The biggest single issue with the Collins class was the selection of a conceptional, bespoke, US combat system, being developed by a contractor, new to the field and out of their depth, instead of the perfectly adequate proven European (Dutch) solution. To replace it we selected an in service USN option although there was another, perfectly adequate European (German this time) option on offer that was a little over half the price, available earlier, easier to retrofit and recommended by DSTO as the best solution.
The Germans in particular have an extensive, proven track record of successful technology transfers and support for foreign builds. The UK, France, Italy and the Netherlands all, also, have long and successful histories of exporting defence equipment, with or without foreign builds. To date, every time we have gone for a supplier who hasn't exported anything before we have had serious issues due in part to a serious lack of applicable engineering and project management skills in the RAN and army (the RAAF being a lot better in this regard).
Many issues we have had have been due to our own failings in understanding the risk and even the status of the project we are buying into, i.e. we have bought a lot of gear assuming it is MOTS or a minor modification of such, when in actual fact it is still developmental and as such we assign insufficient project management an technical support resources to the procurement and also are overly optimistic on schedule. We also often rule out ultimately more honest and realistically coated and scheduled options because they are more expensive and riskier on paper, yet may have been the better option in a more competently evaluated tender. In other words politicians should listen to service experts, technical professionals and defence scientists over accountants.
