-down of F/A-18F operations (in soley RAAF service). Furthermore our doctrine and strategy are predicated upon our existing force levels, not significantly smaller...

Our force structure is based on a minimum of four strike fighter squadrons. We played with the idea of reducing to 3 and trying to make up for the lack with advanced, long ranged and precise weapons, but the Government didn't accept that change in strategy (correctly) and chose to retain the full four squadrons. I'm not sure a day to day reduction of 12.5% of our air combat force (based on a notional 'squadron of 12 aircraft operated by RNZAF) meets our needs, just as Government wasn't convinced a 25% reduction in platform numbers was a good idea either.

A dual acquisition of an additional 12 aircraft would be a different story, and one well worth considering, though not without remaining problems given we convert pilots to the Shornets through the USN training scheme and have limited (ie: nil to none) capacity to prepare RNZAF pilots for this conversion through our lead in fighter training scheme.

I suspect the complexities involved in such a plan aren't vastly different to NZDF raising it's own, solely domestic capability, nor the cost much different and as always, it's a fundamentally ideological issue anyway. NZ prefers to cut off it's nose to spite it's face when it comes to potential combat capability.

Extremely generous gift? I would not say over estimating as I was under the assumption that there would be a commercial transaction at the heart of this. I was staying clear of numbers because that can descend into shopping lists.

The force multiplier effect of an additional procurement could well be the best option - if it is felt that the RAAF can sustain the spending on them at keep all of them. If we did bite that bullet I would expect an arrangement (commercial) to be made to integrate the RNZAF contribution operations under the RAAF - that would need to be there.

That gets us into the very narrow Shornet procurement window. Which then stops everything in its tracks following down that pathway.

Which means very much heading into the unknown and a very long time to get there.

 

[Rob c]

Extremely generous gift? I would not say over estimating as I was under the assumption that there would be a commercial transaction at the heart of this. I was staying clear of numbers because that can descend into shopping lists.

The force multiplier effect of an additional procurement could well be the best option - if it is felt that the RAAF can sustain the spending on them at keep all of them. If we did bite that bullet I would expect an arrangement (commercial) to be made to integrate the RNZAF contribution operations under the RAAF - that would need to be there.

That gets us into the very narrow Shornet procurement window. Which then stops everything in its tracks following down that pathway.

Which means very much heading into the unknown and a very long time to get there.

The political considerations would also make it difficult when deciding who could use what when the s--- hit the fan.

 

[Todjaeger]

Extremely generous gift? I would not say over estimating as I was under the assumption that there would be a commercial transaction at the heart of this. I was staying clear of numbers because that can descend into shopping lists.

The force multiplier effect of an additional procurement could well be the best option - if it is felt that the RAAF can sustain the spending on them at keep all of them. If we did bite that bullet I would expect an arrangement (commercial) to be made to integrate the RNZAF contribution operations under the RAAF - that would need to be there.

That gets us into the very narrow Shornet procurement window. Which then stops everything in its tracks following down that pathway.

Which means very much heading into the unknown and a very long time to get there.

From my POV, attempting to get a sort of joint force going with the RAAF to operate SHornets is problematic at best. And that is being a bit polite, as some of the critical issues have to do with questions of sovereignty and decisions of policy.

Right now, the RAAF Shornets are needed to provide the strike capability left vacant by the (entirely sensible IMO) retirement of the F-111C's. This capability is projected as a requirement until 2022+ when the F-35A's might start entering service. At that time, under the original plan, the SHornets would be returned to the US since they would no longer be needed as a stopgap. With the decision to have half the order pre-wired like Growlers, then the order for a dozen Growlers, it is distinctly possible that some/all the SHornets could be kept in RAAF service past 2022. There is also the added potential that half could be converted into Growlers.

Until the RAAF/ADF makes the decision to cut the SHornet from inventory, absent a very lucrative offer from NZ, there is little advantage that I see for any RAAF SHornets to be operated by RNZAF pilots not seconded to and operating under RAAF control. Similarly, there is little advantage to the RAAF in having any stationed in NZ. Unless/until they become excess to RAAF needs, I expect them to be utilized for/in Australia, or on RAAF deployments overseas.

Unfortunately with respect to policy, I would say that the US and Oz would likely be unwilling/disinterested in aiding NZ in getting back into operating fighter aircraft, unless the pilots, ground crew, and aircraft were under US or Australian control. Or any difficulties and expenses involved were absorbed by NZ to the point that there is no disadvantage to the US or Australia.

NZ has a history of making major defence policy decisions over the last 30 years that appear to be driven by ideology, and come at the expense of major allies. With that in mind, absent ironclad agreements which would prevent an NZ policy change especially following a change in gov't or leadership, ending RNZAF involvement with RAAF SHornets, I just do not see things changing.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Until the RAAF/ADF makes the decision to cut the SHornet from inventory, absent a very lucrative offer from NZ, there is little advantage that I see for any RAAF SHornets to be operated by RNZAF pilots not seconded to and operating under RAAF control. Similarly, there is little advantage to the RAAF in having any stationed in NZ. Unless/until they become excess to RAAF needs, I expect them to be utilized for/in Australia, or on RAAF deployments overseas.

In actual fact to do anything would require US State Dept involvement first.

the rest is academic. RAAF and AustGov cannot share Shornets without dealing with the extant FMS and ITARS constraints - and thats wholely solely State Depts field of play

 

[Todjaeger]

In actual fact to do anything would require US State Dept involvement first.

the rest is academic. RAAF and AustGov cannot share Shornets without dealing with the extant FMS and ITARS constraints - and thats wholely solely State Depts field of play

Is State permission required for the RAAF to keep the SHornets in service, post-2023?

As this was the point I was raising. If Oz for whatever reason only purchases 72 F-35A's, then I would see the SHornets kept in service past the originally planned decade of service. If Oz has a need to keep them in service, then they would not be available for any plans involving NZ or the RNZAF, regardless of whether permission from State would be granted. The SHornets IMO would only be available if they became excess to Oz needs because enough F-35's and Growlers had reached FOC in the RAAF.

At that point, then requests could be made to State to permit sale/transfer to NZ, or perhaps some future A-NZ joint force.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Is State permission required for the RAAF to keep the SHornets in service, post-2023?

I would think its just a variation to the FMS conditions - I don't see it as odious - and my own view is that the Growlers will probably stay - there are some significant advantages in maintaining a short squadron within the Project/Plan Jericho constructs

As this was the point I was raising. If Oz for whatever reason only purchases 72 F-35A's, then I would see the SHornets kept in service past the originally planned decade of service. If Oz has a need to keep them in service, then they would not be available for any plans involving NZ or the RNZAF, regardless of whether permission from State would be granted. The SHornets IMO would only be available if they became excess to Oz needs because enough F-35's and Growlers had reached FOC in the RAAF.

At that point, then requests could be made to State to permit sale/transfer to NZ, or perhaps some future A-NZ joint force.

Shornets would only be made available if they were surplus to reqs.

Again the nostradamic view I'm inclined to hold at this stage is that the Shornets will go and Growlers will stay on.

Once the Shornets are released, then its a NZG to State Dept issue. Assuming that this was an NZDF future force desire, then State could delegate how and what needed to be done to the Shornets in OZ prior to transfer to NZDF. There is no physical need for them to be sent to CONUS under those conditions

All of this is so far down the road that......... trailing sentence kicks in......

 

[ADMk2]

Extremely generous gift? I would not say over estimating as I was under the assumption that there would be a commercial transaction at the heart of this. I was staying clear of numbers because that can descend into shopping lists.

The force multiplier effect of an additional procurement could well be the best option - if it is felt that the RAAF can sustain the spending on them at keep all of them. If we did bite that bullet I would expect an arrangement (commercial) to be made to integrate the RNZAF contribution operations under the RAAF - that would need to be there.

That gets us into the very narrow Shornet procurement window. Which then stops everything in its tracks following down that pathway.

Which means very much heading into the unknown and a very long time to get there.

In the context that Australia could be convinced to base 50% (as a notional figure, as I mentioned earlier) of it's Shornet capability in Ohakea, operated, piloted and manned by the RNZAF in exchange for an increased NZ contribution to the ANZAC idea and some reduction in our TLS costs, I could think of no other way to describe such a plan than as an unbelievably, generous gift.

If however the proposal is that, NZ were to purchase 'nn' of these aircraft from us (despite the reality that we need them ourselves to meet our strategic requirements) then the issues go far beyond what we have already discussed in terms of agreements between NZ and Australia and practical day to day matters of operating modern tactical fighter jets, into the ITARS and US State Department issues, that others have already mentioned.

To be honest, I think it would be simpler to propose the NZDF simply buy Super Hornets direct from Boeing... The 'mountain' that would need to be climbed would be K2 versus Everest I think...