Interesting that the estimates are now coming in lower than they were back in 2010, let alone 2013-14, amazing what, not only competition, but transparency and good governance can do. I wouldn't be surprised if (yes I do realise timing means it's not an option) it is subsequently determined that as local design and build was not only possible, but affordable and desirable.
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates
- Thread starter icelord
- Start date
- Status
And the states have wasted no time in putting their view forward:
South Australia wants 12-submarine build back on agenda after costings report - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
Some people are just never happy! Even though it looks like South Australia will get the build they want the full amount. Eight subs are better than six, which is also better than none.
I guess the actual hull numbers will not be revealed until the release of the defence white paper.
If the full 12 are not deemed necessary then I would rather see money being spent on other necessary assets.
While I believe that number's ordered should be based on what the navy needs the full 12 at current pricing estimates is not a major spending issue. Remember when Abbott was in power he was pushing for 12 built in Japan for $25 billion, 12 (Doesnt actually mention the build location, Curious) for $15 billion still quite possibly leaves $10 billion extra to flow onto other projects.
It is all a bit academic, as even with a commitment to build 12 a future government will more than likely be too tempted to cancel later vessels to resist, having been ordered by an opposing party.
Many reasons will be given (changed strategic, and or economic circumstances, different technology that can do the job, etc.).
So can probably rely on an order for 8 to be adhered to, but 12 is so far out as to make the last 4 or so pie in the sky.
The best you can hope for is a commitment to a continuous build, and even that would not be set in stone.
One of the issues with Collins was they assumed that with six hulls they could have three to four available at anytime with one in FCD and one in MCD or an intermediate docking at any given time. This depended on FCDs taking no longer than about twelve months each, MCDs being six month or so, and intermediate dockings taking only a couple of months. Also critical was that there be sufficient qualified and experienced crews to permit boats to deploy, sufficient berths for trainees, and enough boats to permit deployments to be achieved while crews for boats coming out of maintenance availabilities were raised, trained and certified.
Six hulls were never enough for this, deployments meant that there were not actually enough hulls to provide along side and sea training for new submariners, let alone to support ASW training for the rest of the ADF. Throw in an FCD that scope creep has pushed out to two years, out of cycle upgrades making an MCD much longer, training cruises delayed or cancelled to provide a boat or crew for a deployment, deferred maintenance (for whatever reason) increasing the cost and schedule required when they finally started, unexpected maintenance issues, unexpected damage (tug colliding with Waller) and all plans are out the window.
Those were the real issues with a fleet of six boats, then successive governments made it worse by Howard and Rudd each laying up a boat prior to FCD (don't know if Rudd had any control to change this but I don't think his governments hatchetjob on ASC helped). While one was already in FCD and another in what was called pre-FCD (stripped bare to provide a parts pool for the rest of the fleet), meaning half the fleet was in the building halls at Adelaide from 2007 to 2010-11.
Just imagine if we had a fleet of ten or twelve boats, we could literally have an operational squadron with four or five boats, fully crewed and certified, available for deployment at days or weeks notice. There could be a training squadron with three to four boats conducting alongside and sea training as well as supporting fleet and RAAF ASW training. Finally there would be three to four boats in build, extended maintenance / upgrade, or working up.
ASW training seems to have been totally under resourced over the last 15 years.
Firstly, training in a simulator is fine but unless the crews get a taste of reality with a live boat and live aircraft it really is diminished.
The lack of training was exacerbated by splitting fleet training between East and West with half the fleet in either place. That combined with total lack of availability probably meant ( and I'm guessing) entire work-ups have probably been concluded without the ASW team ever having completed a week of C series CASEXs ( combined exercises with subs, fixed wing air and surface units)
In the days whee we had organic f/w air and all the fleet including subs were based in Sydney, this was common fodder.
The issue with ships and submarines is if they are not maintained effectively, including ensuring sufficient trained and certified crew are available, the platforms physically deteriorate, become more expensive and difficult to maintain, with their service lives being significantly shortened. Even laying a platform up in reserve has significant costs, not to prevent deterioration, but to control and slow it. Systems need to be inspected and serviced whether a platform is in service or not. Sorry, not trying to tell you how to suck eggs, the above is mainly as explanation for others without exposure to maintaining major assets.
Anyway the thing is there is an operational overhead for any type of equipment that exists whether you have one or a dozen (or many more) platforms. The fewer the number of platforms the greater the proportion of operating cost goes to overheads, the greater the number, the smaller the proportion. It can actually be less efficient and potentially more expensive to operate a smaller fleet than a larger one, especially if heroic efforts are required to meet certain operational requirements with a smaller number of platforms than ideal, i.e. maintenance and or upgrades need to be deferred and their is not a sufficiently large pool of competent, experienced personnel to support operations as well as training.
You can, as was the case with the Collins from the mid 2000s to early 2010s, potentially be left with a very expensive fleet that is incapable of providing the required capability. The government was spending billions but because they were skimping in critical areas they were not getting a return and "efficiencies" they made worsened the situation as what was left was incapable of supporting the capability.
t68
Well-Known Member
IMHO think any projected savings is going to be monopoly money anyway once the build starts, governments have away of creative accounting
+1
I would prefer sticking on the 8 + 4 optional as in the original plan. Those "cost saving" may never comes true, partly because it may be just another marketing fraud, it is overly optimistic, or the construction has fxxked up again.
I can see the economic of scale,but, when practically all government divisions in are on cost cut, employment freeze or scrapping projects, I just don't feel it is the right time.
Fair call.
How about, based on what has happened with the Collins class, I would rather they spend more money and get it right rather than try and do it for less and fail, which would mean the money they spent has been wasted.
Ideally they wouldn't have drawn money from other services and projects, but considering it has been done, there is a duty to ensure it was worth it. Also, even though sold politically as a move to create / preserve jobs in local ship building, I would argue experience has shown that modern warships require extensive local infrastructure and knowhow to support and maintain the capability and that is best (or most easily) obtained through local construction. I base this on having worked for a builder doing maintenance and upgrades as well as for a maintainer looking after someone else's build.
As a proud Australian, student of history and follower of international events I believe in a strong and effective defence force, as a tax payer I demand value for money, based on my knowledge and experience, I believe the most cost effective way to maintain an effective and capable navy is to maintain an effective and capable naval shipbuilding and maintenance sector. Unlike aircraft and ground vehicles the building facilities for ships and submarines are also highly effective at maintenance, quite often more so than maintenance only facilities. This is why I see the support of shipbuilding to be a strategically critical necessity.
I am sorry if I have misunderstood or over reacted to your post as I also see the need for the full capability planned for LAND 400 and that indications are that the capability will be reduced in favour of sorting out shipbuilding. I agree that should there be significant savings on ship building then that money should be invested in other critical capabilities, in fact I wonder if LAND 400 should perhaps be stretched rather than reduced, or if savings should be found elsewhere all together. My concern is if we fail to do shipbuilding properly, we will as we have done time and time again, end up spending more money for less capability to the detriment of the ADF and nation as a whole.
Except doesn't TKMS have a history of building to a contractual price, As in they take the risk of cost over runs so if they are saying that they can build them for around $15 billion then it isn't such a stretch that the others can't either.
As for your other points, How often have you known the Australian government to ever take up the options? And what do you mean by "the construction has fxxked up again"? The Collins class construction wise had very few issues, Most faults came from the systems them selves with only one section of hull having faulty welds Such issues could have occurred in any country. You also can't compare the AWD to this as ASC has had more experience with submarines then surface ships not to mention the enterprise make up and contract for the AWD was seriously flawed. A better comparison would be the Anzac frigates as both the Japanese and Germans (Not sure on the French) want to bring Australian's over to there respective countries to train them up, Similar to what occurred with the Anzacs and we all know how well that turned out because they media ignored it (If they cant complain about it they dont want to know about it).
It was two hull sections with faulty welds, ironically the only two sections fabricated outside Australia, i.e. in Sweden.
There is actually a pattern with the Collins class and the problems the project encountered, the greater the perceived risk, the more attention and mitigation was applied and the more successful and trouble free that part of th project proved to be. The parts of the project that were perceived to be of lower risk (usually due to being in the hands of an experienced and competent overseas contractor) often proved to be the source faults, failures, non compliance, cost blowouts and delays.
Examples of experienced overseas contractors letting the project down include Rockwell and their combat system, Hedemora and the diesels, the shaft seal, periscope the propeller, Kockums for not tank testing the modified hull form etc. Basically groups and organisations contracted due to their expertise failed to put as much effort into assuring the quality and performance of their work as ASC, PMB (Pacific Marine Batteries) and others put into their often bleeding edge work.
Even if that means the other services are hamstrung and aren't effectively equipped and prepared for the future? I fail to see how the defence of the nation should be prejudiced just so a couple of thousand South Australians can have a job. We can have a strong Navy without Australian shipbuilding. The question is can we have a strong Australian Defence Force WITH Australian shipbuilding? It's a zero sum game afterall - ever dollar spent subsiding an industry that will forever be entirely reliant on government orders is a dollar less being spent on actual defence capabilities.
I'm all for Australian shipbuilding (why wouldn't I be?) but not at the cost of cannibalising the rest of the ADF to do so.
I doubt there will be any savings as such. Money will most likely go to patch blackholes else where (out of defence). Submarines aren't the only project going at the moment, OPV's, future frigates etc. I don't imagine a cash injection of $10+ billion to go into defense after the contract is signed, as its most likely that money was going to be borrowed. The head of the DSTO at one stage claimed the subs were going to cost more than the NBN some $50 billion... Its not like that cash is just sitting there waiting to be redeployed.
TKMS and I would imagine Japan would adhere to a fixed price. Japan isn't offering to build us submarines to chase a profit. They are doing it for geo-strategic reasons. Of the 3 I would imagine japan has a pretty good idea of the cost because they are actually building and operating these types of submarines.
We should initially order 8 or 9 submarines, provide money for the first three, let some future government take over the funding for the others. Remember by the time the 9th submarine is being built it will be late in the 2020's at least.
I like the figure nine or twelve. Built in lots of three, with each three modernised over the previous three.
I like the figure nine or twelve. Built in lots of three, with each three modernised over the previous three.
This project could be stretched out over such a long period of time that we might end up building multiple classes.
I can see us building 2 classes. The first class could be a direct replacement for the Collins subs and will be built through till the mid 30s and the second class will actually expand the fleet and will be built through to the late 40s and perhaps even the early 50s.
I can see us building 2 classes. The first class could be a direct replacement for the Collins subs and will be built through till the mid 30s and the second class will actually expand the fleet and will be built through to the late 40s and perhaps even the early 50s.
Again when you order the bare minimum (Which still actually isn't enough as it is) and allow future governments to decide the future more often then not they won't go for it so all your doing is setting it up to fail long term.
As to the funding, you don't have to provide all cash up front but merely pay as you go. As to build lot's that has been mentioned previously and between training, maintenance, rebuilds, transit and deployments lot's of 4 is actually the more efficient way to go.
You are also off on your build schedule, It has been mentioned many times that with 12 they hope to make it a continuous build industry implying a new build every 18 - 30 months depending on how long they want the life span of the submarine to be (18 - 30 years, Only bringing up the 18 year factor as it may be desirable to fit our replacement schedule in with Japan if we for that option) as such we will only be starting to build some place between the 4/5th and 7th boats (depending on build schedule and boat life span).
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Based off prior numbers, I think lots of four make more sense. Many military and naval items follow the rule of three, while subs seem to follow a rule of four.
One potential concern I would have though, is without there being a firm commitment for 8+ subs, if only 3-4 were funded, a future gov't might decide to 'save' money by an early cancellation, resulting in penalties and only 3-4 subs in RAN service. Each sub would also be of 'higher' cost because there are fewer platforms to spread the development and penalty costs across.
Now I definitely understand the concern about more money for subs taking away from funding Army and/or RAAF needs, and vice versa. One of the issues that I have observed over the last decade or so, is the number of times that a defence project is 'forced' to do something to reduce costs, which lowers initial/upfront costs, but raises the price tag further on down the line. And it is not even deferring some of the costs, but actually increasing them, much like a balloon mortgage. The ADF does not seem to be forced to do this to the degree or with the frequency that the NZDF does, but it does seem to be commonly recurring event.
One of the other recurring ogres in the corner, is the degree of politics which drives purchase decisions. This can be anything from industrial interests wining and dining politicians and non-defence decision-makers, to politicians choosing who/where to build or employ facilities, based upon whose seat is threatened.
One of the things I tend to like about US defence procurement programs, is that there tends to be long-term, bipartisan planning involved, so that there is not very many changes or breaks in procurement, even when there are changes in the administration (which happens every 4-8 years).
Using the naval construction industry in Australia as an example, if bipartisan agreement could be reached, the RAN and associated agencies have enough demand for vessels for the industry to sustain itself without a boom-bust cycle. Unfortunately what has been happening is that there have been significant gaps in procurement with changes in gov't, starving the industry of work. Then when things reach a sort of critical mass, where orders need to be placed, the various companies then compete with each other for the work and to restart capabilities they had but had been/were forced to allow to wither.
Having it set up, so that companies know that before their current project is completed there will be a follow-on project of some sort, so that companies can plan on transitioning from project to project instead of closing up shop until the next project starts, which might be in six months, or not for another six years... Doing it like this can help reduce and spread out the sunk industrial costs and time. But it does require bipartisan agreement, otherwise it could end with a chance in gov't.
- Status