NZDF General discussion thread

[t68]

Not sure if they would be willing to leave a well paid army career in britain to return to the low paid quagmire of fiji,even if they did, would britian be giving them the needed armour,artillary, and navy, air support, they dont have?i think not, especially if thier civilians are threatened, And hardly a giant, numbers wise only 2 active regiments in the main islands 2 others are scattered throught the islands,and counting that two thousand, similar size to our regular force plus territorial units,with none of the gear. But significantly less than NZDF, as a whole.

One only has to look at operation Morris Dance in 87 to the intentions of AusGov and independant nations, only time we will rush into something like that is if another Somila situation and under UN sanction as part of a broader effort, like Operation Solace in 93.

And if you look at op MD it was by sheer luck that the amount of assets where in the area, least now we have more options then before with a rifle company being scattered over severals ships to accomadate them

 

[Todjaeger]

Not sure if they would be willing to leave a well paid army career in britain to return to the low paid quagmire of fiji,even if they did, would britian be giving them the needed armour,artillary, and navy, air support, they dont have?i think not, especially if thier civilians are threatened, And hardly a giant, numbers wise only 2 active regiments in the main islands 2 others are scattered throught the islands,and counting that two thousand, similar size to our regular force plus territorial units,with none of the gear. But significantly less than NZDF, as a whole.

Not to take it OT, but realistically does NZ have the capability to conduct an amphibious opposed landing?

While Fiji might not have aircraft to use to provide air superiority or CAS, NZ does not really have such aircraft either. The P-3K2 Orions might be able to provide some ground attack and CAS using Maverick AGM's and/or Mk-82 'dumb' bombs, but without an ACF and AAR, NZ does not really have anything to bring to the fight in terms of combat aircraft.

As for artillery support, not sure what is really available to Fiji, but NZ would not really have much either, until a secure beachhead has been established. The two ANZAC-class FFH's might be able to provide NGFS, if they are available for deployment, and the Canterbury is felt to be safe enough so the FFH's are not needed for screening. Until the artillery can be landed and supplied with munitions, any NZ forces would not have artillery support either.

What this means IMO is that NZ could not successfully land and hold terrain in Fiji, because the fight would essentially be 'too even' meaning unacceptable (and unneeded) casualties. Keep in mind that with a very limited Kiwi ability to provide pre-landing bombardment, the 81mm mortars could make a right mess. If the Fijian Dabur-class patrol boats are available/operational, they too could cripple if not sink the landing craft, unless either the FFH's are first tasked with neutralizing them, and/or the new Kiwi Seasprites with the Penguin AShM's can take them out. With the Canterbury having a similar armament (25mm gun on Canterbury vs. 20mm gun on the Dabur-class) the MRV would not realistically be able to protect landing craft on their way from ship to shore and back. With only two LCM aboard Canterbury, plus the fact they are apparently in need of replacement... Things would not look good.

While the Canterbury does have spots for four helicopters, I do not think that they would be sufficient to bring in enough troops and more importantly heavy weapons and munitions, to overwhelm any defending Fijians.

Now if it was a joint ADF-NZDF amphibious operation, things would potentially be quite different due to both the quantity of assets, as well as some of the specific types available. Specifically the ability to track and sink any hostile vessels before they could get close to the landing ships, and the ability to have combat air support to target enemy points of resistance.

 

[ngatimozart]

Not sure if they would be willing to leave a well paid army career in britain to return to the low paid quagmire of fiji,even if they did, would britian be giving them the needed armour,artillary, and navy, air support, they dont have?i think not, especially if thier civilians are threatened, And hardly a giant, numbers wise only 2 active regiments in the main islands 2 others are scattered throught the islands,and counting that two thousand, similar size to our regular force plus territorial units,with none of the gear. But significantly less than NZDF, as a whole.

They would be back on the first plane available if they thought their homeland was under mortal threat. Don't discount their ties to their homeland and more importantly their villages and people because they are very strong. Somewhat like Maori with whanau and iwi, but stronger. Another thing you underestimate is the native Fijians fighting ability. When I was at Hobsonville Air Force base in the early 1980s we had training groups from the Fijian Army and the PNG Army there. One night both groups got on the fire water and it was Fiji vs PNG brawl. Whilst us Maori aren't afraid of a good fight, there was no way that of us Kiwis were going to try and break it up. To dangerous.

 

[t68]

Interesting analysis you have going there Todjeager,Would the Kiwis even use P3 in that role? Most certantly they would make use of the ISR capability on the aircraft, and they would close to there endurance as they have no AAR capability*

If the Kiwis ever did anything remotely like this they would have no option but to use STUFT and do an *Atlantic Conveyor( what sort of shipping is available?) to bring in ready helicopters for use

Priority would be to take the*port of Lautoka which would be a major undertaking by itself to deploy NZLAV which would give firepower superiority and them rush to Nadi International airport to secure an air-bridge. *If the Kiwis were able to manage this without undue losses would they then have the manpower to move out?

 

[Hone C]

Priority would be to take the*port of Lautoka which would be a major undertaking by itself to deploy NZLAV which would give firepower superiority and them rush to Nadi International airport to secure an air-bridge. *If the Kiwis were able to manage this without undue losses would they then have the manpower to move out?

I think we can fairly safely rule out any unilateral NZ intervention in Fiji. The implications of invading a independent sovereign state aside, NZ just doesn't have the ability to project enough power to make it feasible.

AFAIK HMNZS Canterbury can really only lift a reinforced company group. Given that Lautoka itself is garrisoned by 5th Battalion FIR (which has a regular company that can be augmented as needed by TF companies) it would be a tough proposition. A fight in a coastal town of 50000+ residents to gain port access would be messy and ROE would probably preclude entirely (or seriously restrict at least) use of whatever NGS or limited air support could be provided.

Similarly Nadi is garrisoned by the 4th Battalion, which has responsibility for the airfield, and is a similar sized town.

Even if all 3 Battalions (incl QAMR) were able to get in somehow, just securing the lodgement could be hard enough, especially if stretched by resistance from a potentially hostile population (or the need to provide humanitarian aid, etc. in the case of a real human rights catastrophe that triggered the intervention), let alone having any manpower available to 'move out' into Suva or confront the regular Fijian military forces.

Having worked with Fijians before (both from the Fijian Infantry Regiment and serving in the British Army), they are in general a good bunch of blokes who are natural soldiers and who love a scrap. Defending their home turf, despite a lack of modern kit, they would be lethal. As Ngati said, not to be underestimated.

 

[KiwiRob]

Not to take it OT, but realistically does NZ have the capability to conduct an amphibious opposed landing?

While Fiji might not have aircraft to use to provide air superiority or CAS, NZ does not really have such aircraft either. The P-3K2 Orions might be able to provide some ground attack and CAS using Maverick AGM's and/or Mk-82 'dumb' bombs, but without an ACF and AAR, NZ does not really have anything to bring to the fight in terms of combat aircraft.

As for artillery support, not sure what is really available to Fiji, but NZ would not really have much either, until a secure beachhead has been established. The two ANZAC-class FFH's might be able to provide NGFS, if they are available for deployment, and the Canterbury is felt to be safe enough so the FFH's are not needed for screening. Until the artillery can be landed and supplied with munitions, any NZ forces would not have artillery support either.

What this means IMO is that NZ could not successfully land and hold terrain in Fiji, because the fight would essentially be 'too even' meaning unacceptable (and unneeded) casualties. Keep in mind that with a very limited Kiwi ability to provide pre-landing bombardment, the 81mm mortars could make a right mess. If the Fijian Dabur-class patrol boats are available/operational, they too could cripple if not sink the landing craft, unless either the FFH's are first tasked with neutralizing them, and/or the new Kiwi Seasprites with the Penguin AShM's can take them out. With the Canterbury having a similar armament (25mm gun on Canterbury vs. 20mm gun on the Dabur-class) the MRV would not realistically be able to protect landing craft on their way from ship to shore and back. With only two LCM aboard Canterbury, plus the fact they are apparently in need of replacement... Things would not look good.

While the Canterbury does have spots for four helicopters, I do not think that they would be sufficient to bring in enough troops and more importantly heavy weapons and munitions, to overwhelm any defending Fijians.
.

Why undertake an opposed beach landing, the easier way to do it IMO would be to air drop the SAS at Nadi Airport, take the airport first then use it as the airbridge, the Hercs could bring in the heavy gear (artillery) with the RNZAF 757's and 77W's chartered from Air NZ to bring in the infantry. Canterbury could be offshore with LAV's ready to land, there's plenty of places the landing craft could offload within the immediate vacinity of the airport. An ANZAC parked offshore with Canterbury would be sufficient to keep any aircraft the Fijians could use away, and you could shell the barracks close to the airport, we also have two OPC's which could tag along and should be able to deal with the Fijian Daburs. That would give a force of 4 Seasprites plus the 4 NH90's on Canterbury.

Park the second ANZAC offshore from Suva, shell the parliament buildings and Presidential Palace and keep aircraft away from Nausori Airport. NH90's from Canterbury could then be used by the SAS to assault the Parliament, backed up by LAV's landed by Canterbury at Nadi.

They would be back on the first plane available if they thought their homeland was under mortal threat. Don't discount their ties to their homeland and more importantly their villages and people because they are very strong. Somewhat like Maori with whanau and iwi, but stronger. Another thing you underestimate is the native Fijians fighting ability. When I was at Hobsonville Air Force base in the early 1980s we had training groups from the Fijian Army and the PNG Army there. One night both groups got on the fire water and it was Fiji vs PNG brawl. Whilst us Maori aren't afraid of a good fight, there was no way that of us Kiwis were going to try and break it up. To dangerous.

Think about it ngati, how would they get back to Fiji? Are they going to paddle canoes? Shut down Nadi and Nausori Airports, nobody is going to get home.

 

[Nick underscore]

Agree there Rob, NZSAS insertion into Nadi Int'l would be the first stage IMV.

I just don't think NZ have enough troops to air-insert & hold the lodgement for the formation of a secure air-bridge.

Extra logistical support would have to come from someone, then this hypothetical changes completely from a unilateral mission.

 

[KiwiRob]

Agree there Rob, NZSAS insertion into Nadi Int'l would be the first stage IMV.

I just don't think NZ have enough troops to air-insert & hold the lodgement for the formation of a secure air-bridge.

Extra logistical support would have to come from someone, then this hypothetical changes completely from a unilateral mission.

I'd think you could air drop the SAS, once the terminal is taken both 757's could quickly land 300-400 infantry, NH90's and Sprites from Canterbury, ANZACS and OPV's with door gunners, along with fire support from the ANZAC could keep the Fijians in their barracks.

Once a few LAV's have been landed that makes it harder for them to move us out of the airport. It's a pity none of ours are set up as morter carriers, or with a decent sized gun.

Remember a sizeable portion of the population would probably offer quite a bit of support, there's not a lot of love between the Indians and the native Fijians.

 

[Hone C]

Seizing an airfield is not a simple matter of dropping a couple of dozen blokes onto it then flying everyone else in on chartered airliners, which is basically what this scenario envisions.

Seizing an airhead is quite a major operation, especially by parachute assault. The US Army,for example, considers this operation a Brigade tasking at a minimum, and a large part of the 82nd Airborne Division (and recent British Parachute Regiment) training revolves around it (ie CJOAX). The logistics of getting men and equipment dropped in is a major challenge, especially at such a range, and with only 5xC-130H/2x757. The airport then has to be cleared and the runways checked for FOD/obstacles before the TAL can begin, key infrastructure secured as well as a perimeter established, etc. A hard ask for NZSAS, plus the scalies and the handful of RNZIR para qual'd blokes to do before the rest arrived.

As I mentioned previously, the Fijians have the 4th Battalion based at Nadi, with a regular infantry company in vicinity of the airport, and TF companies able to reinforce (as well as the regular 3rd Battalion in Suva).

 

[KiwiRob]

Seizing an airfield is not a simple matter of dropping a couple of dozen blokes onto it then flying everyone else in on chartered airliners, which is basically what this scenario envisions.

Seizing an airhead is quite a major operation, especially by parachute assault. The US Army,for example, considers this operation a Brigade tasking at a minimum, and a large part of the 82nd Airborne Division (and recent British Parachute Regiment) training revolves around it (ie CJOAX). The logistics of getting men and equipment dropped in is a major challenge, especially at such a range, and with only 5xC-130H/2x757. The airport then has to be cleared and the runways checked for FOD/obstacles before the TAL can begin, key infrastructure secured as well as a perimeter established, etc. A hard ask for NZSAS, plus the scalies and the handful of RNZIR para qual'd blokes to do before the rest arrived.

As I mentioned previously, the Fijians have the 4th Battalion based at Nadi, with a regular infantry company in vicinity of the airport, and TF companies able to reinforce (as well as the regular 3rd Battalion in Suva).

I'm working on the assumption that this would be a surprise invasion, the Fijians wouldn't know we were coming kind of deal. I'm thinking Panama and Grenada type scenario.

Another option would be to send the RNZAF 757's up in place of the scheduled Air NZ flight, they land catch the locals by surprise the Hercs follow in rapid succession with the armoured Pinz's, meanwhile Canterbury is unloading LAV's via the landing craft across the beach from the airport. An ANZAC could be providing fire support for the SAS and infantry.

Since Fiji has no form of early warning we would probably catch them unaware, they wouldn't have time to muster the TF companies and probably couldn't get the regular up and ready to fight before they were over run.

 

[Hone C]

I'm working on the assumption that this would be a surprise invasion, the Fijians wouldn't know we were coming kind of deal. I'm thinking Panama and Grenada type scenario.

Another option would be to send the RNZAF 757's up in place of the scheduled Air NZ flight, they land catch the locals by surprise the Hercs follow in rapid succession with the armoured Pinz's, meanwhile Canterbury is unloading LAV's via the landing craft across the beach from the airport. An ANZAC could be providing fire support for the SAS and infantry.

Since Fiji has no form of early warning we would probably catch them unaware, they wouldn't have time to muster the TF companies and probably couldn't get the regular up and ready to fight before they were over run.

Bear in mind that Grenada and Panama both involved massive levels of overmatch by the invading (and in Panama's case already present) US forces, both numerically as well as complete naval and air superiority. As Todjaeger pointed out, NZ forces would be effectively operating at parity or close enough to it.

Yes, similar things have been done before with the element of surprise; the 1976 Operation Thunderbolt by the Israelis into Entebbe Airport being a successful example of the kind of TAL and airfield seizure you refer to. Operations of this type tend to have limited objectives and time on task however, and involve significant risk. A big roll of the iron dice to bet a forcible entry and subsequent operations on.

You're also assuming the availability of at least one, possibly both, of the ANZACs, HMNZS Canterbury, the C-130 and 757 fleet, and a sizable proportion of the SF and Regular Army. That's a lot of assumptions about availability and serviceability of kit and equipment, units and personnel held at OLOC, etc.

Hypotheticals aside, we need to be realistic about what forces NZDF can actually project outside of a coalition environment. We currently have a small RO/RO ferry type transport, an aging AOR with limited stores space, 5 C-130s and a pair of 757s to both transport and sustain forces abroad. The platforms just don't exist to provide force sustainment for much more than a company group IMHO, at least not in a contested environment.

 

[ngatimozart]

I'm working on the assumption that this would be a surprise invasion, the Fijians wouldn't know we were coming kind of deal. I'm thinking Panama and Grenada type scenario.

Another option would be to send the RNZAF 757's up in place of the scheduled Air NZ flight, they land catch the locals by surprise the Hercs follow in rapid succession with the armoured Pinz's, meanwhile Canterbury is unloading LAV's via the landing craft across the beach from the airport. An ANZAC could be providing fire support for the SAS and infantry.

Since Fiji has no form of early warning we would probably catch them unaware, they wouldn't have time to muster the TF companies and probably couldn't get the regular up and ready to fight before they were over run.

There would be no surprise. The lead up would have to be a deterioration in diplomatic relations between NZ, Australia and Fiji and a crisis of some kind. Think a coup where NZ citizens taken hostage by the military and / or threatened with death and any other nasty situation you care to throw in. An early warning system doesn't have to be electronic - it can be human, so the Fijians could get HUMINT warning well before any amphib force arrives in their waters. Also the Chinese could pass on Intel to them. You can't take anything for granted especially witn an operation like the one you propose.

 

[t68]

Bear in mind that Grenada and Panama both involved massive levels of overmatch by the invading (and in Panama's case already present) US forces, both numerically as well as complete naval and air superiority. As Todjaeger pointed out, NZ forces would be effectively operating at parity or close enough to it.

Yes, similar things have been done before with the element of surprise; the 1976 Operation Thunderbolt by the Israelis into Entebbe Airport being a successful example of the kind of TAL and airfield seizure you refer to. Operations of this type tend to have limited objectives and time on task however, and involve significant risk. A big roll of the iron dice to bet a forcible entry and subsequent operations on.

You're also assuming the availability of at least one, possibly both, of the ANZACs, HMNZS Canterbury, the C-130 and 757 fleet, and a sizable proportion of the SF and Regular Army. That's a lot of assumptions about availability and serviceability of kit and equipment, units and personnel held at OLOC, etc.

Hypotheticals aside, we need to be realistic about what forces NZDF can actually project outside of a coalition environment. We currently have a small RO/RO ferry type transport, an aging AOR with limited stores space, 5 C-130s and a pair of 757s to both transport and sustain forces abroad. The platforms just don't exist to provide force sustainment for much more than a company group IMHO, at least not in a contested environment.

Agree in the context that NZ is only limited action offence/ defensive in seizing small amounts of area for short periods, this instance they have the means to take and hold say a port terminal or airport then push to the objective such as a embassy for evacuation or similer, or in a coalition event providing support to a larger force.

This is where a mixed fleet would be of most importance of NZLAV and Busmaster PMV

 

[Todjaeger]

You're also assuming the availability of at least one, possibly both, of the ANZACs, HMNZS Canterbury, the C-130 and 757 fleet, and a sizable proportion of the SF and Regular Army. That's a lot of assumptions about availability and serviceability of kit and equipment, units and personnel held at OLOC, etc.

Hypotheticals aside, we need to be realistic about what forces NZDF can actually project outside of a coalition environment. We currently have a small RO/RO ferry type transport, an aging AOR with limited stores space, 5 C-130s and a pair of 757s to both transport and sustain forces abroad. The platforms just don't exist to provide force sustainment for much more than a company group IMHO, at least not in a contested environment.

If memory serves, the NZDF does not actually have all that available. I forget the exact numbers as it keeps changing, but IIRC one or two of the C-130's are unavailable right now since they are undergoing the SLEP. With the planned upgrades to swap the RIM-7 Sea Sparrow for the Sea Ceptor and other capabilities, soon at least one of the FFH's will completely unavailable for months at a clip.

On its own, NZ might have the ability to quickly take and hold an LZ or beachhead to evacuate foreign nationals, but IMO even if the NZDF had all its forces available at one time for deployment, it lacks sufficient assets of the right kind to project and hold power. Not only does this require being able to get forces to a distant area, in a condition where they can fight, but it also requires being able to get the required logistics to sustain said forces.

As for using the success of Operation Urgent Fury (US invasion of Grenada) as an example, while it did succeed, there was an enormous disparity in forces, as well as differences in the situation. Amongst them was the distance. Fiji is ~2,100 km from Auckland, while Grenada is less than 900 km from Puerto Rico, which is a US possession large enough for US forces to stage from. Also at the time, there was a major US training area on an island off the coast for Puerto Rico.

In terms of troop numbers, the US had a roughly 6:1 advantage, with support available from a CBG as well as USAF TACAIR. Just in terms of surface vessels, there were more USN and USCG vessels providing support (combat or logistics) than are in the entire RNZN.

These sorts of differences have an absolute impact on the success of failure of an operation.

 

[kiwipatriot69]

Agree in the context that NZ is only limited action offence/ defensive in seizing small amounts of area for short periods, this instance they have the means to take and hold say a port terminal or airport then push to the objective such as a embassy for evacuation or similer, or in a coalition event providing support to a larger force.

This is where a mixed fleet would be of most importance of NZLAV and Busmaster PMV

Good debate, guess i really opened up a can of worms with this topic! Was really expecting Coalition partner like Austrailia involved , and a bit disappointing to think New Zealand, despite all the new gear we invested in since east timor incident,or training done at exersizes like Southern Katipo isnt enough to do such an operation single handed

 

[t68]

One has to look at the Battle for Umm Qasr to capture the port using UK 3rd Brigade, US 15th MEU and and Polish GROM which had taken a few days to secure. But that is a worst case effort were they also travelled overland and had support from other elements.

BBC NEWS | Middle East | Tough battle for Umm Qasr

 

[Todjaeger]

Good debate, guess i really opened up a can of worms with this topic! Was really expecting Coalition partner like Austrailia involved , and a bit disappointing to think New Zealand, despite all the new gear we invested in since east timor incident,or training done at exersizes like Southern Katipo isnt enough to do such an operation single handed

If there was some sort of joint operation alongside Australia and/or the US, the situation would of course be different, potentially by a great deal. As I had mentioned, larger partner-nations have both greater numbers of forces available, but also a greater range of capabilities within those forces. Many of the capabilities which the NZDF lack, can completely transform a battlefield.

In terms of what has been 'invested' in the NZDF since Timor Leste... I do not think much really has been invested. There have been some measures to retain existing capabilities, or perhaps regenerate a few minor lost capabilities, but little apart from purchasing Canterbury in developing new NZDF capabilities. And there still have been capabilities which have since been let go, due to the cost to retain vs. the likely threat and service needs elsewhere. As an example, Army would have to resort to trashfire outside of a coalition environment for air defence, since the MANPADS have been retired.

While the above was just an example, another which I find much more worrisome is that the RAAF had to deploy a flight or Hornets to NZ for an exercise, so that Kiwi troops could get practice operating with air support. IIRC this was done prior to a deployment of Kiwi troops to Afghanistan, where they would be operating under the umbrella of coalition air support. Without the training (and actual aircraft) the Kiwi troops would have been unable to work with the air support available in Afghanistan safely, and the presence of Kiwi troops would likely have been more a hindrance than help.

What I am concerned about, is as future battlefields becoming more combined-arms and joint-service, the NZDF becomes relegated to little more than a ceremonial presence in future coalitions, because the various Gov'ts do not or refuse to, fund the NZDF to the degree to at least work alongside common partners. Never mind actually having the NZDF kitted out to do some of the roles and tasks needed in the event of a threat to NZ, or Kiwi interested overseas.

 

[kiwi in exile]

There would be no surprise. The lead up would have to be a deterioration in diplomatic relations between NZ, Australia and Fiji and a crisis of some kind. Think a coup where NZ citizens taken hostage by the military and / or threatened with death and any other nasty situation you care to throw in. An early warning system doesn't have to be electronic - it can be human, so the Fijians could get HUMINT warning well before any amphib force arrives in their waters. Also the Chinese could pass on Intel to them. You can't take anything for granted especially witn an operation like the one you propose.

agreed. while an attack by air would be a surprise, getting an ANZAC and th Cant nearby for the neccessary support would be difficult to say the least as I imagine there would be a lot of recreational/commercial vessels nearby not to mention local aircraft, patrol boats and Chinese support.

 

[t68]

If there was some sort of joint operation alongside Australia and/or the US, the situation would of course be different, potentially by a great deal. As I had mentioned, larger partner-nations have both greater numbers of forces available, but also a greater range of capabilities within those forces. Many of the capabilities which the NZDF lack, can completely transform a battlefield.

In terms of what has been 'invested' in the NZDF since Timor Leste... I do not think much really has been invested. There have been some measures to retain existing capabilities, or perhaps regenerate a few minor lost capabilities, but little apart from purchasing Canterbury in developing new NZDF capabilities. And there still have been capabilities which have since been let go, due to the cost to retain vs. the likely threat and service needs elsewhere. As an example, Army would have to resort to trashfire outside of a coalition environment for air defence, since the MANPADS have been retired.

While the above was just an example, another which I find much more worrisome is that the RAAF had to deploy a flight or Hornets to NZ for an exercise, so that Kiwi troops could get practice operating with air support. IIRC this was done prior to a deployment of Kiwi troops to Afghanistan, where they would be operating under the umbrella of coalition air support. Without the training (and actual aircraft) the Kiwi troops would have been unable to work with the air support available in Afghanistan safely, and the presence of Kiwi troops would likely have been more a hindrance than help.

What I am concerned about, is as future battlefields becoming more combined-arms and joint-service, the NZDF becomes relegated to little more than a ceremonial presence in future coalitions, because the various Gov'ts do not or refuse to, fund the NZDF to the degree to at least work alongside common partners. Never mind actually having the NZDF kitted out to do some of the roles and tasks needed in the event of a threat to NZ, or Kiwi interested overseas.

Well thought out post very impressed. It just goes to show how far our Kiwi mates have been mauled by successive goverments and if we are not carefull the ADF could be cut off at the knees as well.

Don't know how true it is or not but the Chinese whispers I heard during Gulf War 1 why Army did not play a big part was we were in the same boat at the time our equipment was to far obsolete.

 

[ngatimozart]

If there was some sort of joint operation alongside Australia and/or the US, the situation would of course be different, potentially by a great deal. As I had mentioned, larger partner-nations have both greater numbers of forces available, but also a greater range of capabilities within those forces. Many of the capabilities which the NZDF lack, can completely transform a battlefield.

In terms of what has been 'invested' in the NZDF since Timor Leste... I do not think much really has been invested. There have been some measures to retain existing capabilities, or perhaps regenerate a few minor lost capabilities, but little apart from purchasing Canterbury in developing new NZDF capabilities. And there still have been capabilities which have since been let go, due to the cost to retain vs. the likely threat and service needs elsewhere. As an example, Army would have to resort to trashfire outside of a coalition environment for air defence, since the MANPADS have been retired.

While the above was just an example, another which I find much more worrisome is that the RAAF had to deploy a flight or Hornets to NZ for an exercise, so that Kiwi troops could get practice operating with air support. IIRC this was done prior to a deployment of Kiwi troops to Afghanistan, where they would be operating under the umbrella of coalition air support. Without the training (and actual aircraft) the Kiwi troops would have been unable to work with the air support available in Afghanistan safely, and the presence of Kiwi troops would likely have been more a hindrance than help.

What I am concerned about, is as future battlefields becoming more combined-arms and joint-service, the NZDF becomes relegated to little more than a ceremonial presence in future coalitions, because the various Gov'ts do not or refuse to, fund the NZDF to the degree to at least work alongside common partners. Never mind actually having the NZDF kitted out to do some of the roles and tasks needed in the event of a threat to NZ, or Kiwi interested overseas.

I would have to agree and what has been invested hasn't stopped the deterioration in combined arms skills and the loss of capabilities across the board. All of this has been bought about by the lack of sufficient govt investments across the wide range of defence capabilities in all thee services. NZ cannot mount an amphibious op against a relatively undefended enemy, even if it tried. Not because of the quality of the people within NZDF, but because it doesn't have the platforms or enough personnel to undertake such an op. There is no seaborne logistics support, hence logistics tail, two LCM are not enough, a LPD / LHD of at least 13 - 14,000 tonnes is required and Canterbury used as part of the logistics tail. Amphibious ops are basically won and lost on logistics, or the lack thereof. Then there is the NGS and with only two frigates that is going to be doubtful especially if one is unavailable and the other is busy protecting the force. Escorts: none apart from the aforementioned frigates whose war fighting abilities in a modern war are light weight even with the new upgrade. Hence no real Kiwi onwater security for the amphib force.

The next point is that said force will have no Kiwi air cover, offensive or defensive, because NZ does not possess such capabilities. It can maybe field overhead ISR with the Orions and they could drop Mk82 500lb dumb bombs, but that's it. The Sprites have Penguin but AFAIA they cannot be used against land targets, plus Treasury would have an absolute hissy fit about them actually being used There are also the pintle mounted MAG58s on the NH90s, Sprites and A109s, however these are 7.62mm and not great hitting power. That is why the RN, I believe, has gone to the M3M .50 cal for its pintle mounts on its helos. Think the Danes have gone the same way too.

The third problem as I see it is the reduced numbers of personnel in NZDF and not just grunts, but right across the three services especially in the technical trades. Then there is the Army. Do they have enough kit and people for such an op? How long can they be realistically sustained in the field and sustained by a seabridge; that comes back to logistics. Personally I think they need a 105mm SPG on a 8 x 8 wheeled vehicle, a SPAAG on a 8 x 8 wheeled vehicle and a mobile SAM system maybe Mistril based. Finally on things Army, I'd like to see the Army Aviation Corp reinstated flying reconnaissance helos and armed attack type helos with both types being marinised so that they can operate them off ships as required.

What else needs to happen is that the Air Combat Force needs to be reinstated with adequate number of aircraft to be able to operate effectively. 18 was the minimum number of A4K Skyhawks required to meet the taskings stipulated by the NZG prior to the 1998 election. Any platforms we acquire must be able to operate effectively with our partners and allies.

The elephant in the room is the political dimension, in that successive NZ governments of both stripes see defence as easy beat, a luxury rather than a necessity and they betray the country for political and economic ideological philosophies that are flawed and not always in the nations best interest. Hence very little money for defence and it is left to run down, its skills and knowledge left to decay just like in the 1930s. Look what happened then. Because of this, I believe that NZDF, due to its political masters, has the probability of becoming a liability to friends and allies in hot coalition operations because it no longer has the capabilities to operate in a modern highly technical combat environment and it is not self reliant and self supporting in foreign theatres of operation.