Royal New Zealand Air Force

[RobWilliams]

There are claims that the USAF think that CAS and humping stores etc., into the battlefield for the Army are below it, yet if the Army tries to do it themselves it's like a red flag to a bull to the USAF, so they go all out to kill any Army program.

The USAF tried to offload A-10's onto the Army who rejected the proposal on cost. They're managing their own budget right now and the CAS role won't help with that. The Army Secretary even said that CAS was an AF rather than Army role.

Army Not Interested in Taking A-10 Warthogs from Air Force | DoD Buzz

 

[Volkodav]

As I see it, within most air forces (USAF and RAF in particular) there are three overlapping schools of thought. There is the "if it flies the air force should own, operate and control it, no matter it's primary role, or operating environment", then the "Air Power fundamentalists" who seek to divest any capability that does not directly contribute to strategic air power, specifically strategic bombing / strike and finally there is the growing number of "purple" or joint minded officers who see the the air force as a repository of professional skill and knowledge to support the application of air power throughout the military.

Basically one group seek to control everything, to build their empires while the fundamentalists are not interested in anything outside of what they see as their core missions and actively seek to divest what they see as superfluous activities. Only the last group seem to see the big picture, understand and support air power in its entirety, irrespective of the uniform worn or the environment flown in. The issues occur when the empire builders gain control of the capability then the air power fundamentalists, driven by tight budgets, scrap it in the name of cost saving.

I do not see it as a deliberate strategy but rather inter meshing beliefs and biases, these days often among ill informed political and lobbyist types than uniform leading to the loss of capability. The Joint Harrier Force is a good example, there was massive support for the capability within the Army and RAF, perhaps as much or more than in the RN if those against spending on carriers at all and those who wanted CTOL carriers are taken into account, with the decision being made by the minister and PM, against professional advice.

 

[Todjaeger]

Regarding any USAF figures and details about the C27J, especially when presented to Congress, one has to be very, very cautious. I believe later that figure was shown to be highly inaccurate.

The USAF never wanted the C27J. Originally the C27J was a US Army project in order for it to have battlefield air logistics support that it believed it wasn't getting from the USAF. The USAF is very against the Army having it's own fixed wing component and through Congress eventually managed to obtain control of the C27J program which it shut down. It claims that it can deliver what the Army needs using USAF C130 aircraft. Obviously the Army disputes this. The political fighting between the USAF and US Army can also be seen in the current stoush over the USAF attempts to retire the A10 without a replacement. They claim that the F35 will be able to fill the same role but the Army are not yet convinced of that. There are claims that the USAF think that CAS and humping stores etc., into the battlefield for the Army are below it, yet if the Army tries to do it themselves it's like a red flag to a bull to the USAF, so they go all out to kill any Army program. Very, very political played out using Senators and Congress critters. Truth be known the USAF would probably take over and kill Army rotary wing capability if it could.

AND

The USAF tried to offload A-10's onto the Army who rejected the proposal on cost. They're managing their own budget right now and the CAS role won't help with that. The Army Secretary even said that CAS was an AF rather than Army role.

Army Not Interested in Taking A-10 Warthogs from Air Force | DoD Buzz

I do not wish to take the discussion too far OT (it is the RNZAF, not USAF thread after all...) but some things to keep in mind. The USAF can indeed fulfill US Army battlefield logistics airlift with the C-130. Whether it actually wants or plans to is another story. IMO the US Army was smart in attempting to redevelop its own solution, it is unfortunate that the USAF "won" and managed to take the project over, and little surprise that the project got dropped.

Some of the issues in the US regarding air operations stems from the 1948 Key West Agreement, which basically dictated which services had responsibility or authority for different roles. Unfortunately while the agreement spells which service can do what, it apparently does not require a service to do some of what would within that specific service's area of responsibility or authority. CAS for ground/Army operations being one, and related to that, arming helicopters, which the Army did because it was not satisfied with the amount and quality of fixed wing CAS it was receiving from the USAF. Given that the USAF at the time seemed focused on introducing ICBMs, strategic bombers and fast jet fighters into the USAF combat inventory, and not low, slow mud-movers... Here is a link to some history of US Army Aviation.

Realistically though, we on DT really do not have the data needed to make an accurate determination of whether the C-295 or C-27J is more appropriate for the NZDF in terms of capability. Until data from the air transport study becomes available, we do not know the volume, dimensions, weight and form of cargo most airlifted by (or for) the NZDF. I strongly suspect that, for the RNZAF, a situation similar to one that the USAF and RAAF, has been (or will be) found. Namely that for many of the airlift flights, a C-130 would be conducting an airlift mission mostly empty, but still need to be used because there was nothing else of a smaller size which had the required flight range with cargo load weight, and/or the load was of such a size, or dimensions, or floor weight, etc.

That was part of the reason why the US Army seemed so keen on the C-27J, because it was like a mini-Hercules, same floor strength, same cargo bay dimensions, etc. Basically both aircraft can airlift 463L pallets, the C-27J cannot airlift as many as a C-130. AFAIK unfortunately, the C-295 is not able to handle the 463L pallet, or at least not without either ensuring the pallet is not at max load and possibly loaded with too tall a cargo. Per this page on the 463L several aircraft are certified by MIL-STD-1791 for the 463L, but the C-295 is not on the list.

If the standard cargo load/pallet for the RNZAF is a smaller and lighter pallet, then the C-295 might be just fine with Kiwis on the roundels.

 

[RegR]

If we are just moving the exact same pallets/loads then why not just fly them direct in the C130? It is still a tactical lifter. If it's one (taller) pallet then build it 2 lower to start with (not sure how often we would need to crossload full pallets outside of a decent APOD anyway, again fly direct). As for vehicles, revert back to primary lifter if we really needed to, but really what is one pinzgauer good for?

Nice to be able to do exact same loads but is that what we really 'need' the smaller short-medium range lifter to do in this price, capability and employment range? Just like it's tier2 maritime counterpart do we actually require it to be creeping more into a quasi tier1 role or do we already have that covered off sufficiently? If we just need a basic niche filler then no point operationally or financially getting the same, albeit smaller fully tactical lifter if there is no actual requirement as again cost is key and funds are finite both now and over their life and will ultimately determine options, numbers and 'extras'(such as suites, self protection etc)

Again I guess it comes down to indviduals interpretations of tiers (for air transport) and what exactly is envisaged as to how both types should be utilised, operated, where, when etc as to which way we should lean. Pros and cons for both as always.

 

[Todjaeger]

If we are just moving the exact same pallets/loads then why not just fly them direct in the C130? It is still a tactical lifter. If it's one (taller) pallet then build it 2 lower to start with (not sure how often we would need to crossload full pallets outside of a decent APOD anyway, again fly direct). As for vehicles, revert back to primary lifter if we really needed to, but really what is one pinzgauer good for?

Nice to be able to do exact same loads but is that what we really 'need' the smaller short-medium range lifter to do in this price, capability and employment range? Just like it's tier2 maritime counterpart do we actually require it to be creeping more into a quasi tier1 role or do we already have that covered off sufficiently? If we just need a basic niche filler then no point operationally or financially getting the same, albeit smaller fully tactical lifter if there is no actual requirement as again cost is key and funds are finite both now and over their life and will ultimately determine options, numbers and 'extras'(such as suites, self protection etc)

Again I guess it comes down to indviduals interpretations of tiers (for air transport) and what exactly is envisaged as to how both types should be utilised, operated, where, when etc as to which way we should lean. Pros and cons for both as always.

I take it you have not worked in a warehouse or cargo/shipping concern?

Again, I do not know what the standard sized shipping pallet the NZDF uses, or even if the ability to keep using the 463L pallet would be to NZ's advantage.

With that in mind though, if a service uses a standard sized shipping pallet for everything except the outsized loads and/or vehicles, it can significantly streamline cargo handling. Also keep in mind ahub and spoke arrangement for cargo handling and shipping.

There is a central hub, or perhaps hubs, were cargo comes in. It could be a theatre sea- or airport, a major airbase, whatever. If the incoming cargo is already packed on the proper pallet at the point on embarkation to the central hub, then all that needs to happen is for the hub to locate the correct pallet, and then load it aboard a tactical airlifter which will then transport it out to the FOB or wherever the next destination is, as an intra-theatre cargo move.

However, if the pallet or other shipping system used to move the cargo from the point of origin to the hub is different than the one used to handle the cargo being moved from the hub to the final destination, then the load needs to be broken down and repackaged, before it can be loaded aboard the tactical airlifter.

Another potential alternative would be to start from the point of origin using the pallets optimized for the final leg of the journey the cargo will be taking, but that can waste potentially valuable cargo space ( weight & volume) because instead of a shipping container or strategic airlifter being able to carry 1+ pallets depending on load, it might need to use 2 pallets, with different dimensions than the standard pallet to carry the same weight or volume of cargo.

In many respects the B757's illustrate this short of issue quite well. By cargo deck space/dimensions, one of the RNZAF B757's can do strategic airlift of 11 pallets of cargo. However, due to the low floor weight strength of the B757 baggage or cargo deck, each pallet can only weight IIRC 2,000 lbs. Being able to carry 11 of them does mean the B757 can airlift about 22,000 lbs of gear or cargo, but if the B757 is covering the point of origin to hub leg ofnthe cargo move, and then the cargo was to head to an intra-theatre FOB aboard a C-130, the load would either need to be repackaged at the hub (again, IIRC a C-130 has space for only 6 pallets) or then two separate C-130 flights would be needed.

As a rule when shipping something, the less the components of a load need to be handled once they have been packaged for shipment, the faster the load can be moved, and the less likely it is that some or all of the load will be lost or damaged in transit.

And depending on the load, the time in which it takes for the cargo to transit from the point of origin to the deployed end-user in the field can literally be the difference between life and death, or mission success or failure.

 

[Zero Alpha]

If we are just moving the exact same pallets/loads then why not just fly them direct in the C130?

I'm not sure there is any point of the primary aircraft is the C-130. If it's A400 or C-17 then it's much more useful. However, it may be cheaper to operate a C-27 if the C-27 can use substantially the same support systems as the -130. With commonality between the larger aircraft, it would be theoretically possible to use the same maintenance personnel. Loadmasters could also be common. That would, in theory, save hours/fatigue on the more expensive asset. That would make operating the smaller aircraft an either/or option with the larger, not necessarily a operating both types on the same operation.

As for vehicles, revert back to primary lifter if we really needed to, but really what is one pinzgauer good for?

Stuff-all for an initial deployment. But If it's a a replacement for a busted vehicle in a longer term operation, then it means a larger aircraft doesn't need to be tasked. IF you look at the number of vehicles broken down in Bouganville, then a small transport could have swapped out the busted ones as part of a weekly courier run. The Herc fleet couldn't manage that.

Nice to be able to do exact same loads but is that what we really 'need' the smaller short-medium range lifter to do in this price, capability and employment range?

Again, it comes down to how big the primary transport is.

The Hercs currently also fulfil the role of backup SAR aircraft. Somewhere in the mix there potentially needs to be a backup to the MPA (or perhaps a permanent SAR aircraft if we end up with the P-8).

 

[ngatimozart]

If we are just moving the exact same pallets/loads then why not just fly them direct in the C130? It is still a tactical lifter. If it's one (taller) pallet then build it 2 lower to start with (not sure how often we would need to crossload full pallets outside of a decent APOD anyway, again fly direct). As for vehicles, revert back to primary lifter if we really needed to, but really what is one pinzgauer good for?

Nice to be able to do exact same loads but is that what we really 'need' the smaller short-medium range lifter to do in this price, capability and employment range? Just like it's tier2 maritime counterpart do we actually require it to be creeping more into a quasi tier1 role or do we already have that covered off sufficiently? If we just need a basic niche filler then no point operationally or financially getting the same, albeit smaller fully tactical lifter if there is no actual requirement as again cost is key and funds are finite both now and over their life and will ultimately determine options, numbers and 'extras'(such as suites, self protection etc)

Again I guess it comes down to indviduals interpretations of tiers (for air transport) and what exactly is envisaged as to how both types should be utilised, operated, where, when etc as to which way we should lean. Pros and cons for both as always.

Actually I believe it comes down to economics Reg. It's far cheaper to use a twin engined turbo prop to move say to or three pallets than a four engined turboprop. It also makes more logical sense, because generally the flights are over a shorter distance. It's not related to "individuals interpretations of tiers (for air transport)" but more to economics of operation. That's the way I see. TodJ and ZA have covered it quite nice in their last two posts.

The USAF tried to offload A-10's onto the Army who rejected the proposal on cost. They're managing their own budget right now and the CAS role won't help with that. The Army Secretary even said that CAS was an AF rather than Army role.

Army Not Interested in Taking A-10 Warthogs from Air Force | DoD Buzz

Just as an aside and not to hijack thread some articles on USAF interservice rivalry and the A10:
The Real Problem with the U.S. Air Force
The Air Force’s Smear Campaign Against the A-10 Relies on Flawed Data
Now the U.S. Air Force Wants You to Believe the A-10 Is Too Old to Fight

 

[Todjaeger]

Actually I believe it comes down to economics Reg. It's far cheaper to use a twin engined turbo prop to move say to or three pallets than a four engined turboprop. It also makes more logical sense, because generally the flights are over a shorter distance. It's not related to "individuals interpretations of tiers (for air transport)" but more to economics of operation. That's the way I see. TodJ and ZA have covered it quite nice in their last two posts.

Agreed, it is not about "Tiers" with strategic or tactical airlift, but what size and weight loads normally moved, over what distance, and what size and weight loads might need to be moved,and again over what distance, and how often all these might or will need to be done. Then what combination of airlifters can best meet these requirements, and work with existing or soon-to-be introduced cargo handling systems.

Again referring back to the US adoption of the 463L pallet as the standard shipping pallet for most military airlifters... At this point it is in common usage for domestic/civilian air shipping, and the aircraft and terminal cargo handling systems have the appropriate sized and placed rollers to ease on and offloading of the pallets. More importantly from the US perspective, the pallets are usable across a number of different aircraft, namely the C-5 Galaxy, the C-9 Skytrain, KC-10 Extender, the C-17 Globemaster, the C-27 Spartan, the CH-47 Chinook, and C-130 Hercules. This potentially means that supplies to support a unit in the field, even away from an FOB, could be flown into a theatre by a strategic airlifter from the US, then the very same pallet, or pallets (if there are ony a couple of them) could offloaded from a C-17 onto a C-130 or C-27, to next be moved from a theatre level base/staging area/cargo hub to a FOB, where that very same palletor set of pallets could be offloaded again. This time the pallets might go onto a CH-47 (or possibly several, depends on the # of pallets) to be brought right out to the troops in the field. If the US did not have a common airfreight pallet, then each time the load changed from one type of aircraft to another, each pallet load would need to be broken down and repackaged onto the type of pallet the next aircraft used in the air cargo link.

As for using the C-130 instead of a C-27 to move 1 - 3 pallets, that certainly could be done, but since a C-130 can carry up to 6 pallets, that unused capacity on each airlift is not being as efficient as using smaller airlifters which cost less to run and would be closer to full load. Where it can become significant, is when those smaller cargo runs become a major, or the major type of cargo run being moved. Then the "savings" of not using a C130 instead of a C-27 can make a difference, just due too the difference in normal operating costs. Specifically for NZ, I just really don't see NZ selecting the C-130 as the replacement for the strategic airlift component. Not with better options either available or on the horizon.

 

[RegR]

Cheers guys all good replies, yes I understand and appreciate the common pallet system and its benefits/cost/time saving between aircraft types but that is what I am saying in a NZ context would we nescessarily crossload pallets between say (currently) a C130 to a C27/295 for a local/regional airmove as the distances involved would not really warrant it unless you are suggesting it will stage to somewhere like Afghan where the US makes full use of these benefits through it various types and bases. Not sure if actual international deployment is why we are considering this capability but if so then the loading advantages would be slightly more relevant (dependant on what we replace Hs with and who we work with obviously).

Airmoves/5 moves would build a load individually for either one or the other dependant on size, amount, distance etc and send direct therefore not much requirement for cross loading or staging and the common loading pallet loses it's benefit somewhat in this particular instance. It would probably be used at some stage just because, just not enough IMO to confirm one option over another purely on that basis. I see the smaller type as taking up the slack closer to home and freeing up the big gear for the big/distance jobs not forming part of an airbridge where time critical smooth transitions are required (not regularly enough anyway) but that's just me.

Now the Boeing taking a load to a friendly APOD on international ops due to threat level/runway state to crossload to the pre-positioned C130 to take direct into NZs AO (Strat and Tac working together) will enjoy the benefits of said common loading pallets but I just can't picture it regularly enough regionally to commit to a particular AC type for that specific reason especially if it adds cost unduly for a inconveiniant not unworkable option. Just not enough gain for my liking. I understand the economics of using an appropriate size type AC for a relevant load to gain maximum efficiency (a major point of the medium lifter idea) just do not think it needs to be solely or even majorly factored on the common pallet system otherwise that somewhat already matches the types but is it really a issue for how we would use it? Guess we need to look at C27/C295 user countries and how they intergrate their fleets (or inter-operable countries for that matter) to get a better picture/understanding. The frenchies that come over for skytrain would be a good start.

Actually Zero the Aus/NZ hercs flew into Bougainville fortnightly, obviously mainly Aus due to proximity so could have just as easily swapped out vehicles, never saw an Aus Caribou (I guess their type version of the time) come in once so I guess you would still send your bigger asset and just make the load worthwhile with extras to justify the journey, can never have too much re-supply, and would need to be a pretty special vehicle to get its own flight over and above. They would have had to dedicate a monthly flight to replace broken down NZ rovers back then if that was the case lol.

Agreed I do not think we will go with Js personally, only compared C130 as that is what we currently have and pers have been making comparison and commonality suggestions between the Js and the C27J though I assume being US origin would also align with C17 (at least load system wise) and with A400 and C295 coming from the same stable should be similarities there.

 

[ngatimozart]

Just had it confirmed by someone who does know, the RNZAF does use the 463L as their main pallet of choice.

 

[Nick underscore]

1st RNZAF C-130H landed aid in Vila

 

[Todjaeger]

Just had it confirmed by someone who does know, the RNZAF does use the 463L as their main pallet of choice.

Given that the main military airlifter in NZ for the past five decades or so is the Herc, I figured. Not sure what pallet gets used on the flying money pits, weight-limited 463L's or something else.

Reg, just to be clear, the idea behind the C-27J as I understand it, is for it to take smaller loads that used to be sent by a mostly empty Hercules, and use a more efficient aircraft the smaller load. The point about the common palletand anility for a C-27 and C-130 to swap pallets, is that in some cases, something like a C-130 might be covering one portion of the airlift needed for a logistical chain, perhaps a long-distance intra-theatre airlift between hubs, with the C-27 then doing pickup and delivery to a FOB. I do not expect the RNZAF to actually operate both aircraft, except for perhaps a brief while the Hercules replacement airlifter is reaching IOC and the Hercs themselves are being taken out of service. Of course RNZAF aircraft will likely still operate alongside the Hercs of other air forces, like the RAAF, USAF, Philippines, etc for exercises, HADR, and other deployments.

 

[RobWilliams]

Just as an aside and not to hijack thread some articles on USAF interservice rivalry and the A10:
The Real Problem with the U.S. Air Force
The Air Force’s Smear Campaign Against the A-10 Relies on Flawed Data
Now the U.S. Air Force Wants You to Believe the A-10 Is Too Old to Fight

My point was that when push came to shove the Army said that CAS was a USAF role when they had to put the dollars on the table. In your post you said the USAF tried to shut everything the Army did down if they felt it was their job, well, in this case they actively offered to make an element of fixed wing CAS an Army role.

 

[Zero Alpha]

Bougainville

I've found a published source on some of the logistics issues in Bougainville. It is consistent with what I've been told from people who were there. I don't want to bog down on this, but as an illustration of a context where an aircraft like the -295 or the -27J could have contributed the lions share of support after the initial lodgement.

By January 1998, the consequences of rushed logistic planning and capping numbers without analysing services to be provided were now being felt. Resupply arrangements had also begun to fail.There was no coordination of air movements by the NZDF and the ADF into and out of Bougainville.​

...

By mid-February 1998, the ADF resupply system into Bougainville was becoming more unreliable and the NZDF system had virtually stopped. Roger’s staff had submitted just over 850 demands for resupply during the previous 10-week period. An average of 56 per cent of demands arrived on time, 28 per cent arrived over two weeks late and a further five per cent arrived over four weeks late. Just over 10 per cent of demands failed to arrive at all. During the same period, his staff submitted 770 demands to the NZDF logistic system under combined logistic support arrangements agreed by the ADF and NZDF. An average of 16 per cent was satisfied on time, with a further 14 per cent arriving over two weeks late. By the end of the period, 68 per cent of demands had not been met at all. After 31 January 1998, the NZ resupply system shut down, leaving 90 per cent of outstanding demands unsatisfied.​

...

Mataparae and senior officers in New Zealand were at loggerheads over safety issues related to the numbers of helicopters and air hours; the serviceability of vehicles and communications equipment; supply issues, such as spare parts; the replacement of Special Forces personnel; and lack of canteen services. After not receiving reinforcement and satisfactory resupply in the first week of March, the RNZAF advised that the next resupply flight would not arrive before 18 March 1998.
​

...

In Wilkinson’s opinion, the achievement of TMG objectives and the safety of monitoring team personnel were now being threatened by New Zealand pride and Australian stubbornness.​

Source​

 

[Nick underscore]

Nice linky there Zero Alpha. Cheers

Interesting read, including the homepage, regarding other deployments and subsequent observations.

 

[Zero Alpha]

UK A400 Milestones

Milestones for UK A400 introduction in to service and full operational capability:

Tranche 1 - basic strategic airlift (2015)

Tranche 2 will involve non-permissive operations and inter-theatre operations (from 2016), as well as deployable intra-theatre capability (from 2017).

In Tranche 3 the aircraft will undertake tactical transport, including airdrops (from late 2017)

Tranche 4 includes advanced capabilities and full support to the Airborne Assault Task Force (from 2018 to 2022).Source​

 

[40 deg south]

Nice linky there Zero Alpha. Cheers

Interesting read, including the homepage, regarding other deployments and subsequent observations.

+1. Very interesting info I hadn't seen before.

Nice to have you posting again, ZA.

 

[40 deg south]

Philippines To Buy 3 New Spanish Transport Planes

The Philipines is about to receive the first of 3 C295s. Their circumstanes are very different to ours, so perhaps the one relevant piece of information is the price.

Defencenews reports it at US$119 mil, or a hair under $40 mil per plane. I haven't found any clear description of what is included, other than a quote from a Phillipines website saying the price included 'spares and support'.

 

[Todjaeger]

My point was that when push came to shove the Army said that CAS was a USAF role when they had to put the dollars on the table. In your post you said the USAF tried to shut everything the Army did down if they felt it was their job, well, in this case they actively offered to make an element of fixed wing CAS an Army role.

Again, I do not wish to derail the RNZAF thread, but since 1948 Army has had little or no fixed-wing combat capability. Which means that if Army were to get CAS handed back to them by the Air Force, it would need to develop a programme to teach it's fixed-wing pilots how to do CAS, and also practice it. This means setting up infrastructure that Air Force already has, duplicating parts of already existent Air Force training programmes, things like a fixed-wing air combat school, practice bombing ranges, then start stocking duplicates of weaponry that Air Force, Navy and the Marines already possess. The Army could of course do so, but in addition to the cost of acquiring the A-10's themselves, there would be some fairly significant startup and ongoing costs for Army to have their own, organic CAS.

Also, if there was no changes made to the Key West Agreement, then the USAF could, at a latter date interfere with the Army CAS programme, because would still be the USAF's responsibility. I cannot see if being worthwhile for the Army to expend significant funds so that it can do something which the Air Force is supposed to be doing, but does not want to, without requiring the Air Force to also surrendering the responsibility and authority for that capability, and also funding to provide it.

 

[Zero Alpha]

Just had it confirmed by someone who does know, the RNZAF does use the 463L as their main pallet of choice.

I'd be interested to know if the Boeings are fitted for handling the 463, or just the civilian ULD. I've only flown in them in passenger config - never seen the combo/cargo config.