ARH AAMs vs VLO Aircraft

[Boagrius]

Hi all,

Just a quick query to those more knowledgeable on the forum than yours truly (everyone? ;-p):

As I am sure is common around these parts, I have been following the development of the F35 over the years, along with the shoddy clickbait journalism that has accompanied it (not to mention the drivel churned out by APA et al. even before that).

A common theme in the "critiques" of all the above seems to be the assumption that the AAMs and associated guidance systems of potential adversaries should work "as advertised" when cued via the onboard sensors of the launch platform (usually some Flanker variant/PAK FA/J20/whatever).

This, however, brings me to my question:

Given the significant amount of work that has gone into sig management on the F35, what effect is this likely to have on the guidance systems of missiles fired at it, especially those with active radar seekers?

I imagine a modern FPA equipped IIR seeker may not have too much trouble acquiring an F35 or "similar" (I use the term loosely) in the WVR arena, but the relatively tiny radars on ARH weapons like AA-12 or PL-12 would surely suffer a serious detection range penalty when faced with a VLO target like the F35. Depending on severity, this could presumably neuter the fairly vital "launch and leave" capability of said missiles by shrinking their terminal homing baskets to the point of irrelevance (??).

I think this is also particularly pertinent when considering the hype some sources have drummed up in relation to DRFM jammers (eg. Khibiny) and their implications for western BVR AAMs like AMRAAM and Meteor in their active terminal phase.

For what it's worth I use the F35 only as an exemplar - I imagine this may be an issue when targeting most if not all genuine 5th gen jets generally and wonder if there could be a shift to alternative/multimodal terminal guidance methods in the future as a consequence?

Cheers!

 

[SpudmanWP]

The range at which an ARH seeker can acquire a target while still having time & maneuver energy to engage that target is called the killbox. Since the VLO nature of the target will undoubtedly reduce the seeker effectiveness, several things will happen. Top of these is that the killbox will get significantly smaller. This means that not only will the seeker have less time to react to the target (once it sees it), but that the launching aircraft will have to do a better job with mid-course guidance in order to get the missile into this now-smaller killbox.

 

[Boagrius]

^ Thanks Spudman, much as I would have expected.

I am quite curious about the extent of the "shrinkage" you're referring to (?) - for example a given missile can hardly be considered a "fire and forget" system if it still has to be semi-actively guided to within <5nm of the target in order to achieve a kill(??). That final distance is going to represent a tiny fraction of the weapon's overall travel time for a Mach 4+ BVR weapon. I can see this having significant operational implications in the A-A arena, especially when considering VLO 5th gen platforms pitted against 4-4.5 gen non-VLO opponents.

Granted, making an accurate assessment of the implications of the above hinges upon radar performance and RCS data that is not publically available, but I find it astonishing that it never seems to get mentioned in the public domain (particularly in relation to the F35). Just another very pivotal place in which VLO can disrupt the enemy kill chain I suppose...

Finally, I find it a bit odd that, with the cancellation of JDRADM, the only true spiritual successor to AMRAAM in the works on the US side is in the T3 program - but even this seems to be an RF based system. I would have thought that, given the above (not to mention the advent of new EW systems like Himalaya, Khibiny and the EA capabilities of emerging AESA radars), there may be a move towards something like IIR terminal guidance for targeting future 5th gen opponents, even in the BVR arena? ...Or is the U.S just THAT confident in the ECCM capabilities of its current and planned ARH missiles?.

 

[ADMk2]

^ Thanks Spudman, much as I would have expected.

I am quite curious about the extent of the "shrinkage" you're referring to (?) - for example a given missile can hardly be considered a "fire and forget" system if it still has to be semi-actively guided to within <5nm of the target in order to achieve a kill(??). That final distance is going to represent a tiny fraction of the weapon's overall travel time for a Mach 4+ BVR weapon. I can see this having significant operational implications in the A-A arena, especially when considering VLO 5th gen platforms pitted against 4-4.5 gen non-VLO opponents.

Granted, making an accurate assessment of the implications of the above hinges upon radar performance and RCS data that is not publically available, but I find it astonishing that it never seems to get mentioned in the public domain (particularly in relation to the F35). Just another very pivotal place in which VLO can disrupt the enemy kill chain I suppose...

Finally, I find it a bit odd that, with the cancellation of JDRADM, the only true spiritual successor to AMRAAM in the works on the US side is in the T3 program - but even this seems to be an RF based system. I would have thought that, given the above (not to mention the advent of new EW systems like Himalaya, Khibiny and the EA capabilities of emerging AESA radars), there may be a move towards something like IIR terminal guidance for targeting future 5th gen opponents, even in the BVR arena? ...Or is the U.S just THAT confident in the ECCM capabilities of its current and planned ARH missiles?.

The US appears confident in the capability of its AIM-120C and D missiles for it's long range BVR weapons, for the near future.

If anything, they are much more focussed on smaller (and shorter ranged) missiles, to increase the weapons load of fighters (and perhaps bombers...) with internal weapons bays and for new concepts in miniature 'self-defence' weapons in what I can envisage eventuating into an 'active defence' type scenario.

Under such circumstances this is one possible future combat: LO aircraft are essentially avoiding each other, the difficulties involved in locating and engaging each other are too great, the majority of fighter aircraft will be destroyed where they spend the bulk of their time: on the ground, and any engagements in the air, will take place in short range ambush or self-defence type scenarios, where the bigger missiles won't matter so much.

The larger missiles will primarily be used to engage support nodes further out, ie: AWACS, MPA's and refuellers, transports etc.

 

[Boagrius]

Thanks ADM, that makes sense.

It strikes me that the pilot is rapidly becoming a limiting factor in the kinematic performance of combat aircraft (although airframe fatigue is doubtlessly an issue here as well), making the kind of "active (missile) defence" (presumably also via ECM/EA/DIRCM/DEWs etc) you mention increasingly more important than traditional defensive maneuvers with flare/chaff.

That said, I do find the U.S reliance on the AMRAAM fascinating. I mean they literally have no other missile that fills the BVR niche (even Blk II AIM9X has pretty short legs). Given their doctrinal emphasis on achieving air supremacy, they must have a lot of faith in it. I guess we won't know exactly why until the finer details of it are publically available...

That said, I would have thought an IIR seekerhead for terminal homing even on BVR missiles might make sense in the post-2020 timeframe. Not sure how feasible that would be though. Maybe (as you suggest) something like LM's CUDA will get a run after all.

 

[Bonza]

For what it's worth I use the F35 only as an exemplar - I imagine this may be an issue when targeting most if not all genuine 5th gen jets generally and wonder if there could be a shift to alternative/multimodal terminal guidance methods in the future as a consequence?[/B]

Cheers!

Regarding alternative or multimode guidance methods for missiles, for a while the United States was working on a program called JDRADM - the Joint Dual Role Air Dominance Missile. The weapon was intended to replace both AMRAAM and HARM missiles, and so used a dual active radar homing / radiation homing guidance system, and it wouldn't surprise me if it had some kind of secondary guidance for the anti-radiation role, in the event the targeted radar stopped transmitting. And if I remember correctly one or more AMRAAM variants (presumably the later ones), in addition to active radar homing, have some degree of home-on-jam capability. If I'm mistaken then I'm sure other more learned posters will correct that.

Going a little further back in history one can find other examples such as the AIM-97 Seekbat - another US developmental missile system that was ultimately cancelled rather than put into service. This was a large weapon based on the AGM-78 Standard anti-radiation missile and intended to address the long-range armament and Mach 2.5-3.2 speeds of the MiG-25 Foxbat. In the AIM-97's case it was initially launched using semi-active radar homing to get it to the target area, at which point it would transition to infrared homing for the terminal phase (as you can imagine a Foxbat travelling at Mach 3 would generate a substantial infrared signature). However, a combination of misintepreted test data, poor testing practices and a reassessment of the MiG-25's capabilities led to the cancellation of the missile without much apparent progress (going by the information I've seen, anyway).

Yet another example was the requirement for the AIM-152 AAAM, a proposed replacement for the AIM-54 Phoenix that was evaluated in the 1980s. There were two competing designs, a Hughes/Raytheon model using a hybrid ramjet/rocket motor and a combination inertial guidance/active radar homing system (much like modern ARH missiles like AMRAAM, AA-12, etc), though there were plans to include an infrared guidance system in addition to this.

The other model was made by General Dynamics and Westinghouse, and used a multiple-pulse rocket motor, with inertial guidance and semi-active radar homing for initial guidance, with the somewhat odd choice of an electro-optical seeker for terminal guidance, in addition to a more conventional backup infrared seeker. To overcome the problems associated with semi-active radar homing, it was intended to equip aircraft with radar pods so as to provide missile guidance without having to align the aircraft's own nose-mounted radar to the target. Once again, the project was destined to be cancelled, this one in 1992. In the AIM-152's case, its intended target began to disappear - the missile had been intended to provide an extended-range response to supersonic Soviet bombers carrying large anti-ship missiles, allowing fleet air defence fighters to engage these targets before they could threaten US Navy carrier groups. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union this requirement was reassessed and, presumably, it was decided that the existing F-14 Tomcat/AWG-9 radar/AIM-54 missile combination was sufficient for existing threats.

The last cancelled missile program I'll mention wasn't given the normal missile designation of AIM-(XXX). Instead the program was referred to only as Have Dash I and II. This may indicate the program didn't progress very far, or perhaps it indicates some level of classification - I have no idea. In any case, Have Dash was an effort to develop a missile airframe that itself would be low observable. Have Dash I consisted of studies between 1985 and 1988, but produced nothing viable. Have Dash II started in 1990 at which time there was a desire for a signature-managed missile intended to replace the AMRAAM and complement the Advanced Tactical Fighter program, which at the time consisted of both prototypes, the YF-22 and YF-23. The missile had body shaping intended to reduce radar signature and provide heat resistance, as it was intended to operate at Mach 5. The intended seeker package was a combination of inertial guidance, and dual-mode active radar and infrared homing for the missile's terminal phase. Some recoverable prototype Have Dash II missiles were produced, but these lacked both the production-type Mach 5 engine and, I believe, the fully functional guidance package. There is very little information on hand regarding Have Dash II - flights of the recoverable test airframes may have taken place in 1992 or thereabouts, but all information regarding results are classified, and it appears as though the program fell by the wayside at some point, with any useful data possibly having informed future AMRAAM development (an assumption on my part).

Off the top of my head those are some of the alternate seeker technologies that have been explored, although not in operational settings obviously. A different approach involves what is apparently a Russian tactic (although I've not seen it documented in any credible sense) of carrying multiple missiles of the same type with different guidance packages. So for example the R-27 missile's most common variant has a semi-active radar guidance package, but another variant has an infrared guidance package and there is a allegedly a third variant with an active radar guidance package, though why one would procure this variant given the existence of the R-77, I do not know. From what I understand the R-27 is still the more common missile amongst Russian air forces - perhaps refitting older missiles with modern guidance packages is easier than buying more R-77s? In any case that is speculation on my part.

The point is that, according to the alleged tactic, a fighter aircraft will carry R-27s with varied guidance systems, and volley-fire them at a target in the hope of increasing the chances of a kill. The idea is that in addition to having to defeat the radar seeker on one R-27, an opponent must also worry about the infrared seeker on the other missile. Or, say both Russian and adversary aircraft have fired semi-active radar guided missiles - to stay on approach risks running headlong into the opponent's missile, but to turn away wastes your own missile shot, but if you have another missile in flight, this one equipped with an infrared seeker, you can safely turn away while still having a missile "in the game". However as I have said, I am unsure if this is indeed a tactic practiced by Russian pilots, and in addition I am skeptical of an infrared seeker's ability to pick up and successfully engage targets at BVR ranges - the ranges at which radar-guided missiles might typically be launched. Though I am given to understand the AIM-132 ASRAAM's infrared guidance package is sensitive enough that I've heard it described as a "semi-BVR" missile, I'm not so sure that the R-27's guidance system could match it, especially considering the Russian missile is supposed to have a much longer effective range. I suppose infrared guidance gets better and better, but for true BVR ranges I suspect there's a reason almost everyone has settled on active radar guidance packages, ideally in conjunction with inertial guidance and two-way datalinks for mid-course updates.

Anyway I hope some of that is useful to you, or at least gives you something to google.

 

[Boagrius]

Hi Bonza,

Thanks for the info – some very interesting history there, will definitely give me some further reading to do! Have Dash 2 sounds very akin to what I am talking about as a potential successor to AMRAAM (although perhaps traveling at Mach 5 would be unnecessary?).

As I mentioned in my second post, I am a little puzzled by the fact that JDRADM’s only apparent substitute is the T3 program, which still seems to be oriented towards a combination of active and/or passive radar homing in its terminal guidance phase. I have seen no mention in the public domain of an IR based seeker head being considered for whatever T3 produces – even in a dual mode fashion (as was being touted for JDRADM)?

I mainly find this puzzling because the RF spectrum seems to be rapidly becoming a very difficult place to operate for a “poor little missile seeker head” so to speak. JDRADM’s (now defunct) dual mode RF/IR guidance package makes more intuitive sense against a 5th gen target. Would it not also be possible to use inertial guidance with midcourse updates, but then switch to an IIR terminal seeker in BVR? Genuinely curious.

I’ve got to admit the traditional Russian approach to the problem that you mention (using a variety of missiles with differing guidance types in unison) makes a lot of sense as a “risk spreading” strategy. Hence why I view the U.S investment in the RF only AMRAAM as being a pretty resounding endorsement of its ECCM abilities and overall effectiveness in the near term. That said, I do wonder if they will be able to rely so heavily on a purely RF based seeker in the medium to longer term (next gen jammers, VLO targets, EA from AESA radars and so on). I understand the Brits are looking at fielding a suite of seekers for the upcoming CAMM missile, perhaps for this very reason (?).

ADM rightly pointed out that the best way to counter a fleet of 5th gen aircraft (or any fleet really) is to cut them off at the source by destroying them on the ground and/or their airfield. That said, it strikes me that this may not be viable in scenarios where targeting airfields could be prohibited due, for example, to the risk of further escalation. A serious deterioration in Syria today might be a good example of such a “restricted ROE” environment, or perhaps a confrontation in the Pacific involving Taiwan; the U.S might not want to attack Chinese mainland airbases, but still need to be able to provide an effective BARCAP for its assets and those of its allies in theatre.

 

[ADMk2]

Thanks ADM, that makes sense.

It strikes me that the pilot is rapidly becoming a limiting factor in the kinematic performance of combat aircraft (although airframe fatigue is doubtlessly an issue here as well), making the kind of "active (missile) defence" (presumably also via ECM/EA/DIRCM/DEWs etc) you mention increasingly more important than traditional defensive maneuvers with flare/chaff.

That said, I do find the U.S reliance on the AMRAAM fascinating. I mean they literally have no other missile that fills the BVR niche (even Blk II AIM9X has pretty short legs). Given their doctrinal emphasis on achieving air supremacy, they must have a lot of faith in it. I guess we won't know exactly why until the finer details of it are publically available...

That said, I would have thought an IIR seekerhead for terminal homing even on BVR missiles might make sense in the post-2020 timeframe. Not sure how feasible that would be though. Maybe (as you suggest) something like LM's CUDA will get a run after all.

It isn't only the US that has relied soley on AMRAAM, most Western nations have...

However this is what I'm talking about for the future of US missiles, beyond AIM-120D and AIM-9X and no, IIR isn't seen as the guidance system of choice...

 

[Boagrius]

It isn't only the US that has relied soley on AMRAAM, most Western nations have...

Of course, no argument there. Just a further endorsement of its capabilities.

However this is what I'm talking about for the future of US missiles, beyond AIM-120D and AIM-9X and no, IIR isn't seen as the guidance system of choice...

That's very interesting - why is that? I am beginning to suspect that Western radar based missile guidance technology (be it active, passive or both) must be comfortably keeping pace with the competition... at least as far as western airforces are concerned.

 

[Bonza]

Hi Bonza,

Thanks for the info – some very interesting history there, will definitely give me some further reading to do!

Yes as I mentioned in my second post, I am a little puzzled by the fact that JDRADM’s only apparent substitute is the T3 program, which still seems to be oriented towards a combination of active and/or passive radar homing in its terminal guidance phase. I have seen no mention in the public domain of an IR based seeker head being considered for whatever T3 produces – even in a combined fashion? (as was being touted for JDRADM).

I mainly find this puzzling because the RF spectrum seems to be rapidly becoming a very difficult place to operate for a “poor little missile seeker head” so to speak. JDRADM’s (now defunct) combined RF/IR guidance package makes more intuitive sense against a 5th gen target.

I’ve got to admit the Russian approach to the problem that you mention (using a variety of guidance types in unison) makes a lot of sense as a “risk spreading” strategy. Hence why I view the U.S investment in the AMRAAM as being a pretty resounding endorsement of its ECCM abilities and overall effectiveness in the near term. That said, I do wonder if they will be able to rely so heavily on a purely RF based seeker in the medium to longer term (next gen jammers, VLO targets, EA from AESA radars and so on). In understand the Brits are looking at fielding a suite of seekers for the upcoming CAMM missile, perhaps for this very reason (?).

ADM rightly pointed out that the best way to counter a fleet of 5th gen aircraft (or any fleet really) is to cut them off at the source by destroying them on the ground and/or their airfield. That said, it strikes me that this may not be viable in scenarios where targeting airfields could be prohibited due, for example, to the risk of further escalation. A serious deterioration in Syria today might be a good example of such a “restricted ROE” environment, or perhaps a confrontation in the Pacific involving Taiwan; the U.S might not want to attack the Chinese mainland, but still need to be able to provide an effective BARCAP for its assets and those of its allies in theatre.

Yes, I'm similarly puzzled although I'm sure there's development going on way out of the public eye. I found the Lockheed CUDA quite confusing as a concept - for a future populated by aircraft designed to minimise RF signature, isn't a radar-guided kinetic-kill weapon quite possibly the worst option? Wouldn't a seeker-sensitive directional blast fragmentation warhead following an IIR guidance package be infinitely more preferable to requiring radar lock-on from a diminutive seeker head, followed by direct impact with a maneuvering target, to achieve a kill? CUDA might not have had much size to it, but surely it could embark a small warhead - at least enough to disable an aircraft... but then perhaps it is meant for things other than LO combat jets. I don't know.

There is also the Supersonic Testbed Risk Reduction program, another Lockheed job. While it consists (as far as anyone's saying) of studies rather than the production of any specific weapon systems, the objective is still the production of a future AMRAAM-class weapon. I really don't know why they cancelled JDRADM, it was a good idea and while the AMRAAM-D sounds capable, personally I think it'll find itself outpaced by Meteor. I sincerely hope that the primary air superiority weapon post-AMRAAM is equipped for hypersonic speeds (might need one more generation before hypersonics get that small, but it's coming) and is able to generate multiple types of seeker input.

Personally in the interim I'd like to see a range-enhanced ASRAAM variant, as its IR guidance package is apparently quite impressive in terms of range. If you could somehow boost the weapon's range (regarding current range, I have heard figures of around 20-30 nautical miles being thrown around, and not by idiots - anyone have any better info?) while keeping it roughly AMRAAM sized, or at least of a size to fit internally in the F-35, you could possibly vary guidance options while retaining four (and due to be six in future) BVR missiles. But then I suppose I'm more likely to see such a weapon in the form of CAMM - it does share components and features with ASRAAM, and an air-launched variant is planned. And development of CAMM-ER started in 2013, I'm sure it wouldn't be difficult to mate the boosted and air-launched variants.

It'll always be most efficient to destroy the enemy's air forces on the ground, where their OODA loop is at its very shortest. Whether by standoff weapons such as cruise missiles, a decapitation airstrike, or the insertion of sufficient ground forces to overwhelm the target, there's no reason to fight a combat jet in the air if you can catch it on the ground. But you make a good point, there are some situations where the bombing of a military airbase will escalate matters infinitely more than a single jet shot down.

 

[Boagrius]

Yes, I'm similarly puzzled although I'm sure there's development going on way out of the public eye. I found the Lockheed CUDA quite confusing as a concept - for a future populated by aircraft designed to minimise RF signature, isn't a radar-guided kinetic-kill weapon quite possibly the worst option? Wouldn't a seeker-sensitive directional blast fragmentation warhead following an IIR guidance package be infinitely more preferable to requiring radar lock-on from a diminutive seeker head, followed by direct impact with a maneuvering target, to achieve a kill? CUDA might not have had much size to it, but surely it could embark a small warhead - at least enough to disable an aircraft... but then perhaps it is meant for things other than LO combat jets. I don't know.

My thoughts exactly! Same applies to T3 as far as I can tell (up until now anyway - sounds like ADM may have more to add here). Perhaps CUDA is pitched more at the threat of being swamped by previous gen aircraft - the kind of threat you might see from the PLAAF.

There is also the Supersonic Testbed Risk Reduction program, another Lockheed job. While it consists (as far as anyone's saying) of studies rather than the production of any specific weapon systems, the objective is still the production of a future AMRAAM-class weapon.

Hadn't heard of that, thanks. More bed-time reading for me!

I really don't know why they cancelled JDRADM, it was a good idea and while the AMRAAM-D sounds capable, personally I think it'll find itself outpaced by Meteor. I sincerely hope that the primary air superiority weapon post-AMRAAM is equipped for hypersonic speeds (might need one more generation before hypersonics get that small, but it's coming) and is able to generate multiple types of seeker input.

Yeah I have no idea what the issue (if any) with JDRADM was. Propulsion perhaps? Throttleable ramjets seem very promising these days - the one on the Meteor does sound like it may leave the 120D behind performance wise. Perhaps the determining factor will be the capability of their respective guidance systems. It will be very interesting to see what propulsion system ends up on AMRAAM's U.S successor(s) at any rate. Ram/scramjets seem likely at this point.

Personally in the interim I'd like to see a range-enhanced ASRAAM variant, as its IR guidance package is apparently quite impressive in terms of range. If you could somehow boost the weapon's range (regarding current range, I have heard figures of around 20-30 nautical miles being thrown around, and not by idiots - anyone have any better info?) while keeping it roughly AMRAAM sized, or at least of a size to fit internally in the F-35, you could possibly vary guidance options while retaining four (and due to be six in future) BVR missiles. But then I suppose I'm more likely to see such a weapon in the form of CAMM - it does share components and features with ASRAAM, and an air-launched variant is planned. And development of CAMM-ER started in 2013, I'm sure it wouldn't be difficult to mate the boosted and air-launched variants.

Yet again you're mirroring my own thoughts on the subject. I would have thought an internally carried ASRAAM/CAMM is perhaps an even better fit for the doctrine behind the F35 particularly than is the AIM9X. The 6" rocket on the ASRAAM combined with its more aerodynamic design strike me as better suited to the kind of BVR/near BVR engagements envisaged for the jet, as well as the "over the shoulder" defensive shots that EODAS would make readily possible. AIM9X, by contrast, seems better suited to the kind of "knife fight in a phonebooth" niche that F35 drivers (and probably many others) would prefer to avoid. While it is obviously ridiculously nimble off the trail, I do wonder if that little motor holds the 9X back, particularly in rear hemisphere engagements.

As for CAMM - it is a program I've been very interested in recently. I could see it having a lot of promise for Australia in particular. Both the ground based and air launched variants could be well suited to our needs (we probably have the naval side of things adequately covered by ESSM and SM2/6). Would be nice to see us field a land based SAM/IADS capability that is more substantial than the sprinkling of MANPADs we use now.

It'll always be most efficient to destroy the enemy's air forces on the ground, where their OODA loop is at its very shortest. Whether by standoff weapons such as cruise missiles, a decapitation airstrike, or the insertion of sufficient ground forces to overwhelm the target, there's no reason to fight a combat jet in the air if you can catch it on the ground. But you make a good point, there are some situations where the bombing of a military airbase will escalate matters infinitely more than a single jet shot down.

Indeed - the downing of the Russian Fencer is probably a good example of this. Much better to drop one bird than carpet bomb Hmeimim airbase! The corollary of this, though, is that you're still going to want to be able to effectively hunt 5th gen opponents in the air if and when the situation demands it (?).

 

[Todjaeger]

There is a factor which seems to have been left out in this discussion on western AAM seeker packages, namely data links.

With the amount of R&D which has been poured into not just sensor but also the comms/datalink technology, the capabilities of a missile's seeker have become significantly less crucial to how well a given missile is going to be able to perform.

With the potential for a launching fighter to get track data from other fighters, AEW&C, ground and ship-based sensors, there is a much greater chance for a hostile aircraft to be detected even if it is described as being LO. If the launching fighter (or another asset) can then relay instructions to the AAM on where to go via datalink, the AAM does not have to rely upon it's own much less capable sensor and/or processors.

In prior AAM's the missile would at some point generally need to detect it's target for terminal guidance, or (with some SAM systems) receive continuous data from the launch platform. Now with datalinks the guidance can come from a number of different sources.

 

[Boagrius]

There is a factor which seems to have been left out in this discussion on western AAM seeker packages, namely data links.

With the amount of R&D which has been poured into not just sensor but also the comms/datalink technology, the capabilities of a missile's seeker have become significantly less crucial to how well a given missile is going to be able to perform.

With the potential for a launching fighter to get track data from other fighters, AEW&C, ground and ship-based sensors, there is a much greater chance for a hostile aircraft to be detected even if it is described as being LO. If the launching fighter (or another asset) can then relay instructions to the AAM on where to go via datalink, the AAM does not have to rely upon it's own much less capable sensor and/or processors.

In prior AAM's the missile would at some point generally need to detect it's target for terminal guidance, or (with some SAM systems) receive continuous data from the launch platform. Now with datalinks the guidance can come from a number of different sources.

Thanks for this - I did not realise this was the case. I was under the impression that the missile would need to go active or HOJ mode at some point before impact. So you''re saying a notional F35/F22/whatever could just feed the missile guidance data from a datalinked AWACS/DDG/whatever for its entire flight if needed? Scary capability right there - that means the target RWR would literally get zero indication of the incoming missile.

The only question that springs to mind then is what kind of orientation the notional launcher (F35/22/whatever) would need to have to the missile so as to maintain the data stream - ie. can it shoot and then turn away completely to avoid detection/counter shots? Or are you saying they could literally just hand guidance of the AAM entirely over to said AWACs/DDG etc? Now that WOULD be scary... Sorry if I'm being a bit dense, just clarifying.

*As an aside, now you've got me wondering whether the Russian Fencer really was hit by a 'winder (crew claimed no RWR warning before impact, leading many to conclude that it was an IR shot that downed them). The Turks do have the E7 after all - presumably with Link 16...

 

[Todjaeger]

Thanks for this - I did not realise this was the case. I was under the impression that the missile would need to go active at some point before impact. So you''re saying a notional F35/F22/whatever could just feed the missile guidance data from a datalinked AWACS/DDG/whatever for its entire flight if needed? Scary capability right there. The only question that springs to mind then is what kind of orientation the notional launcher (F35/22/whatever) would need to have to the missile so as to maintain the data stream - ie. can it shoot and then turn away completely to avoid detection/counter shots?

I freely admit I do not know if datalinks are capable of providing the needed level for complete terminal guidance. I would imagine that if they are not currently capable of doing so, that it is being worked on.

Hypothetically, the launch platform would not need any sort of orientation to maintain the datalink. There is the potential for a completely different asset to play the role of datalink node/controller.

There is potential for a 'nightmare scenario' for a hostile force to encounter multiple flights of F-22 and/or F-35 fighters operating in concert at disparate ranges. Leading pairs of fighters could be operating with passive sensors and minimal datalink emissions, with a trailing pair of fighters acting as 'spotters' significantly further back (100+ km perhaps). The trailing fighters could then provide detection and guidance to missiles launched by the leading fighter pair(s) right at the edge of WVR/BVR range, without the leading fighters revealing their presence with emissions until the actual launch itself. This could provide the targets with a window of only about 25 seconds to detect the incoming missiles and react to them, never mind attempting to detect, target, and engage the fighters which launched the missiles. The leading fighters could then immediately maneuver away from the point of launch, while the trailing fighters could continue to remain oriented towards the targets and provide guidance. Once the leading fighters have launched their ordnance, they could swap relative positions with the trailing fighters/spotters, who then becoming the leading fighters/shooters. Or there could be an even larger radar like those found aboard something like an E-737 Wedgetail or Peace Eagle, which could act as the spotter/missile guidance, or if near/over an allied task force, a SPY-1 or similar type of radar array could be used if the aircraft & vessels have CEC.

The other thing about this which can make the scenarios even more interesting, is the potential for distributed sensors and datalinks to allow one force to control the vector of the engagement. Imagine if one force of LO aircraft, backed up by such sensors could engage another force at a right angle, outside the arc of the other force's nosecone-mounted radars. Not only would their be a potentially larger surface area to get radar returns or other sensory contacts from, but the in-bound missiles might not be spotted until the target gets WVR of the missile. By then it would usually be too late.

 

[Boagrius]

Wow, the joys of network centrism huh? No wonder the Russians have been going to town on the ECM/EW front (Krasukha et al. comes to mind). Even so, I can't imagine there's an easy way to disrupt ALL that information sharing? Thanks for your input Tod, I found it fascinating.

There is potential for a 'nightmare scenario' for a hostile force to encounter multiple flights of F-22 and/or F-35 fighters operating in concert at disparate ranges. Leading pairs of fighters could be operating with passive sensors and minimal datalink emissions, with a trailing pair of fighters acting as 'spotters' significantly further back (100+ km perhaps). The trailing fighters could then provide detection and guidance to missiles launched by the leading fighter pair(s) right at the edge of WVR/BVR range, without the leading fighters revealing their presence with emissions until the actual launch itself. This could provide the targets with a window of only about 25 seconds to detect the incoming missiles and react to them, never mind attempting to detect, target, and engage the fighters which launched the missiles. The leading fighters could then immediately maneuver away from the point of launch, while the trailing fighters could continue to remain oriented towards the targets and provide guidance. Once the leading fighters have launched their ordnance, they could swap relative positions with the trailing fighters/spotters, who then becoming the leading fighters/shooters. Or there could be an even larger radar like those found aboard something like an E-737 Wedgetail or Peace Eagle, which could act as the spotter/missile guidance, or if near/over an allied task force, a SPY-1 or similar type of radar array could be used if the aircraft & vessels have CEC.

Sounds like a 5th gen version of the "grinder". Certainly makes the leap from 4th gen to 5th gen more apparent. A 4-4.5 gen platform trying this has to take it for granted that the target will likely be alerted to their presence at some point in the engagement (perhaps even before missile launch). 5th gen? Not so much...

 

[Feanor]

Sounds like a 5th gen version of the "grinder". Certainly makes the leap from 4th gen to 5th gen more apparent. A 4-4.5 gen platform trying this has to take it for granted that the target will likely be alerted to their presence at some point in the engagement (perhaps even before missile launch). 5th gen? Not so much...

Perhaps someone more qualified can comment, but it's been my impression that even 4.5th gens are slowly but surely being upgraded with capabilities of this sort, especially in the US. At the end of the day, is there any reason a Block XX F-16 can't carry the electronics and antenna necessary for this?

*As an aside, now you've got me wondering whether the Russian Fencer really was hit by a 'winder (crew claimed no RWR warning before impact, leading many to conclude that it was an IR shot that downed them). The Turks do have the E7 after all - presumably with Link 16...

The Su-24 was designed for low altitude operations, predominately. Likely to save costs, many aircraft only have missile launch warning sensors in the upper hemisphere of the aircraft, the idea being that it's only likely to get attacked from above. This was cited on some Russian boards as the reason the aircraft likely had no idea it was attacked.

 

[Boagrius]

Perhaps someone more qualified can comment, but it's been my impression that even 4.5th gens are slowly but surely being upgraded with capabilities of this sort, especially in the US. At the end of the day, is there any reason a Block XX F-16 can't carry the electronics and antenna necessary for this?

I suspect you are correct here. I mean the "grinder" maneuver (where two elements of a flight alternate being in front or behind so as to maintain continuous group SA and firing capability) is a BVR tactic that has existed for some time. Hardly surprising to see it get a new twist with technological advances

The Su-24 was designed for low altitude operations, predominately. Likely to save costs, many aircraft only have missile launch warning sensors in the upper hemisphere of the aircraft, the idea being that it's only likely to get attacked from above. This was cited on some Russian boards as the reason the aircraft likely had no idea it was attacked.

Didn't know that, thanks Feanor. I did think the Sidewinder was an odd candidate in this scenario given how close the F16(s) would have needed to get, undetected, to take the shot.

 

[Todjaeger]

Perhaps someone more qualified can comment, but it's been my impression that even 4.5th gens are slowly but surely being upgraded with capabilities of this sort, especially in the US. At the end of the day, is there any reason a Block XX F-16 can't carry the electronics and antenna necessary for this?

Some of the avionics can be installed onto older aircraft generations, either as MLU/SLEP upgrades, or as part of a new variant or aircraft block/tranche. What gets significantly harder to accomplish is reducing the signature of older generation aircraft.

This is significant, because much of the current air combat tactics seem to revolve around first detection of hostiles. With one side (A) detecting the other side (B) first, then side A has the potential to set the terms of the engagement. If the avionics and other supporting battlesystems are comparable (presence of AEW&C, comms, datalinks, etc.) then the side with 5th Gen fighters are much more likely to spot an opposing side with 4.5 Gen fighters first, and therefore be able to control the engagement, establish range and positional superiority, concentration of forces, and/or have opportunities to engage nodes of hostile battlesystems, etc.

In some respects, it might not even be necessary to have fighter forces directly engage each other, since the battlesystems could instead use their respective fighters to target the opposing battlesystem's nodes. AFAIK, this has been a planned Russian tactic for some time, with specific AAM's (planned for at least, not sure if they were ever actually developed/fielded) to target US/NATO E-3 Sentry AEW aircraft from long range. Where the tactic could run into difficulty, is the need to take shots from 200+ km away. Even with Mach 4 missiles, that still allows several minutes for detection and response. The other difficulty with the tactic is that the potential detection range of some of the AEW systems is even greater now than before, potentially out to 400+ km from the AEW. This means that a planned launch from 200 km to keep the launching fighter beyond the detection range of the AEW may now be well within detection range (and thus response) prior to launch. A LO fighter flight could potentially get much closer to a hostile AEW (or other battlespace node) prior to weapons launch, drastically reducing the time available for detection, decision-making, and response/reaction.

As elements of a force's battlesystem get degraded or destroyed, then the effectiveness of the forces the battlesystem supports will be similarly degraded. A LO fighter might be hard to detect (and thus engage or destroy) but if the battlesystem supporting it is in shambles, the LO fighter itself will not present a significant threat.

 

[Boagrius]

In some respects, it might not even be necessary to have fighter forces directly engage each other, since the battlesystems could instead use their respective fighters to target the opposing battlesystem's nodes.

This is an interesting concept, similar perhaps to what ADM was alluding to earlier. That said, surely both sides are going to want to be able to provide BARCAP/HVA CAP for their respective nodes, making it necessary to have a robust "fighter vs fighter" capability (and therefore AAMs designed for such)?

 

[Todjaeger]

This is an interesting concept, similar perhaps to what ADM was alluding to earlier. That said, surely both sides are going to want to be able to provide BARCAP/HVA CAP for their respective nodes, making it necessary to have a robust "fighter vs fighter" capability (and therefore AAMs designed for such)?

Indeed, the nodes are of very high value in a battlesystem. Keep in mind though that engagements are not so much fighter vs. fighter events, but are actually systemic events. Disabling a hostile node could mean a fighter targets/shoots it down with an AAM, but it could also be targeted via cyberwarfare or the subject of EA. Nodes also are not just confined to airspace, but can be ground-based or aboard ships. I am also anticipating that nodes could start being (if they are not already...) spaceborne.

The value of a LO fighter (IMO) is that their presence has to be contemplated in both offensive and defensive capacities, as well as their potential to act as harvesters or ISR assets. In this respect, these aircraft could potentially start to take on some of the roles of the 'traditional' naval LO asset, the submarine.

An opposing force has to keep in mind that, just because they are not currently detecting LO fighters present, that does not mean none ARE present quietly collecting data and/or waiting for the right opportunity to strike.

As people can see, the potential range of variables which 5th Gen fighters can introduce into a battlesystem can be quite... intriguing.