This is just my assessment. When I say a significant portion, I don't mean that we would the major designer - we'll be the minor partner. It's just that we may have to have a larger input than we have had previously (as we would be the major customer). The ANZACs were designed by the Germans & the Aussies. NZ pretty much took what was offered. Similarly, we didn't have great input to the British frigates we operated. When we have had a bigger input it hasn't worked out well - Canterbury, OPVs etc.
I think it is quite possible that none of our major partners will have a light frigate (lets say <5000t, thats all I think we will be able to afford, and we will be lucky to get any sort of frigate at all) in production by 2028, so we could be left to sort out the design with the shipbuilder on our own. With regard to Type 26, I'm reacting to concerns raised that it might now be closer to 8000t (from an interview with 1st Sea Lord Zambellas in October -
here), along with fresh rumours this week of a major cut coming post the UK election (which may hit Type 26 numbers). Aussies similarly won't build anything cheap enough for us. Germans, Norwegians, Dutch & Danish ships are also pushing 6000t these days. Something modified from the French Lafayette (like the Singaporeans have done) is a possibility, but then you would probably have a major job fitting US/NATO systems & weapons in it. Canadians might have a reasonable design but will insist on building it in Canada. US might come to our rescue if they build an FFG7 replacement in serious numbers. A small production run (2-3) also creates affordability issues.
Chis73
Honestly, I doubt the dimensions or displacement would be the issue for the RNZN. OTOH cost could be a factor, and there is a reason why the phrase, "steel is cheap, and air is free," exists in naval construction.
What I suspect would a problem is how much the RNZN, or more realistically Gov't would allow the RNZN to spend, on the frigate fitout. IIRC the cost of weapons, sensors, and combat data systems and the requisite systems integration can equal half the overall cost of the completed vessel, and sometimes more.
While things have gotten better, I am concerned that a future Kiwi warship might only be armed enough to defeat a hostile OPV, because of politics and short-sighted bean-counters and the like.
Another reality is that I just do not see NZ being able to construct a replacement vessel, which means in addition to any design work, there has to be a suitable yard to actually construct and the fitout the frigate(s).
A potential reason why a position for a naval architect was created might be an attempt to prevent some of the Project Protector issues, especially with respect to Canterbury and the OPV's. Given that the original LWSO seemed to want to be a bit of everything (and AFAIK it did include a kitchen sink, since it presumably would have a mess...) but as can happen, trying to include a bit of everything often can lead to being good/suitable for nothing. This did not quite happen with Canterbury, since it can fufill a sealift role, but what makes a vessel suitable for a sealift role (lane metres, displacement/buoyancy set aside for embarked personnel, cargo and vehicles, etc, impacts how a vessel will behave when the personnel, cargo and vehicles are absent. As they would be if Canterbury was operating in the patrol ship role. Given that vessel handling for the Charles Upham when empty was an issue, it is a bit surprising that a similar sort of mistake was made in selecting Canterbury.
OTOH though, the roles of sealift and patrol are quite different, and I would not normally expect a customer to request a vessel able to do both.
-Cheers
