Well there were only four (+1) F-100s and only four F-125s are planned so I really can't see the relevance of the statement. Following the thinking that eight is not enough to prove MOTS (or whatever they are arguing) the only option left would be FREMM.
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The problem isn't the number, it's the schedule. The Type 26 won't be in the water before a decision on the Sea 5000 frigate is made. In fact, the design may not even be frozen by then. It will,be hard to argue it is a MOTS solution if it's still just a bunch of drawings.
True, don't want a repeat of the MRH90 or ARH. That said in hindsight the Type 45, for example, was a vastly superior platform to the F-104 (even the considerably updated F-105) that missed serious consideration as it was seen as too developmental.
What has been seen in reality is that the Darings are a generation ahead and are larger, faster, longer ranged, more economical, have much larger power generation capacity, better damage control, than the F-105, let alone the F-104 baseline. Due to their more modern design and power systems they ironically would likely have been much easier to fit the AEGIS Baseline 7.1 and AN/SPY-1D(V) to than the already tight F-100 has proved to be.
All six Darings were in service before Hobart hit the water and four of them were in service before F-105. The Type 45 had problems associated with the UKs own shipbuilding cutbacks but they were sorted well before those of F-105 building efficiency of which actually went backwards compared to the first four (due to design changes, obsolescence and supply chain issues).
Even discounting the Type 45 due to the lack of an existing AEGIS version you can compare the German and Dutch, or even the Japanese and South Korean AWD projects, let alone to a minimum change Flight IIA Arleigh Burke to the Spanish design selected as the basis of SEA 4000 and there is the frightening, but still likely possibility that they could have been built more easily and less expensively, in less time than the F-100.
All hindsight but realistically nothing that a thorough, properly scoped, risk assessment couldn't have identified. The unknown quantity was Navantia's complete lack of experience in supporting an overseas licence build which has to share top billing with the late 90s, early 2000s Australian shipbuilding black hole (not to mention government over optimism in how hard and expensive it would be to rebuild the capability) as the root cause for cost and schedule issues.
What does this have to do with Type 26, easy, like the Type 45 the Type 26 will be a vastly more capable and versatile platform than most of its competitors, its design and build strategies will be far more compatible with export and overseas build than most of its competitors and like other recent UK designs it will have been designed and reviewed to death before steel is cut.
Once in a while that's an interesting magazine, but its content is not that of the RAN and broader ADF/DoD community thinking out loud.
That said, it's a great deal more thoughtful and reasoned than it's closest peer, being Warships IFR.
From the RNZAF thread discussion on NZ and Aust (RAN) interest in the F-4 Phantom.
Quote:
Originally Posted by SpazSinbad View Post
Never heard that story myself (Phantom offered) but I guess that makes sense if a 'modernised Essex class carrier' offered; which was not possible due to carrier crew number requirements being too onerous, amongst other issues; and I don't believe the Essex would be 'modernised' (except by Australia - another burden).
Abraham Gubler dug this out several years ago, a very interesting read.
http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=1565492
I'll post it in the RAN thread as well as that's where it belongs.
Quote:
Originally Posted by SpazSinbad View Post
Never heard that story myself (Phantom offered) but I guess that makes sense if a 'modernised Essex class carrier' offered; which was not possible due to carrier crew number requirements being too onerous, amongst other issues; and I don't believe the Essex would be 'modernised' (except by Australia - another burden).
Abraham Gubler dug this out several years ago, a very interesting read.
http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=1565492
I'll post it in the RAN thread as well as that's where it belongs.
A very interesting read and the number one conclusion was..." The RAN cannot meet its responsibilities without the use of fixed wing fighters and ASW aircraft."
While you could argue that fighters can be replaced by advanced missile systems to some degree, the 1965 conclusion is as true today as it was then. Then it prepared for a threat from an Indonesia bellicose and in turmoil with growing numbers of Whiskey class submarines, today it's an uncertain region with growing naval capability and huge increases in submarines.
Therefor I'd argue that the RAN still can't meet its responsibilities without organic fixed wing ASW support. If the same capability can be met by advanced ASW UAVs , that could be armed and tasked under the tactical command of the task group commander (CTG) that would go some way to meeting that requirement but AFAIK this capability does not yet exist.
Actually on historic RAN carrier plans the common thread seems to have been, even when the desirability or even necessity for the capability was seen, that the RAN could not man such ships in addition to the existing fleet. It strikes me as ironic then that during the early 50s the RAN was manning two light fleet carriers, a heavy cruiser, a light cruiser being refitted for future service, plus a number of destroyers and frigates.
It was only savage defence cuts in the mid to late 50s that meant the RAN lacked sufficient manpower to crew more capable vessels in the 60s. in hindsight, without the defence cuts, larger numbers of smaller less capable vessels, as well as some larger obsolescent types (the cruisers) could and perhaps should have been retained, in response to the strategic situation and Australia's defence treaty obligations, into the early 60s and then been replaced with a smaller number of more capable modern vessels.
Melbourne and Sydney could have been replaced by a single, or even pair of SCB125 Essex conversions, a Centaur, Hermes or even Victorious, while the cruiser(s) (Hobart had been flagged at one point for a guided missile conversion) with DLGs (US styled frigates or the RNs County, or even the RN Escort cruiser which started as an RN Vittorio Veneto and evolved into a smaller, earlier Invincible), and the Battle and Daring class destroyers could have received guided missile conversions. None of this would have cost much, if any more than what happened in reality.
All in the past now but papers like the above show what could have been and why.
It was only savage defence cuts in the mid to late 50s that meant the RAN lacked sufficient manpower to crew more capable vessels in the 60s. in hindsight, without the defence cuts, larger numbers of smaller less capable vessels, as well as some larger obsolescent types (the cruisers) could and perhaps should have been retained, in response to the strategic situation and Australia's defence treaty obligations, into the early 60s and then been replaced with a smaller number of more capable modern vessels.
Melbourne and Sydney could have been replaced by a single, or even pair of SCB125 Essex conversions, a Centaur, Hermes or even Victorious, while the cruiser(s) (Hobart had been flagged at one point for a guided missile conversion) with DLGs (US styled frigates or the RNs County, or even the RN Escort cruiser which started as an RN Vittorio Veneto and evolved into a smaller, earlier Invincible), and the Battle and Daring class destroyers could have received guided missile conversions. None of this would have cost much, if any more than what happened in reality.
All in the past now but papers like the above show what could have been and why.
Indonesia's military of the time had been boosted in part to be able to counter any attempt by the Dutch to intervene in what they saw as their domestic affairs, i.e. to match, over match or counter any capability they could bring to the region, in particular their large modern light cruisers, their carrier and its strike fighters.
As far as I am aware the capabilities Indonesia developed during the early 60s had nothing to do with any desire to confront or intimidate Australia with our political class merrily sitting on their hands happy that there was no issue until the confrontation against Netherlands New Guinea and the Brunei Revolt, both in 1962. The public suddenly realised that not only did our northern neighbour have many more people than us, they also had a much larger and better equipped military that was operating equipment that matched or was even significantly more advanced and capable than anything we had, hence a degree of panic, the reintroduction of national service and a massive re-equipment of the defence force.
They were confronting the SE Asian colonial powers and the newly/soon to be independent Malaysia and by association Australia. Remember confrontation? followed by a period of political destabilisation with all,that weaponry awaiting use.
This culminated in the East Timor invasion before things returned to equilibrium.
I'm sympathetic to your conclusion, but the above simply does not follow unless RAN responsibilities remain the same. As ever, the armed forces "responsibilities" are whatever the government of the day says they are, and I at least don't know how they've changed (despite having been around way back then)
oldsig
The issue is that the government consistently expects the services to be able to fulfil the responsibilities whether they have been funded, equipped and trained for them or not. This is where we get embarrassments like barely being able to deploy to Timor, promising a non-existent armoured brigade to support our allies, not being able to deploy our own casevac helos to Afghanistan, not being able to deploy amphibs to assist after natural disasters and having to borrow a tanker because ours was shagged, having our PB force fall over three times in ten years, having our subs and skimmers unavailable as they were needed.
The governments tend to look at what they have on paper, or what they interpret they have rather than what they have actually funded to be maintained, manned and ready for deployment. Basically you get what you pay for and if you are only paying for under strength battalions with token armoured support that's what you get, even if the org chart says you have enough gear and personnel to field a full armoured brigade. If you are only providing sufficient funding for three submarines and two and a half certified crews then that all you will have, if you don't fund maintenance your ships will wear out and break, then won't be available when you need them.
I have assumed the RANs responsibility is primarily to deploy an amphibious group say for example to East Timor or to join with a combined force in the SCS. In both cases the task force needs escorting to wherever it is needed and that means suitable ASW screening to and from the area of operations. Without organic fixed wing ASW it becomes a more risky operation.
Way back when, our responsibility was to provided ASW hunter killer operations to sanitise the SEATO area.
Same responsibility only in light blue.
SpazSinbad
Active Member
AJASS NAS Nowra Dec 1951 til Dec 1990
A bit of nostalgia for dem ASW days: Snippets of History - AJASS | Fleet Air Arm Association of Australia
A bit of nostalgia for dem ASW days: Snippets of History - AJASS | Fleet Air Arm Association of Australia
Nice post, but has nothing whatever to do with the post of mine you quoted. I don't disagree, having spent my own share of time trying to satisfy our political masters without the ideal means to do so, but please don't quote me and then rant away on an unrelated subject.
oldsig
What you posted was the inspiration. While it is the government who decides what the responsibilities of the ADF are it is also the government that assumes that the services are capable of fulfilling those responsibilities even when they have consistently failed to provide the level of funding required to build and maintain the capabilities need to get the job done.
You posted:
"I'm sympathetic to your conclusion, but the above simply does not follow unless RAN responsibilities remain the same. As ever, the armed forces "responsibilities" are whatever the government of the day says they are, and I at least don't know how they've changed (despite having been around way back then)"
Which is true but it is also true that successive governments have cut and changed the types and level of required capabilities, or even simply failed to fund minimum maintenance of the skills and equipment required, while expecting the ADF to still be able to muddle through should the proverbial hit the fan. I do not doubt there are politicians, public servants and even ADF members who have absolutely no idea of the size, capability and more to the point, the limitations of the ADF. People who have no idea of the difference between a patrol boat or a frigate, a Bushmaster or an Abrams, let alone a battalion or a division.
They assume we have hundreds of tanks in multiple brigades and that the navy has aircraft carriers, some of these people are able to influence funding and capability. The issue is not so much when they change the responsibilities, but rather when they don't then fail to fund the required capability.
Dave Baddams has fleshed out that very thought, in reply to a curiously ill-informed piece that possible LHD task group ASW patrols don't need organic fast air.
This, from the last paragraph:
"Using the LHDs for ASW is a valid idea for ADF examination, as most of the time the ships will not be loaded to the gunwales with soldiers and vehicles for amphibious training or cargo for disaster relief. While some hope that this year’s White Paper pushes the F-35B concept towards comprehensive analysis in the lead-up to a decision on Project AIR 6000 Phase 2C, a strong case could be made in the future for analysis of all LHD air capabilities and how they could fit into strategic planning for forward defence. That certainly includes embarked ASW. Alas, without organic and persistent fast air it wouldn’t be much of a real-world option."
It's from ASPI at this link The LHDs and the rotor-wing option—a pilot’s response
By the way, Dave Baddams was embarked air chief in Adelaide for the contractor's trials last spring. He's written elsewhere since then that the internal changes between the JCI and the RAN ships have zero impact on possible STOVL ops. No doubt he has no idea of what he's talking about.
Thanks for the link
I had'nt read that one although I have enjoyed reading the many others associated with the LHD / F35b debate.Dont mind the ASPI as you will often get articles with differing views on the same subject.
I'm sure the debate on how best to employ the Canberra class will continue long after the next DWP and I'm sure the one after that.As these ships are of such a wonderful and flexible design I'm sure they will be both constantly in demand and will reinvent themselves many times over in the decades of service ahead.
In my opinion it would seem a waste to limit such capable ships solely to amphibious opperations. However in 2016 its still early days of learning how to conduct amphibious opperations from the ships and consolidate and expand helicopter flights from the flight deck.These ships are a big step up from the days of HMAS Tobruk and Manoora.There is still much to learn and a great deal of training to be had, however once the ADF becomes comfortable with its new Amphibious capability I trust it is open to further explore Canberra's full potential.
Time will tell as to how the Canberra class evolves.
Regards S
An interesting piece on the Strategist Blog by Hans Ohff, who was a former CEO of ASC, about the Collins sub replacement
To me, this sums up the debate and that is IMHO what has been missing. He discusses some of the technologies required and some that will become important in the future including computing and advancements in cyber-physical systems (CPS) (links to pdf of scientific paper).
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Story about cutting the number of subs to be built.
Looking at the piece by Ohff, its interesting about how long Collins will be around for.
I do think Collins will be operating for a while yet. Even if we do want to get to 12 boats (8 or beyond boats by/before ~2040), it would seem some sort of life extension may be required.
Story about cutting the number of subs to be built.
Definitely agree that its a bit of a moot point. Arguing about acquisitions decisions that need to be made by 2038 at the earliest!
Looking at the piece by Ohff, its interesting about how long Collins will be around for.
I do think Collins will be operating for a while yet. Even if we do want to get to 12 boats (8 or beyond boats by/before ~2040), it would seem some sort of life extension may be required.
Joe Black
Active Member
In a continuous built model like what Japan is doing, we don't have to commit the sub to anything more than 6-8 and start rolling out new subs to replace the Collins on a 1-to-1 basis. As long as there are always 9 subs available at any one time (assuming the "3 Operational- 3 in Maintenance - 3 for training" formula is adhere to) I reckon.
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