It seems to me that there are a lot of mods that would be needed for the Soryu to match Australia's requirements. Range and combat system will need to be addressed at the very least. It seems a bit unfair for the Australian bidders since they were bidding on a speculative design that met RAN requirements while the Japanese seem to have put forward a bid based on an off the shelf model.
It is like the Japanese were asked put in a quote on a stock standard family sedan while ASC was preparing a bid based on a luxury saloon.
The Germans put in a bid of around $20 billion which included building in Australia. When you look at how smoothly the ANZAC build went compared to the Collins and AWD projects it is probably worth giving some more thought to the German proposal.
German designed submarines have been built in Korea, Greece and Turkey. Not always successfully I will grant you ... but given their experience it is certainly worth considering.
The big difference with the ANZAC build was it was the first time since the early 1960s that an experienced competent yard went straight into a new build having just completed another project. It is (pardon the pun) the valleys of death that is killing our ship (and submarine) building capability more than anything else.
With the exception of the ANZAC build, which followed the Australian Frigate Project (HMAS Melbourne and Newcastle) every local build for the RAN has been either the first build from a greenfield site or after a long break in building (valley of death). The ANZAC project was also an extended build of ten hulls from a single yard as opposed to the traditional procurement pattern of ordering ships of the same design from multiple yards.
Basically we did it right once and then having seen this to be an efficient, competitive and cost effective way to acquire ships for the RAN decided never to do it again, reinvented the wheel and stuffed it up. It would actually have been quite easy to follow the ANZAC build out of Williamstown immediately with a class of air defence frigates or AWDs instead of upgrading the FFGs and subsequently the ANZACs.
The German Type 123 Brandenburg class frigates for example were contemporaries (slightly earlier build actually) of the ANZACs. They were similar enough to, but larger and more modern than the MEKO 200 design to have fit seamlessly into Williamstown. Being larger than the ANZACs they could have quite easily been upgraded into air defence ships using a variation of the USN NTU upgrade combat system developed for their non AEGIS cruisers and destroyers and also used by South Korea in their KDX II destroyers. This would have provided a perfectly good enough solution with more hulls equipped with near AEGIS level of capability.
A continuous build of six to eight ships with a two year gap from the last ANZAC to the first new FFG then a two year gap to the second ship and one ship a year after that would have seen the ships delivered in 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and possibly 2015 and 2016 as well. They could have actually been built in two batches of three or four with the second batch upgraded to incorporate CEAFAR radars with a two ear gap between batches, stretching the program out by a year to 2015 or 2017.
Add a two year gap to 2017 for six ships or 2019 for eight ships and the first of the ANZACs would be 21 or 23 years old, not antiques but old enough to consider replacement rather than upgrade and young and capable enough to sell to another navy as a going concern. The ANZAC replacement build of two batches of four would carry on through to 2027 or 2029 when the first of the new FFGs would be around twenty years old and could start to be replaced.
Alternatively a class of ten to twelve corvettes or OPVs could be added to the build cycle between the new FFGs and ANZAC replacements which would stretch service life of the frigates to 30 years which would then require a mid life update at about fifteen years to keep them viable.
This doesn't need the Type 123 class to work as the Type 124 Sachsen class AWD, the Spanish F-100 and the Dutch De Zeven Provinciën class were all available, proven, in service, designs before the final ANZAC commissioned and could have, with a little foresight followed on without a valley of death. They would have been more expensive than the Type 123 option but being built earlier and at Williamstown they would have been cheaper than the actual AWD project which would have easily permitted a fourth hull to have been afforded or possibly even a fifth and sixth. Again remembering these option would have removed the need to upgrade either the Adelaides or ANZACs saving $2 billion or so.
There we have it a sensible, affordable continuous build, based on the ANZAC industrial model that successfully delivered ten ships within budget and ahead of schedule. The remaining ships, such as the LHDs, LPD, AORs, LCH(R)s could then either be ordered overseas or build consecutively ant another yard, say FORGACS while ASC, especially with the support of a revitalised ship building sector providing trained, experienced and competent trades and professionals could start on their own perpetual build of new submarines with 18 months between boats in each batch and two or three years between batches.
Ah what could have been.