Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[the road runner]

While I agree the 35mm gun gives the AMV an advantage, I think the bigger advantage when it comes to the gun is commonality with the Phase 3 vehicle. I would prefer a common turret between the CFV and IFV, even if this meant getting 'only' a 30mm gun as opposed to the 35mm gun of the AMV. The training and support advantages with this are huge.The choice of CRV will have to be done in a way that doesn't prejudice the choice of Phase 3 vehicle (ie, picking a vehicle from a manufacturer that doesn't offer a competitive IFV would be dumb).

The CV90 35mm turret can be placed onto the Patria AMV

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HmqQsWoUq7w

One can only hope that Government make a decision with a common turret as Raven has stated. The AMV/CV90 dose sound like the winning bid for Army.

Raven any idea when a winner will be chosen ?

 

[MARKMILES77]

While I agree the 35mm gun gives the AMV an advantage, I think the bigger advantage when it comes to the gun is commonality with the Phase 3 vehicle. I would prefer a common turret between the CFV and IFV, even if this meant getting 'only' a 30mm gun as opposed to the 35mm gun of the AMV. The training and support advantages with this are huge. The choice of CRV will have to be done in a way that doesn't prejudice the choice of Phase 3 vehicle (ie, picking a vehicle from a manufacturer that doesn't offer a competitive IFV would be dumb).

Based on what I have seen of the returns from the RFT, I predict the Boxer and AMV will be shortlisted for the CRV. Personally I think the CV90 is a far more competitive vehicle for the IFV requirement than the Boxer; so I think the AMV will still have a pretty big advantage for the Phase 2 tender. I would certainly be happy with an AMV/CV90 mix (pending funding being available).

I agree, commonality of turret between the the CRV and IFV would seem to be extremely desirable. This is why I don't understand not having a combined tender for the CRV and IFV parts of Land 400. That way a common turret would have been automatic. Now whichever company wins the CRV phase of Land 400 has a massive advantage for the IFV phase. If you don't win Phase 2 would you even bother going ahead with a Phase 3 bid?

 

[ADMk2]

Yes good news, I was wondering how defence planned to meet training and operational requirements with only seven airframes. This was especially as the number of hours needed for training and support during exercises was sure to increase with the delivery of the LHDs, as they would add to the certification burden of crews / maintainers (i.e. hours per year) needed as a minimum to fly off the Canberras.

Throw in a future deployment of two airframes to Afghanistan or else where I could see the fleet being pushed to meet required obligations at home.

They did so with 6 and four before that for the last couple of decades...

No doubt we needed a bigger fleet, but Army makes do as always...

 

[Jezza]

The CV90 35mm turret can be placed onto the Patria AMV

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HmqQsWoUq7w

One can only hope that Government make a decision with a common turret as Raven has stated. The AMV/CV90 dose sound like the winning bid for Army.

Raven any idea when a winner will be chosen ?

And throw some of these into the order too.
Patria - Nemo 120mm Mortar 8X8 Armoured Vehicle
Nice looking system.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9i7eYIg1CM

 

[Raven22]

Raven, is there way to access stats regarding military offences?
I would be interested in seeing a yearly comarison of UD, s since the introduction of the F88 and variants, there were soooo many UD, s when it was introduced. Be interesting to see how they have dropped since the intoduction, and then compare the UD rate to conventional weapons, pre F88. I know in my service, I never UD, ed and only ever had one digger in my section UD, my best mate, who I charged,( unforgivable offence in my books) then after the F88 was introduced, there was an avalanche of UD, s , in my opinion, caused by bad weapon handling, and a bad trigger guard (designed to be fired when wearing mittens) makingnit impossible for the average man to keep his finger outside the trigger guard.

I'll answer this here, to avoid clogging up the kiwi thread with Australian centric discussion. I doubt there is a way to access stats for UDs. In fact, I dare say accurate stats don't exist, as I can't imagine that record keeping for summary proceedings 20-30 years ago was very thorough. There was certainly no AIMS to keep track of things back then.

However, the issue of UDs when the F88 was first introduced was simply down to training and lack of familiarity. Soldiers familiar with old weapons took a while to develop muscle memory that worked with the new weapons. As soldiers became more experienced, and new soldiers joined without bad habits from previous weapons, the rate of UDs dropped off significantly. It's certainly not an issue any more - the Army has been on constant ops for 15+ years and you won't read too many people talking about UDs/NDs being a problem. There is certainly no problem with the F88 specifically or bullpup weapons generally. I dare say the rate of UDs/NDs now is significantly less now than in the pre-F88 days, due to increased safety processes like the buddy system and the use of the WTSS for a lot of weapon practices.

In fact, new weapon handling drills for the F88 have been introduced due to the EF88 coming into service, and they strip a lot of the artificial safety constraints that were introduced to curb the UD problem back in the day. There's no taking the barrel off to clear the weapon any more, no engaging the hold open recess when going to action, no barrel parallel to the ground at all times (so you can't readily access the magazine) etc etc. The new drills are aimed to being used on the battlefield, and not on live firing ranges with artificial safety constraints, which is a good step in the right direction.

 

[rossfrb_1]

Now that all the CRV bids are in and being assessed, I wonder how important the bidder's choices of main gun will be in deciding the eventual winner. Most of the focus has been on the various hulls offered but to my mind the choice of main gun is shaping up as an area where one of the bidders clearly stands out. Three of the bidders are offering 30mm main guns but the AMV35 will come with a 35mm Bushmaster III cannon. Although a 5mm diameter difference seems trivial the increase in kinetic energy of the 35mm round over the 30mm round is enormous.
The CRV tender protection requirements themselves indicate how important this difference may be. CRV is aiming for protection from 30mm AP but will be vulnerable to 35mm AP. Very few IFV/APCs would offer protection from rounds larger than 30mm. This extra lethality, along with the availability of a 35mm KETF round, which allows the 35mm cannon to effectively put a MBT out of action at ranges up to 4000 metres would seem to offer it a decisive advantage over 30mm guns.
If I was choosing the CRV winner, I think I would take a lot of persuading that the AMV is not the best choice and that mainly comes down to it's 35mm gun.
All 4 offered hulls seem "reasonably" similar in design. It is only in the choice of main gun that one option stands out from the others.

Interested to hear what other people think?

For me I wonder about ammunition capacity (amongst other things). I understand that fewer 35mm rounds should be required to do a job versus the 30mm, however it is also bigger and heavier recoils more. Is that important in a 30+ tonne vehicle I don't know?
Here are a few bits I have gleaned for the purpose of comparison:

ASLAV 25 (as a point of reference)
Calibre 25×137 mm
ready rounds 210 rounds
stowed rounds 510 rounds
barrel mass 49kg
total weapon mass 120kg
recoil force 45kN
weapon length 2.572m
HE projectile has a mass of 180 g.

CV9030
Main armament 30 mm Bushmaster II/MK44 cannon, dual feed
Calibre 30 mm x 173 mm
Am. types APFSDS-T, MPLD-T, TP-T
ready rounds 2 x 80 rds (dual feed)
stowed rounds Typical 240 rds
barrel mass 69kg
total weapon mass 156kg
recoil force 36kN
weapon length 3.405m
HE Projectile has a mass of 362 g

CV9035
Main Gun: ATK Bushmaster III 35mm Autocannon
ready rounds 70
stowed rounds 280 (alternate source 173)
Calibre 35 x 228mm
Default Ammunition "A": 35/140 NMxxx APFSDS, 35/140 ABM M/XX LS (ABM/KETF)
barrel mass 127kg
total weapon mass 231kg
recoil force 63kN
weapon length 4.018m
HE Projectile has a mass of 550 g

I found a thread on tanknet (FWIW) covering the 30mm vs 35mm debate
CTA40 Cannon - AFV Forum - tank-net.com

Personally I have been intrigued by the CTWS (CTA 40) and am a little disappointed it doesn't seem to be in the mix for Land 400. However I can understand the ADF's reluctance to adopt such a new system where we would have commonality with only the brits & the french.
The yanks seem to be leaning toward the 30mm so I suspect that might count for something.
rb

 

[Bluey 006]

While I agree the 35mm gun gives the AMV an advantage, I think the bigger advantage when it comes to the gun is commonality with the Phase 3 vehicle. I would prefer a common turret between the CFV and IFV, even if this meant getting 'only' a 30mm gun as opposed to the 35mm gun of the AMV. The training and support advantages with this are huge. The choice of CRV will have to be done in a way that doesn't prejudice the choice of Phase 3 vehicle (ie, picking a vehicle from a manufacturer that doesn't offer a competitive IFV would be dumb).

Based on what I have seen of the returns from the RFT, I predict the Boxer and AMV will be shortlisted for the CRV. Personally I think the CV90 is a far more competitive vehicle for the IFV requirement than the Boxer; so I think the AMV will still have a pretty big advantage for the Phase 2 tender. I would certainly be happy with an AMV/CV90 mix (pending funding being available).

Do you know much about the level on commonality for the Bushmaster III 35mm and the bushmaster II 30mm?

Do they have common systems, operate in the same way?

Based on what i have read the 35mm has significantly more penetration,punch and range. Thus, the 35mm will be be better for engaging other IFVs but one wonders if the large recoil,weight additions associated with a larger round (35mm rounds are significantly larger), and limited volume of ammunition that can be carried due to larger volume are desirable traits for a reconnaissance vehicle that is usually operating in advance of other forces.

I am wondering, if there is a high level of commonality.... if the MKIII 35mm for the IFV and MKII 30mm for the CRV is a viable option?

Thoughts?

 

[Raven22]

It’d make no sense at all to mix 30mm and 35mm cannons if it can be avoided. They provide too similar a capability, and the support impost would be too great to justify it.

The 35mm is preferred as it provides greater future proofing than the 30mm. The main purpose of the cannon on the CFV/IFV is the destruction of enemy AFVs. In a world where everybody’s vehicles are becoming heavier and better protected, the 35mm has far greater ability to penetrate and destroy vehicles over the 30+ year lifespan of the system. The ability of the 30mm to carry more stowed rounds isn’t very helpful if it can’t destroy enemy vehicles at preferred combat ranges in the first place.

It’s probably worth pointing out the CFV isn’t just a recon vehicle either, although that is its main role. Due to the relatively small numbers of AFVs in a Beersheeba brigade, to be able to concentrate enough combat power to be decisive it is expected that the CRV will have to contribute to the close fight, as well as do the whole recon/counter recon thing. After the CRV has found and shaped the enemy, it will likely be used in fire support to help ‘shoot in’ the attack being conducted by tanks, IFVs and infantry. In this role, the heavier, longer ranged gun with more variety of programmable ammunition has obvious advantages. As a side note, this is why the CRV is supposed to have level 6 armour - to enable it to survive in the close fight. It wouldn't be required where it to be used only as a recon vehicle.

See this link for an example: http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/Multimedia/LAND400_CloseCombatStoryboard-9-5562.pdf

 

[vonnoobie]

Here is a question, Are they looking to get these vehicles with which ever set gun size be it 30mm or 35mm and thats it or are they aiming to have the hulls and possigbly turrets built to allow future upgrades to allow the larger guns to be fitted?

Procedding WWII the IJN skirted around the Washington naval treaty by building ships armed to the power of a light cruiser but the actual gun mounts where sized to allow the fitting of armament associated with Heavy cruisers, Could we do something similar? Better for long term security in the essence the asset wont become useless before its intended end date.

 

[Raven22]

While some of the turrets are designed to be modular, they are not specifically designed to be up gunned later in life. Which isn't really much of a problem - if you want a bigger gun, just put a new turret on the vehicle. It's what the Brits are doing with the warrior, among many other examples.

 

[t68]

just wondering with all this talk of the need for more investment in Army, what are the plans for water transport with the soon to retire LCM8 and LARC-V

On numerous sites they each say that LCM-8 is to be replaced by LCM-1E, but we only have 12 and from what I can see they also don't have the same fit out as LCM-8 with the extended wheel house for galley storage and head with shower faculty. And aren't they operated by navy pers?

And what of the LARC-V, I understand the are looking at Ultra Heavy‐lift Amphibious Connector but that larger than LCM-1E and comparable with LCAC in it final dimensions.

if LCM-1E is operated by navy and no replacement for LARC-V is this the end of Army water transport except for am 1353 coral snake?

 

[kiwi in exile]

Australia has solved this problem by selecting the Elcan SpectreDR as the new daysight. The SpectreDR is both a 4x and 1x sight in one - it simply has a throw lever to switch between the two. So you can have the 4x selected most of the time, but if you approach close terrain simply throw the lever to switch to 1x.

The SpectreDR will replace all day sights currently in use aside from scopes for sniper rifles - it will equip all F88s (it will be delivered with new EF88s and replace the old 1.5x sight on legacy F88SA2s), all F89s, and (in a 7.62mm version) all Mag58s. Not only this excellent from a capability POV, as it is an excellent sight, it will save massive amounts of time and money as you only have to support/maintain a single sight, and you only have to train soldiers on a single sight. The only problem is the sight is quite heavy (600g from memory) and VERY expensive.

Does anyone know anything about this. Posted on the NZ army thread.
Cheers

 

[Massive]

Due to the relatively small numbers of AFVs in a Beersheeba brigade, to be able to concentrate enough combat power to be decisive it is expected that the CRV will have to contribute to the close fight, as well as do the whole recon/counter recon thing.[/URL]

Thanks Raven,

Understanding that Beersheeba is a compromise to allow for force generation but is the compromise in terms of combat power too great?

As an alternative could force generation occur within brigades?

As an example - go to two brigades rather than three - one infantry and one mechanised.

Infantry brigade:

1 Cav regiment (4 squadrons)
1 Lift squadron
4 Infantry battalions
1 Artillery regiment (4 batteries)
1 Engineering regiment (4 squadrons)

Mechanised brigade:

1 Cav regiment (4 squadrons)
4 Mechanised battalions (2 tank squadrons, 2 Mech infantry companies)
1 Artillery regiment (4 batteries)
1 Engineering regiment (4 squadrons)

4 stage rotation within each brigade, sustaining an infantry & a mech battlegroup (core of which is battalion size) on deployment with ability to surge to 2 battalion brigade deployments as required.

Would be interested in members thoughts on this?

Would note that when you do the maths on the resources required does make you realise that the Beersheeba compromise is a pretty good one given the constraints faced.

Regards,

Massive

 

[FoxtrotRomeo999]

Massive,

Your larger 2 Brigade structure implies increasing the size of Army considerably (army of fours rather than an army of threes - eg., 8 tank squadrons (112 tanks) and the Beersheeba objective of better combined arms cooperation is threatened by the Mech/Inf divide rather than all operating in a combined brigade.

I would stick with the three brigade structure. However, I believe the proposed ACR is too lightweight. I would modify it to:

1 Cav squadron
1 tank squadron
1 mech infantry squadron (existing 86 vehicles to give battalion lift plus supporting tank squadron)
== I don't mind getting extra tanks!
1 mobile artillery/spg battery
== keep asking and we may get them
1 Armoured Engineering squadron

Maybe add a dedicated helicopter squadron (Taipans and Tigers).

Have a great day, FPR

 

[Raven22]

Would be interested in members thoughts on this

Well, the obvious problem is the force you describe is much larger than the current force. Where do the extra soldiers come from?

The biggest problem with Beersheeba isn't the combat forces, it's the combat support and combat service support elements - they are simply not large enough to support the combat force. Making the combat force larger will only make the problem worse.

It's all moot anyway, as the army is not getting any bigger. In fact, it will need to get smaller. The Army is currently about 1500 soldiers over authorised strength (ie, if you add up all the numbers that are supposed to be in each unit, it is about 1500 soldiers more than the government says we can have). The army was trying to get funding for the extra soldiers as part of the force structure review, but it didn't happen. So, the army has to find a way to cull 1500 posns.

Considering the combat force is already larger than can be supported (and it's far easier to grow combat forces at short notice than CS and CSS), that's where the cuts are going to come from. The army is doing planning now on the 'Beyond Beersheeba' orbat, and as I understand it the chief will make some decisions in about April.

My guess, is you will see 2 RAR disappear (or, at least, the rifle companies disappear), with the ground combat element of the amphib force rotated among the brigades. I think you'll see the size of the MSS in the battalions reduce, possibly even disappear (with the second order effect being you need less Land400 vehicles to lift the now smaller platoons, saving even more soldiers). I also think the size of cavalry troops will reduce to only four vehicles (which I think in a post ASLAV world is better anyway).

Reductions like this will cut the army's coat by the amount of cloth it has, make the whole force more supportable, and free up positions for things like HIMARS batteries and cyber warfare capabilities that may or may not be part of the white paper.

 

[Volkodav]

Well, the obvious problem is the force you describe is much larger than the current force. Where do the extra soldiers come from?

The biggest problem with Beersheeba isn't the combat forces, it's the combat support and combat service support elements - they are simply not large enough to support the combat force. Making the combat force larger will only make the problem worse.

It's all moot anyway, as the army is not getting any bigger. In fact, it will need to get smaller. The Army is currently about 1500 soldiers over authorised strength (ie, if you add up all the numbers that are supposed to be in each unit, it is about 1500 soldiers more than the government says we can have). The army was trying to get funding for the extra soldiers as part of the force structure review, but it didn't happen. So, the army has to find a way to cull 1500 posns.

Considering the combat force is already larger than can be supported (and it's far easier to grow combat forces at short notice than CS and CSS), that's where the cuts are going to come from. The army is doing planning now on the 'Beyond Beersheeba' orbat, and as I understand it the chief will make some decisions in about April.

My guess, is you will see 2 RAR disappear (or, at least, the rifle companies disappear), with the ground combat element of the amphib force rotated among the brigades. I think you'll see the size of the MSS in the battalions reduce, possibly even disappear (with the second order effect being you need less Land400 vehicles to lift the now smaller platoons, saving even more soldiers). I also think the size of cavalry troops will reduce to only four vehicles (which I think in a post ASLAV world is better anyway).

Reductions like this will cut the army's coat by the amount of cloth it has, make the whole force more supportable, and free up positions for things like HIMARS batteries and cyber warfare capabilities that may or may not be part of the white paper.

I wonder if it would be worth while pushing some of the extra numbers to the reserves, i.e. reserve squadrons, troops, companies, platoons, batteries etc attached to the brigade to boost numbers in those areas where we appear to fall short. This would include an additional one or two squadrons of tanks, additional AIFVs, artillery etc. cheaper than reg units but as they are attached to regular brigades cheaper than stand alone reserves.

 

[Nick underscore]

My guess, is you will see 2 RAR disappear (or, at least, the rifle companies disappear), with the ground combat element of the amphib force rotated among the brigades. I think you'll see the size of the MSS in the battalions reduce, possibly even disappear (with the second order effect being you need less Land400 vehicles to lift the now smaller platoons, saving even more soldiers). I also think the size of cavalry troops will reduce to only four vehicles (which I think in a post ASLAV world is better anyway).

Reductions like this will cut the army's coat by the amount of cloth it has, make the whole force more supportable, and free up positions for things like HIMARS batteries and cyber warfare capabilities that may or may not be part of the white paper.

Would the govt (through not approving the over-strength numbers) allow any rifle coy's to disappear? I understand the agreement that the army becomes more balanced, but the political 'optics' of losing 'X' number rifle coy's looks unappealing, no?

Hypothetically - Do you prefer the inclusion of a HIMARS capability or a few batteries of SPG?

 

[Raven22]

I wonder if it would be worth while pushing some of the extra numbers to the reserves, i.e. reserve squadrons, troops, companies, platoons, batteries etc attached to the brigade to boost numbers in those areas where we appear to fall short. This would include an additional one or two squadrons of tanks, additional AIFVs, artillery etc. cheaper than reg units but as they are attached to regular brigades cheaper than stand alone reserves.

That is being looked at (although not tanks and armoured vehicles, but capabilities the reserve already have). The problem is, the reserve is struggling to fulfill the existing commitment to the reinforcing battlegroup (ie, the reserve battlegroup that joins the regular brigade for Ex Hamel), and even that is only for fear area security type tasks, not the full suite of tactical tasks. Expecting them to be able to provide entire sub units to the brigade, in addition to the reinforcing battlegroup, at a short notice to move, is beyond the capability of the reserve, at least at the moment. Considering that reserve recruitment continues to shrink, the reserve probably need to get their own house in order before taking on more tasks (the worst thing the reserve can do is try to be a part time ARA. It's been proven it doesn't work).

I think the reserve will get a bigger role, but not for the first rotation of a major deployment. I think the army will cheat the force gen cycle a bit, with the reset brigade expected to fill the gaps in the ready brigade with formed subunits doing the same training and on the same notice to move. Therefore these subunits of the reset brigade will deploy with the first rotation of any major deployment, and the reserve will then mobilise and fill in the gaps created for the next rotations. This gives them 12-24 months to go through the opgen process, which is realistic. Of course, there are major problems with this plan, but it briefs well on paper.

 

[Raven22]

Would the govt (through not approving the over-strength numbers) allow any rifle coy's to disappear? I understand the agreement that the army becomes more balanced, but the political 'optics' of losing 'X' number rifle coy's looks unappealing, no?

Hypothetically - Do you prefer the inclusion of a HIMARS capability or a few batteries of SPG?

I don't think anyone in government will care if rifle coys disappear or not, as they are raised and disbanded on a regular basis anyway. The real kicker that governments get excited about is unit numbers - I don't think army will be allowed to can a battalion, for instance, as that will be seen publicly as a cut to capability, even if it's just rebalancing that capability elsewhere. That's why I don't think 2 RAR will be disbanded completely. I think it will lose the rifle companies and support company (ie, the components that make up the ground combat element of the amphibious force) but will remain the amphibious support battalion that provides the headquarters, pre-landing force, logistic specialists etc that form the backbone of the amphibious capability. It will be an infantry battalion in name only, but will still appear on the orbat and therefore won't be perceived as a cut to capability.

Ref HIMARS, yes I think that is a better capability than getting SPGs. SPGs can't really do anything that out current M777 can't do - they would just do them better. HIMARS on the other hand is a whole new capability - it give the commander the ability to reach out and touch someone at operational-level ranges, which is a pretty revolutionary capability for our army.

Another reason is that HIMARS will allow Army to contribute more to the nation's maritime strategy. Obviously, this maritime strategy may involve the ADF having to control vital choke points in sea lanes etc to our north. Things like HIMARS and a true GBAD capability will allow the army to contribute to this on an operational level. We could use our fancy new amphib capability to deploy to the area, and set up our GBAD to deny air access and our extended range anti-surface systems to deny sea access. It would allow army to contibute to the joint fight beyond simply 'winning the land battle'. It would essentially give army an 'A2AD' capability. I think you'll see both a HIMARS capability (with the idea that the launcher will be used to launch more than just rockets) and reinvigorated GBAD capability come to the fore in the next ten years or so for this reason.

 

[Volkodav]

That is being looked at (although not tanks and armoured vehicles, but capabilities the reserve already have). The problem is, the reserve is struggling to fulfill the existing commitment to the reinforcing battlegroup (ie, the reserve battlegroup that joins the regular brigade for Ex Hamel), and even that is only for fear area security type tasks, not the full suite of tactical tasks. Expecting them to be able to provide entire sub units to the brigade, in addition to the reinforcing battlegroup, at a short notice to move, is beyond the capability of the reserve, at least at the moment. Considering that reserve recruitment continues to shrink, the reserve probably need to get their own house in order before taking on more tasks (the worst thing the reserve can do is try to be a part time ARA. It's been proven it doesn't work).

I think the reserve will get a bigger role, but not for the first rotation of a major deployment. I think the army will cheat the force gen cycle a bit, with the reset brigade expected to fill the gaps in the ready brigade with formed subunits doing the same training and on the same notice to move. Therefore these subunits of the reset brigade will deploy with the first rotation of any major deployment, and the reserve will then mobilise and fill in the gaps created for the next rotations. This gives them 12-24 months to go through the opgen process, which is realistic. Of course, there are major problems with this plan, but it briefs well on paper.

Agreed, it would be better to accelerate the preparedness of the other two ACRs / brigades while bringing in reserve units to backfill for the deployed regular units, still bringing the ratio of armour to infantry to a more favorable and capable balance.

As much as I appreciate the benefits of Beersheba, it still hasn't really changed the traditional "Infantry Division" ratio of armour and support elements to Infantry. There is still only one tank, one cavalry, one artillery and one engineer regiment per division, or one squadron / company of each per brigade.

The only difference to the balance being brought about by the reduction in the number of infantry battalions from traditional nine battalions per division to seven, or more to the point, from three to two in each brigade. Logically a hardened army would have improved the ratios, increasing the number of support elements to at least one squadron / company per battalion, if not a full regiment per brigade. In fact if each brigade had a tank regiment, it could probably make do with only a single Cav Sqn.