Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[Raven22]

As much as I appreciate the benefits of Beersheba, it still hasn't really changed the traditional "Infantry Division" ratio of armour and support elements to Infantry. There is still only one tank, one cavalry, one artillery and one engineer regiment per division, or one squadron / company of each per brigade.

Huh? Each brigade has its own arty regiment, engineer regiment and CSS battalion, not one per division. There's more armour too, as 'traditionally' the division had only a single APC squadron, not one per brigade as will be the case with the Beersheeba ACR.

Logically a hardened army would have improved
the ratios, increasing the number of support elements to at least one squadron / company per battalion, if not a full regiment per brigade. In fact if each brigade had a tank regiment, it could probably make do with only a single Cav Sqn.

I would argue that, logically, a hardened Army would take an objective look at what it was expected to do, the resources available, and design a force structure to succeed within those constraints. Comparing the forces structure to line diagrams of the orbat from years gone (orbats which were never achieved and only existed on paper) is entirely irrelevant.

This is the same level of analysis which make it hard for Army to rebalance the force structure - you are simply counting the number of battalions/regiments and moving on, without actually looking at the capability provided.

 

[Volkodav]

Huh? Each brigade has its own arty regiment, engineer regiment and CSS battalion, not one per division. There's more armour too, as 'traditionally' the division had only a single APC squadron, not one per brigade as will be the case with the Beersheeba ACR.



I would argue that, logically, a hardened Army would take an objective look at what it was expected to do, the resources available, and design a force structure to succeed within those constraints. Comparing the forces structure to line diagrams of the orbat from years gone (orbats which were never achieved and only existed on paper) is entirely irrelevant.

This is the same level of analysis which make it hard for Army to rebalance the force structure - you are simply counting the number of battalions/regiments and moving on, without actually looking at the capability provided.

I was looking at what I understand to be the intended verses the actual force levels, fully realising those force levels have not been achieved since the early 70s as the ADF as a whole was progressively hollowed out. My mistake on the artillery, traditional levels have officially been one field battery per battalion or a regiment at brigade level, then again how many gun batteries are we talking about now, I recall some discussion that though there may be a regiment in each brigade there is not actually an actual field or medium battery for each battalion.

My argument is that we went through the Penteopic Army, Army21, Hardened Networked Army and now Plan Beersheba and the actual scale of equipment is not much different from what was it was meant to be on paper since the late 50s. Terminology and org charts have changed but not the scale of equipment, which, if anything, has been cut back as older kits is retired or replaced.

Raven, you seem to alternate between saying money is being wasted on shipbuilding etc. to the detriment of the army, particularly in terms of the possible effect of the army's modernisation, to defending perceived cuts in numbers and capabilities, when numbers are questioned. You have stated that combat power is critical for the CFV and AIFV because we don't have more tanks and that more tanks would be desirable, yet when it is put forward the we have had only one regiment worth of tanks (often less) since the 50s and more tanks would be justified you appear to disagree. Which is it?

The orbats of old are as valid (or invalid) as those of today as is the fact they often were never achieved.

 

[Raven22]

My argument is that we went through the Penteopic Army, Army21, Hardened Networked Army and now Plan Beersheba and the actual scale of equipment is not much different from what was it was meant to be on paper since the late 50s. Terminology and org charts have changed but not the scale of equipment, which, if anything, has been cut back as older kits is retired or replaced.

This is wrong. Each one of those reorganisations, plus others, lead to changes in equipment levels. The Pentropic organisation came in at the end of national service, when the money that was being spent on the Nashos was used to equip the division. That's where the money for the M113s, M2 howitzers, L5 pack howitzers etc came from. When the army was reorganised back into a tropical establishment division in 1964, it was decided that the division needed to be air portable. So money was spent buying the Caribous, the C130Es and new helicopters, among many other things.

Raven, you seem to alternate between saying money is being wasted on shipbuilding etc. to the detriment of the army, particularly in terms of the possible effect of the army's modernisation, to defending perceived cuts in numbers and capabilities, when numbers are questioned. You have stated that combat power is critical for the CFV and AIFV because we don't have more tanks and that more tanks would be desirable, yet when it is put forward the we have had only one regiment worth of tanks (often less) since the 50s and more tanks would be justified you appear to disagree. Which is it?

I agree we need more tanks, and many other things. Where I disagree is the reason why. We don't need more tanks now because our Army happened to have more tanks in the inventory in the 50's. We also don't need tanks because a line diagram for a division I saw once said there should be a regiment per brigade. If you are going to talk about equipment numbers, orbats etc, it actually has to be based on real analysis. Simply saying 'traditionally a division has a regiment per brigade' or 'we had over 100 centurions back in the day, we only have 59 tanks now, therefore we need more tanks' is irrelevant. It's the sort of analysis you would expect from the Herald Sun.

The orbats of old are as valid (or invalid) as those of today as is the fact they often were never achieved.

I disagree. Things change. What might have been a valid orbat in 1950 isn't going to be a valid orbat today. For example, the Pentropic organisation came about due to the need to fight on a nuclear battlefield. The strategic thought of the time was the next big war would be fought with tactical nuclear weapons, and hence the land force needed to remain dispersed to avoid targeting, and therefore needed large self contained units with good mobility able to fight independently. Hence why the division was reorganised into five what we would today call combined arms battlegroups, with 1500 soldiers and commanded by a full colonel, with the brigade ceasing to exist.

The Pentropic organisation made a lot of sense in the late 1950s. As soon as the policy of the major powers stopped being massive retaliation and started to be flexible response (ie, the next war likely wouldn't start out nuclear), the Pentropic organisation stopped making sense. It certainly makes no sense now. That is why simply looking at the past isn't always helpful. While there is no such thing as a new idea, what was the answer to the problem 10, 20, 50 years ago isn't the answer today, because the problem has changed.

 

[aussienscale]

Based on what I have seen of the returns from the RFT, I predict the Boxer and AMV will be shortlisted for the CRV. Personally I think the CV90 is a far more competitive vehicle for the IFV requirement than the Boxer; so I think the AMV will still have a pretty big advantage for the Phase 2 tender. I would certainly be happy with an AMV/CV90 mix (pending funding being available).

The AMV and CV90 would certainly be a good mix, and don't get me wrong I like both, the CV90 in particular, but am a little concerned about (Publicly listed) operational range:

Patria AMV: 600-850 km, still good, but less than the Boxer at 1,100 km

CV90: 320 km

Raven, is there potential for this to be a concern ? Don't profess to know the answer, was just curious with out larger distances for Australian operations.

The AMV is certainly up to the challenge compared to the ASLAV, but the CV90 fall short with the M1's, are there any operational issues this might bring up ? or not of any significance.

Cheers

 

[old faithful]

Would it be fair to conclude that plan Beersheeba is all about participating in a coalition force, pack up a battle group in nice neat package, and deploy it as a part of a task force, maybe given a task akin to FSB in The Vietnam war? Eg, dominate an AO. 3 such brigades gives you a close to identical package at the ready at any one time.
I dont see the plan as defence of Australia in Australia, more as 3 x expiditonary forces, flexible units capable of rotation through a prolonged deployment, with both the RAAF and RAN capable to deploy and support the force with their assets.
Will the new white paper contiue with this plan, probably too late to change, would a change of Government change the plan, most probably it would.

 

[Raven22]

The AMV and CV90 would certainly be a good mix, and don't get me wrong I like both, the CV90 in particular, but am a little concerned about (Publicly listed) operational range:

Patria AMV: 600-850 km, still good, but less than the Boxer at 1,100 km

CV90: 320 km

Raven, is there potential for this to be a concern ? Don't profess to know the answer, was just curious with out larger distances for Australian operations.

The AMV is certainly up to the challenge compared to the ASLAV, but the CV90 fall short with the M1's, are there any operational issues this might bring up ? or not of any significance.

Cheers

I wouldn't put too much stock in publically published figures for things like range. It's like taking VW at face value when they tell you the emissions rating of their cars. It depends on so many things that unless everyone uses the same standard it isn't very helpful. Certainly I don't think how much diesel the vehicle can carry will be the determining factor in which vehicle gets selected.

 

[t68]

well as Raven is eluding to the Army is over establishment but does not have the manpower in the enablers, would that not be a fault with the system, or has the system been changed from when you had your three choice's but were sent where their was shortages even if it was not one of your choices?

 

[Raven22]

Would it be fair to conclude that plan Beersheeba is all about participating in a coalition force, pack up a battle group in nice neat package, and deploy it as a part of a task force, maybe given a task akin to FSB in The Vietnam war? Eg, dominate an AO. 3 such brigades gives you a close to identical package at the ready at any one time.
I dont see the plan as defence of Australia in Australia, more as 3 x expiditonary forces, flexible units capable of rotation through a prolonged deployment, with both the RAAF and RAN capable to deploy and support the force with their assets.
Will the new white paper contiue with this plan, probably too late to change, would a change of Government change the plan, most probably it would.

You're right that Plan Beersheeba is all about making three brigades that can deploy for a long period of time in rotation, but not necessarily as part of a coalition.

At the end of the day, Plan Beesheeba is designed to meet government guidance - to be able to deploy a brigade continuously while keeping a unit on standby for another contingency. Layer on top of that the guidance that the ADF must be able to operate independently of our allies, that it must be capable of fighting a near peer threat, and must be optimised to fight in the region yet capable of deploying anywhere, and you can see why Beersheeba looks the way it does.

At the end of the day the Beersheeba orbat is designed to be a Swiss Army knife. Not particularly good at any one thing, but able to do just about everything tolerably well. It might have a lot of problems, but it's not a bad attempt to meet goverment guidance within the allocated resources.

 

[Raven22]

well as Raven is eluding to the Army is over establishment but does not have the manpower in the enablers, would that not be a fault with the system, or has the system been changed from when you had your three choice's but were sent where their was shortages even if it was not one of your choices?

The problem isn't recruiting. The problem is in allocating the manpower in the first place. When army sat down and allocated the 30 000 odd soldiers against all the capabilities, they built the combat force first, then whatever was left was split amongst the support elements. Time has shown that this isn't a good idea - if you can't support the combat force, then it is the equivalent of a wooden gun (to borrow a phrase deform Menzies). Hence the desire to rebalance the manpower to make a more balanced force.

It's important to point out as well, the army isn't 1500 soldiers above establishment, the establishment is 1500 soldiers above the funded strength. Ie, the sum of all the positions in all the units is more than goverment is willing to fund. Those extra 1500 soldiers don't actually exist, they are simply lines in an excel spreadsheet showing what is supposed to exist in the future. It's not like the army has to sack 1500 soldiers, they simply have to delete 1500 theoretical future posns that would have existed if the plan continued unchanged.

 

[Nick underscore]

Ref HIMARS, yes I think that is a better capability than getting SPGs. SPGs can't really do anything that out current M777 can't do - they would just do them better. HIMARS on the other hand is a whole new capability - it give the commander the ability to reach out and touch someone at operational-level ranges, which is a pretty revolutionary capability for our army.

Another reason is that HIMARS will allow Army to contribute more to the nation's maritime strategy. Obviously, this maritime strategy may involve the ADF having to control vital choke points in sea lanes etc to our north. Things like HIMARS and a true GBAD capability will allow the army to contribute to this on an operational level. We could use our fancy new amphib capability to deploy to the area, and set up our GBAD to deny air access and our extended range anti-surface systems to deny sea access. It would allow army to contibute to the joint fight beyond simply 'winning the land battle'. It would essentially give army an 'A2AD' capability. I think you'll see both a HIMARS capability (with the idea that the launcher will be used to launch more than just rockets) and reinvigorated GBAD capability come to the fore in the next ten years or so for this reason.

Thanks for response.

I agree the additional capability would be great for the Army (on many levels). I just remember Abe Grubler posting (both here and another forum) on the benefit of crew protection & mobility of armoured artillery, within a high threat environment. I guess when you can reach out (~300km) that is a game changer and that excludes future changes to the launch systems.

If ADF is thinking of adding HIMARS capability, then I would like some consideration toward THAAD for 16 AL Rgt (x1 Bty)

Could you pls answer a question on the CSS Btln's, I understand that there will be two lift troops (approx 26 PMV's) added across the units. Are these newly raised or re-assigned troops from 2/14?

Regarding the armoured reserve sqdns, I noticed that 4/19 has two sqdns on paper, but only 17 PMV (1 coy lift) - this is the same for 1/15. We have plenty of spare bushmasters, so is this a question of manpower in the armoured reserve sqdns?

Cheers

 

[Volkodav]

The problem isn't recruiting. The problem is in allocating the manpower in the first place. When army sat down and allocated the 30 000 odd soldiers against all the capabilities, they built the combat force first, then whatever was left was split amongst the support elements. Time has shown that this isn't a good idea - if you can't support the combat force, then it is the equivalent of a wooden gun (to borrow a phrase deform Menzies). Hence the desire to rebalance the manpower to make a more balanced force.

It's important to point out as well, the army isn't 1500 soldiers above establishment, the establishment is 1500 soldiers above the funded strength. Ie, the sum of all the positions in all the units is more than goverment is willing to fund. Those extra 1500 soldiers don't actually exist, they are simply lines in an excel spreadsheet showing what is supposed to exist in the future. It's not like the army has to sack 1500 soldiers, they simply have to delete 1500 theoretical future posns that would have existed if the plan continued unchanged.

Teeth to tail ratio has been a catch cry for some time now and is what preceded the gutting of naval engineering and the loss of a multitude of supposedly unnecessary organic functions throughout the ADF. Ironically as the RAN and Army lost a lot of previously organic abilities and functions the RAAF seemed to manage to bolster many of these areas and become more professional in how they do business, tying it to safety and the ability to deploy at all, refusing to make do or just get it done.

There is a general misperception by the public and many politicians that cutting the tail, i.e. logistics and support areas, in favour of front line capabilities, improves efficiency and overall capability. This is despite multiple analyses, reports and reviews clearly stating that adequate support is vital for any capability and can actually be a force multiplier, while failing to provide adequate support has pretty much been to root cause of virtually every capability failure.

This is not just the case in defence, industry in general has experienced this over and over again. Savings in support and logistics are false economy a result in increased through life costs and / or degraded capability.

 

[vonnoobie]

If ADF is thinking of adding HIMARS capability, then I would like some consideration toward THAAD for 16 AL Rgt (x1 Bty)

I don't agree with this, 16 AL Regiments area of expertice is against aircraft, not ballistic missiles, Adding THAAD will only jumble that up massively as they are chalk and cheese in there respective roles. You are best implementing an entirely new regiment to take on that role, However rather then acquiring the THAAD we would be better to acquire the Patriot. It comes down quite simply to costs and what we can afford, At $800m per a system the THAAD is quite simply out of our price range to acquire it in numbers to make it useful.

 

[Raven22]

Could you pls answer a question on the CSS Btln's, I understand that there will be two lift troops (approx 26 PMV's) added across the units. Are these newly raised or re-assigned troops from 2/14?

Regarding the armoured reserve sqdns, I noticed that 4/19 has two sqdns on paper, but only 17 PMV (1 coy lift) - this is the same for 1/15. We have plenty of spare bushmasters, so is this a question of manpower in the armoured reserve sqdns?

The vehicles for the PMV Sqn that's part of the CSSBs have simply been reallocated from elsewhere, while the personnel to man them are new posns that have been created. The PMV Sqn is a bit of a bastard child that no one really likes. I wouldn't be surprised if it is moved or even gotten rid of out of a quest to reduce personnel numbers.

While there are lots of 'spare' Bushmasters lying around that aren't issued to units, they are mostly tied up being upgraded (being digitised or being upgraded to the latest configuration by Thales). There's still a large number deployed as well, and a sizeable training fleet in the MEAO configuration that can't be issued to units. Since 2 Div is the last priority, the reserve regiments have been slow to receive vehicles due to all the other competing requirements.

Even when they receive their full entitlement, they won't have a full complement of vehicles anyway. Each regiment will have enough to do individual training with, with a large loan pool that all units can call on for use in large scale training activities (such as when the reinforcing battle group joins in on Ex Hamel).

 

[Raven22]

I don't agree with this, 16 AL Regiments area of expertice is against aircraft, not ballistic missiles, Adding THAAD will only jumble that up massively as they are chalk and cheese in there respective roles. You are best implementing an entirely new regiment to take on that role, However rather then acquiring the THAAD we would be better to acquire the Patriot. It comes down quite simply to costs and what we can afford, At $800m per a system the THAAD is quite simply out of our price range to acquire it in numbers to make it useful.

ABM systems are certainly not on the table. Even patriot-like capability is probably a bridge too far. I imagine that something like HUMRAAM might be the top tier system procured, with a short ranged system also procured for more mandane tasks like shooting down tactical UAVs.

 

[vonnoobie]

ABM systems are certainly not on the table. Even patriot-like capability is probably a bridge too far. I imagine that something like HUMRAAM might be the top tier system procured, with a short ranged system also procured for more mandane tasks like shooting down tactical UAVs.

I agree, Only mentioned Patriot as a more sensible acquisition for a land based ABM defence system, But that wont even be mentioned until we sort out the Hobarts, So not an issue till 2025 or later, If ever.

I do like the idea of the HUMRAAM, though again that act's in a role far outside the capability or intent of 16 AL Rgt so again would be better to have a new unit set up to use that. Would have some benefit's in commonality I'd imagine with the RAAF using the AIM-120's though we can leave out that bastard Hummer.

 

[old faithful]

Teeth to tail ratio has been a catch cry for some time now and is what preceded the gutting of naval engineering and the loss of a multitude of supposedly unnecessary organic functions throughout the ADF. Ironically as the RAN and Army lost a lot of previously organic abilities and functions the RAAF seemed to manage to bolster many of these areas and become more professional in how they do business, tying it to safety and the ability to deploy at all, refusing to make do or just get it done.2

There is a general misperception by the public and many politicians that cutting the tail, i.e. logistics and support areas, in favour of front line capabilities, improves efficiency and overall capability. This is despite multiple analyses, reports and reviews clearly stating that adequate support is vital for any capability and can actually be a force multiplier, while failing to provide adequate support has pretty much been to root cause of virtually every capability failure.

This is not just the case in defence, industry in general has experienced this over and over again. Savings in support and logistics are false economy a result in increased through life costs and / or degraded capability.

hmmmm, do we really NEED stewards? What about a poor mans Johnny Farhnam? There are plenty of places to cut in the defence force personel if we really need to cut positions.

 

[Volkodav]

hmmmm, do we really NEED stewards? What about a poor mans Johnny Farhnam? There are plenty of places to cut in the defence force personel if we really need to cut positions.

We still have bands, including singers but were flying hot box meals from Aust to Timor because many field kitchens had been among the late 90s cuts. It was determined that private contractors could do a better job managing the availability of many of our vehicles, aircraft and ships, removing the need to maintain expensive holdings of spares, or even the sort of experienced people to manage the support systems and maintenance programs.

It did deliver substantial savings initially, then availability levels dropped, equipment became unserviceable and there were no longer sufficient qualified and experienced people available to recover the situation. The situation was made worse by the fact that private industry often was not capable of delivering the required availability on the allocated budget and when painted into a corner, simply walked away. Here is a simple truth, most outsourcing costs more in the long term than keeping work in house as one of the costs is a loss of technical competency among those who manage, maintain and support capabilities.

 

[ASSAIL]

We still have bands, including singers but were flying hot box meals from Aust to Timor because many field kitchens had been among the late 90s cuts. It was determined that private contractors could do a better job managing the availability of many of our vehicles, aircraft and ships, removing the need to maintain expensive holdings of spares, or even the sort of experienced people to manage the support systems and maintenance programs.

It did deliver substantial savings initially, then availability levels dropped, equipment became unserviceable and there were no longer sufficient qualified and experienced people available to recover the situation. The situation was made worse by the fact that private industry often was not capable of delivering the required availability on the allocated budget and when painted into a corner, simply walked away. Here is a simple truth, most outsourcing costs more in the long term than keeping work in house as one of the costs is a loss of technical competency among those who manage, maintain and support capabilities.

Sorry for being off topic but this is perfectly illustrated by what happened in naval engineering. They abolishe the trade trading establishments, dumbed down organic engineering, abolished the Fleet Maintenance Unit and ended up with a real cluster ferk. The ships deteriorated, naval personnel couldn't repair basic defects, engineering personnel, those who remained, had no trade experience when posted ashore, etc....etc.
Result, initial savings, huge contractor costs and discontented, read discharged, engineers therefor hobbled navy, pathetic.:ar15

 

[Nick underscore]

. You are best implementing an entirely new regiment to take on that role, However rather then acquiring the THAAD we would be better to acquire the Patriot. It comes down quite simply to costs and what we can afford, At $800m per a system the THAAD is quite simply out of our price range to acquire it in numbers to make it useful.

Maybe so, but I did state 'for consideration'. I think in next 7-10yrs Aust will acquire this capability. I would have thought x1 battery - perm parked up north - would cover the entire continent.. Add in future upgrade to AWD's and that should cover most of the spectrum of loonies/threats

Your numbers are off. Just in the last week, U.S. congress approved the Lockheed contract on Lot 7 & 8 @ $528m USD. That's two batteries, as I understand.

Yes, I do agree the capability is expensive.

The vehicles for the PMV Sqn that's part of the CSSBs have simply been reallocated from elsewhere, while the personnel to man them are new posns that have been created. The PMV Sqn is a bit of a bastard child that no one really likes. I wouldn't be surprised if it is moved or even gotten rid of out of a quest to reduce personnel numbers.

While there are lots of 'spare' Bushmasters lying around that aren't issued to units, they are mostly tied up being upgraded (being digitised or being upgraded to the latest configuration by Thales). There's still a large number deployed as well, and a sizeable training fleet in the MEAO configuration that can't be issued to units. Since 2 Div is the last priority, the reserve regiments have been slow to receive vehicles due to all the other competing requirements.

Even when they receive their full entitlement, they won't have a full complement of vehicles anyway. Each regiment will have enough to do individual training with, with a large loan pool that all units can call on for use in large scale training activities (such as when the reinforcing battle group joins in on Ex Hamel).

Cheers for response. You think as part of WP, Army will get more Bushmaster's?

ABM systems are certainly not on the table. Even patriot-like capability is probably a bridge too far. I imagine that something like HUMRAAM might be the top tier system procured, with a short ranged system also procured for more mandane tasks like shooting down tactical UAVs.

Shame.

Would HURAAM system work with Bushmaster and/or JTLV? I must say, it ain't pretty..

 

[t68]

You think as part of WP, Army will get more Bushmaster's?

I believe under an additional 49 Bushmaster vehicles were bought as a well extra 122 Mercedes-Benz G-Wagon vehicles. but have no idea if these have been delivered as yet.

As far as I am aware both Bushmaster and Hawkei PMV-L are to be built at Bendigo