The C-295 has an 11 hour endurance - going out to 1000 nautical miles at cruise speed (260 knots) will take 3 hours 50 mins, with the return it would have a roughly give it a roughly 3 and a half hour loiter at that distance - that's pretty damn close in the scheme of things, bearing in mind we are not using exact figures, to your nominal 4 hour requirement.
It could do a 4 hour loiter at 900 nautical miles which is again pretty close.
Cruise Speed and Endurance figures are taken from the Pacific Wings article on the visit of the C-295 a couple of months ago. (Assuming my maths is right - I have so little idea about knots/miles so used an online calculator)
Thanks. A nautical mile is 2000 yards where as a terrestrial mile is 1760 yards. 1 knot is 1 nautical mile per hour. At 260 knots ground speed (not IAS) it would take 4 hours to travel 1000 nautical miles (1040 to be precise) out to the patrol area and another four hours to return home which at eleven hours endurance leaves it three hours for a patrol. That doesn't take into account any weather problems it may encounter on the way out ot way back and there is no margin for safety. Therefore the safety margin reduces your patrol time.
Ng
The whole point of a light tactical transport is that they are cheap to buy and run, and can cover off low-end missions not requiring a more expensive aircraft. Without these cost advantages, what is the point?
Hence, the market's preference for the less capable but much cheaper C235/295 over the C27J.
Fair point and I agree but I feel in our case that cheap has not proven to have been the best and our geography plays a very major part in any capability that we acquire which requires a good operating range from its base. We are not landlocked and we are the most isolated nation in the world. People tend to forget that.
fisheries/SAR will be carried out by the C295 "combi" and ASW/ASuW will be carried out by the C295 MPA. I think there is a lack of knowledge about the Capability of the MPA version of the C295 and a misunderstanding that a number of mission systems are currently utilised on the P-3K2, that is why Airbus are pitching the C295 MPA to the RAF as a Nimrod replacement. There is a great thread on Think Defence about the various MPAs available and discussion on the benefits and weaknesses of each option.
For all those that want P8/Triton I have a couple of questions, how do you fund it? is there enough money in the budget for it? If not what do you give up to fund it? 4 P8s really, how do you manage a SQN where 1 Captain resigns/airframe is U/S you have lost 25% of your Operational Capability, we want more airframes not less to gain flexibility and options.
Yes the C295 could not do a MH370 Operation (unless there was tanker support, MRRT maybe) but honestly in the past 40 years of P3 Ops how many tasks have been in that profile? Is it worth bankrupting the NZDF for a Capabilty that is capable of those 5% of tasks that a C295 MPA could not do?
Would P8/Triton provide a potent force for the NZDF, of course. Is P8/Triton the right answer for the NZDF, for a number of reasons no.
If you do the analysis from a purely financial perspective then your argument would have validity. However there is no financial or operational sense in acquiring a platform that does not meet the capability requirements of the end user, i.e., the customer who in this case is the NZG thru the NZDF. We have had experiences of platforms being acquired for capabilities that did not meet the requirements of those capabilities involving significant subsequent costs to the NZG in extra maintenance, not fit for requirement, lost utilisation etc, high operating costs. Examples exist such as the HMNZS Charles Upham, Frigates Wellington & Southland (ex RN Dido & Bacchante), the Scorpion light tanks, the AerMacchi MB339 trainers.
Look at the larger picture especially the geographical picture of where NZ is located and where the nearest non NZ territory is. Ask yourself these:
- What tonnage of NZ flagged vessels are NZ exports and imports carried on?
- What happens to the NZ economy if our Sea Lanes Of Communication (SLOC) are in any way interfered with, or heaven forbid closed.
- Where are our SLOC?
There how important is the P8 / Triton combi
PLUS a good credible RNZN surface combat force to continual good health and wellbeing of the NZ economy? This is the
seablindess, that is so highly prevalent in NZ, I am talking about. Kiwis ignore the fact that we are a maritime nation, even though we love the water, we forget that we are so dependent upon the ocean for our economic wellbeing and that the security of the tyranny of distance gave us, 150 years ago, no longer exists. We had enemy ships operating in NZ waters during WW1, enemy ships, submarines and aircraft in WW2, Soviet subs during the cold war up until the late 1980s and recently foreign subs and a foreign navy Q ship (for want of a better term). We are not immune from foreign adventures in our waters or our region of interests.
