NZDF General discussion thread

[Todjaeger]

The problem with our current defence set up is they lack fast reaction time and cannot react to anything any distance from a base. this means that anyone who wants to simply needs to rock up and establish them selves and there is little we could do. Example some car transporters like they bring cars and trucks from Japan full of gear and people going into say the Mount or Taranaki and there is little we can do. The possibilities are endless because of our lack of fast reaction ability.

We have discussed a direct invasion of NZ here on DT a number of times over the years. The basic consensus has been;

1. There is little threat of a direct invasion
2. Only a handful of nations have the capability
3. Those nations are largely friendly to NZ
4. Other nations which could attempt such an invasion would trigger a number of alerts

Now I agree that if another power could establish a beachhead on NZ, especially if kitted with anything more substantial than light infantry and small arms, the NZDF would be hard pressed to dislodge them given the current size, capabilities, and dispersal of the NZDF. This is also assuming of course, that the landed force can receive the required logistical support, either from overseas or by seizing what is needed from within NZ.

However, NZ would not be alone in such a fight, unless/until NZ's allies are either already engaged to the point where they would be unable to come to NZ's aid, or they had already been overwhelmed/overrun. Given how kindly most of NZ's traditional allies and the western world as a whole reacts to one country conquering or attempting to conquer another...

Where many here on DT have seen and continue to see issues with Defence, is the (admittedly IMO) naive view that anything less than a full scale invasion is not a 'real' defence threat facing NZ. Ng here has a term for this sort of blinkered POV, calling it 'sea blindess', where anything past the waters edge, or perhaps the 12 n mile limit, it not something to be concerned about. As an example, when piracy off the Horn of Africa got particularly bad (before the international task force was deployed) and the insurance rates spiked, it cost an extra $100k per voyage to ship things. The Gov't of the day apparently did not consider that increase in cost a problem for NZ's SLOC. With everything going on in the SCS, and the potential for the situation to become even more unstable, that would threaten NZ trade and SLOC with over half the world, with only the Australian and North/South American markets not being impacted (or impacted largely).

Given how much influence and control (by controlling the chequebook) Treasury seems to have, and the importance attached to finance, I do wish an actuary would sit down and run the numbers for risk/cost analysis, as well as risk probabilities. I get the impression at times that those making some of the financial decisions have been congratulating themselves on 'saving' NZ money by cutting back on NZDF expenditures and/or having capabilities lapse, which works as long as nothing happens which required those reduced or lost capabilities.

Unfortunately given the type of environment a modern military faces, a programme to sustain/replace an existing capability can easily last a decade between the programme start and IOC. A programme to regain a capability which had been lost or gain one never had previously, can easily take longer. Especially if capability competency is needed.

 

[Rob c]

We have discussed a direct invasion of NZ here on DT a number of times over the years. The basic consensus has been;

1. There is little threat of a direct invasion
2. Only a handful of nations have the capability
3. Those nations are largely friendly to NZ
4. Other nations which could attempt such an invasion would trigger a number of alerts

Now I agree that if another power could establish a beachhead on NZ, especially if kitted with anything more substantial than light infantry and small arms, the NZDF would be hard pressed to dislodge them given the current size, capabilities, and dispersal of the NZDF. This is also assuming of course, that the landed force can receive the required logistical support, either from overseas or by seizing what is needed from within NZ.

However, NZ would not be alone in such a fight, unless/until NZ's allies are either already engaged to the point where they would be unable to come to NZ's aid, or they had already been overwhelmed/overrun. Given how kindly most of NZ's traditional allies and the western world as a whole reacts to one country conquering or attempting to conquer another...

Where many here on DT have seen and continue to see issues with Defence, is the (admittedly IMO) naive view that anything less than a full scale invasion is not a 'real' defence threat facing NZ. Ng here has a term for this sort of blinkered POV, calling it 'sea blindess', where anything past the waters edge, or perhaps the 12 n mile limit, it not something to be concerned about. As an example, when piracy off the Horn of Africa got particularly bad (before the international task force was deployed) and the insurance rates spiked, it cost an extra $100k per voyage to ship things. The Gov't of the day apparently did not consider that increase in cost a problem for NZ's SLOC. With everything going on in the SCS, and the potential for the situation to become even more unstable, that would threaten NZ trade and SLOC with over half the world, with only the Australian and North/South American markets not being impacted (or impacted largely).

Given how much influence and control (by controlling the chequebook) Treasury seems to have, and the importance attached to finance, I do wish an actuary would sit down and run the numbers for risk/cost analysis, as well as risk probabilities. I get the impression at times that those making some of the financial decisions have been congratulating themselves on 'saving' NZ money by cutting back on NZDF expenditures and/or having capabilities lapse, which works as long as nothing happens which required those reduced or lost capabilities.

Unfortunately given the type of environment a modern military faces, a programme to sustain/replace an existing capability can easily last a decade between the programme start and IOC. A programme to regain a capability which had been lost or gain one never had previously, can easily take longer. Especially if capability competency is needed.

I agree the chance of an invasion is low, but not nil. The chance of your house catching fire is less than 0.5% per year but it is still considered prudent to fully insure it.
to invade NZ does not require a mini D day effort, due to our lack of defence any available form of transport can be used, like civilian passenger aircraft, ro.ro ships, ferries , or a combination of anything that was available, take a port and /or an airport and you could vastly outnumber our forces before they could get there.
The capacity to improvise is all that is needed. Like ISIS has show. The capacity to do this could be achieved by almost any rouge organisation or country. Just because we cannot see a way does not mean someone else cannot find away.
Alerts can be very short, the Falklands got less than 48 hours and in this day and age the aggressor may not even be a country. Some organisations may even consider a suicide mission, if they could take a city and hold it for a week or two imagine the world wide attention that would get. The possibilities are endless and almost anyone could achieve something that could cause us a great deal of grief. By the time allies arrived the civilian casualties could be substantial. You are correct that a new capacity would take a long time to achieve and could easily go well past the decade you mentioned, No one who has us in there sites will send us an invitation be prepare to join our war as the opposition in 10 to 15 years, at that time frame they would not know them selves. So restoring a good basic functioning defence ability should be a must. Not doing so would be like waiting for smoke to start coming out of your house and then trying to get insurance. The conventional wisdoms now no longer apply, they have been replaced by the endless possibilities of the unconventional rouge organisation which at times simply want to cause as much trouble as possible regardless of the outcome. It must also be kept in mind that Asia will by 2030 be more powerful both economically and military than NATO.

 

[MrConservative]

I agree the chance of an invasion is low, but not nil. The chance of your house catching fire is less than 0.5% per year but it is still considered prudent to fully insure it.
to invade NZ does not require a mini D day effort, due to our lack of defence any available form of transport can be used, like civilian passenger aircraft, ro.ro ships, ferries , or a combination of anything that was available, take a port and /or an airport and you could vastly outnumber our forces before they could get there.
The capacity to improvise is all that is needed. Like ISIS has show. The capacity to do this could be achieved by almost any rouge organisation or country. Just because we cannot see a way does not mean someone else cannot find away.
Alerts can be very short, the Falklands got less than 48 hours and in this day and age it may not even be a country. Some organisations may even consider a suicide mission, if they could take a city and hold it for a week or two imagine the world wide attention that would get. The possibilities are endless and almost anyone could achieve something that could cause us a great deal of grief. By the time allies arrived the civilian casualties could be substantial. You are correct that a new capacity would take a long time to achieve and could easily go well past the decade you mentioned, No one who has us in there sites will send us an invitation be prepare to join our war as the opposition in 10 to 15 years, at that time frame they would not know them selves. So restoring a good basic functioning defence ability should be a must. Not doing so would be like waiting for smoke to start coming out of your house and then trying to get insurance. The conventional wisdoms now no longer apply, they have been replaced by the endless possibilities of the unconventional rouge organisation which at times simply want to cause as much trouble as possible regardless of the outcome. It must also be kept in mind that Asia will by 2030 be more powerful both economically and military than NATO.

Rob

The NZG cannot do everything alone and it will never be able to fend off any significant asymetrical or conventional military or security threat. As long as it is able to provide responses to likely scenarios on its doorstep and also maintain a credible contribution to the regional and global security umbrella, noting that interdependency is a virtue in our limited circumstances, then I really think that realistically we doing OK. One thing it does have is through its relationships and contributions, its valuable membership of the FYES alliance. So overall the NZDF might seem a tier 3 player in the scheme of things, we actually have a seat at a very important tier 1 intelligence table. We are far more likely to know of any curveball thrown at us far earlier than most.

The NZDF has Seven main priority areas, however they have different degrees of emphasis and funding. They are all important and need to be resourced and recognised. The question regarding the future structure or solutions for the NZDF in the years ahead therefore need to be focused on sufficient resources that can achieve the following outcomes.

1. Maintain and protect the sovereignty of the ‘Realm of NZ’, its EEZ and its protectorates.

2. Provide as directed, contributions to coalition Task Forces using Land, Air and Maritime Force components alongside like-minded nations and formal allies. For example UNSC Chapter VII mandated Peace Enforcement scenarios.

3. Provide as directed, contributions to Humanitarian and Disaster Support within the Realm of NZ and the South Pacific or further afield if the NZ government choses.

4. Provide as directed, contributions of Land, Air and Maritime components to UNSC Chapter VI mandated Peace Keeping scenarios.

5. Provide as directed, contributions of Land, Air and Maritime components to Security and Stabilization Scenarios within the Pacific Forum region under the auspices of the Biketawa Declaration enabled under UNSC Chapter VIII.

6. Provide as directed, specialist equipment and personal to enable Multi-Agency Operations and Tasking assistance to the New Zealand Government.

7. Develop and support New Zealand’s military heritage & history, its Veterans community, and its international Defence relationships.

Of the 7 points above the one that needs addressing is point 2. Points 3 to 7 we actually are doing OK with. Some countries ignore a lot of those kind of soft or smart power activities, we are being good global citizens by doing so. We are not addressing the weaknesses in point 2 and should. By being able to contribute valid capabilities to potential higher level conflict scenarios we would also be reinforcing any potential security fish-hooks that may undermine our capacity to secure point one, which is kind of the overarching rationale.

But of course we have to and must, still maintain those policy points 3-7 as outlined above. I actually think the road map ahead is good with Future 2035 and the JATF approach. It is just that it needs to be substantially resourced better to get greater efficacy out of our expeditionary contributions to Chp VII coalitions. Ideally three capable frigates, the Endeavour replacement, LWSV, and a future MRASS at the heart of our naval expeditionary capability. The ability to rotate a CATG, and have the ability to concurrently a deploy if directed a LGT and a SpecFor capability and finally an improved strategic and tactical air mobility as well as integration into BAMS. Those capabilities would really have us able to make a solid contribution to any Chp VII scenario or regional security umbrella. What is missing? Well a multi-role air combat capability is obvious however the horizons on that are limited and would involve Santa Claus.

 

[Rob c]

Rob

The NZG cannot do everything alone and it will never be able to fend off any significant asymetrical or conventional military or security threat. As long as it is able to provide responses to likely scenarios on its doorstep and also maintain a credible contribution to the regional and global security umbrella, noting that interdependency is a virtue in our limited circumstances, then I really think that realistically we doing OK. One thing it does have is through its relationships and contributions, its valuable membership of the FYES alliance. So overall the NZDF might seem a tier 3 player in the scheme of things, we actually have a seat at a very important tier 1 intelligence table. We are far more likely to know of any curveball thrown at us far earlier than most.

The NZDF has Seven main priority areas, however they have different degrees of emphasis and funding. They are all important and need to be resourced and recognised. The question regarding the future structure or solutions for the NZDF in the years ahead therefore need to be focused on sufficient resources that can achieve the following outcomes.

1. Maintain and protect the sovereignty of the ‘Realm of NZ’, its EEZ and its protectorates.

2. Provide as directed, contributions to coalition Task Forces using Land, Air and Maritime Force components alongside like-minded nations and formal allies. For example UNSC Chapter VII mandated Peace Enforcement scenarios.

3. Provide as directed, contributions to Humanitarian and Disaster Support within the Realm of NZ and the South Pacific or further afield if the NZ government choses.

4. Provide as directed, contributions of Land, Air and Maritime components to UNSC Chapter VI mandated Peace Keeping scenarios.

5. Provide as directed, contributions of Land, Air and Maritime components to Security and Stabilization Scenarios within the Pacific Forum region under the auspices of the Biketawa Declaration enabled under UNSC Chapter VIII.

6. Provide as directed, specialist equipment and personal to enable Multi-Agency Operations and Tasking assistance to the New Zealand Government.

7. Develop and support New Zealand’s military heritage & history, its Veterans community, and its international Defence relationships.

Of the 7 points above the one that needs addressing is point 2. Points 3 to 7 we actually are doing OK with. Some countries ignore a lot of those kind of soft or smart power activities, we are being good global citizens by doing so. We are not addressing the weaknesses in point 2 and should. By being able to contribute valid capabilities to potential higher level conflict scenarios we would also be reinforcing any potential security fish-hooks that may undermine our capacity to secure point one, which is kind of the overarching rationale.

But of course we have to and must, still maintain those policy points 3-7 as outlined above. I actually think the road map ahead is good with Future 2035 and the JATF approach. It is just that it needs to be substantially resourced better to get greater efficacy out of our expeditionary contributions to Chp VII coalitions. Ideally three capable frigates, the Endeavour replacement, LWSV, and a future MRASS at the heart of our naval expeditionary capability. The ability to rotate a CATG, and have the ability to concurrently a deploy if directed a LGT and a SpecFor capability and finally an improved strategic and tactical air mobility as well as integration into BAMS. Those capabilities would really have us able to make a solid contribution to any Chp VII scenario or regional security umbrella. What is missing? Well a multi-role air combat capability is obvious however the horizons on that are limited and would involve Santa Claus.

The first priority on the NZD list is the main priority, every thing else is secondary to this. the loss of our sovereignty means that we cannot carry out any of the others on the list or any government function. The first function of any defence force of any country is to maintain that countries sovereignty and the freedom of its people. The population of the world is doubling every 50 years with a bludgeoning need for fresh water and arable land ( we have a surplus of both), the economic and military rise of Asia and the rise of the rouge organisations have changed our traditional strategic outlook. This view is starting to be expressed by some Analysts and professional commentators. A basic reasonably sized air combat force (second hand would do) would be able to stop any threat very quickly posed by any country or rouge organisation, except anyone with large aircraft carriers More importantly it would provide a deterrent so they would not try. Secondary considerations should never be at the expense of the primary function. Maintaining the freedom of New Zealanders our children and grandchildren into the future is the most important function of defence, something we appear to have lost sight of.

 

[John Fedup]

The first priority on the NZD list is the main priority, every thing else is secondary to this.

As is the case for any responsible government.

Maintaining the freedom of New Zealanders our children and grandchildren into the future is the most important function of defence, something we appear to have lost sight of.

The same can be said for Canada. Perhaps living next to a superpower makes it easier to forget.

 

[MrConservative]

The first priority on the NZD list is the main priority, every thing else is secondary to this. the loss of our sovereignty means that we cannot carry out any of the others on the list or any government function. The first function of any defence force of any country is to maintain that countries sovereignty and the freedom of its people. The population of the world is doubling every 50 years with a bludgeoning need for fresh water and arable land ( we have a surplus of both), the economic and military rise of Asia and the rise of the rouge organisations have changed our traditional strategic outlook. This view is starting to be expressed by some Analysts and professional commentators. A basic reasonably sized air combat force (second hand would do) would be able to stop any threat very quickly posed by any country or rouge organisation, except anyone with large aircraft carriers More importantly it would provide a deterrent so they would not try. Secondary considerations should never be at the expense of the primary function. Maintaining the freedom of New Zealanders our children and grandchildren into the future is the most important function of defence, something we appear to have lost sight of.

I agree with your first sentence. What I would add is that by looking after points 2 through to 7 that I made with respect to NZDF priorities is that point 1 is substantially looked after.

Interdependency with our allies in the region underpins what we do whether it is through formal relationships such as CDR, FPDA and the Washington - Wellington declarations as well as FYES.

The lack of an air combat capability is a real concern, however even that has to be looked through the lense of alligned capabilities and platforms with our closest defence partners, particularly the RAAF. Post 2022 when the Growlers are well bedded down with 6 Sqd, F-35 is starting to build significant fleet numbers and legacy Hornet is phasing out, a conversation should now be started with respect to the potential of RNZAF 'buy in and shared involvement' in operating the 24 RAAF superbugs in 1 Sqd, with a view for example of 12 of them operating out of Ohakea instead of 24 at Amberley could very well suit everyone. That is a conversation which I think is worth taking further. I have looked closely at the reconstituted ACF on the model we had pre 2001 and fiscally it is impossible to replicate with anything approaching a viable modern defence capability that could be sustained.

 

[kiwipatriot69]

I agree with your first sentence. What I would add is that by looking after points 2 through to 7 that I made with respect to NZDF priorities is that point 1 is substantially looked after.

Interdependency with our allies in the region underpins what we do whether it is through formal relationships such as CDR, FPDA and the Washington - Wellington declarations as well as FYES.

The lack of an air combat capability is a real concern, however even that has to be looked through the lense of alligned capabilities and platforms with our closest defence partners, particularly the RAAF. Post 2022 when the Growlers are well bedded down with 6 Sqd, F-35 is starting to build significant fleet numbers and legacy Hornet is phasing out, a conversation should now be started with respect to the potential of RNZAF 'buy in and shared involvement' in operating the 24 RAAF superbugs in 1 Sqd, with a view for example of 12 of them operating out of Ohakea instead of 24 at Amberley could very well suit everyone. That is a conversation which I think is worth taking further. I have looked closely at the reconstituted ACF on the model we had pre 2001 and fiscally it is impossible to replicate with anything approaching a viable modern defence capability that could be sustained.

Hypothetically speaking, if RNZAF/NZDF did go ahead with your idea of jointly operating a squadron or so of RAAF Super hornets ,first off, how old are they? can a SLEP be done on them? and how long and how much money would be required to do so, not that im against the idea, far from it.:smilie

 

[MrConservative]

Hypothetically speaking, if RNZAF/NZDF did go ahead with your idea of jointly operating a squadron or so of RAAF Super hornets ,first off, how old are they? can a SLEP be done on them? and how long and how much money would be required to do so, not that im against the idea, far from it.:smilie

I have raised this 'joint squadron' idea in the past even before the previous white paper. Though it is something that I would also not have as a most critical priority. BAMS, 3 Anzac replacements, Strategic airlift and a future multi-role amphibious support ship all need to be locked in first. Only then would I look at the air combat component.

Nevertheless, it is the only way in which we would see a glimmer of hope in achieving a credible and capable air combat component within the NZDF. It is just a concept and it is simply a conversation starter but it does need three big hurdles to get over. 1. A willingness by the NZ Govt / Public to make the committment. 2. That it can be proven to be advantageous to the Australian government as possible partners. 3. Clear objectives beyond it being just nice to have.

It maybe that the RAAF decides it cannot spare any F/A-18F aircraft for sale and transfer to New Zealand. They may decide that they do not want to operate a portion of their F/A-18F fleet in NZ. Alternatively, though open to a joint squadron with NZ, the OZ Govt might prefer us to buy off the US. Or indeed the NZ govt might prefer a greater cost benefit in buying its own short squadron / squadron using new, leased or used ex-US forces F/A-18F aircraft (or even EA/18G's) with a view to working together towards a joint ANZAC squadron as part of a wider ANZAC air task force. There are a number of ways to slice and dice things.

The first 12 unwired F/A-18F's were produced from July 2009 and fully operational with RAAF 1 Sqd in late 2010. The 12 wired F model's which then followed were operational with 6 squadron in early 2011. These are very youthful aircraft. They are also very capable as multi-role strike platforms and will have a place in US / OZ inventories for many years ahead complementing the JSF.

In my view a major SLEP is many years off. Though rolling upgrades to later Block standards can and will be undertaken. The cost of a SLEP cannot be realistically calculated at this stage. I'm not even going to attempt costing it back on envelope style. Though only an interim F-111 solution, they the F models will likely be flying with the RAN alongside the F-35A and EA-18G for quite some time, comfortably well into the 2030s. My view is if we are going to go down this reconstituted air combat capability road it has to be done in association with the RAAF /ADF in some mutually beneficial form as well as USN. That said a lets buy x amount of y for z is a discussion I really do want to avoid. That is not the conversation that will get us anyway further and has been done to death. The use has to be justified, quantified and qualified. The insurance policy or just in case argument on defence aquisitions can always find something else to spend hard fought money on viz a 4th Frigate, more MISR and WGS capability that are used constantly.

Cheers MrC

 

[Todjaeger]

4. Provide as directed, contributions of Land, Air and Maritime components to UNSC Chapter VI mandated Peace Keeping scenarios.

5. Provide as directed, contributions of Land, Air and Maritime components to Security and Stabilization Scenarios within the Pacific Forum region under the auspices of the Biketawa Declaration enabled under UNSC Chapter VIII.

6. Provide as directed, specialist equipment and personal to enable Multi-Agency Operations and Tasking assistance to the New Zealand Government.

I do admit, while these points can be beneficial to NZ, I do have issues with how NZ has engaged them in the last ~15 years or so. Or more specifically, the number of them and the number of personnel involved.

IIRC at one point somewhere around 2008-2010, the NZDF had ~10% (roughly 900 personnel at the time) of the total personnel deployed away from NZ, on ~27 different international peacekeeping missions. Now the deployments were not all of the same size since some were essentially a deployed squad, while others were likely closer to a reinforced platoon-level formations. With that in mind though, that many personnel scattered across so many deployments would make any sort of unit level training more difficult.

As I understand, NZ had reduced the level of int'l commitments due at least in part to the strain which the NZDF was suffering from, to support so many detachments. What concerned me (and still does to a degree) is that the gov't of the day apparently felt that being "a good international citizen" and/or committing NZDF personnel to many disparate deployments for political/diplomatic reasons was sufficient justification to introduce conditions which would have 'broken' the NZDF had things continued.

On a related note, while I do agree that some of the specialist capabilities which the NZDF possesses should be made available for other gov't agencies. However, it does seem at times that some of the capabilities choices are being made primarily for the benefit of other agencies. Given how limited the resources for the NZDF are, having kit and personnel used primarily to support non-defence related taskings seems to be directing even more NZDF resources away from the NZDF.

 

[t68]

I have raised this 'joint squadron' idea in the past even before the previous white paper. Though it is something that I would also not have as a most critical priority. BAMS, 3 Anzac replacements, Strategic airlift and a future multi-role amphibious support ship all need to be locked in first. Only then would I look at the air combat component.

Agree a lot has to be done to revitalise the NZDF across all three service, but unfortunatly if an ACF was reestablished planing would have to start now.

1. A willingness by the NZ Govt / Public to make the committment. 2. That it can be proven to be advantageous to the Australian government as possible partners. 3. Clear objectives beyond it being just nice to have.

There are a number of ways to slice and dice things.

That also doesn't mean the first steps have to be jet powered,
A programs to meet Armed Reconnaissance requirements would be a start which could also incorporate Light Attack, that would eventually be needed by the JATF would also benefit the ADF

AT-6 Wolverine anyone?

The first 12 unwired F/A-18F's were produced from July 2009 and fully operational with RAAF 1 Sqd in late 2010. The 12 wired F model's which then followed were operational with 6 squadron in early 2011. These are very youthful aircraft. They are also very capable as multi-role strike platforms and will have a place in US / OZ inventories for many years ahead complementing the JSF.

At this time FOC for the 72 F35A's is expected for 2023, the remaining replacement aircraft for the F/A18-Fis not yet known, it would make sense for those per-wired aircraft to become G's, IOC for the Growlers is expected in 2018, so a hand off of the 12x F's 2025 time frame is not out of the realms of plausibility. But can/could you make the case for which the NZG would accept to venture down this road again?

 

[MrConservative]

That also doesn't mean the first steps have to be jet powered,
A programs to meet Armed Reconnaissance requirements would be a start which could also incorporate Light Attack, that would eventually be needed by the JATF would also benefit the ADF. AT-6 Wolverine anyone?

But can/could you make the case for which the NZG would accept to venture down this road again?

The conversation here is about making the case. Which is your job as a poster to contribute to.

The first steps would have to be training related with NZDF sponsored slots on Hawks RAAF post RNZAF T-6 wings or sponsored T-2's at RAF Valley or USN T-45s at Pensacola. So there will be no NZ based advanced training and likely that such training will always be contracted out. The second step would be RNZAF pilots posted on exchange / sponsored to RAAF/USN OCU's that fly the F/A-18E/F.

That kind of activity needs to start a few years before the first aircraft are potentially operating in joint RAAF / RNZAF colours or flying training or operational sorties out of Ohakea.

 

[MrConservative]

I do admit, while these points can be beneficial to NZ, I do have issues with how NZ has engaged them in the last ~15 years or so. Or more specifically, the number of them and the number of personnel involved.

IIRC at one point somewhere around 2008-2010, the NZDF had ~10% (roughly 900 personnel at the time) of the total personnel deployed away from NZ, on ~27 different international peacekeeping missions. Now the deployments were not all of the same size since some were essentially a deployed squad, while others were likely closer to a reinforced platoon-level formations. With that in mind though, that many personnel scattered across so many deployments would make any sort of unit level training more difficult.

As I understand, NZ had reduced the level of int'l commitments due at least in part to the strain which the NZDF was suffering from, to support so many detachments. What concerned me (and still does to a degree) is that the gov't of the day apparently felt that being "a good international citizen" and/or committing NZDF personnel to many disparate deployments for political/diplomatic reasons was sufficient justification to introduce conditions which would have 'broken' the NZDF had things continued.

On a related note, while I do agree that some of the specialist capabilities which the NZDF possesses should be made available for other gov't agencies. However, it does seem at times that some of the capabilities choices are being made primarily for the benefit of other agencies. Given how limited the resources for the NZDF are, having kit and personnel used primarily to support non-defence related taskings seems to be directing even more NZDF resources away from the NZDF.

The collapse of the TF in numbers from around 6000 in 1990s to about 2000 by the end of last decade made life hard as tempo's rose. And I believe the reduction from around 5400 regulars to around 4500 during last decade compounded that. The new structure within the NZ Army is far better in my view. Pity it was not done 15 years earlier. It may have halted the slide.

As for you well made point about other agencies murking the capability set one of the reasons why we ended up with the IPVs was that they were preferred by Phil Goff and the Fisheries Departments who were considered the "customer". The Navy want vessels with a greater range / sea day endurance. Instead of having 4 IPVs and 2 OPVs - possibly in hindsight 4 quality OPVs with good range would have been better and more sustainable for around the same money invested. Something like a revised Norwegian Nordkapp Class built under license would have been better.

 

[shanes_world_05]

The conversation here is about making the case. Which is your job as a poster to contribute to.

The first steps would have to be training related with NZDF sponsored slots on Hawks RAAF post RNZAF T-6 wings or sponsored T-2's at RAF Valley or USN T-45s at Pensacola. So there will be no NZ based advanced training and likely that such training will always be contracted out. The second step would be RNZAF pilots posted on exchange / sponsored to RAAF/USN OCU's that fly the F/A-18E/F.

That kind of activity needs to start a few years before the first aircraft are operating in joint RAAK / RNZAF colours or flying training or operational sorties out of Ohakea.

Would NZ and her allies be better served by more of and more capable P-3's and her replacements than a reformed ACF?. Say 8-12 P-3's (total) with SLAM and Harpoon with say a commitment to similar 4-10 P-8's similiar equiped (Big price I know)? Devils advocate as I can't see the Aussie electorate viewing it well and NZ electorate being occupied with the whiners and whingers clawing their way to the news networks microphones first. If we offered P-3's in numbers, A400m for aerial refueling and a few more NH90 specialised in CSAR maybe we count ourselves back in that way with good dual use for more civil assistance type stuff?

 

[t68]

The conversation here is about making the case. Which is your job as a poster to contribute to.

.

I thought I did, unfortunatly my post was not very clear cut.

I did suggest an Armed Recon platform in place of fast jets which might be a bit more palatable to the goverment than fast jets. A possible number of tasking such as Littoral Maritime Patrol, Joint Terminal Attack Controller training and perhaps a limited Airborne Interdiction capabilty which would support a future JATF whilst complimenting Tiger ARH or it's replacements

Personaly I think NZ has as much chance of rebuilding a fast jet capabilty as the RAN has in getting a dedicated strike carrier

 

[MrConservative]

I thought I did, unfortunatly my post was not very clear cut.

I did suggest an Armed Recon platform in place of fast jets which might be a bit more palatable to the goverment than fast jets. A possible number of tasking such as Littoral Maritime Patrol, Joint Terminal Attack Controller training and perhaps a limited Airborne Interdiction capabilty which would support a future JATF whilst complimenting Tiger ARH or it's replacements

Personaly I think NZ has as much chance of rebuilding a fast jet capabilty as the RAN has in getting a dedicated strike carrier

Then I would not bother as that option does not really address New Zealands strategic needs and more marked capability gaps which exist in the Air-Maritime zone.

I actually sense a shift within New Zealand defence thinking that though it may not be prevalent within the time frame of this forthcoming white paper but a movement on the negative to a more neutral position concerning a component of air combat capability within the NZDF. The DWP will mention that there is growing contestability within our wider region.

I had the same view but there is a growing pragmatism coming back into vogue. I have been quite down on the ACF discussion. Mostly because they were shopping lists. This alternative concept that I am raising is essentially about finding an equilibrium between doing nothing - an option that is becoming incrementally untenable through to reconstituting an ACF which yes I agree is not an option on fiscal and over-reaching grounds. It is about finding a balance between what we require and what a partner in the joint operating space can also gain weight from.

 

[MrConservative]

Would NZ and her allies be better served by more of and more capable P-3's and her replacements than a reformed ACF?. Say 8-12 P-3's (total) with SLAM and Harpoon with say a commitment to similar 4-10 P-8's similiar equiped (Big price I know)? Devils advocate as I can't see the Aussie electorate viewing it well and NZ electorate being occupied with the whiners and whingers clawing their way to the news networks microphones first. If we offered P-3's in numbers, A400m for aerial refueling and a few more NH90 specialised in CSAR maybe we count ourselves back in that way with good dual use for more civil assistance type stuff?

Lets go back through the time frame outlined earlier. We are talking a decade away and a graduated build up and as I noted earlier a capability set introduced after the other priority capability sets have been sorted. Why would we want to order more P-3s when we would around mid next decade be phasing them out. If you replaced the P-3 with the P-8 then that is a good point well made.

The people with microphones and whingers are just a shouty minority. The MSM in NZ has an even lower trust factor and dwindling audience than politicians.

 

[John Fedup]

Perhaps Textron's Scorpion jet fighter is an economically viable way for NZ to get back into the fast jet game. With an operating cost of $3,000 per hour and a claimed price tag of $20m US, it seems to be a bargain compared to available (new) alternatives.

 

[ADMk2]

Perhaps Textron's Scorpion jet fighter is an economically viable way for NZ to get back into the fast jet game. With an operating cost of $3,000 per hour and a claimed price tag of $20m US, it seems to be a bargain compared to available (new) alternatives.

But it isn't a 'fast' jet, hence why it is so cheap. It is subsonic, with a very limited performance envelope. Even other subsonic aircraft like Hawk's or A-4's leave it for dead performance-wise.

Cost is one thing. Capability is another. I'm not certain what it is Scorpion brings to the table that NZDF actually requires, that justifies it's cost compared to a more traditional solution.

If CAS is what is needed what does that look like? AT-6C Texan II can provide it cheaper even than a Scorpion and it has commonality with the T-6C's already in NZ service, reducing TLS.

Scorpion doesn't have the performance needed to replace a genuine combat aircraft and can't match the cost price of a prop like an AT-6C or a Super Tucano...

Probably why no-one has bought them...

 

[MrConservative]

Perhaps Textron's Scorpion jet fighter is an economically viable way for NZ to get back into the fast jet game. With an operating cost of $3,000 per hour and a claimed price tag of $20m US, it seems to be a bargain compared to available (new) alternatives.

What I am trying to develop here is a discussion about a graduated capability pathway undertaken by the NZDF over a period of years that transitions towards and integrates with an appropriate strategic weight and responsibility into an existing multi-role air combat platform, the F/A-18F, with our longest and closest defence partner. What I am not trying to do is raise in any form is a discussion around any other fast air type.

It is pretty simple. The RAAF will circa 2022/3 operate 12 Growlers, 24 F/A-18F's and a growing number of F-35A's at some stage 72+. This is about evolving a pathway to take over some responsibility for costs / partial ownership involved in operating a portion of those 24 F models, or alternatively buying through FMS additional airframes, with them operating out of NZ and thus picking up on the former Army/Navy joint training roles once undertaken by the A-4's - whilst also eventually providing for a Kiwi air combat component within a larger RAAF air task force contribution for any future Chp VII scenario. Plus of course the various other roles and options that such a platform can vicariously provide which have not existed since December 2001.

 

[John Fedup]

But it isn't a 'fast' jet, hence why it is so cheap. It is subsonic, with a very limited performance envelope. Even other subsonic aircraft like Hawk's or A-4's leave it for dead performance-wise.

Cost is one thing. Capability is another. I'm not certain what it is Scorpion brings to the table that NZDF actually requires, that justifies it's cost compared to a more traditional solution.

If CAS is what is needed what does that look like? AT-6C Texan II can provide it cheaper even than a Scorpion and it has commonality with the T-6C's already in NZ service, reducing TLS.

Scorpion doesn't have the performance needed to replace a genuine combat aircraft and can't match the cost price of a prop like an AT-6C or a Super Tucano...

Probably why no-one has bought them...

True, nobody has bought yet but it is still early days. Although it costs about 3 times as much the Scorpion offers a 9,000 pound payload, 150 knot higher speed and longer range.